Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (2026)

Carrying a weapon

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he or she possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his or her person, in a vehicle occupied by him or her, or otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to attempt to unlawfully employ the handgun, knife, or club as a weapon against a person.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Club” means any instrument that is specially designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious physical injury or death by striking, including a blackjack, billie, and sap;
    2. “Handgun” means any firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches (12") that is designed, made, or adapted to be fired with one (1) hand;
    3. “Journey” means travel beyond the county in which a person lives; and
    4. “Knife” means any bladed hand instrument three inches (3") or longer that is capable of inflicting serious physical injury or death by cutting or stabbing, including a dirk, a sword or spear in a cane, a razor, an ice pick, a throwing star, a switchblade, and a butterfly knife.
  3. It is permissible to carry a weapon under this section if at the time of the act of carrying the weapon:
    1. The person is in his or her own dwelling or place of business or on property in which he or she has a possessory or proprietary interest;
    2. The person is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or member of the armed forces acting in the course and scope of his or her official duties;
    3. The person is assisting a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or member of the armed forces acting in the course and scope of his or her official duties pursuant to the direction or request of the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or member of the armed forces;
    4. The person is carrying a weapon when upon a journey, unless the journey is through a commercial airport when presenting at the security checkpoint in the airport or is in the person's checked baggage and is not a lawfully declared weapon;
    5. The person is a registered commissioned security guard acting in the course and scope of his or her duties;
    6. The person is hunting game with a handgun that may be hunted with a handgun under rules and regulations of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission or is en route to or from a hunting area for the purpose of hunting game with a handgun;
      1. The person is a certified law enforcement officer, either on-duty or off-duty.
      2. If the person is an off-duty law enforcement officer, he or she may be required by a public school or publicly supported institution of higher education to be in physical possession of a valid identification identifying the person as a law enforcement officer;
    7. The person is in possession of a concealed handgun and has a valid license to carry a concealed handgun under § 5-73-301 et seq., or recognized under § 5-73-321 and is not in a prohibited place as defined by § 5-73-306;
    8. The person is a prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney carrying a firearm under § 16-21-147; or
    9. The person is in possession of a handgun and is a retired law enforcement officer with a valid concealed carry authorization issued under federal or state law.
  4. Carrying a weapon is a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1975, No. 696, § 1; 1981, No. 813, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-3151; Acts 1987, No. 266, § 1; 1987, No. 556, § 1; 1987, No. 734, § 1; 1995, No. 832, § 1; 2003, No. 1267, § 2; 2005, No. 1994, § 293; 2013; No. 539, § 2; 2013, No. 746, § 2; 2015, No. 1155, § 14; 2019, No. 472, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2019, No. 472, § 6, provided:

“Policy required.

“(a) A state institution shall develop a policy consistent with this act concerning the lawful open or concealed carry of a handgun by an off-duty law enforcement officer at a state institution affected by this act.

“(b) The promulgation of a policy under this section is exempt from the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq”.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1995, No. 832, became law without the Governor's signature.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added “unless the journey … lawfully declared weapon” to the end of (c)(4).

The 2005 amendment, in (a), inserted “or her” twice and “or she”; and substituted “correctional officer” for “prison guard” in (c)(2) and twice in (c)(3).

The 2013 amendment by No. 539 added (c)(9).

The 2013 amendment by No. 746 substituted “to attempt to unlawfully employ” for “to employ” in (a); inserted (b)(3); redesignated former (b)(3)(A) and (3)(B) as (b)(4) and inserted “three inches (3") or longer”; substituted “It is permissible to carry a handgun under this section if” for “It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that” in the introductory language of (c); substituted “registered commissioned security guard” for “licensed security guard” in (c)(5); rewrote (c)(8); added (c)(9) (now (c)(10)); and substituted “Carrying a weapon is a Class A misdemeanor” for “(1) Any person who carries a weapon into an establishment that sells alcoholic beverages is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both. (2) Otherwise, carrying a weapon is a Class A misdemeanor.” in (d).

The 2015 amendment, in the introductory language of (c), substituted “weapon” for “handgun” and substituted “the weapon” for “a weapon”.

The 2019 amendment redesignated (c)(7) as (c)(7)(A); added “either on-duty or off-duty” in (c)(7)(A); and added (c)(7)(B).

Research References

ALR.

Validity of airport security measures. 125 A.L.R.5th 281.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Laws Allowing or Proscribing Openly Carrying Firearms, 25 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2018).

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurent Sacharoff & Jacob Worlow, Open Carry in Arkansas – An Ambiguous Statute, 2014 Ark. L. Notes 1548.

Ark. L. Rev.

Act 696: Robbing the Hunter, or Hunting the Robber? 29 Ark. L. Rev. 570.

John Thomas Shepherd, Comment: Who Is the Arkansas Traveler?: Analyzing Arkansas's “Journey” Exception to the Offense of Carrying a Weapon, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 463 (2013).

J.H. Berry, Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a Difficult Statute, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 139 (2017).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The state may, as a matter of its police power, place appropriate restriction on one's right to bear arms. Jones v. State, 314 Ark. 383, 862 S.W.2d 273 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1237, 114 S. Ct. 2743, 129 L. Ed. 2d 863 (1994).

The simultaneous possession statute, § 5-74-106, does not unconstitutionally overlap or conflict with this section. Johnson v. State, 333 Ark. 673, 972 S.W.2d 935 (1998).

Construction.

The primary differences between this section and § 5-73-121 (now repealed) are (1) § 5-73-121 (now repealed) contains no specific element of purpose to use the knife as a weapon against another person; (2) § 5-73-121 (now repealed) carries a three-month maximum term in jail as compared to one year for violation of this section; and (3) § 5-73-121 (now repealed) includes a presumption of guilt if the knife's blade is three-and-one-half inches in length. Garcia v. State, 333 Ark. 26, 969 S.W.2d 591 (1998) (decision under prior law).

Purpose.

Former section prohibiting the wearing or carrying of certain weapons was intended to prevent the carrying of a pistol with a view of being armed and ready for offense or defense in case of conflict with a person or wantonly going armed. Allison v. State, 161 Ark. 304, 256 S.W. 42 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Assisting Law Enforcement Officers, Etc.

For cases discussing the use of armed services weapons, see McDonald v. State, 83 Ark. 26, 102 S.W. 703 (1907); Blacknall v. State, 90 Ark. 570, 119 S.W. 1119 (1909); Henderson v. State, 91 Ark. 224, 120 S.W. 966 (1909) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Evidence that the defendant was deputized by the town marshal to assist in preventing an expected disturbance which did not occur did not bring his act of carrying a pistol within the exception, as the marshal was not engaged in guarding prisoners. Allison v. State, 161 Ark. 304, 256 S.W. 42 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Evidence and Proof.

It was not necessary to prove that the pistol was loaded. State v. Wardlaw, 43 Ark. 73 (1884) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Clark v. State, 253 Ark. 454, 486 S.W.2d 677 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant possessed a knife bearing a double-edged, nearly five-inch blade which was concealed under his shirt and in the small part of his back, the knife was described as a gang-type weapon, and defendant offered no explanation for having the knife concealed on his person, evidence of violation of this section held sufficient. Nesdahl v. State, 319 Ark. 277, 890 S.W.2d 596 (1995).

Arrest of driver for violation of this section, after being stopped and searched because the car had no license plates, upheld. United States v. Peyton, 108 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for carrying a weapon where the defendant, without a permit, had in her vehicle and in her possession a handgun, and she pointed the gun at another person, which was evidence that the purpose of the handgun was for use against a person. Dillehay v. State, 74 Ark. App. 100, 46 S.W.3d 545 (2001).

In a case in which a youth was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent upon a finding that he had committed the criminal offense of carrying a weapon, in violation of this section, he unsuccessfully argued that the state did not prove that he knew the knife was there because he was driving a borrowed car, his sending the officer to retrieve his cell phone was inconsistent with such knowledge, and merely being in the car with the knife—what he referred to as joint occupancy—was insufficient evidence to sustain his adjudication. The issue on appeal was not one of joint occupancy since the youth was alone in the vehicle; therefore, the question was whether there was sufficient evidence to find that he constructively possessed the knife, and, while trial counsel seemed to have made some argument with regard to the purpose element, such argument was conspicuously absent on appeal. M.S. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 254 (2010).

In a case in which a youth was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent upon a finding that he had committed the criminal offense of carrying a weapon, in violation of this section, he unsuccessfully argued that the search of the car that yielded the weapon should have been suppressed. The intrusion into the vehicle was not a search, but an errand undertaken at the youth's request to retrieve his cell phone, and the knife, or at least the handle, was found in plain sight by a police officer. M.S. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 254 (2010).

Indictment.

Indictment held sufficient. State v. Masner, 150 Ark. 469, 234 S.W. 474 (1921) (decision under prior law).

Lawful Use.

Carrying a pistol to kill hogs was not a violation of former section prohibiting the wearing or carrying of certain weapons. Cornwell v. State, 68 Ark. 447, 60 S.W. 28 (1900) (decision under prior law).

Length of Time Carried.

The weapon need not have been carried for any particular length of time. Henderson v. State, 91 Ark. 224, 120 S.W. 966 (1909); Thompson v. City of Little Rock, 194 Ark. 78, 105 S.W.2d 537 (1937) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Mail Carriers.

A mail carrier was not by reason of his occupation exempted from former section prohibiting the wearing or carrying of certain weapons. Hathcote v. State, 55 Ark. 181, 17 S.W. 721 (1891) (decision under prior law).

Occupied Vehicle.

Having a pistol in a glove compartment of an automobile was carrying a pistol. Stephens v. City of Ft. Smith, 227 Ark. 609, 300 S.W.2d 14 (1957) (decision under prior law).

There was probable cause to search a car's dashboard compartment where the ammunition in the car, the currency in the vents, and the configuration of the dashboard indicated a fair probability that guns, or other contraband or evidence of a crime, would be found in the dashboard compartment; defendant was held to possess the weapon found in the dashboard compartment. United States v. Sample, 136 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 1998).

Own Dwelling, Property, Etc.

The exception in regard to carrying weapons upon one's own premises only protected such as have an estate or interest in the premises. Kinkead v. State, 45 Ark. 536 (1885) (decision under prior law).

A tenant in possession of leased premises had such an interest that would have included him in the exception; however, a lodger or renter who used premises in common with others did not have such an interest that would bring him within the exception. Clark v. State, 49 Ark. 174, 4 S.W. 658 (1887) (decision under prior law).

A landlord had no right to carry weapons upon premises in possession of a tenant, although the tenant was wrongfully detaining the same after the termination of his lease. Jones v. State, 55 Ark. 186, 17 S.W. 719 (1891) (decision under prior law).

A mere license to enter certain premises gave no right to carry weapons there. Lemmons v. State, 56 Ark. 559, 20 S.W. 404 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Owner of fee in a highway was not entitled to carry weapons thereon. Moss v. State, 65 Ark. 368, 45 S.W. 987 (1898) (decision under prior law).

The word “business” in subsection (c)(1) does not include vehicular businesses, such as a taxi cab or other motor vehicles used for commercial purposes. Boston v. State, 330 Ark. 99, 952 S.W.2d 671 (1997).

Persons Upon a Journey.

One who was going from home to a definite point distant enough to convey him beyond the circle of his neighbors, and to detain him throughout the day, and not within the routine of his daily business, was upon a journey within the meaning of the former exception. Davis v. State, 45 Ark. 359 (1885) (decision under prior law).

The exception to former statute prohibiting the wearing or carrying of certain weapons was designed as a protection against the perils of the highway to which strangers were exposed, and which were not supposed to exist among one's neighbors. Hathcote v. State, 55 Ark. 181, 17 S.W. 721 (1891) (decision under prior law).

Whether a mail carrier on his daily trip was making a journey within the meaning of the law was a question of fact for a jury. Hathcote v. State, 55 Ark. 181, 17 S.W. 721 (1891) (decision under prior law).

One who has been on a journey could not, after his return to his accustomed haunts, continue to carry his pistol. Holland v. State, 73 Ark. 425, 84 S.W. 468 (1904) (decision under prior law).

A person, upon completing a journey, could not continue to carry a pistol upon stopping an hour or so at the home of his relative. Ackerson v. State, 76 Ark. 301, 89 S.W. 550 (1905) (decision under prior law).

One returning home from a town some miles distant where he knew only one person was upon a journey. Ellington v. Town of Denning, 99 Ark. 236, 138 S.W. 453 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Whether or not the accused was on a journey was a question for the jury. Collins v. State, 183 Ark. 425, 36 S.W.2d 75 (1931) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant was merely going from North Little Rock to Little Rock, the defendant, who was charged with carrying a gun illegally, was not entitled to the defense of carrying a weapon when upon a journey. Woodall v. State, 260 Ark. 786, 543 S.W.2d 957 (1976) (decision under prior law).

Where there was no evidence in the record which indicated that by driving to a certain city and back, defendant had traveled beyond the circle of his neighbors and general acquaintances, making it necessary to defend against the perils of the highway, the court's failure to give an instruction that being on a “journey” was a defense to the charge of carrying a prohibited weapon did not constitute reversible error. Riggins v. State, 17 Ark. App. 68, 703 S.W.2d 463 (1986).

Possession.

Police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop and search defendant where no crime was being investigated at the time the blue lights were engaged, nothing indicated that defendant had an unlawful intent in possessing the weapon while at a store, and defendant had walked two miles away from the store at the time of the encounter. Merely possessing a weapon is not a crime in Arkansas; under the clear language of this section, the possessor of a handgun must have an unlawful intent to employ it as a weapon against a person in order to make that possession a criminal act. Taff v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 488, 562 S.W.3d 877 (2018).

Use as a Weapon.

To sustain a conviction it was essential to show that the pistol was carried as a weapon and whether it was so carried was a question for the jury. Wylie v. State, 131 Ark. 572, 199 S.W. 905 (1917) (decision under prior law).

Where pistol was loaded it could be presumed that it was placed in the glove compartment of automobile as a weapon. Stephens v. City of Ft. Smith, 227 Ark. 609, 300 S.W.2d 14 (1957) (decision under prior law).

There was a presumption of fact that the loaded pistol found by sheriff's officers under the front seat of the car driven by appellant was placed there as a weapon, and while that presumption may have been removed by proof offered by appellant, it was a question of fact for the jury to resolve the truth and determine whether the pistol was carried as a weapon. Clark v. State, 253 Ark. 454, 486 S.W.2d 677 (1972) (decision under prior law).

There is a presumption that a loaded pistol is placed in a car as a weapon. McGuire v. State, 265 Ark. 621, 580 S.W.2d 198 (1979).

Cited: Duckins v. State, 271 Ark. 658, 609 S.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1980); Hutcherson v. State, 34 Ark. App. 113, 806 S.W.2d 29 (1991); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Murders, 327 Ark. 426, 327 Ark. 426, 938 S.W.2d 854 (1997).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1990–2023 · leading case: Christopher Stoner v. Eugene Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013).
Christopher Stoner v. Eugene Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013). · cites it 14× “§ 5-73-120(a), a person must have “a purpose to employ the handgun, knife, or club as a weapon against a person,” regardless of whether the person possesses the weapon on his person, in a vehicle, or in such a manner that the weapon is readily available for use.”
Jesse W. Pettry v. State of Arkansas, 2020 Ark. App. 162 (Ark. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 11× “Pettry’s brief asked the court to dismiss the weapon charge and find him not guilty because the facts 13 did not support a conviction for violating Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 . As he put it, “The State has not only the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the handgun…”
Garcia v. State, 969 S.W.2d 591 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 21× “Garcia was initially charged with carrying a knife with the purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (Supp. 1995), in addition to an unrelated third-degree battery charge.”
Boston v. State, 952 S.W.2d 671 (Ark. 1997). · cites it 10× “Appellant Sterling Boston was convicted in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (Supp. 1995), the unauthorized carrying of a weapon.”
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013). · cites it 2× “2 See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-73-120 , 5-73-315; Fla.”
Cockrell v. State, 370 S.W.3d 197 (Ark. 2010). · cites it 5× “2 The defense also addressed the charge of carrying a weapon and argued that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (Repl. 2005), a person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a handgun, knife, or club on his person, in his vehicle, or otherwise readily available…”
Johnson v. State, 972 S.W.2d 935 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 4× “He points out that § 5-73-120 provides certain strictures that make it unlawful for a person to carry a weapon (including a handgun) and that, under subsections (C)(1) and (4), the statute specifically allows a person to possess and carry a weapon in one’s home or when on a…”
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. Murders, 938 S.W.2d 854 (Ark. 1997). · cites it 4× “Finally, the appellees claimed that the amendment was contrary to statute, particularly Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (Repl. 1993). Following a trial, the trial court entered an order declaring that the amended portion of regulation 18.”
Jones v. City of Little Rock, 862 S.W.2d 273 (Ark. 1993). · cites it 5× “§ 27-14-304 (1987); failure to obtain a vehicle inspection sticker, Ark. Code Ann.”
State v. Lutters, 853 A.2d 434 (Conn. 2004). “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (c) (Michie Sup.”
Rosario v. State, 894 S.W.2d 888 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 2× “See section 5-73-119(a)(2) (possession of a handgun by any person on public school property, on a school bus or at a school bus stop); section 5-73-119(a)(3) (possession of a handgun by any person on property of state-supported higher education facility or in vehicle or…”
Nesdahl v. State, 890 S.W.2d 596 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 6× “Nesdahl was charged and convicted under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (a) (1987) which in relevant part provides a person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a knife on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120(a) — 6 cases
Christopher Stoner v. Eugene Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013). “§ 5-73-120(a), a person must have “a purpose to employ the handgun, knife, or club as a weapon against a person,” regardless of whether the person possesses the weapon on his person, in a vehicle, or in such a manner that the weapon is readily available for use.”
Cockrell v. State, 370 S.W.3d 197 (Ark. 2010). “2 The defense also addressed the charge of carrying a weapon and argued that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (Repl. 2005), a person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a handgun, knife, or club on his person, in his vehicle, or otherwise readily available…”
Jones v. City of Little Rock, 862 S.W.2d 273 (Ark. 1993). “§ 27-14-304 (1987); failure to obtain a vehicle inspection sticker, Ark. Code Ann.”
Tyler McKisick v. State of Arkansas, 2022 Ark. App. 426 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022).
Nesdahl v. State, 890 S.W.2d 596 (Ark. 1995). “Nesdahl was charged and convicted under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (a) (1987) which in relevant part provides a person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a knife on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120(b)(1) — 1 case
Cockrell v. State, 369 S.W.3d 19 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120(b)(2) — 1 case
Nesdahl v. State, 890 S.W.2d 596 (Ark. 1995). “Nesdahl was charged and convicted under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (a) (1987) which in relevant part provides a person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a knife on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120(b)(l) — 1 case
Cockrell v. State, 370 S.W.3d 197 (Ark. 2010). “2 The defense also addressed the charge of carrying a weapon and argued that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120 (Repl. 2005), a person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a handgun, knife, or club on his person, in his vehicle, or otherwise readily available…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120(c)(4) — 2 cases
Christopher Stoner v. Eugene Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013). “§ 5-73-120(a), a person must have “a purpose to employ the handgun, knife, or club as a weapon against a person,” regardless of whether the person possesses the weapon on his person, in a vehicle, or in such a manner that the weapon is readily available for use.”
State v. Donahue, 978 S.W.2d 748 (Ark. 1998).
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