Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-309 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Insanity Procedure in Cases of Contempt for Default in Family Support Payments, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 361.

Taxability of Attorneys' Fees as Costs, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 70.

Support — Alimony, Suit Money and Property Settlement, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 61.

Note, A Secured Party's Right to Recover Attorney's Fees and Expenses: Svestka v. First National Bank in Stuttgart, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 579.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Hawthorne, Note: Family Law — Divorce — Constitutionality of Arkansas Property Settlement and Alimony Statutes, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 123.

Shively, Survey of Family Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Note, Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Arkansas' Gender-Based Statutes on Dower, Election, Statutory Allowances, and Homestead Are Unconstitutional, Hess v. Wims; Stokes v. Stokes, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 361.

Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Family Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 624.

Arkansas Law Survey, Waddell, Family Law, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 229.

Survey — Family Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Case Notes

Note. Some of the following cases were decided prior to the 1979 amendment to this section that made maintenance, etc., available to the husband as well as the wife in divorce proceedings.

Constitutionality.

A husband's liability for the attorney's fee of his wife in a divorce suit is statutory and not a debt by contract within Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 1, exempting personalty of an unmarried person as against debts by contract. Walker v. Walker, 148 Ark. 170, 229 S.W. 11 (1921).

Where this section (prior to its 1979 amendment) granted rights to temporary alimony, maintenance and attorney's fees only to wives and not to husbands, this section contained a gender-based classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generated additional benefits only for those it had no reason to prefer, and therefore, this section was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. Hatcher v. Hatcher, 265 Ark. 681, 580 S.W.2d 475 (1979) (decision prior to 1979 amendment).

In General.

In a suit for divorce, a chancellor has power to award alimony pendente lite to the wife; in the absence of any proof of separate property in the wife, it is just and reasonable to compel the husband to furnish the means for her to prosecute or defend the suit and with necessaries suitable to her station in society and his means. Glenn v. Glenn, 44 Ark. 46 (1884).

A husband may not defeat his wife's right to support during the pendency of her divorce action by offering to return to the home and support her. Womack v. Womack, 247 Ark. 1130, 449 S.W.2d 399 (1970).

Trial court properly considered the factors to be used in determining an award of alimony and properly found that the ex-wife was entitled to a lifetime award where (1) she remained at home throughout the majority of her 25-year marriage; (2) she had not worked for the past 20 years, ever since the parties' child was born; (3) her only employment experience came from jobs paying at or slightly more than minimum wage; (4) she did not have a college degree and she did not think she had the skills to return to college at her age; and (5) the husband had the ability to pay the alimony award. Hiett v. Hiett, 86 Ark. App. 31, 158 S.W.3d 720 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial judge's findings that the relationship between the wife and her boyfriend was not one of sharing economic responsibility, and that he was neither a member of her household nor a member of her family; the boyfriend and wife had no joint bank accounts, credit cards, or other financial holdings, obligations, or ties, and whether or not they were romantically involved was not determinative of whether termination of alimony was appropriate. Gibson v. Gibson, 87 Ark. App. 62, 185 S.W.3d 122 (2004).

Increase in alimony to wife was proper as wife proved a material change in circumstances; her diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis affected her ability to supplement her income as she had done in the past by being a massage therapist and limited her potential employment in other fields. Weeks v. Wilson, 95 Ark. App. 88, 234 S.W.3d 333 (2006).

Applicability.

Where a petition is filed to set aside a default decree obtained on constructive service alleging that the decree was procured by fraud, the court may allow the defendant temporary alimony and attorney's fees. Stewart v. Stewart, 101 Ark. 86, 141 S.W. 193 (1911).

An action to vacate a divorce decree is not governed by this section. Floyd v. Isbell, 211 Ark. 631, 201 S.W.2d 755 (1947).

Acts 1979, No. 705, which amended this section to make it gender-neutral, could not be retroactively applied absent clear legislative intent to that effect, and since there was no indication of such intent, the act was only prospective in its application. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980), overruled in part, Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

Amount of Allowance.

A court of chancery in estimating the allowance to be made the wife, pendente lite, on a bill for divorce, will take into consideration her expenses to be incurred during the progress of the suit; where an allowance has been made for her, it will be presumed that her counsel's fee was considered in fixing the amount. Bauman v. Bauman, 18 Ark. 320 (1857).

In a separate maintenance suit award for support of wife as temporary allowance was reduced. McGuire v. McGuire, 231 Ark. 613, 331 S.W.2d 257 (1960).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff more money for alimony and attorney's fees pending further litigation since the allowances made were only temporary and there was no way of knowing pending a full and final hearing the needs of plaintiff or the financial status of defendant. Yohe v. Yohe, 238 Ark. 642, 383 S.W.2d 665 (1964).

Attorney's fees of $8,000 awarded in child custody modification action under the authority of subsection (a) of this section. Jones v. Jones, 327 Ark. 195, 938 S.W.2d 228 (1997).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err by ordering former husband to pay former wife $100 per month in alimony because the evidence showed that he had the ability to pay, he was not responsible for child support after the child's graduation from high school, and the child's college expenses were not considered; moreover, husband's arguments concerning wife's decision to move and her accountability for her financial situation were rejected. Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 368 Ark. 43, 243 S.W.3d 270 (2006).

Trial court abused its discretion in ordering husband to pay wife alimony in the amount of $250 per week for six months from the date of the divorce decree where the wife's needs far outweighed the husband's ability to provide alimony for six months; the wife, who was unemployed but seeking employment, had no assets, other than those awarded by the trial court, upon which to rely for support. Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Ark. App. 96, 244 S.W.3d 712 (2006).

In a divorce action, an alimony award to a former wife was proper when the wife chose to home-school two minor children, was a stay at home mother under an agreement between the parties, and had no marketable skills or meaningful employment history. Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d 232 (2007).

Appeal.

An appeal from an order for ad interim alimony may be taken immediately. Casteel v. Casteel, 38 Ark. 477 (1882).

A decree for alimony pendente lite is a final decree which is appealable. Glenn v. Glenn, 44 Ark. 46 (1884).

As incident to its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has power pending an appeal in a divorce suit to make an order allowing a wife costs and suit money. In re Smith, 183 Ark. 1025, 39 S.W.2d 703 (1931).

Husband in appeal from divorce action has no standing to raise any question about the constitutionality of allowing alimony and attorney's fees where no allowance was made. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977).

Attorney's Fees.

Attorney's fees allowed. Stearns v. Stearns, 211 Ark. 568, 201 S.W.2d 753 (1947); Cook v. Cook, 233 Ark. 961, 349 S.W.2d 809 (1961); Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589, 361 S.W.2d 92 (1962); Wood v. Wright, 238 Ark. 941, 386 S.W.2d 248 (1965); Grumbles v. Grumbles, 245 Ark. 77, 431 S.W.2d 241 (1968); Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983).

Attorney’s fees not allowed. Warren v. Warren, 215 Ark. 567, 221 S.W.2d 407 (1949).

Order of court requiring plaintiff to deposit a stated sum for attorney's fees and expenses of wife in the defense of action before wife was required to plead was within court's discretion. Goynes v. Goynes, 231 Ark. 47, 328 S.W.2d 258 (1959).

Awarding of attorney's fees was a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court. Where evidence supported it, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award attorneys' fee. Goodloe v. Goodloe, 253 Ark. 550, 487 S.W.2d 593 (1972).

Attorney's fees were not awarded under this section as a matter of right, the granting or denial of the fees being within the sound discretion of the chancellor; evidence sufficient to find that chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to award fees. Ryan v. Baxter, 253 Ark. 821, 489 S.W.2d 241 (1973).

During the pendency of an action for an absolute divorce or a limited one, the chancery court has the authority to allow attorney's fees to either spouse upon a showing of circumstances warranting it. Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983).

Chancellor had authority under this section to grant attorney's fees to either party where the circumstances warranted the relief; wife's amendment to her complaint eliminating her prayer for divorce did not deprive the court of its authority with respect to attorney's fees on the husband's pending cross-complaint for divorce. Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983).

Disparity of the parties' respective incomes, while relevant, cannot alone justify an award of attorney's fees. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 302 Ark. 362, 790 S.W.2d 157 (1990).

The chancellor did not abuse his discretion by declining to award wife attorney's fees and costs, despite her claim of disparity in the parties' incomes and ability to pay these amounts. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000).

The chancellor abused her discretion in awarding attorney's fees to a wife where (1) the case involved a marriage of more than 30 years and complex property-division issues, and the chancellor herself had a crowded docket that complicated timely scheduling of ample hearing time to address all of the property-division issues, (2) the grounds upon which the divorce was granted, 18 months' separation of the parties, did not accrue until just days before the final hearing, and (3) the chancellor awarded each party an equal share of the marital property despite the fact that the husband was retired and was living on a pension that was less than half of the wife's income. Jablonski v. Jablonski, 71 Ark. App. 33, 25 S.W.3d 433 (2000).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother attorney's fees of $1,000 where father was in contempt of court for making child support payments payable to the minor children rather than to the mother, for failing to make child support payments in a timely fashion, for failing to pay drug and dental expenses, and for failing to furnish mother with the required copies of his W2 and 1099 tax forms. Martin v. Scharbor, 95 Ark. App. 52, 233 S.W.3d 689 (2006).

In a domestic relations case, the trial court appropriately granted an ex-wife's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to § 16-22-308 and this section, because her ex-husband, in challenging the attorney's fee award, offered only his own reasoning and the language of the statutes in support of his argument; he cited no legal authority in support of his position, which was a sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's ruling. Artman v. Hoy, 370 Ark. 131, 257 S.W.3d 864 (2007).

Given the trial court's great discretion as to the issuance of an attorney's fee award in alimony cases, the trial court properly awarded the wife attorney's fees and expenses under subsection (b) of this section, since the evidence supported the finding that a substantial change in circumstances, particularly the husband's ability to pay and the wife's need, existed to modify the parties' divorce decree to continue and increase the wife's alimony. Bettis v. Bettis, 100 Ark. App. 295, 267 S.W.3d 646 (2007).

In a divorce and custody matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney's fees to the mother where the father earned over twice as much as the mother earned. Poole v. Poole, 2009 Ark. App. 860, 372 S.W.3d 420 (2009).

On appeal from a divorce decree, considering the disparity in the parties' income, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of $2,000 in attorney's fees to the wife under subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Page v. Page, 2010 Ark. App. 188, 373 S.W.3d 408 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a wife a partial attorney's fee of $12,000 given that the husband had paid his attorneys mainly in cash from the account of the marital business, that the award to the wife was less than half the amount that the husband expended from the marital-business account, and that there was income and earning power disparity between the husband and wife. Wright v. Wright, 2010 Ark. App. 250, 377 S.W.3d 369 (2010).

In dissolution proceedings, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding attorney's fees and costs to a wife, pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of this section, because even though the husband had considerably more assets than the wife, she also had considerable assets; the wife's net worth at the time of the divorce was $600,050, and the wife received $500,000 in marital property and $155,000 in alimony for five years. Barnes v. Barnes, 2010 Ark. App. 822, 378 S.W.3d 766 (2010).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to a mother, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, for having to respond to a father's motions for reconsideration regarding modification of child support obligations because of the economic disparity between the parties and the father's former counsel was familiar with the arguments and issues presented to the circuit court while new counsel was not; the father changed attorneys after the matter was tried but before the order was entered. McDougal v. McDougal, 2011 Ark. App. 13, 378 S.W.3d 813 (2011).

Where the wife was granted a divorce based on indignities, the circuit court abused its discretion by awarding her $11,376.12 in attorney's fees under this section because she did not file an affidavit for attorney's fees, she failed to mention the requested expenses in the decree, and the amount awarded was in excess of the amount sought. Coker v. Coker, 2012 Ark. 383, 423 S.W.3d 599 (2012).

Issue of attorney's fees had to be viewed in light of the alimony and property distribution issues in order to determine whether the circuit court achieved a fair and equitable result; the ex-wife received permanent alimony and an equal share of the substantial marital property, and it was equitable and within the circuit court's broad discretion to order each party to pay for their own attorney's fees. Webb v. Webb, 2014 Ark. App. 697, 450 S.W.3d 265 (2014).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees and litigation-related expenses to the wife; the billing statement did not include fees for work the wife's attorney did in connection with the divorce hearing, post-hearing briefing, or preparation of the proposed order. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in awarding an ex-wife attorney's fees for services rendered in a dispute regarding the proper amount of child support due by the ex-husband under the parties' divorce decree because it had the inherent authority in domestic-relations proceedings to award attorney's fees independent of the statute. Hudson v. Hudson, 2018 Ark. App. 379, 555 S.W.3d 902 (2018).

Trial court had evidence of the relative financial abilities of the parties and did not abuse its discretion in awarding $10,800 in attorney's fees to the wife; in part, the trial court was familiar with the protracted nature of the litigation, which included contempt motions against the husband, there was evidence that the wife was a substitute teacher and was also taking college courses, and there was evidence of the husband's income from the temporary hearing. Deline v. Deline, 2019 Ark. App. 562, 591 S.W.3d 365 (2019).

Child Custody Proceedings.

Where petition for modification of divorce decree relates only to child custody, the allowance of attorney's fees is within the sound judicial discretion of the court. Finkbeiner v. Finkbeiner, 226 Ark. 165, 288 S.W.2d 586 (1956).

Where father brought suit against ex-wife for contempt with regard to her actions in violating a custody agreement by secreting their child outside the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Chancery Court, award of attorney's fees incurred in the contempt proceeding, even though such a proceeding is not specifically included in this section is proper, since the chancery court had the inherent power and jurisdiction to do so in an equity proceeding. Payne v. White, 1 Ark. App. 271, 614 S.W.2d 684 (1981).

Costs and Expenses.

Circuit court did not err by awarding litigation-related expenses, such as court-reporter fees and postage, in addition to attorney's fees; Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) states that other expenses specifically authorized by statute are allowed, and subdivision (a)(2) of this section provides that in a divorce action, the circuit court may award either the wife or the husband costs of court, in addition to a reasonable attorney's fee. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Discretion of Court.

Grant of alimony, maintenance, attorney's fees, etc., is within sound discretion of trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Gladfelter v. Gladfelter, 205 Ark. 1019, 172 S.W.2d 246 (1943); Lewis v. Lewis, 222 Ark. 743, 262 S.W.2d 456 (1953); McGuire v. McGuire, 231 Ark. 613, 331 S.W.2d 257 (1960); Johnson v. Johnson, 240 Ark. 657, 401 S.W.2d 213 (1966).

In a separate maintenance and custody suit in which the wife was unsuccessful, it was within the court's discretion to deny the wife's request for attorney's fees. Tilley v. Tilley, 210 Ark. 850, 198 S.W.2d 168 (1946).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying wife's motion for costs, maintenance, and attorney's fees where she failed to obey order of court. Relbstein v. Relbstein, 220 Ark. 783, 249 S.W.2d 847 (1952).

The questions of the allowance of alimony, attorney's fees and suit money to a wife pending a husband's divorce action are within the sound discretion of the court where commensurate with the husband's ability and duty to pay and the wife's needs, except that it must give a decree for alimony under a properly certified and authenticated copy of a decree of another state. Kearney v. Kearney, 224 Ark. 484, 274 S.W.2d 779 (1955).

An award of attorney's fees is within the discretion of the trial court in a divorce case and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).

Order that husband pay wife's attorney's fees in a divorce case upheld where chancellor determined that the husband was in a much better financial position. Anderson v. Anderson, 60 Ark. App. 221, 963 S.W.2d 604 (1998).

Trial court's decrease in husband's alimony payments was proper even though husband indicated that the relief was not great enough as, given that the trial court's findings indicated it looked at the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the obligation by only 30%. Valetutti v. Valetutti, 95 Ark. App. 83, 234 S.W.3d 338 (2006).

Enforcement.

Courts of chancery have jurisdiction to enforce payment of alimony by all means by which courts usually compel obedience, including dismissal of complaint for disobedience to the order. Casteel v. Casteel, 38 Ark. 477 (1882).

This section and § 9-12-313 provides adequate remedy for the enforcement of decrees for alimony and maintenance. East v. East, 148 Ark. 143, 229 S.W. 5 (1921).

A final decree granting a divorce supersedes an order for temporary alimony. Tracy v. Tracy, 184 Ark. 832, 43 S.W.2d 539 (1931); Lewis v. Lewis, 222 Ark. 743, 262 S.W.2d 456 (1953).

Where husband filed notice of appeal from trial judge's order in divorce proceeding and wife filed notice of cross-appeal but neither party filed supersedeas bond, trial court had not lost jurisdiction and could enforce order by contempt proceeding. Kearney v. Butt, 224 Ark. 94, 271 S.W.2d 771 (1954).

Husband was not guilty of contempt for refusing to pay monthly payments he had been ordered to pay for maintenance resulting from prior proceedings in which no divorce had been requested after the husband was granted a divorce in proceedings in which the wife was not personally served. Smith v. Smith, 236 Ark. 141, 365 S.W.2d 247 (1963).

Trial court was ordered to enforce the original alimony award of $350 per month for 12 months, plus a $5,000 lump sum, because the original chancellor had the authority to enforce that alimony award; those sums accrued prior to the entry of the decree in the instant case and were therefore not subject to modification. Rogers v. Rogers, 90 Ark. App. 321, 205 S.W.3d 856 (2005).

Marital Property.

Where trial court had entered a temporary order pursuant to this section, and that order did not deal with or affect the distribution of the parties' properties, § 9-12-315(b)(3) was not applicable. Allen v. Allen, 17 Ark. App. 38, 702 S.W.2d 819 (1986).

Trial court did not purport to divide any future, non-vested employment benefits pursuant to the divorce decree but, rather, based the award of future alimony on a percentage of the ex-husband's net income, including any bonuses or stock options that the husband received in the future as part of the definition of his net income; thus, it was not error for the trial court to include stock options that might be exercised by the husband in the future as part of his net income for alimony purposes, given that all sources of income had to be considered in determining alimony. Hiett v. Hiett, 86 Ark. App. 31, 158 S.W.3d 720 (2004).

Minors.

In an action by an infant husband, brought by his guardian and parent to annul a marriage with another infant, a judgment cannot be rendered against the guardian and parent for alimony. Erwin v. Erwin, 120 Ark. 581, 180 S.W. 186 (1915).

Modification.

Modification of alimony was warranted where a wife's income and education level had increased, she was able to afford a nice home and automobiles, she received $400,000 in assets from the property distribution, and she was only supporting one child. Parker v. Parker, 97 Ark. App. 298, 248 S.W.3d 523 (2007).

Setting Aside.

Where a wife brought suit for divorce, a temporary order allowing her alimony, attorney's fees, and cost money may be set aside at a subsequent term of court. Poe v. Poe, 93 Ark. 426, 124 S.W. 1029 (1910).

Showing of Merit.

In a proceeding for divorce, where the plaintiff applies for alimony pendente lite and an allowance for attorney's fees, she must make some showing of merit by affidavit or otherwise, if the allegations of her complaint are denied by the answer supported by the affidavits of witnesses. Countz v. Countz, 30 Ark. 73 (1875).

The wife must make a showing of merit before the court will allow temporary alimony and suit money. Slocum v. Slocum, 86 Ark. 469, 111 S.W. 806 (1908).

Cohabitation that occurred during misconduct of spouse and prior to separation of the parties is not an available defense to ad interim allowances under this section. Brabham v. Brabham, 240 Ark. 172, 398 S.W.2d 514 (1966).

Trial court did not err in awarding a wife $1 per year in alimony because she received over $1 million in assets, with a substantial amount of cash. Cummings v. Cummings, 104 Ark. App. 315, 292 S.W.3d 819 (2009).

Order awarding a wife alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month in a divorce action was proper because the trial court considered the proper factors, including the wife's significant health problems impacting her ability to earn an income; the husband's good health; the likelihood that the husband would continue working until retirement age; and the husband's 2007 projected gross earnings. Jackson v. Jackson, 2009 Ark. App. 238, 303 S.W.3d 460 (2009).

Trial court properly denied a wife's request for alimony in a divorce action because there was evidence introduced showing that, while the wife arguably had a need for alimony, the husband's financial situation was not as robust as his salary alone would indicate; the husband still maintained a house payment and car payments for himself and the children while the wife, pursuant to an agreed upon property division, had no debt, no house payment, and no car payment. Whitworth v. Whitworth, 2009 Ark. App. 410, 319 S.W.3d 269 (2009).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (a)(2) of this section in awarding attorney's fees to a wife in a divorce action because the husband's financial position was stronger. Delgado v. Delgado, 2012 Ark. App. 100, 389 S.W.3d 52 (2012).

Cited: Kuespert v. Roland, 222 Ark. 153, 257 S.W.2d 562 (1953); Lewis v. Lewis, 222 Ark. 743, 262 S.W.2d 456 (1953); Milne v. Milne, 266 Ark. 900, 587 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1979); Stokes v. Stokes, 271 Ark. 300, 613 S.W.2d 372 (1981); Russell v. International Paper Co., 2 Ark. App. 355, 621 S.W.2d 867 (1981); Elkins v. Coulson, 293 Ark. 539, 739 S.W.2d 675 (1987); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Gavin v. Gavin, 319 Ark. 270, 890 S.W.2d 592 (1995); Valentine v. Valentine, 2010 Ark. App. 259, 377 S.W.3d 387 (2010).