Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-105 (2026)
Operation of motor vehicle during period of license suspension or revocation
A person whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked under this subchapter who operates a motor vehicle in this state during the period of the suspension or revocation upon conviction is guilty of an unclassified misdemeanor and:
- Shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) days or more than ninety (90) days; and
- May be assessed a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
History. Acts 1983, No. 549, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-2512; Acts 2001, No. 1715, § 1; 2015, No. 299, § 6; 2015, No. 1035, § 1.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendments to this section by Acts 2015, No. 299, § 6, are partially superseded by the amendments to this section by Acts 2015, No. 1035, § 1. Acts 2015, No. 299, § 6, changed the word “act” to “chapter”.
Amendments. The 2001 amendment added “may be assessed … one thousand dollars ($1,000)” and made minor stylistic changes.
The 2015 amendment by No. 299 inserted the (1) and (2) designations; and in the introductory language, substituted “A person” for “Any person”, “driving privilege” for “privilege to operate a motor vehicle”, and “this chapter” for “a provision of this act” and added “upon conviction is guilty of an unclassified misdemeanor and”.
The 2015 amendment by No. 1035 substituted “A person” for “any person”, substituted “this subchapter” for “a provision of this act”, inserted “upon conviction is guilty of an unclassified misdemeanor and”, and substituted “not less than ten (10) days or more than ninety (90) days” for “ten (10) days”.
Case Notes
Evidence.
Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the statement he made to an officer who stopped him admitting that he knew his license was suspended; no Miranda warning was needed because, at the time of the statement, defendant sat in his car on the side of the road, he was never arrested, and after the officer gave him the traffic citation he was free to go. Gorman v. State, 366 Ark. 82, 233 S.W.3d 622 (2006).
Evidence was sufficient for a conviction of driving with a suspended license where defendant admitted to the police officer who had stopped him that he knew his license was suspended and the state produced a certified driving record at trial indicating that defendant's license was suspended for a DWI that had occurred in December 2002. Gorman v. State, 366 Ark. 82, 233 S.W.3d 622 (2006).
Defendant's convictions were supported by substantial evidence where it was shown that (1) shortly after the incident, defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .23 percent, (2) defendant was driving the car that hit two women and narrowly missed a third, (3) just before the impact, defendant was witnessed to speed up and actually swerve the vehicle toward the women's path, and (4) defendant drove away after the impact. Estacuy v. State, 94 Ark. App. 183, 228 S.W.3d 567 (2006).
Evidence was substantial to support a conviction for driving on a suspended license under this section because defendant was not following the restrictions given on his restricted driving permit. The Arkansas Office of Driver Services had issued a restricted permit for defendant to drive from his home in Fayetteville to school, drug-and-alcohol education classes, and for medical emergencies. Fiveash v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 187, 458 S.W.3d 774 (2015).
Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the officer had verified defendant's license was suspended one day prior to the stop at issue, and thus, the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was driving on a suspended license at the time of the stop at issue. Prickett v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 551, 506 S.W.3d 870 (2016).
Circuit court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop was affirmed where the deputy testified that he knew from a prior traffic stop that appellant's license had been suspended, and thus, pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1(a)(iii), he had reasonable cause to believe that appellant was violating this section. Williams v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 291, 524 S.W.3d 13 (2017).
Sentencing.
The sentencing provisions of the Omnibus DWI Act of 1983 are mandatory; where imprisonment is required, such a sentence cannot be reduced or suspended by the judge. Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 434, 681 S.W.2d 395 (1984).
Cited: Liggett v. State, 309 Ark. 608, 832 S.W.2d 813 (1992); Brown v. State, 38 Ark. App. 18, 827 S.W.2d 174 (1992); Payne v. State, 327 Ark. 25, 937 S.W.2d 160 (1997).