Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-801 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction and Application of State Statutory Limitations Periods Governing Election Contests. 60 A.L.R.6th 481.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Election Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 903.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The right to contest an election is a statutory proceeding, the purpose of which is to furnish a summary remedy and to secure a speedy trial. McCastlain v. Elmore, 340 Ark. 365, 10 S.W.3d 835 (2000).

Applicability.

This section is directed toward elections involving candidates, and not toward local option elections. Garrett v. Andrews, 294 Ark. 160, 741 S.W.2d 257 (1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S. Ct. 2873, 101 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1988).

This section only applies to an action by a candidate to contest the certification of a nomination or of the vote following an election; it does not apply to an action brought to challenge to the qualifications of a candidate for public office. Jacobs v. Yates, 342 Ark. 243, 27 S.W.3d 734 (2000).

This section provides a right of action to contest the certification of the nomination or the certificate of vote after an election; thus, the 20-day period for such an action is not applicable to an action brought before a primary election to determine the eligibility of a candidate. Valley v. Bogard, 342 Ark. 336, 28 S.W.3d 269 (2000).

Trial court erred in disimissing a Democratic candidate's challenge to a Republican candidate's residency requirements as the complaint was specifically authorized by § 7-5-207(b) and this section did not apply. Tumey v. Daniels, 359 Ark. 256, 196 S.W.3d 479 (2004).

Voter's filing of election contest in Pulaski County was in error as jurisdiction under subsection (b) of this section was in Phillips County, as that was the county of District 16 where wrongful acts were alleged to have occurred; there was no jurisdiction under the statute to hear a post-election contest in Pulaski County. Simes v. Crumbly, 368 Ark. 1, 242 S.W.3d 610 (2006).

In an election contest, the circuit court erred in dismissing a complaint by a candidate for failure to join the Secretary of State as a party; the complaint was properly filed in the correct county and was timely filed, timely served, and timely answered by the electoral winner; although the specific procedure was provided by this section, it did not supplant the rules of civil procedure. Baker v. Rogers, 368 Ark. 134, 243 S.W.3d 911 (2006).

Appellee candidate's petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment, which sought to have appellant candidate declared ineligible, was dismissed because (1) appellee filed the petition postelection rather than preelection, (2) the petition did not institute a postelection contest under this section because appellee alleged a right to a postelection challenge of appellant's eligibility, and the parties stipulated that appellant obtained the most votes; and (3) a circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear a postelection challenge to eligibility, and the remedy for usurpation of office lay with the state under quo warranto. Zolliecoffer v. Post, 371 Ark. 263, 265 S.W.3d 114 (2007).

School district residents attempted to state a cause of action in illegal exaction, Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13, and the circuit court erred in finding that they alleged a cause of action contesting the school district election, § 6-14-116; the circuit court had to determine whether the residents had stated a cause of action in illegal exaction on remand. Dollarway Patrons for Better Sch. v. Dollarway Sch. Dist., 374 Ark. 92, 286 S.W.3d 123 (2008).

Petition of candidate, who brought a preelection attack on the eligibility of a competing Court of Appeals candidate, was compliant with Arkansas law despite lacking an affidavit. This section is a postelection procedure; preelection attacks are governed by § 7-5-207(b), and that section does not have a verification requirement. Barrett v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 36 (2020).

Abatement or Mootness.

The right of a contestant to have the action determined does not abate or become moot by the act of the contestee in resigning from the office. Cain v. Carl-Lee, 171 Ark. 155, 283 S.W. 365 (1926) (decision under prior law).

In election contest suit where unsuccessful candidate in preferential primary contested certification of vote and certification of nomination, his cause did not become moot after he was elected alderman in general election. Porter v. Hesselbein, 235 Ark. 379, 360 S.W.2d 499 (1962) (decision under prior law).

Challenge to Constitutionality.

Person who is aggrieved by a statute he considers to be unconstitutional may not challenge it by declaratory judgment, in lieu of special statutory procedures designed to determine the issue in the election contest which is the context. Riley v. City of Corning, 294 Ark. 480, 743 S.W.2d 820 (1988).

Complaints.

Circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that the claimant was attempting to amend his complaint with a new cause of action by offering proof of absentee-ballot irregularities under the miscellaneous other category in the claimant's exhibit, because the claimant was perfectly within his rights to make his allegations of absentee-ballot irregularities for nursing home residents, in particular, more definite and certain by offering proof of those violations. The claimant alleged a valid cause of action and set out a prima facie case with sufficient facts to give reasonable information as to the grounds of the contest, and he proffered absentee applications and voter statements to show why and how the ballots were illegal. Willis v. Crumbly, 371 Ark. 517, 268 S.W.3d 288 (2007).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying a candidate's motion for a writ of mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief, because the candidate did not timely challenge the Democratic Party of Arkansas' failure to certify him for placement on the general-election ballot within twenty days, as required by this section. Dobbins v. Democratic Party of Ark., 374 Ark. 496, 288 S.W.3d 639 (2008).

—Amendments.

The complaint filed in a contest cannot be amended to state a new cause of action where the time for bringing the action has expired. Bland v. Benton, 171 Ark. 805, 286 S.W. 976 (1926) (decision under prior law); Cain v. McGregor, 182 Ark. 633, 32 S.W.2d 319 (1930) (decision under prior law); Winton v. Irby, 189 Ark. 906, 75 S.W.2d 656 (1934) (decision under prior law); Martin v. Gray, 193 Ark. 32, 97 S.W.2d 439 (1936) (decision under prior law).

A contestant may, after expiration of the time for filing a contest, amend his original complaint so as to make it more definite and certain. Robinson v. Knowlton, 183 Ark. 1127, 40 S.W.2d 450 (1931) (decision under prior law); Winton v. Irby, 189 Ark. 906, 75 S.W.2d 656 (1934) (decision under prior law).

Amendments could be made after the period specified for filing complaint to perfect causes of action defectively stated within the filing period. Hailey v. Barker, 193 Ark. 101, 97 S.W.2d 923 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Filing of affidavit within specified filing period is jurisdictional and if the affidavit is insufficient at the close of the period, contestant will not be permitted thereafter to amend it so as to confer jurisdiction upon trial court. Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122 S.W.2d 182 (1938); Murphy v. Trimble, 200 Ark. 1173, 143 S.W.2d 534 (1940) (decisions under prior law).

Where complaint and first amendment did not state cause of action, they could not be corrected by second amendment which was not filed within 20 days after certification. Wilson v. Ellis, 230 Ark. 775, 324 S.W.2d 513 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Refusal of court to permit amendment of complaint after expiration of 20 days was not error where original complaint seeking to contest election did not state cause of action. Wheeler v. Jones, 239 Ark. 455, 390 S.W.2d 129, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S. Ct. 313, 15 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1965) (decision under prior law).

Permission to amend properly denied where allegations of petition to amend were insufficient. Simonetti v. Brick, 266 Ark. 551, 587 S.W.2d 16 (1979).

Where election contestant failed to allege facts necessary to contest the election and have herself declared the person with the most votes, it was too late on appeal for her to amend the complaint. Rubens v. Hodges, 310 Ark. 451, 837 S.W.2d 465 (1992).

—Sufficiency.

Allegations of complaint held insufficient. Crawford v. Harmon, 149 Ark. 343, 232 S.W. 427 (1921) (decision under prior law); Hill v. Williams, 165 Ark. 421, 264 S.W. 964 (1924) (decision under prior law); McClendon v. McKeown, 230 Ark. 521, 323 S.W.2d 542 (1959) (decision under prior law); Wilson v. Ellis, 230 Ark. 775, 324 S.W.2d 513 (1959) (decision under prior law); Rubens v. Hodges, 310 Ark. 451, 837 S.W.2d 465 (1992).

An election contest is an adversary proceeding between a candidate not certified and a nominee who was certified if there were only two candidates for the office involved. The pleadings in an election contest case should be sufficiently specific to give reasonable information as to the grounds of contest. McClendon v. McKeown, 230 Ark. 521, 323 S.W.2d 542 (1959) (decision under prior law).

It is necessary to allege facts and not conclusions. Wilson v. Ellis, 230 Ark. 775, 324 S.W.2d 513 (1959) (decision under prior law).

A duly qualified candidate for a municipal office can properly contest an election, where under the facts, although he cannot honestly allege that he received a sufficient number of votes to entitle him to certificate of nomination, he can allege that when the election returns are purged of the enumerated illegal votes it will be shown that such candidate should be certified as a candidate in the run-off or general primary election. Porter v. Hesselbein, 235 Ark. 379, 360 S.W.2d 499 (1962) (decision under prior law).

Appellee's complaint regarding illegal votes complied with the requirements established for stating a cause of action under Wheeler and Womack, where: (1) he named all nine voters in question; (2) he included the number of votes received by each candidate so that a subtraction of the illegally cast votes would show that the contestant received more votes than appellant; (3) appellee averred that the election commission certified appellant as the winner with a vote total of 227 to 219 for appellee for a difference of eight votes; and (4) he stated that the disqualification of the named voters' votes was sufficient to reverse the election results and certify him the true winner of said election. Tate-Smith v. Cupples, 355 Ark. 230, 134 S.W.3d 535 (2003).

—Time of Filing.

Provision requiring the contest to be filed within certain number of days of the certification is mandatory and jurisdictional. Gower v. Johnson, 173 Ark. 120, 292 S.W. 382 (1927); Moore v. Childers, 186 Ark. 563, 54 S.W.2d 409 (1932) (decisions under prior law).

Filing held untimely. Hays v. Harris, 188 Ark. 354, 65 S.W.2d 526 (1933) (decision under prior law); Denney v. Hankins, 212 Ark. 618, 206 S.W.2d 968 (1947) (decision under prior law); Buffington v. Carson, 219 Ark. 804, 244 S.W.2d 954 (1952) (decision under prior law).

Filing held timely. Matthews v. Warfield, 201 Ark. 296, 144 S.W.2d 22 (1940) (decision under prior law).

Filing period held not applicable to appeal from circuit court judgment. Vance v. Johnson, 238 Ark. 1009, 386 S.W.2d 240 (1965) (decision under prior law).

Where the defeated candidates filed a complaint alleging the winning candidates were ineligible, the pleadings, in effect, showed it was an election contest and was deficient when the complaint showed on its face it was not filed within the statutory time following certification of election. Gay v. Brooks, 251 Ark. 565, 473 S.W.2d 441 (1971).

Because no one contested nominee's certification of nomination or certificate of vote within the twenty-day period provided under this section, the nominee was the certified Democratic nominee for the district position before and at the time he withdrew his nomination, leaving a vacancy. Tittle v. Woodruff, 322 Ark. 153, 907 S.W.2d 734 (1995).

Where a candidate timely filed a complaint contesting the certification of election results but filed his verifying affidavit four days after the deadline for the complaint, the action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the statutory language setting the deadline for filing the complaint is unambiguous and the deadline itself is mandatory and jurisdictional. Willis v. King, 352 Ark. 55, 98 S.W.3d 427 (2003).

Where candidate filed a petition for qualification as an independent candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, was notified that his petition was not certified in a letter from the Elections Division of the Secretary of State dated May 2, 2006, but the candidate did not file his verified complaint against the Arkansas Secretary of State until May 31, 2006, which was nine days late, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Daniels v. Weaver, 367 Ark. 327, 240 S.W.3d 95 (2006).

Eligibility to Contest.

Only one claiming to be the nominee at a primary election may contest the election. Storey v. Looney, 165 Ark. 455, 265 S.W. 51 (1924) (decision under prior law).

There is no requirement that a candidate, in order to contest an election, must not himself have been guilty of engaging in corrupt practices. Cain v. CarlLee, 169 Ark. 887, 277 S.W. 551 (1925) (decision under prior law).

The right of contest is confined to the candidate at the primary election and to one who claims to be the rightful nominee. Stewart v. Hunnicutt, 178 Ark. 829, 12 S.W.2d 418 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Loser in primary election was eligible to contest primary election, though chairman of party extracted pollbooks from ballot box and handed same to loser, as ballots themselves were not disturbed. Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 220 S.W.2d 592 (1949) (decision under prior law).

The right of contest is conferred on any candidate with the result that anyone who has been allowed to participate in a primary election as a candidate need not establish anew his qualifications to be a candidate unless they are affirmatively questioned. Gunter v. Fletcher, 217 Ark. 800, 233 S.W.2d 242 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Law providing for a preferential primary election gave as a matter of public policy the right to contest that election upon the proper allegations of entitlement to be certified as a candidate in the run-off or general primary election. Porter v. Hesselbein, 235 Ark. 379, 360 S.W.2d 499 (1962) (decision under prior law).

There is no authority granting the electorate in general a right to challenge the candidacy of a party nominee for failure of the nominating party to enforce a party rule; the party, in its discretion, may waive such requirements subject only to a timely challenge by a candidate or a person with such a relationship with the political party so as to confer standing to challenge the party's action or inaction. Baker v. Jacobs, 303 Ark. 460, 798 S.W.2d 63 (1990).

The right to contest an election is limited to one who claims to be the rightful winner of the contest, and that person must plead that he or she received the majority of the votes. Rubens v. Hodges, 310 Ark. 451, 837 S.W.2d 465 (1992).

This section provides a private, post-election right to challenge an election by allowing a candidate to contest certification by the county board of election commissions; however, the statute was not applicable where neither of the residents who brought the action were candidates and eligibility was challenged, rather than certification of a winner, such that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the action. Pederson v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 128 S.W.3d 818 (2003).

Jurisdiction.

The circuit court had jurisdiction to try contests of election for offices of mayor and of marshal. Payne v. Rittman, 66 Ark. 201, 49 S.W. 814 (1899); Whittaker v. Watson, 68 Ark. 555, 60 S.W. 652 (1901) (decisions under prior law).

The General Assembly may confer on the circuit court original jurisdiction to try contests. Sumpter v. Duffie, 80 Ark. 369, 97 S.W. 435 (1906) (decision under prior law).

In a contest of the election of a member of a county board of education or member of a school district board of directors, the sole forum was the circuit court of the county wherein the contested office existed and its jurisdiction was invoked even in the absence of notice to the contestee where the statutory procedures of § 6-14-116 and law providing procedure for election contests were complied with. Kirk v. Roach, 226 Ark. 799, 294 S.W.2d 335 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court had jurisdiction of election contest for county board of education although summons was not issued and served on defendant, where notice was served on defendant under election contests law and and he entered appearance and never questioned sufficiency of service before or during trial. Bradley v. Jones, 227 Ark. 574, 300 S.W.2d 1 (1957) (decision under prior law).

The chancery court did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction ordering the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to cease prohibiting wholesalers from delivering or selling liquor in a precinct voted dry, since election contests are the exclusive domain of the circuit court. ABC Bd. v. Munson, 287 Ark. 53, 696 S.W.2d 720 (1985).

Where the complaint failed to state sufficient facts for the trial court to determine that jurisdiction was properly alleged, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. King v. Whitfield, 339 Ark. 176, 5 S.W.3d 21 (1999).

Trial court had jurisdiction over the election contest and jurisdiction was not subsequently erased by the election, because the action was filed pre-election. Oliver v. Phillips, 375 Ark. 287, 290 S.W.3d 11 (2008).

Legality of Votes.

The real inquiry upon a contest is whether the contestant or the respondent received the highest number of legal votes, and it is not confined to the ground specified in the notice of contest. The respondent may, without any cross contest, call in question the validity of the votes cast for the contestant, either in the township specified in the notice or any other township in the county. Govan v. Jackson, 32 Ark. 553 (1877) (decision under prior law).

The ineligibility of a party elected to office does not render the votes cast for him illegal, nor give the election to his competitor next highest in the poll. Swepston v. Barton, 39 Ark. 549 (1882) (decision under prior law).

Refusing legal or receiving illegal votes will not affect the election unless they were sufficient in number to change the majority. Swepston v. Barton, 39 Ark. 549 (1882) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court erred to the extent that it based its decision to grant the dismissal on the failure of the claimant to prove specifically how each challenged voter voted, because without question, the claimant should not have been required to present tracing evidence of how each challenged voter voted when he was foreclosed from doing so by Ark. Const. Amend. 81. Willis v. Crumbly, 371 Ark. 517, 268 S.W.3d 288 (2007).

Loyalty Oath.

Whether a political party's rules dictate a loyalty oath, whether the loyalty oath requirement may or may not be waived, and whether certification or decertification results from a nominee's failure to execute a loyalty oath are matters generally left to the political party; however, an exception to this rule is provided for in this section, which confers a right of action on any candidate to contest the certification of a nomination within twenty (20) days of the certification complained of. Baker v. Jacobs, 303 Ark. 460, 798 S.W.2d 63 (1990).

Particular Offices.

Township road overseer was “township officer.” Condren v. Gibbs, 94 Ark. 478, 127 S.W. 731 (1910) (decision under prior law).

School officers are county officers. Ferguson v. Wolchansky, 133 Ark. 516, 202 S.W. 826 (1918) (decision under prior law).

The prosecuting attorney is not a state officer within law, requiring contests for nomination to state offices to be in Pulaski County. Morrow v. Strait, 186 Ark. 384, 53 S.W.2d 857 (1932) (decision under prior law).

Candidate's post-election challenge to a state senate runoff election was properly brought within the circuit or district in which alleged voter fraud occurred; further, the Secretary of State and the State Democratic Committee were not indispensable parties for complete relief under Ark. R. Civ. P. 19 because the office of state senator was not a “state office” as that term had been differentiated in §§ 7-7-401 and 7-5-804, and Ark. Const. art. 5, §§ 3 and 4. Willis v. Crumbly, 368 Ark. 5, 242 S.W.3d 600 (2006).

Parties.

The party claiming the office and the state may join as plaintiffs against another in possession of the office. Whittaker v. Watson, 68 Ark. 555, 60 S.W. 652 (1901) (decision under prior law).

In an election contest, as distinguished from an action seeking to void an election, the election commission is not the proper party defendant, although it is a proper nominal defendant because the commission's function is to promote fair elections, to act in a disinterested manner in disputes between candidates or their representatives, and to take neither side in a contest. Rubens v. Hodges, 310 Ark. 451, 837 S.W.2d 465 (1992).

There is no statute governing who is the proper party defendant in an election contest situation where a candidate dies before an election, and the deceased candidate prevails in the election, and the results of the election are contested by another candidate. Rubens v. Hodges, 310 Ark. 451, 837 S.W.2d 465 (1992).

Rules of Procedure.

Election contests are special proceedings and, therefore, the rules of civil procedure do not apply, in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 81, which exempts those instances where a statute specifically provides a different procedure, in which event the procedure so specified shall apply. Rubens v. Hodges, 310 Ark. 451, 837 S.W.2d 465 (1992).

Because election contests are special proceedings, the rules of civil procedure do not apply. McCastlain v. Elmore, 340 Ark. 365, 10 S.W.3d 835 (2000).

Where candidate filed a petition for qualification as an independent candidate for the office of Arkansas House of Representatives and his petition was denied because it did not contain the required number of verified signatures, the candidate erred by filing a civil rights action against the Arkansas Secretary of State in the Phillips County Circuit Court; subsection (b) of this section required the suit to be filed in Pulaski County, Arkansas. Daniels v. Weaver, 367 Ark. 327, 240 S.W.3d 95 (2006).

In an election contest brought under this section, the candidate still had to prove her allegations of voting irregularities, much as a plaintiff seeking a default judgment has to prove damages under Ark. R. Civ. P. 55, even though Rule 55 did not apply where the statute provided rights, remedies, and procedures. Baker v. Rogers, 368 Ark. 134, 243 S.W.3d 911 (2006).

Where this section provided statutory rights and remedies for election contests that differed from civil procedures rules, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 81, neither Ark. R. Civ. P. 12 nor any other rule of civil procedure applied, and the electoral winner and Carroll County Board of Commissioners were required to file answers within 20 days after the candidate filed her complaint; thus, because no answer was ever filed, dismissal of the complaint for lack of a necessary party was improper. Baker v. Rogers, 368 Ark. 134, 243 S.W.3d 911 (2006).

Service of Process.

Requirement of service held to be waived. Wilson v. Luck, 201 Ark. 594, 146 S.W.2d 696 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Verification by Affidavit.

Affidavits are jurisdictional and must be filed within the time specified. Logan v. Russell, 136 Ark. 217, 206 S.W. 131 (1918) (decision under prior law); McLain v. Fish, 159 Ark. 199, 251 S.W. 686 (1923) (decision under prior law); Culpepper v. Mathews, 167 Ark. 253, 267 S.W. 773 (1925) (decision under prior law); Kirk v. Hartlieb, 193 Ark. 37, 97 S.W.2d 434 (1936) (decision under prior law).

It was error to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that the affidavit failed to state that the affiants were of the same political party with contestant. Ferguson v. Montgomery, 148 Ark. 83, 229 S.W. 30 (1921) (decision under prior law).

Affidavits cannot be made before a notary public who has moved from the county in which the affidavits are made. Lanier v. Norfleet, 156 Ark. 216, 245 S.W. 498 (1922) (decision under prior law).

Where signatures were obtained and thereafter the circuit clerk signed his name to the jurat without alleged affiants appearing before him, affidavit was insufficient. Kirk v. Hartlieb, 193 Ark. 37, 97 S.W.2d 434 (1936) (decision under prior law).

A supporting affidavit attached to the complaint was insufficient where the signatures were not affixed in the personal presence of the officer administering the oath. Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122 S.W.2d 182 (1938) (decision under prior law).

The right to question the sufficiency of affidavit, though it may appear sufficient on its face, is given the contestee. Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122 S.W.2d 182 (1938); Murphy v. Trimble, 200 Ark. 1173, 143 S.W.2d 534 (1940) (decisions under prior law).

Before Supreme Court can determine the legal effect of testimony regarding manner of signing and acknowledging verification, trial court should determine whether affiant after signing affidavit failed in the presence of the clerk to assert his belief in the truthfulness of what the paper contained. Thomas v. Hawkins, 217 Ark. 787, 233 S.W.2d 247 (1950) (decision under prior law).

In contest of election suit, document styled “Answer and Cross Complaint” did not require verification, being nothing more than an answer asserting defenses to the complaint. Edwards v. Williams, 234 Ark. 1113, 356 S.W.2d 629 (1962) (decision under prior law).

There is no requirement that the verification of a complaint of persons contesting an election must be based upon contestants' personal knowledge of facts, rather than belief induced by reports of investigators. Reed v. Baker, 254 Ark. 631, 495 S.W.2d 849 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Writ of Prohibition.

Court had no jurisdiction under election contest law over petition for writ of prohibition in action concerning wrongful ouster from office subsequent to election. Foster v. Ponder, 235 Ark. 660, 361 S.W.2d 538 (1962).

Cited: ABC Div. v. Barnett, 285 Ark. 189, 685 S.W.2d 511 (1985); Lawson v. St. Francis County Election Comm'n, 309 Ark. 135, 827 S.W.2d 159 (1992); Hasha v. City of Fayetteville, 311 Ark. 460, 845 S.W.2d 500 (1993); City of Springdale v. Town of Bethel Heights, 311 Ark. 497, 845 S.W.2d 1 (1993); Hill v. Carter, 357 Ark. 597, 184 S.W.3d 431 (2004).