Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Downward departure under state sentencing guidelines permitting downward departure for defendants with significantly reduced mental capacity, including alcohol or drug dependency. 113 A.L.R.5th 597.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 753.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Criminal Procedure, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 885.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Criminal Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

In General.

Former section which fixed penalty for certain offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, nor was penalty cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by state constitution. Johnson v. State, 214 Ark. 902, 218 S.W.2d 687 (1949) (decision under prior law).

The former statute providing life imprisonment without parole did not violate the constitutional provision vesting the power to grant pardons, reprieves and commutations of sentences in the governor. Tanner v. State, 259 Ark. 243, 532 S.W.2d 168 (1976) (decision under prior law).

The extent of sentencing in criminal cases is controlled by the legislature, and the Arkansas circuit courts have no inherent authority to fashion sentences. Shelton v. State, 44 Ark. App. 156, 870 S.W.2d 398 (1994).

Construction.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has expanded the literal meaning of subsection (a) of this section to say that statutes that define a criminal offense and also possess their own sentencing provisions will control over the general code language. State v. Townsend, 314 Ark. 427, 863 S.W.2d 288 (1993).

Authorizing a particular form of punishment is a far cry from mandating that it be considered, or that the jury be instructed that it be considered in a given case. Dale v. State, 55 Ark. App. 184, 935 S.W.2d 274 (1996).

Act 192 of 1993 amended subdivision (e)(1) of this section and § 5-4-301(a)(1) to permit suspension and probation as alternative sentences for certain drug offenses. Crouse v. State, 2012 Ark. 442 (2012).

Where defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery and theft of property, his sentence was enhanced by seven years pursuant to § 16-90-120 for employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. The enhancement did not violate the plain language of subsection (a) of this section, because subsection (a) and § 16-90-120(a)-(b) can be read harmoniously to mean that § 16-90-120(a)-(b) is only a sentence enhancement, while the Arkansas Criminal Code provides the minimum sentences to be imposed for each specific offense. Williams v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 179 (2013).

Two fifteen-year sentences imposed by the jury under the firearm enhancement were not illegal, because § 16-90-120 and this section could be read in a harmonious manner, and without statutory amendments, the appellate courts' interpretations of the statutes remained the law. Smith v. State, 2013 Ark. 364 (2013).

Applicability.

The version of this section in effect on the date of the crime was committed is the statute that must govern sentencing. State v. Townsend, 314 Ark. 427, 863 S.W.2d 288 (1993).

The fact that Acts 1993, No. 192, now codified as subdivision (e)(1) of this section and § 5-4-301(a)(1), was approved before commission of the crime and effective after the crime did not require its application; the effective date of the act was controlling. Elders v. State, 321 Ark. 60, 900 S.W.2d 170 (1995).

Legislature did not intend for the penalty provisions of the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA), codified at § 5-4-104(b) and § 5-10-101(c), to apply retroactively where the FSMA contained no general retroactivity provision, no retroactivity provision was attached to the FSMA's penalty provisions, and the legislature had expressly stated its intent that other sections of the FSMA applied retroactively. Therefore, the revised punishment for juveniles convicted of capital murder applies only to crimes committed on or after March 20, 2017, the effective date of the FSMA. Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179 (2018).

Parole-eligibility provision of the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA), codified at § 16-93-621(a)(2), did not apply at the time of defendant's hearing because the provision, by its plain language, applies only to those juvenile offenders who are serving a sentence for either capital or first-degree murder; because defendant's life-without-parole sentence was vacated in 2016 under Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, and Kelly v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, he was no longer serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach. Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179 (2018).

Because the relevant provisions of the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 were inapplicable to defendant, defendant was entitled to a hearing under Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, to present Miller evidence for consideration and sentencing within the discretionary range for a Class Y felony. Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179 (2018).

In accord with Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179, 547 S.W.3d 64. Robinson v. State, 2018 Ark. 353, 563 S.W.3d 530 (2018).

In accord with Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179. The circuit court erred in applying the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA) to defendant juvenile's case because defendant committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA, and thus, the penalty provisions did not apply; because defendant's sentence was vacated, he was no longer serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach, and thus, the parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA did not apply at the time of his hearing on the State's motion for resentencing. Ray v. State, 2019 Ark. 46, 567 S.W.3d 63 (2019).

In accord with Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179. Howell v. State, 2019 Ark. 59, 567 S.W.3d 842 (2019); Miller v. State, 2019 Ark. 81, 570 S.W.3d 448 (2019); Elliott v. State, 2019 Ark. 162 (2019).

Authority of Court.

A trial court may reduce the extent or duration of the punishment assessed by the jury if, in the judge's opinion, the conviction is proper but the punishment assessed is still greater than, under the circumstances of the case, ought to be inflicted, as long as the punishment is not reduced below the limit prescribed by the law under § 16-90-107(e); in such a case, the court could reduce the term of imprisonment, then suspend an additional term of imprisonment, with the sum of the two terms not exceeding the jury's original fixed term of imprisonment, meaning § 5-4-104(e)(3) is not rendered a nullity. Brown v. State, 82 Ark. App. 61, 110 S.W.3d 293 (2003).

Citation of Statute.

In the case of requests for probation or a suspended sentence, this section requires appellant to cite the appropriate statute under which he claims he is entitled to such relief, and if the request for probation is specific, but does not include an assertion that appellant was entitled to probation pursuant to this section and § 5-4-301, the Supreme Court will not address whether appellant is entitled to probation based on those sections. Baker v. State, 310 Ark. 485, 837 S.W.2d 471 (1992).

Conversion of Fine Into Jail Term.

The equal protection rule that the state cannot impose a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full was not violated where the defendant, with the assistance of counsel, tendered his own schedule of payment for restitution in exchange for a suspended sentence and then made sporadic payments in violation of the payment schedule. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986).

Double Jeopardy.

Where the defendant was ordered to pay a fine and simultaneously placed on probation, and the defendant paid the fine, but she violated the conditions of probation, the defendant was not unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy when the court revoked her probation and imposed a five-year sentence. Diffee v. State, 290 Ark. 194, 718 S.W.2d 94 (1986).

Effect of Amendments.

Acts 1993, No. 192 amended former § 5-4-301(a)(1)(F) and former subdivision (e)(1)(F) of this section to remove the language from the two statutes which prohibited trial courts from imposing suspended imposition of sentence or probation of controlled substance offenders; the act did not provide for retroactive application, and, thus, its operation is prospective only. State v. Whale, 314 Ark. 576, 863 S.W.2d 290 (1993); State v. Williams, 315 Ark. 464, 868 S.W.2d 461 (1994); State v. Galyean, 315 Ark. 699, 870 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

Fines.

Subsection (e) of this section does not prohibit the court from imposing fines on a defendant who has previously been convicted of two or more felonies; instead, it means that the court is not allowed to impose only a fine in place of prison sentence when the defendant is a habitual offender. Kinsey v. State, 290 Ark. 4, 716 S.W.2d 188 (1986).

Under subsection (e) of this section, the court acted within its statutory authority in assessing a fine and at the same time placing the defendant on probation. Diffee v. State, 290 Ark. 194, 718 S.W.2d 94 (1986).

A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction when, having imposed a sentence for a term of years, which the defendant has been serving, it adds a fine for a subsequent offense. DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993).

In defendant's drug case, the court erroneously instructed the jury regarding penalties in the sentencing phase where it allowed for the jury to consider only the possibility of imprisonment when defendant was an habitual offender; the court failed to give the jury the option of considering only the payment of a fine, as authorized by subdivision (d)(3) of this section. Jones v. State, 357 Ark. 545, 182 S.W.3d 485 (2004).

Court erred in failing to give defendant's proffered jury instruction allowing the jury to consider imposing a fine without imprisonment, notwithstanding his status as a habitual offender, because the model jury instruction which allowed for the jury to consider only the possibility of imprisonment when the defendant was a habitual offender did not accurately reflect the law, as it did not give the jury the option of considering only the payment of a fine, as authorized by subdivision (d)(3) of this section. Andrews v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 597, 424 S.W.3d 349 (2012).

Illegal Sentence.

Circuit court imposed an illegal sentence upon defendant when it attempted to require him to undergo drug and alcohol treatment as a condition of his incarceration after it revoked his probation because no statute authorized the imposition of conditions upon a sentence of incarceration and thus, the circuit court lacked authority to do so. Richie v. State, 2009 Ark. 602, 357 S.W.3d 909 (2009).

Upon defendant's conviction for rape and second-degree battery, the circuit court erred in ordering him to complete a sex-offender treatment program because he was sentenced under §§ 5-4-401, 5-4-501 and these statutes did not authorize the court to order a sex-offender treatment program. Pursuant to § 5-4-303, a circuit court may clearly place conditions on a defendant when the court suspends the imposition of sentence or places the defendant on probation, but that there is no similar provision in subsection (d) of this section that would allow a court to place specific conditions on a sentence of incarceration. White v. State, 2012 Ark. 221, 408 S.W.3d 720 (2012).

Upon revoking defendant's probation for the fraudulent use of a credit or debit card, the trial court sentenced defendant to 365 days' incarceration and required her to attend a drug program. Because such a condition to incarceration was not authorized by subsection (d) of this section, the sentence was illegal. Runion v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 365 (2012).

While this section and § 5-4-301 did not prohibit the suspended imposition of sentence for the offense of sexual assault in the second degree, the trial court could not have entered a judgment imposing a sentence for 180 months' imprisonment and also suspending imposition of an additional 180 months' imprisonment because the judgment had the effect of placing defendant under the jurisdiction of the court for 360 months when the maximum sentence authorized by statute was 240 months. Ward v. State, 2016 Ark. 8, 479 S.W.3d 9 (2016).

Mandatory Sentences.

Since subsection (c) provides that a defendant convicted of a Class Y felony must be sentenced to imprisonment, a defendant convicted of such an offense could not be given a suspended sentence or probation even where the prosecutor agreed that some form of probation would be proper. Harris v. State, 15 Ark. App. 58, 689 S.W.2d 353 (1985).

Where suspended sentences violated the mandatory provisions of subsection (e), they were void, and since the original sentences were illegal, even though partially executed, the sentencing court could correct them, even though a notice of appeal had been filed. Lambert v. State, 286 Ark. 408, 692 S.W.2d 238 (1985).

The suspension of a part of the Class Y felony sentence is prohibited under subsection (e) of this section. Campbell v. State, 288 Ark. 213, 703 S.W.2d 855 (1986).

Upon conviction for aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft of property, defendant's enhanced sentence as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions was affirmed as there was no conflict between subsection (a) of this section and § 16-90-120(a) and (b); subsection (a) refers only to the initial sentence and § 16-90-120(a) and (b) refer only to a sentence enhancement that could be added to the initial sentence. Williams v. State, 364 Ark. 203, 217 S.W.3d 817 (2005).

Probation.

Probation was not a sentence option for rape, a Class Y felony; probation was available as a sentence alternative only for certain Class Y drug offenses. State v. Pinell, 353 Ark. 129, 114 S.W.3d 175 (2003).

Restitution.

The power to sentence the defendant to make restitution was clearly prescribed by law, and thus the sentence was not illegal on its face. Cotnam v. State, 36 Ark. App. 109, 819 S.W.2d 291 (1991).

Supersession of Statute.

It is possible that § 16-90-202 may have been repealed by subsection (a) of this section. Hodge v. State, 320 Ark. 31, 894 S.W.2d 927 (1995).

Suspension or Probation.

Where the defendant was sentenced to a term imprisonment with part of the term to be suspended on certain conditions and when the defendant violated those conditions, the trial court had the power to sentence the defendant to another term in prison since the court's conditional suspension amounted to a decision to suspend the pronouncement of an additional number of years to the original sentence to prison. Holland v. State, 267 Ark. 956, 591 S.W.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1979).

Court is authorized to suspend imposition of sentence or place the defendant on probation, but it may not do both since by § 5-4-101(1), a suspension is “without supervision,” while under § 5-4-101(2), probation requires the “supervision of a probation officer.” Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

Where the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment which was suspended with a number of years probation, upon the revocation of his probation the court could not increase his sentence since the court at the time of his original sentencing could have suspended imposition of the sentence or placed him on probation, and the court had chosen to put him on probation. Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

The court, and not the jury, has the power to suspend imposition of sentence. Rhoades v. State, 270 Ark. 962, 607 S.W.2d 76 (1980), cert. denied, Rhoades v. Arkansas, 452 U.S. 915, 101 S. Ct. 3048 (1981).

Apart from this section, the common law “court probation” procedure is no longer available as a sentencing alternative. English v. State, 274 Ark. 304, 626 S.W.2d 191 (1981).

A court probation proceeding, as codified in subsection (e) of this section, does not constitute either a “conviction” or “finding of guilt” under § 5-4-501 until the original guilty plea is finally accepted and, therefore, is inadmissible for sentence enhancement purposes in a subsequent prosecution. English v. State, 274 Ark. 304, 626 S.W.2d 191 (1981).

Placing the defendant on probation without imposing a sentence is the essential element in “court probation”; all other statutory sentencing procedures require that a judgment of conviction be entered, and the sentence begins to run from the time of the sentence and it is immaterial whether the trial court suspends the imposition of the sentence or the execution of the sentence. English v. State, 274 Ark. 304, 626 S.W.2d 191 (1981).

Where the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment at the Department of Correction, the court could not impose a term of probation on the defendant in addition to the imprisonment. Marion v. State, 4 Ark. App. 359, 631 S.W.2d 315 (1982).

Where court could either suspend imposition of the sentence or place the defendant on probation but it could not do both, and court entered an order suspending sentence and an order placing defendant on probation, the judgment would be construed as a suspension of the imposition of sentence for the probation period. Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983).

When a court grants unauthorized dual judgments of sentence and one is imposed and served, and the other is the suspension of a sentence, there is an election by operation of law and the sentencing court has elected to order the sentence actually imposed; the other is void. Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983).

Where the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on probation, at a subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court could only revoke the fixed term remaining on the suspended sentence, and a new sentence could not be set at the revocation hearing. Deaton v. State, 283 Ark. 79, 671 S.W.2d 175 (1984).

A trial court was only authorized to suspend imposition of a sentence, not the execution of a sentence. Miller v. State, 13 Ark. App. 314, 683 S.W.2d 937 (1985).

Court probation, apart from that authorized by statute, is no longer available as a sentencing alternative inasmuch as it was codified under the Arkansas Criminal Code. The same is true of “advisory sentences” and all other unauthorized forms of sentencing where the trial court takes the defendant's plea under advisement subject to conditions which are, in essence, terms of probation or suspended sentences. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986).

Where defendant was sentenced to period of imprisonment for one year and any additional term of imprisonment for a period of up to five years was suspended, imposition of nine year sentence upon revocation of suspension when court found defendant, subsequent to his release committed the crime of robbery, was proper since 10 years is the maximum for the crime for which he was placed on suspension. Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

Where after defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of theft, a class C felony for which the maximum sentence is 10 years, the court could sentence defendant to one year of imprisonment and suspend imposition of an additional sentence to the penitentiary for a period of five years, since the five year period of suspension did not exceed the maximum prison sentence allowable for the offense. Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

While it is true that subsection (e) of this section provides that a defendant cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment to be followed by a period of probation otherwise than in accordance with § 5-4-304, a court has the authority to sentence one to a term of imprisonment to be followed by a period of suspension. Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

After release from prison an inmate is on probation under supervision of the Department of Correction; the distinction between suspension and probation is whether supervision is exercised, and that is the reason the statutes prohibit a court from sentencing a defendant to a term in prison and following it by a period of probation. Subdivision (e)(3) of this section appears to allow a period of suspension following a term in prison. Brimer v. State, 295 Ark. 20, 746 S.W.2d 370 (1988).

A trial court may not impose a sentence of imprisonment in the state Department of Correction that is followed by probation. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992).

The trial court has no inherent authority to suspend imposition of a sentence and must follow the statutory requirements of this section. State v. Freeman, 312 Ark. 34, 846 S.W.2d 660 (1993).

The circuit court erred by imposing a sentence of three years' supervised probation for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, pursuant to § 16-93-501(10) (repealed), where intent to deliver cocaine was a Class Y felony and a minimum sentence of 10 years was mandatory under former § 5-4-301(a)(1)(F) and former subdivision (e)(1)(F) of this section. State v. Williams, 315 Ark. 464, 868 S.W.2d 461 (1994).

Where, at the time the offense was committed, § 5-64-407, former subdivision (e)(1)(F) of this section and former § 5-4-301(a)(1)(F) prohibited probation for delivery (as opposed to possession) of a controlled substance, the trial court erred in placing defendant on probation. State v. Landis, 315 Ark. 681, 870 S.W.2d 704 (1994); State v. Galyean, 315 Ark. 699, 870 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

Court could sentence a defendant to one term of imprisonment and suspend imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment. Bramucci v. State, 76 Ark. App. 8, 62 S.W.3d 10 (2001).

—Suspension Prohibited.

Effective March 16, 1993, The General Assembly, by specific terms, prohibited trial courts from suspending execution of sentences by enacting subdivision (e)(1)(B)(ii) of this section. Meadows v. State, 320 Ark. 686, 899 S.W.2d 72 (1995).

When a defendant is convicted of a Class Y felony, the General Assembly has specifically provided that a trial court shall not suspend imposition of sentence as to a term of imprisonment or place the defendant on probation. State v. Stephenson, 340 Ark. 229, 9 S.W.3d 495 (2000).

The trial court had no statutory authority to suspend the imposition of sentence or to suspend execution of the 10-year sentence on the Class Y felony charge of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms. State v. Stephenson, 340 Ark. 229, 9 S.W.3d 495 (2000).

Defendant's conviction for simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm constituted a Class Y felony for which no part of her sentence could be suspended pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301(a)(1)(C); therefore, the trial court erred when it suspended 7 years of defendant's 10-year sentence. State v. Hardiman, 353 Ark. 125, 114 S.W.3d 164 (2003).

Under § 5-4-301(a)(1)(F), the trial court lacked statutory authority to suspend imposition of defendant's 20-year sentence for delivery of cocaine upon defendant's guilty plea in 1991 and the judgment was facially invalid, thus, the 20-year sentence that petitioner was currently serving (upon the revocation of the suspended sentence in 1998), was illegal; however, an illegal sentence could be corrected and remand for resentencing was proper. Taylor v. State, 354 Ark. 450, 125 S.W.3d 174 (2003).

Unauthorized Sentence.

Where after the defendant entered a guilty plea to class C felony theft of property, for which the maximum sentence is 10 years, a sentence of 6 years in prison, with 2 years suspended on condition that the defendant pay the sum of $135,000 at the rate of $200.00 per month, beginning 60 days after defendant's release from prison, and continuing for 12 years, at which time a civil judgment would be entered for the outstanding balance, was not authorized. Brimer v. State, 295 Ark. 20, 746 S.W.2d 370 (1988).

The trial court exceeded its authority by ignoring the dictates of subsection (a) and by suspending imposition of five of six years contrary to the mandate of § 5-4-501(a)(4). State v. Freeman, 312 Ark. 34, 846 S.W.2d 660 (1993).

Original judgment and commitment order for driving while intoxicated, was illegal because the term of imprisonment imposed followed by a specified term of probation exceeded the maximum penalty for the offense committed and because the imposition of probation following a term of imprisonment is prohibited by this section. Petree v. State, 323 Ark. 570, 920 S.W.2d 819 (1996).

Defendant's sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, suspended to an additional term of 20 years, pursuant to his guilty plea to one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, was modified to provide that defendant was no longer required to report to a supervising officer, as the sentence was actually one of probation rather than suspension, which was a sentence specifically prohibited by statute. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003).

Trial court was without authority, under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(e)(3) to add a five-year suspended sentence to the terms of imprisonment decided by the jury in finding defendant guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, even though the additional sentence was suspended. Brown v. State, 82 Ark. App. 61, 110 S.W.3d 293 (2003).

Where the jury sentenced defendant on fifteen of the twenty counts of violation of a minor to no term of imprisonment and a fine of zero dollars, the sentence was illegal as the sentencing range was five to twenty years' imprisonment, or a fine not to exceed $15,000, or both; thus, remand for resentencing on those counts was ordered. Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003).

Circuit court's special condition in defendant's sentence that he complete a mandatory drug treatment program while in prison was illegal as it had no authority to impose such a condition under subsection (d) of this section. Once he was sentenced, it was for the Arkansas Department of Correction to determine the conditions of his incarceration. Cline v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 315 (2011).

In a case involving rape and other offenses, a remand was necessary for a trial court to resolve an incongruity within the judgment and commitment order itself, which referred to conditions of a suspended sentence, despite a specification that there were no suspended imposition of sentence. If completion of a Reduction of Sexual Victimization Program was ordered as a condition of incarceration, the circuit court had the opportunity to correct it because only the Arkansas Department of Correction that could have determined any conditions of incarceration. Dillard v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 503 (2012).

Writ of Habeas Corpus Denied.

Habeas relief was not warranted because an applicant was charged under a former first-degree murder statute where a murder was committed in the course of a robbery, and he was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on his plea of guilty to capital-felony murder. An argument that murder in the first degree and capital murder were separate offenses with a separate penalty was rejected. Gooch v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 73 (2014) (Decided under former §§ 41-4702, 41-4706).

Cited: Wolfe v. State, 266 Ark. 811, 586 S.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1979); Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979); Lingo v. State, 271 Ark. 776, 610 S.W.2d 580 (1981); Killman v. State, 274 Ark. 422, 625 S.W.2d 489 (1981); Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987); Jones v. State, 297 Ark. 485, 763 S.W.2d 81 (1989); Lee v. State, 299 Ark. 187, 772 S.W.2d 324 (1989); Delph v. State, 300 Ark. 492, 780 S.W.2d 527 (1989); Matthews v. State, 305 Ark. 207, 807 S.W.2d 29 (1991); Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 507, 808 S.W.2d 780 (1991); Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992); Elders v. State, 321 Ark. 60, 900 S.W.2d 170 (1995); State v. Zawodniak, 329 Ark. 179, 946 S.W.2d 936 (1997); Johnson v. State, 331 Ark. 421, 961 S.W.2d 764 (1998); Sullivan v. State, 366 Ark. 183, 234 S.W.3d 285 (2006); Donaldson v. State, 370 Ark. 3, 257 S.W.3d 74 (2007); Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, 362 S.W.3d 918 (2010); Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906 (2013); State v. O'Quinn, 2013 Ark. 219, 427 S.W.3d 668 (2013); Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982); Simmons v. State, 13 Ark. App. 208, 681 S.W.2d 422 (1985);Palmer v. State, 31 Ark. App. 97, 788 S.W.2d 248 (1990); Vega v. State, 56 Ark. App. 145, 939 S.W.2d 322 (1997); Lair v. State, 283 Ark. 237, 675 S.W.2d 361 (1984); Nelson v. State, 284 Ark. 156, 680 S.W.2d 91 (1984); Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. 287, 497 S.W.3d 666 (2016); Liggins v. State, 2016 Ark. 432, 505 S.W.3d 191 (2016); Burnell v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 10 (2016); Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256, 522 S.W.3d 793 (2017).