Ark. Code Ann. § 5-66-103 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 889.

Recent Development: Gambling, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 283.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutionally overbroad. McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922 S.W.2d 323 (1996).

Construction.

This sentencing provisions of this section and the Criminal Code can be read in harmony: one defines the term of imprisonment and the other permits the court to impose suspension or probation. Johnson v. State, 331 Ark. 421, 961 S.W.2d 764 (1998).

Purpose.

Statutes pertaining to gambling show clear intent to suppress all unlicensed gambling in this state. Albright v. Muncrief, 206 Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1944).

Bingo.

Bingo establishments where money and risk were plainly involved had fair warning that their actions were prohibited. State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992).

The operation of a commercial bingo hall meets the definition of a gambling house, and is therefore a common-law public nuisance. Masterson v. State ex rel. Bryant, 329 Ark. 443, 949 S.W.2d 63 (1997).

Common-Law Nuisance.

Although persons who maintain a place for betting on horse races may be prosecuted under this section and § 5-66-116 they might also be prosecuted under former section which provided for punishment of common-law crimes for maintaining a common-law nuisance. Blumensteil v. State, 148 Ark. 421, 230 S.W. 262 (1921).

Operator of bookmaking establishment, which was a gambling house and therefore a public nuisance at common law and a felony under this section, was precluded from invoking the protection of a court of equity in order to operate it without molestation from the state police. Albright v. Karston, 206 Ark. 307, 176 S.W.2d 421 (1943).

Evidence.

Testimony by the owner of the property regarding a small hole which had been cut in a door of which he had no knowledge, as to whether hole was used as a peep hole, or as a serving shelf for food held properly refused. Sorrentino v. State, 214 Ark. 115, 214 S.W.2d 517 (1948).

It is not necessary that the state prove that the defendant actually engaged in wagering to convict under this section. McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922 S.W.2d 323 (1996).

Gambling Devices.

Tables, blackboards and other articles being actually used by bookmaker in carrying on the betting operations and not being used for any other purpose were gambling devices. Albright v. Karston, 206 Ark. 307, 176 S.W.2d 421 (1943).

There may be gambling devices that are no less such, although not always so used, but which, from their nature, may be used for other purposes. Albright v. Muncrief, 206 Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1944).

Teletype machines used to furnish horse race information to various gambling houses with operator's knowledge of the use made by the gambling houses of the information which he was furnishing them from the teletype machine were converted into gambling devices. Albright v. Muncrief, 206 Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1944).

Testimony that police officer answered calls to a defendant's telephone regarding racing forms, placing bets, etc., held admissible to show the use being made of the telephone. Liberto v. State, 248 Ark. 350, 451 S.W.2d 464 (1970).

Gambling Houses.

One would be guilty of running a gambling house if he permitted gaming tables to be exhibited and gambling to be carried on in a house controlled by him whether he engaged in gambling or maintained or exhibited such tables and other gambling devices or not. Turner v. State, 153 Ark. 40, 239 S.W. 373 (1922).

An establishment maintained for the purpose of receiving and making bets on horse races is a gambling house. Albright v. Karston, 206 Ark. 307, 176 S.W.2d 421 (1943); Albright v. Muncrief, 206 Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1944).

Refusal to instruct jury that it was necessary for it to find that defendant receive a profit or other remuneration before the defendant could be found guilty of operating a gambling house held not error, as gravamen of the offense is the maintaining of a house for gambling, and not the profit realized therefrom. Sorrentino v. State, 214 Ark. 115, 214 S.W.2d 517 (1948).

Evidence held sufficient to support a conviction for operation of a gambling house. Sorrentino v. State, 214 Ark. 115, 214 S.W.2d 517 (1948); Pope v. State, 215 Ark. 216, 219 S.W.2d 940 (1949).

Where land, on which there were plank tables used for gambling purposes, was part of railroad right of way, but, as far as defendant's patrons were concerned, defendant controlled place, defendant might properly be convicted. Colbert v. State, 218 Ark. 790, 238 S.W.2d 749 (1951).

Evidence of gambling and statement of defendant to officers that he and another person owned the place was sufficient to make a case for the jury in prosecution for keeping a gambling house. Copeland v. State, 226 Ark. 198, 289 S.W.2d 524 (1956).

The keeping of a gambling house is not limited by this section to a place where those engaged in gambling find shelter and it was not error to refuse an instruction that a finding that the defendant operated a place where those desiring to engage in gambling might resort to and find shelter while engaged in gambling was required for conviction. Liberto v. State, 248 Ark. 350, 451 S.W.2d 464 (1970).

Evidence of cockfighting and loud, open gambling on premises owned by the defendant was sufficient to convict under this section. McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922 S.W.2d 323 (1996).

Indictment.

An indictment alleging that a sheriff, knowing that certain persons were exhibiting gambling devices in the county, failed to arrest them was held to state an offense under this section. Mays v. Robertson, 172 Ark. 279, 288 S.W. 382 (1926).

Instructions.

Instructions by the court conformed to this section, where the jury was required under the instructions to find that the defendant had an interest in the conduct and operation of the gambling house. Sorrentino v. State, 214 Ark. 115, 214 S.W.2d 517 (1948).

Where grand jury returns separate indictments against defendant, one for a felony in operating a gambling house, and one for a misdemeanor in setting up gaming devices, and defendant proceeds to trial on felony charge, he is not entitled to an instruction by the court on misdemeanor charge. Pope v. State, 215 Ark. 216, 219 S.W.2d 940 (1949).

Intent.

When the mental culpability requirement of § 5-2-203 is read into this section, it is clear that a person must act purposely, knowingly, or recklessly for a violation to occur. McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922 S.W.2d 323 (1996).

Jury Question.

Whether defendant's house in a residential area was a gambling house was a jury question. Flaherty v. State, 255 Ark. 187, 500 S.W.2d 87 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 995, 94 S. Ct. 1599, 39 L. Ed. 2d 893 (1974).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

It was not error for the judge to refuse to give an instruction defining the offense under § 5-66-104 as a lesser-included offense of that proscribed by this section where the defendant was either guilty of operating a gambling house or guilty of nothing at all. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ark. 535, 527 S.W.2d 636 (1975).

Sentence.

The alternative-sentencing provisions, permitting suspended sentence or probation, are applicable to offenses under this section, even though this section has its own penal provision. Johnson v. State, 331 Ark. 421, 961 S.W.2d 764 (1998).

Cited: Buchanan v. State, 214 Ark. 835, 218 S.W.2d 700 (1948); Hardwick v. State, 220 Ark. 464, 248 S.W.2d 377 (1952); Campbell v. City of Hot Springs, 232 Ark. 878, 341 S.W.2d 225 (1960); Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122 (1968); State v. Adkisson, 251 Ark. 119, 471 S.W.2d 332 (1971); Thompson v. State, 298 Ark. 502, 769 S.W.2d 6 (1989); United States v. Thompson, 925 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1991).