Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-123 (2026)
Offenses involving a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device
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A person commits the offense of unlawfully allowing another person to start or attempt to start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device if he or she:
- Has had his or her driving privileges restricted under § 5-65-118 and cannot operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device;
- Knowingly solicits or allows a person to start or attempt to start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device; and
- Has the purpose to operate or be in actual physical control of the motor vehicle.
- A person commits the offense of unlawfully starting or attempting to start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device for another person if he or she knowingly starts or attempts to start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device for another person who is restricted from operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle that does not have a functioning ignition interlock device.
- A person commits the offense of tampering with an ignition interlock device if he or she knowingly tampers with or attempts to circumvent the operation of an ignition interlock device that has been installed in a motor vehicle.
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A person commits the offense of providing a motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device to another person if he or she:
- Knowingly provides a motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device to another person who is restricted from operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle that does not have a functioning ignition interlock device; and
- Knows or should have known that the other person was restricted from operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device.
- A person who violates this section is upon conviction guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
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It is a defense to prosecution under this section if:
- A person starts or attempts to start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device for the purpose of safety or mechanical repair of the ignition interlock device or the motor vehicle and the person subject to the restriction does not operate the motor vehicle; or
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The court has previously found that a person is required to operate a motor vehicle in the course and scope of his or her employment and, if the motor vehicle is owned by the employer but does not have a functioning ignition interlock device installed, that the person may operate that motor vehicle during regular working hours for the purposes of his or her employment if:
- The employer has been notified of the driving privilege restriction; and
- Proof of that notification is with the motor vehicle.
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However, the defense in subdivision (f)(2)(A) of this section does not apply if:
- The business entity that owns the motor vehicle is owned or controlled by the person who is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device; or
- The driving privilege restriction is the result of the offender's second or subsequent offense.
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The court has previously found that a person is required to operate a motor vehicle in the course and scope of his or her employment and, if the motor vehicle is owned by the employer but does not have a functioning ignition interlock device installed, that the person may operate that motor vehicle during regular working hours for the purposes of his or her employment if:
History. Acts 2015, No. 299, § 6.
Subchapter 2 — Chemical Analysis of Body Substances
Effective Dates. Acts 1969, No. 17, § 2: Jan. 30, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the drinking driver is a major cause of automobile accidents; that the ability of a driver is seriously impaired when there is 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the driver's blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance; and that enactment of this act will provide for more effective control of the drinking driver. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”
Acts 1969, No. 106, § 4: Feb. 25, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the drinking driver is a major cause of automobile accidents; that the ability of a driver is seriously impaired when there is 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the driver's blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance; and that enactment of this act is immediately necessary to provide for more effective control of the drinking driver. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”
Acts 1971, No. 306, § 2: Mar. 17, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that doctors, nurses and hospitals throughout the State are called upon by law enforcement officers to withdraw blood for purposes of determining alcoholic content thereof from individuals suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors; that in the performance of such duties, doctors, nurses and hospitals are assisting the State of Arkansas in the enforcement of laws designed to promote motor vehicle safety; and that doctors, nurses and hospitals should not be held liable for violating any of the criminal laws in connection with the administering of such blood tests, nor should they be held liable for civil damages in connection therewith, unless such services are performed with negligence; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify the liabilities of doctors, nurses and hospitals in the administration and enforcement of the implied consent law of this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1975, No. 660, § 3: Mar. 28, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that physicians, persons under the direction and supervision of physicians, and institutions throughout the State are called upon by law enforcement officers to withdraw blood for purposes of determining alcoholic content thereof from individuals suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors; that in the performance of such duties physicians, persons under the direction and supervision of physicians and institutions are assisting the State of Arkansas in the enforcement of laws designed to promote motor vehicle safety; and that such persons and institutions shall not be held liable for violating any of the criminal laws in connection with the administering of such blood tests, nor should they be held liable for civil damages in connection therewith, unless such services are performed with negligence; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify the liabilities of doctors, persons under the direction and supervision of physicians, and institutions in the administration and enforcement of the implied consent law of this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1983, No. 549, § 19: Mar. 21, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that the act of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or drugs constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the safety of all citizens of this state, and that increasing the penalty for this dangerous conduct may serve as a deterrent to such behavior. Further, it is found that increased income derived from the levying of such penalties can best be utilized to provide immediate alcohol and drug safety and rehabilitation and treatment programs both to prevent an increase in the use of intoxicating alcoholic beverages and drugs and to rehabilitate persons convicted of related offenses. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”
Acts 1985, No. 169, § 3: Feb. 22, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that hospitals, other institutions and persons working under the direction and supervision of physicians are not accorded tort immunity for the withdrawal of blood to determine alcohol or controlled substance content; that such immunity existed prior to the enactment of the DWI Law in 1983; that the elimination of the tort immunity was inadvertent and should be immediately reinstated. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1987, No. 75, § 3: Feb. 19, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law identifying circumstances under which persons who operate or are in actual physical control of a motor vehicle are deemed to have given consent to chemical tests to determine whether they have been driving while intoxicated does not apply when the driver is involved in a nonfatal accident and is not actually operating the motor vehicle at the time the police arrive and is not arrested as a result of the accident; that the failure to include such circumstance was inadvertent and should be immediately corrected in order to provide for the proper enforcement of our DWI law; and that this act will make that correction in the DWI law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1987, No. 277, § 3: Mar. 17, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that at least one trial court judge has indicated that the DWI implied consent statute might be unconstitutional because no maximum period for the suspension of operators' licenses is indicated; that the implied consent statute is a vital weapon in combatting drunken driving; and that this act will cure the constitutional objections. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1993, No. 132, § 5: Feb. 15, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-202(a), as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas and Arkansas Court of Appeals, are inadequate regarding the conduct of persons whom the General Assembly intended to be subject to the provisions of the implied consent law, in that the courts have construed § 5-65-202(a)(3) to be applicable only where a police officer physically stopped a moving vehicle and possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that the person was DWI prior to the stop, see Roberts v. State, 287 Ark. 451, 701 S.W.2d 112 (1985); Gober v. State, 22 Ark. App. 121, 736 S.W.2d 18 (1987); that § 5-65-202(a)(3) is being amended to implement the General Assembly's intent to have the implied consent law encompass conduct of persons whom police officers have reasonable cause to believe have committed the offense of DWI, at the time such persons are arrested for DWI. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety, and welfare shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1995, No. 802, § 9: Mar. 27, 1995: Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act provides for administrative revocation and suspension of drivers' licenses for persons charged with the offense of driving while intoxicated; that based on Arkansas Crime Information Center statistics on DEI arrests, the Office of Driver Services could anticipate up to sixteen thousand (16,000) hearings if everyone arrested requested a hearing; that funds will be necessary for additional staff to handle this program along with significant costs to prepare for and implement this program; and that this act is necessary immediately in order to insure that sufficient funds are available for the financial stability of this program. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1995, No. 802, § 5(a): Sections 1, 3, and 4 effective for all arrests or offenses occurring on or after July 1, 1996.
Acts 1995, No. 802, § 5(b): Section 2 effective July 1, 1995.
Acts 2005, No. 886, § 3: Mar. 16, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that confusion exists regarding the admissibility of drug analyses made by the State Crime Laboratory in certain cases due to a recent decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals; that a standard of admissibility of analyses made by the State Crime Laboratory must be established; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to prosecute pending cases and cases filed in the future. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”
Research References
ALR.
Admissibility in criminal case of blood alcohol test where blood was taken despite defendant's objection or refusal to submit to test. 14 A.L.R.4th 690.
Destruction of ampoule used in alcohol breath test as warranting suppression of result of test. 19 A.L.R.4th 509.
Admissibility in criminal case that accused refused to take sobriety test. 26 A.L.R.4th 1112.
Motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.
Ark. L. Rev.
Case Note, South Dakota v. Neville: Refusal to Submit to a Blood-Alcohol Test as Evidence of Intoxication, 37 Ark. L. Rev. 702.
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Criminal Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.
Legislative Survey, Torts, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 607.
Survey — Evidence, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.