Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-505 (2026)

Control of separate real and personal property

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. The real and personal property that any married person now owns, or has had conveyed to him or her by any person in good faith and without prejudice to existing creditors, that is acquired as sole and separate property, that comes to him or her by gift, bequest, descent, grant, or conveyance from any person, that he or she has acquired by trade, business, labor, or services carried on or performed on his or her sole or separate account, that a married person in this state holds or owns at the time of the marriage, and the rents, issues, and proceeds of all such property shall, notwithstanding the marriage, be and remain his or her sole and separate property.
  2. The separate property may be used, collected, and invested by him or her, in his or her own name, and shall not be subject to the interference or control of his or her spouse nor shall it be liable for the spouse's debts, except as may have been contracted for the support of the spouse, or support of the children of the marriage by the spouse or his or her agent.

History. Acts 1873, No. 126, § 2, p. 382; C. & M. Dig., § 5580; Pope's Dig., § 7230; Acts 1981, No. 873, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 55-404.

Cross References. Property of femme covert, Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 7.

Case Notes

Construction with Other Law.

Where decedent and his surviving spouse were married for only four years, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the transfer-on-death (TOD) account was the sole and separate property of decedent's three children by a prior marriage as the named beneficiaries of the TOD account; the funds used to purchase the account were gained as the result of the sale of decedent's business, which he acquired before his marriage to the surviving spouse and continued to hold as his separate property during the course of the marriage, and the surviving spouse admittedly had no ownership interest in the business, nor was their commingling of any funds between the surviving spouse and the decedent once they were married. Ginsburg v. Ginsburg, 359 Ark. 226, 195 S.W.3d 898 (2004).

Conveyance.

A wife may convey her separate estate as a femme sole and even though conveyance is without acknowledgment it would be valid between the parties. Johnson v. Graham Bros. Co., 98 Ark. 274, 135 S.W. 853 (1911).

Curtesy.

If a woman makes no disposal of her separate property and there is issue born alive of the marriage, at her death husband's right of curtesy attaches as at common law. Neely v. Lancaster, 47 Ark. 175, 1 S.W. 66 (1886). See also Percy v. Cockrill, 53 F. 872 (8th Cir. 1893); McGuire v. Cook, 98 Ark. 118, 135 S.W. 840 (1911).

Husband's right of curtesy is superior to claim of wife's creditors. Hampton v. Cook, 64 Ark. 353, 42 S.W. 535 (1897).

Liability for Debts.

The contracts of a married woman will not be enforced against her separate estate, unless they are made in reference thereto, or for her personal benefit. Stillwell v. Adams, 29 Ark. 346 (1874).

If the obligation is for improvement or preservation of the wife's estate, it will be implied that her property is liable for the debt. Henry v. Blackburn, 32 Ark. 445 (1877).

A married woman may contract for improvements upon her separate property and such a contract become the basis of a mechanic's lien for labor and materials. Hoffman v. McFadden, 56 Ark. 217, 19 S.W. 753 (1892).

Where husband was unable to pay on contract secured by a note executed by husband and wife to secure payment, the note was a valid obligation of the wife so far as it was for the benefit of her separate estate. Crenshaw v. Collier, 70 Ark. 5, 65 S.W. 709 (1901).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 2003–2004 · leading case: Ginsburg v. Ginsburg, 120 S.W.3d 567 (Ark. 2003).
Ginsburg v. Ginsburg, 120 S.W.3d 567 (Ark. 2003). · cites it 4× “Under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-505 (Repl. 2002), a married person may own “sole and separate property.”
Ginsburg v. Ginsburg, 195 S.W.3d 898 (Ark. 2004). · cites it 6× “This court reversed on the ground that there were remaining issues of fact as to whether the TOD was separate property under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-505 (Repl. 2002), and, if not, whether the account was purchased for the purpose of fraudulently depriving Appellant of her interest…”
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