Ark. Code Ann. § 5-66-104 (2026)

Case Notes

Purpose.

It was the purpose of this section to suppress any of the gambling devices constantly being invented to evade the gambling laws. Portis v. State, 27 Ark. 360 (1872); Euper v. State, 35 Ark. 629 (1880).

Statutes pertaining to gambling show clear intent to suppress all unlicensed gambling in this state. Albright v. Muncrief, 206 Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1944).

Acts Constituting Offense.

One who keeps a billiard table and permits others to play upon it for so much per game, to be paid for by the loser, violates this section. State v. Sanders, 86 Ark. 353, 111 S.W. 454 (1908).

The fact that the owner of the table plays in the game of poker and furnishes chips to others does not make him an exhibitor of a gaming table. Tully v. State, 88 Ark. 411, 114 S.W. 920 (1908).

One who furnishes any device by which money may be won or lost through chance or skill is guilty of exhibiting a gambling device. Johnson v. State, 101 Ark. 159, 141 S.W. 493 (1911).

One who shows a table specially prepared for a game of “craps” for the purpose of attracting betters, and who retains, for the use of the table, a certain percent of the bets, violates this section. Gershner v. State, 106 Ark. 488, 153 S.W. 600 (1913).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Hill v. State, 264 Ark. 313, 571 S.W.2d 228 (1978).

A telephone-card vending machine was an illegal gambling device where the machine operated as follows: (1) a patron would place a $1 bill in the machine, and the machine would then print an “Emergency Long Distance Telephone Card” good for three minutes of long distance; (2) at the same time, the machine would register a number of play credits; (3) the patron could then play a game on the machine “similar to tic-tac-toe on a 3 x 3 matrix consisting of various symbols which may be lined up for additional points,” (4) these points could then be redeemed for a cash prize ranging from $1 to $1,000; (5) additionally, after using the prepaid telephone card, the patron could mail the used card to the defendant for a supplemental drawing for various prizes such as electronics or airline tickets; and (6) if a patron did not wish to purchase a telephone card but still wanted to play the game, he or she could use one of the self-addressed, stamped post cards provided at the store and mail it to the defendants for a free-play certificate, which could be redeemed for a $1 bill to play the game. Pre-Paid Solutions, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 343 Ark. 317, 34 S.W.3d 360 (2001).

Gambling Device.

Particular items held to be gambling devices. Riley v. State, 120 Ark. 450, 179 S.W. 661 (1915); Howell v. State, 184 Ark. 109, 40 S.W.2d 782 (1931); Steed v. State, 189 Ark. 389, 72 S.W.2d 542 (1934); Stanley v. State, 194 Ark. 483, 107 S.W.2d 532 (1937).

Teletype machines used to furnish horse racing information to various gambling houses with operator's knowledge of the use made by the gambling houses of the information which he was furnishing them from the teletype machine were converted into gambling devices. Albright v. Muncrief, 206 Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1944).

Mere intention to use seized radio equipment in connection with gambling did not make radio equipment a gambling device, if equipment had never been used for gambling. Burnside v. State, 219 Ark. 596, 243 S.W.2d 736 (1951).

Merely setting up a machine that gives free games does not violate this section, but when the free games won on the machine were converted to cash by the proprietor's paying off the games in money the machine clearly became a gaming device. Bostic v. City of Little Rock, 241 Ark. 671, 409 S.W.2d 825 (1966).

Trial court correctly found the owners' video poker and video slot machines were illegal gaming devices and subject to destruction in that they were designed for the purpose of playing a game of chance whereby winning credits entitled the player to continue to play, or if a player had won sufficient credits, to redeem the credits for a prize; although the owners had paid taxes on them as amusement devices, that fact alone did not legalize, authorize, license, or permit any machine equipped with any automatic payoff mechanism. Sharp v. State, 350 Ark. 529, 88 S.W.3d 848 (2002).

Three countertop machines were not gaming devices per se where no tokens, money, or prizes were offered in connection with the machines; the machines were more akin to video arcade machines intended for amusement because a player inserted money and could play gambling-like games, but never received anything in return except amusement. State v. 26 Gaming Machs., 356 Ark. 47, 145 S.W.3d 368 (2004).

Just as devices described as slot machines in another case were determined to be illegal gaming devices, defendant's devices were gambling devices proscribed by this section; because they were slot machines, they were expressly excluded by § 26-57-403(a) from the definition of amusement devices found at § 26-57-402. Paris v. State, 87 Ark. App. 344, 192 S.W.3d 277 (2004).

Gaming Defined.

Gaming is the risking of money, between two or more persons, on a contest or chance of any kind, where one must be loser and the other gainer. The definition of gambling, previously set forth by the court, which comports with the common understanding of the term “gambling,” prevents the statutes from being void for vagueness. State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

Refusal to give an instruction defining the offense under this section as a lesser-included offense of that prescribed by § 5-66-103 where the defendant was either guilty of operating a gambling house or guilty of nothing at all held proper. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ark. 535, 527 S.W.2d 636 (1975).

Money or Property.

The words “money or property” as used in this section mean any money or any valuable thing or any representative of anything that is esteemed of value. Rankin v. Mills Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S.W.2d 161 (1930).

Multiple Convictions.

This section is violated by every one who sets up or exhibits any one of the games named, and he may be separately convicted for maintaining each device. Jacobs v. State, 100 Ark. 591, 141 S.W. 489 (1911).

Separate Offenses.

The offense under this section is distinct from that defined by § 5-66-107, and if both are charged in the same indictment, one will be quashed. State v. Morris, 45 Ark. 62 (1885); Lyman v. State, 90 Ark. 596, 119 S.W. 1116 (1909).

Cited: Colbert v. State, 218 Ark. 790, 238 S.W.2d 749 (1951); Bostic v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 50, 418 S.W.2d 619 (1967); Flaherty v. State, 255 Ark. 187, 500 S.W.2d 87 (1973); Mullins v. State, 359 Ark. 414, 198 S.W.3d 504 (2004).