Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (2026)

Research References

Cross References. Placement of juveniles, preference for relative placement, § 9-27-355.

Preference to relative caregivers for child in foster care, § 9-28-105.

Reinstatement of parental rights, § 9-27-370.

Resumption of services, § 9-27-369.

Review of termination of parental rights, § 9-27-360.

ALR.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Constitutional issues. 110 A.L.R.5th 579.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 A.L.R.5th 349.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Effect on parenting ability and parental rights. 116 A.L.R.5th 559.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Best interests analysis. 117 A.L.R.5th 349.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning guardian ad litem and counsel. 118 A.L.R.5th 561.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act. 119 A.L.R.5th 351.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues. 122 A.L.R.5th 385.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning rehabilitative and reunification services. 12 A.L.R.6th 417.

Construction and Application by State Courts of Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 Requirement of Active Efforts to Provide Remedial Services, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). 61 A.L.R.6th 521.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Placement Preferences of State and Federal Indian Child Welfare Acts. 63 A.L.R.6th 429.

Admissibility, Sufficiency, and Other Issues Concerning Expert Evidence to Prove or Disprove Shaken Baby Syndrome. 16 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2015).

Parents' Physical Illness or Physical Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Parental Rights — Applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act. 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Claims of Ineffective Counsel at Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings — Prehearing and Procedural Issues. 30 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Claims of Ineffective Counsel at Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings — Hearing and Post-Hearing Issues. 30 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments, Domestic Relations — Termination of Parental Rights, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 1015.

Note, What About the Child?: A Critique of Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 353.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Family Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 79.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 913.

Annual Survey of Case Law, Family Law, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 744.

Case Notes

In General.

Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196 (1992).

Subdivision (c)(1) of this section and § 9-9-215(a)(1) point to a public policy which, in determining what is in the child's best interest, favors a complete severing of the ties between a child and its biological family when he is placed for adoption. Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 314 Ark. 92, 858 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

The Department of Human Services was not required to have physical or legal custody of a child in order to proceed where an amendment to the statute which deleted such requirement took effect before the appellant's parental rights were actually terminated. Moore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 333 Ark. 288, 969 S.W.2d 186 (1998).

The rights of natural parents are not to be passed over lightly, but these rights must give way to the best interest of the child when the natural parents seriously fail to provide reasonable care for their minor children. Parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Baker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 42, 8 S.W.3d 499 (2000).

When the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship; however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Chase v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 86 Ark. App. 237, 184 S.W.3d 453 (2004).

Subsection (c) of this section clearly contemplates termination of only a single parent's parental rights. Griffin v. Ark. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 322, 236 S.W.3d 570 (2006).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to provide permanency in a juvenile's life in all instances where return of a juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare, and it appears from the evidence that return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time. Thompson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 59 Ark. App. 141, 954 S.W.2d 292 (1997).

Order terminating a mother's parental rights to her two children was upheld as the children had been with a foster family for three years and such a delay went against the clear legislative intent of this section. Kight v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 94 Ark. App. 400, 231 S.W.3d 103 (2006).

Intent behind the termination of parental rights statute is to provide permanency in a child's life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the child's health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child's perspective. Everly v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 528, 589 S.W.3d 425 (2019).

Abandonment.

Trial court properly found that a mother had abandoned her child because she had not visited the child since 2011, she had not provided any documentation showing that she had obtained a psychological evaluation, that her name was on the lease to the home she lived in, or that she had provided financial assistance for the child, she had not begun parenting classes, had not provided a viable relative placement for the child, and had not held a job for an extended period of time. Knerr v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 550 (2014).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment because the father was in prison throughout the entirety of the proceeding, there was no evidence that he was served with the emergency order of custody, and the trial court's orders repeatedly found him to be in noncompliance with a case plan of which he had no knowledge. Brinkley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 625, 533 S.W.3d 639 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on subjecting the children to aggravated circumstances by abandoning them was proper because the father was aware that his children had been placed in foster care and adjudicated dependent-neglected; despite his knowledge of the proceedings, there was no proof of any contact with his children throughout the case either while he was incarcerated, while he was out on bond, after he had been released to the halfway house, or after he had returned to court for his originally scheduled termination hearing; and there was no evidence that the father took advantage of any opportunities to have contact with his children that would have been available to him in prison or in the halfway house. Clark v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 243, 548 S.W.3d 216 (2018).

Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the Department of Human Services proved the ground of abandonment because the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the father failed to support or maintain regular contact with his child without just cause; by his own testimony, the father attended only three visits in 2017, and he admitted that he exercised three visits in January 2018 only after his lawyer told him it would look better for him. Norris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 571, 567 S.W.3d 861 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on the statutory ground of abandonment because the father testified that he purposely avoided involvement in the case, he knew that the children were in the custody of the Department of Human Services and that legal proceedings were being pursued but he chose not to participate, the children spent over one year in foster care and the father had no contact or visitation with them during that year, and the father's explanations for his absence were considered by the trial court and deemed unjustified. Burns v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 253, 576 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Although a mother testified that she moved to Arizona where she had family to help overcome her drug addiction and had been sober for six months, appellate counsel's no-merit motion to withdraw was granted and termination of parental rights was affirmed on the abandonment ground because the mother chose to move to another state, ceased contact with the Department of Human Services, did not return to Arkansas to attend any hearings, and had not seen the two-year-old child in over a year at the time of the termination hearing; in addition, the mother had recently married a paroled felon, and returning the child to her in Arizona, where there were so many “unknowns”, would subject the child to potential harm. Meisch v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 283, 577 S.W.3d 444 (2019).

Adoptability.

Where the five-month-old child was removed from the home after suffering non-accidental trauma consistent with shaken baby syndrome, the father's parental rights were properly terminated; adoptability was but one factor to consider and the trial court specifically stated that the children were adoptable, notwithstanding any disabilities. McFarland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a best-interest finding as to the adoptability of a mother's children in a parental rights termination proceeding: the children's caseworker, an adoption specialist, and a case manager with a developmental-disabilities program all testified that all three children were adoptable. This section did not require that the Department of Human Services present proof that there were potential adoptive parents for these particular children. Henson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 697 (2009).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court failed to hear evidence or make findings regarding the children's adoptability as required by this section. Therefore, its order terminating the father's rights was reversed. Haynes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 28 (2010).

In granting a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights to two children, a trial court properly conducted a best-interest analysis under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section and found that the likelihood that the children would be adopted was very high as the Department of Human Services had an adoptive home for the children. Clingenpeel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 84, 381 S.W.3d 107 (2011).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding pursuant to this section, the trial court did not err in finding that the father's children were adoptable as the trial court had evidence from a Department of Human Services caseworker that in her opinion, the children were adoptable and that there was at least one prospective family for some of the children. Woodall v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 247 (2011).

There was no error in the finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of facts warranting the termination of parental rights because the circuit court was presented with evidence containing direct statements from the potential adoptive parents that they wanted to adopt the children and neither subdivision (b)(3) of this section nor case law, required any specific quantum of evidence. Renfro v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 419, 385 S.W.3d 285 (2011).

Order terminating appellant's parental rights to her children was affirmed because the trial court had evidence with which to consider the likelihood of the children's adoption and made a finding that they were likely to be adopted; the adoption specialist stated that she had been able to find adoptive parents for sibling groups. Bayron v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 75, 388 S.W.3d 482 (2012).

Termination of a father's parental rights to his children was affirmed because, despite the father's contention that there was a complete lack of evidence that the children were adoptable, the children's caseworker, who had worked on the case for over a year after its inception, testified at the termination hearing that the children were adoptable, and the testimony from a caseworker or an adoption specialist that children were adoptable was alone sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard to establish the children's adoptability. Thompson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 124 (2012).

In a termination of parental rights case under this section, a trial court properly considered adoption evidence in determining whether termination was in the children's best interest; testimony from an adoption specialist that two children were adoptable was sufficient. A mother contended that the evidence of adoptability was not sufficient, but the adoption specialist stated that a family had already inquired about adopting the children. Lowery v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 478 (2012).

Because the Department of Human Services, the CASA worker, the children's therapist, and the trial court believed that the children were adoptable and that the grandmother had stated that she intended to adopt them, the record demonstrated that the trial court considered the likelihood of adoption as part of its best-interest analysis in terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 753, 431 S.W.3d 364 (2013).

In a termination of parental rights case, no error was shown because adoptability was but one factor to be considered in the best interest analysis; evidence was presented by a caseworker, an adoption specialist, and a volunteer that a child was adoptable. Stockstill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 427, 439 S.W.3d 95 (2014).

In a parental rights termination case, there was no evidence regarding adoptability of the father's two oldest children, and the circuit court made no finding concerning this lack of evidence; accordingly, the circuit court clearly erred when it found that termination of the father's parental rights to his two oldest children was in their best interest. Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 481 (2014).

Under prior cases, the circuit court's best-interest analysis will be insufficient unless there is some evidence regarding adoptability or the court explains why termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children regardless of their adoptability. Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 725, 478 S.W.3d 272 (2015).

Although a father argued that the trial court erred in finding that termination of his parental rights was in his child's best interest due to a complete lack of credible evidence demonstrating the likelihood of adoptability and potential harm, the appellate court noted that there was evidence presented to the trial court to consider in determining the child's adoptability. The caseworker did not make a blanket statement that all children were adoptable, instead concentrating on the child's specific circumstances and needs in giving her opinion that the father's child was adoptable. Caldwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 144, 484 S.W.3d 719 (2016).

Termination of parental rights as to one of a parent's children was appropriate because the court's finding of adoptability in regard to the best interest analysis for that child was not clearly erroneous; the record contained the foster parent's testimony that the foster parent and their spouse wished to adopt the child. However, reversal and remand was appropriate as to the parent's other child because the record indicated no evidence about adoptability of the child and the court made no finding that such evidence would not have mattered. Miller v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 239, 492 S.W.3d 113 (2016).

Circuit court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his child; while the court's order erroneously relied on the testimony of a nonexistent witness, there was direct testimony on that issue from the child's foster mother, who testified that she and her husband wanted to adopt the child, there was no requirement that an adoptive home be approved and available for the child at the time of the termination hearing, this section required consideration of whether the child was adoptable, and a prospective parent's interest in adopting the child indicated adoptability. Miller v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 249, 491 S.W.3d 164 (2016).

Trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest where the only evidence supporting the finding that the children were adoptable was one child's testimony that she wanted her mother's rights terminated and her foster parents to adopt her, and that evidence did not speak to the likelihood that the children would be adopted. Kerr v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 271, 493 S.W.3d 342 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest as the caseworker's testimony that the children were adoptable was sufficient to support an adoptability finding because the caseworker specifically testified that there were no known medical or physical barriers to adoption, and that the children's young ages made them even more adoptable. Duckery v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 358 (2016).

Conclusion that terminating the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous; although no witness testified that the child was adoptable or that there was a likelihood of adoption, the circuit court did what it was statutorily required to do: consider the likelihood that the child would be adopted, and while the father might have been able to care for the child if he remained sober, the circuit court could have found that the child's need for permanency through adoption outweighed the father's need for time to become a fit parent. Sharks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569 (2016).

Caseworker testified that although the child was “pretty severely developmentally delayed”, she saw no barriers to his adoption because his developmental delays were not so severe as to prevent some other family from loving him; her testimony was not self-contradictory, and in any event, the fact that a child has developmental delays did not negate a finding that a child was adoptable, and the adoptability finding was supported by the evidence. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 440, 503 S.W.3d 122 (2016).

For best interest purposes, the trial court's consideration of the likelihood of the child being adopted was underpinned by adequate evidence; the caseworker did rely on her professional experience, but she also testified to the child's particular characteristics, her youth being a distinct advantage, and that her current placement had expressed interest in adopting her. Bell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 446, 503 S.W.3d 112 (2016).

There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that there was a likelihood that the children would be adopted because the former caseworker testified that the children were adoptable and multiple witnesses testified to the children's emotional capabilities and characteristics, which informed adoptability. Stanley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 581, 507 S.W.3d 544 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to five of her six children was in the children's best interests because the trial court considered evidence regarding the children's adoptability and concluded that the adoption specialist for the Department of Human Services (DHS) indicated that each child had the potential for adoption and that there were no significant barriers to adoption of any child; DHS was not required to prove adoptability by clear and convincing evidence as the trial court merely had to consider the evidence of adoptability presented; and setting the bar higher would unfairly punish children with special needs or developmental disabilities who needed permanency. Solee v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 640, 535 S.W.3d 687 (2017).

Trial court erred in finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest where it found that the children were adoptable even though there was no evidence of adoptability in the record, and there was no finding that the absence of evidence of adoptability made “no legal difference” to the ultimate decision of what was in the children's best interest. Simon v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 327, 551 S.W.3d 425 (2018).

Circuit court did not err in finding all three children adoptable; although the court stated that the children had no special medical or behavioral needs that prevented them from being adopted, it followed that statement with an acknowledgement that one child was still in therapeutic foster care and another had behavioral issues, and thus those two children's specific circumstances were considered. Day v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 492, 562 S.W.3d 871 (2018).

Adoptability is not an essential element in a termination case; rather, it is merely a factor that must be considered by the circuit court in determining the best interest of the child. There is no requirement that an adoption specialist testify at the termination hearing. Evidence that adoptive parents have been found is not required, and neither is evidence that proves the child will be adopted. Atwood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 448, 588 S.W.3d 48 (2019).

Adoption Subsidies.

Administrative law judge erred in finding that children were not in the state's custody for adoption subsidy purposes because, although the children were in their aunt's physical custody, the state maintained a supervisory role over the children through the context of the protective-services case that remained open on the children until their parents' rights were terminated. Batiste v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 46, 204 S.W.3d 521 (2005).

Aggravated Circumstances.

Termination of parental rights was appropriate where juveniles were subjected to aggravated circumstances involving sexual abuse and extreme and repeated cruelty. The trial court found that, while not as likely as the adoption of his sister, there was a likelihood that the brother would be adopted once he was stable. Since there was no appeal from the aggravated circumstances decision, there was no need to address the alternate ground for termination, which was based on the parents' 25- and 35-year sentences in criminal cases. Bowman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 477 (2012).

There was sufficient evidence to support the termination of a mother's parental rights because she had subjected the children to aggravating circumstances since there was little likelihood of reunification. Inter alia, the mother failed to comply with the case plan, had a long history of alcohol abuse, and could not provide a suitable and safe home for the children. Mitchell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 715, 430 S.W.3d 851 (2013).

Termination of the father's parental rights was affirmed based on the finding of aggravated circumstances, given that there was clear evidence that reunification services were unlikely to succeed; the father never fully complied with the case plan, he did not understand the significance of his violent tendencies, and the results of his psychological evaluation and his therapist's testimony supported the finding that further services would not likely help the father and termination was necessary to protect the child. Weathers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 142, 433 S.W.3d 271 (2014).

Termination of a parent's parental rights, based on the statutory ground of aggravated circumstances was appropriate because the parent did not have regular visits with the children after they came into care and the circuit court found little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Dornan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 355 (2014).

Trial court's finding that the Department of Human Services proved that the mother had subjected a juvenile to aggravated circumstances was not clearly erroneous, as the evidence showed that the child sustained a subdural hematoma, bruising, and bite marks while in the mother's custody. Warren v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 469, 441 S.W.3d 72 (2014).

Circuit court properly terminated the parents' parental rights because the child was adoptable and returning him to their custody could cause potential harm where they did not have stable housing, the child had spent more than three of his nine years in foster care, there was physical abuse and educational neglect, the parents were unable to permanently correct the conditions causing the removal, and additional services would not result in a successful reunification. Chapman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 525, 443 S.W.3d 564 (2014).

Circuit court properly found that it was in a child's best interest to terminate the father's parental rights because the circuit court did not err in finding that other factors arose after commencement of the case, the father demonstrated an incapacity and indifference to remedy those issues, the father also subjected the child to aggravated circumstances by his arrests, his failures to regularly take his medications, attend counseling, and maintain stable housing, and the child was adoptable. Samuels v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 527, 443 S.W.3d 599 (2014).

There was a finding of aggravated circumstances in this case, as the trial court found that the child had been abandoned and the mother failed to adequately address the issues, and the findings clearly set out the reasons why there was little likelihood that any further services would result in successful reunification; the appeal was deemed wholly without merit. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 717 (2014).

Mother's parental rights were terminated for abandonment under this section where there was little likelihood that the services would have resulted in a successful reunification based on the mother's lack of visitation or participation in court-ordered services. The mother's abandonment of the children demonstrated aggravated circumstances. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 34 (2015).

Termination of parental rights to the parent's youngest children was appropriate on the statutory ground of aggravated circumstances because (1) the circuit court did not err in considering the parent's previous dependency case regarding the parent's children; (2) one of the parent's older children testified as to abuse and neglect in the parent's home; and (3) the court also considered the parent's ongoing drug use and failure to follow the court's order regarding prescription-drug use and residential treatment. McKinley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 475, 471 S.W.3d 209 (2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper and her due process rights were not violated; in the July 2014 petition, the mother was given notice reasonably calculated to inform her as to what reasons the Department of Human Services was alleging to terminate her parental rights based on aggravated circumstances under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) of this section. There is no requirement that a no reunification finding be made prior to filing the petition to terminate parental rights — only that a determination “has been or is made” by a judge; and the trial judge made that finding in a hearing held in August 2014, which relieved the department of providing further reunification services. Smithee v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 506, 471 S.W.3d 227 (2015).

Trial court committed no error in finding that the mother had subjected her children to aggravated circumstances; the reason the children were removed from the home was because of sexual abuse committed against the oldest child by the mother's husband, but despite all the evidence of abuse, the mother refused to believe that anything inappropriate had occurred. Given the mother's denial of the abuse and her disregard of the oldest child's well-being, the trial court correctly determined that the mother's failure to protect her children would continue if the children were returned to her. Miller v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 727, 479 S.W.3d 63 (2015).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights because there was no clear error in its finding that the mother subjected her children to aggravated circumstances; the mother failed to protect her children from the father's sexual abuse, and she admitted to knowingly engaging in sex acts in front of the children, which was sexual abuse under Arkansas law. Geatches v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 344, 498 S.W.3d 326 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported an aggravated circumstances ground for termination of a father's parental rights because (1) the father's children were removed at least three times for environmental issues, and (2) the father only recently began counseling and realized a need for a better home. Murphey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 430, 502 S.W.3d 544 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported an aggravated circumstances ground for termination of a mother's parental rights because (1) the children were removed from the mother three times for environmental issues, and (2) the mother was in jail and had no home to return to when released. Murphey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 430, 502 S.W.3d 544 (2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights where the Department of Human Services provided appropriate reunification services to her, including services directed toward improving her mental health, the evidence showed that she was unable or unwilling to recognize that she suffered from mental illness, and given the repeated failures to remedy the problems, it was not error to find that there was little likelihood that services to the mother would result in successful reunification. Dade v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 443, 503 S.W.3d 96 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated circumstances ground for termination of parental rights given the child's testimony about daily beatings with a stick or belt as well as other evidence. Rodgers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 569, 506 S.W.3d 907 (2016).

Circuit court's finding of aggravated circumstances was supported by the evidence; although the Department of Human Services failed to arrange visitation, it had made services available to the father for well over a year, and the father had not made even minimal progress toward remedying his circumstances, had failed every drug screening, and failed to attend any hearing. Shawkey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 2, 510 S.W.3d 803 (2017).

Trial court's decision to terminate parental rights on the aggravated circumstances/little likelihood of reunification ground was not clearly erroneous where a caseworker testified about the numerous services provided throughout the case, and despite those services, the parents at no point showed they could consistently maintain a sanitary and safe household for four small children. Bean v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 77, 513 S.W.3d 859 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on the court's finding of aggravated circumstances because, at the time of the termination hearing, the father had been in a drug-treatment program for one week and had four or five weeks remaining, but he had unsuccessfully attempted treatment twice before; he had not seen his children since May 2016, had not had steady employment or housing since the children had been in the custody of the Department of Human Services, and was on probation for assaulting the children's mother and possessing drug paraphernalia. Canada v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 476, 528 S.W.3d 874 (2017).

Circuit court's finding that aggravated circumstances supported termination of a mother's parental rights was upheld where the mother had not appealed the adjudication order in which the court had made that finding. Whitaker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 61, 540 S.W.3d 719 (2018).

Aggravated-circumstances ground supported termination because the parents, after receiving services, did not address their anger problems; the parents had violent altercations with a caseworker, the father was arrested for disorderly conduct and assault, the mother was arrested for disorderly conduct, the parents' aggressive behavior was observed during visitations, and the court observed the parents' volatile temperament in the courtroom. The parents also failed to complete parenting-without-violence classes that were in the case plan. Nichols v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 85, 542 S.W.3d 197 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on aggravated circumstances was affirmed where she had failed to protect the children from the father's physical abuse, even after their initial removal and return, she expressed no worries about the father's anger issues, and it was clear that she was not convinced that the father had hurt the children after their return. Bonner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 142, 544 S.W.3d 90 (2018).

Given the fact that the father was incarcerated for the majority of the case and had demonstrated sustained criminal misconduct indicative of an impediment to reunification with his children, termination of his parental rights based on the trial court's finding of aggravated circumstances was proper. Kohlman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 164, 544 S.W.3d 595 (2018).

Although the father argued that he was never offered meaningful services, a finding of aggravated circumstances did not require the Department of Human Services to prove that meaningful services were provided, and in light of the father’s persistent criminal misconduct, the proof supported the conclusion that there was little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification. Kohlman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 164, 544 S.W.3d 595 (2018).

Because the mother did not appeal the prior aggravated-circumstances findings in adjudication and permanency-planning orders, there was no meritorious appellate challenge to the aggravated-circumstances statutory ground that was used to terminate her parental rights; thus, the appeal was frivolous and counsel's motion to withdraw was granted. Roland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 333, 552 S.W.3d 443 (2018).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of aggravated circumstances; it was doubtful whether additional counseling could have benefited him given that he missed almost as many mental-health counseling sessions as he attended, was resistant during sessions, and stated that he did not want or need counseling. Scott v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 347, 552 S.W.3d 463 (2018).

Circuit court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights based on aggravated circumstances was not clearly erroneous because the Department of Human Services had been providing services for 20 months at the time of the termination hearing, the mother drank alcohol in violation of a court order, and the children's foster mother testified about concerning behaviors that arose after the children had contact with the mother. McHenry v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 368, 553 S.W.3d 771 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as the mother subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, meaning there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification, because the mother had spent a great portion of time during the case in jail; she continued to use illegal drugs; she conceded at the termination hearing that she had a drug problem and needed help, yet she did not complete intensive outpatient drug treatment, did not complete counseling, and did not complete parenting classes; and, when provided 57 opportunities to visit the child, she visited the child only 14 times. Murphy v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465 (2018).

Mother unsuccessfully argued that the circuit court erred in finding that the Department of Human Services (DHS) had provided meaningful services throughout the case; a finding of aggravated circumstances does not require that DHS prove that meaningful services toward reunification were provided. Guardado v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 16, 568 S.W.3d 296 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the aggravated circumstances ground as there was little likelihood that services to the mother would result in a successful reunification because a Department of Human Services (DHS) foster-care and protective-services supervisor testified that the mother failed to learn how to parent, she lacked the mental capacity to watch all three of her children at the same time, and the children were able to wander away from her without her knowledge; and a DHS program assistant stated that, in 22 of 43 visits she supervised, the mother would lose one of her three children. Barton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 239, 576 S.W.3d 59 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the aggravated circumstances ground because she refused to believe that the eldest child was sexually abused and she failed to keep her children away from her husband after the eldest child's allegation was found to be true; and while the mother and her husband were separated and she had filed for divorce, the separation had occurred only months earlier and more than a year after the eldest child's allegation of abuse. Drane v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 256, 576 S.W.3d 550 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the aggravated-circumstances ground as there was ample evidence of the mother's persistent instability because she lived in 11 places, had eight jobs, and owned six vehicles, and she admitted that there were times she was unemployed during the case, lacked transportation, and did not have a valid driver's license; and there was little likelihood that further services would result in reunification because she failed to attend counseling, regularly take her medication, and take her children to counseling. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 263, 576 S.W.3d 537 (2019).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of aggravated circumstances was appropriate because there was little likelihood that services to the father would have resulted in successful reunification as the father, who had a persistent and unresolved addiction to drugs, did not complete recommended drug counseling and did not have a sponsor. Furthermore, the father failed to maintain stable housing or employment, was driving without a license, and was at risk of having his parole revoked due to pending drug charges (no-merit brief). Kloss v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 389, 585 S.W.3d 725 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the evidence proved the aggravated circumstances ground for termination of the mother's parental rights; she did nothing to address her drug addiction following her completion of drug treatment, her home was unsuitable, and she was not making enough money to support a family. Hampton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 497, 588 S.W.3d 763 (2019).

Alternative Findings.

Order provided that appellant was not one to whom any parental rights ever attached, and remaining findings were intended to be alternative and applicable only in the event of the reversal of the determination that appellant had no parental rights, which did not materialize; to the extent that the order might be read as an involuntary termination of appellant's rights, the order was modified to make clear that it was not to be read in that manner, and because no parental rights existed to be terminated, no such termination occurred. Manken v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 100, 483 S.W.3d 834 (2016).

Americans with Disabilities Act.

Parent failed to demonstrate that her rights pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, were violated when she was denied visitation with her child and her parental rights were terminated, where parent was not denied any services on the basis of her mental disability, but denial of visitation and termination of parental rights was based solely on the best interests of the child. J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997).

At no point did attorneys for the mother raise the Americans with Disabilities Act accommodations argument, and the trial court did not ignore the mother's mental deficiencies, but specifically acknowledged them and appointed an attorney ad litem in addition to appointed counsel; the trial court did not act in a manner that flagrantly prejudiced the mother so as to have justified the appellate court in applying the third exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement. Weathers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 142, 433 S.W.3d 271 (2014).

Appeal.

In a termination of parental rights appeal, under Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 3-1 and 3-2, the “entire record” could be properly prepared and transmitted by the circuit clerk without including the case plan, even though the plan had in fact been filed in accordance with § 9-27-402; it was the mother's burden to bring up an adequate record for review and, because the record omitted the case plan, the court could not review the mother's due process claim. Rodriguez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 360 Ark. 180, 200 S.W.3d 431 (2004).

Father's motion to file a belated appeal of an order terminating his parental rights was granted as the failure of father's counsel to inform him that he had the right to appeal the order was a good reason to grant the motion. Flannery v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 368 Ark. 31, 242 S.W.3d 619 (2006).

In an appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding in which the mother's counsel filed a no-merit brief pursuant to the Linker-Flores decision and Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 6-9(i), there had been full compliance with Rule 6-9(i) and the appeal was without merit. The appellate court determined that the trial court's order to terminate the mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous, and the mother's counsel discussed the other rulings made by the trial court and explained why they would not support a meritorious appeal. Gossett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 240, 374 S.W.3d 205 (2010).

Because a mother whose parental rights were terminated failed to preserve her claims and did not appeal the prior orders finding reasonable efforts by the Department of Human Services, she waived those claims for purposes of appeal; and even absent waiver, the claims would have failed on the merits because the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the department made meaningful efforts and offered appropriate family services. Kelley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 481 (2011).

Mother's appeal of an order terminating her parental rights to her child was dismissed because she failed to appeal from an earlier order terminating her parental rights based on her consent under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(v) (a) of this section. Faas v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 666 (2011).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her three children was affirmed because the mother did not argue that the statutory grounds supporting termination of her parental rights were not proved by clear and convincing evidence and the appellate court would not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Andrews v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 22, 388 S.W.3d 63 (2012).

Counsel met the requirements for no-merit parental rights termination cases, and the court affirmed the termination and granted counsel's motion to be relieved from representation. Smart v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 257 (2013).

Because counsel did not address the other factors ground for terminating the father's parental rights in his appellate brief, and because counsel addressed only the substantial-period-of-incarceration ground in a most cursory and unsatisfactory fashion, counsel's discussion did not meet the requirements of a no-merit appeal in a termination of parental rights case; because counsel failed to adequately explain why there was clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground to support termination of the father's parental rights, counsel was required to rebrief the appeal. Washington v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 13 (2014).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated for neglect and failure to correct the conditions that caused removal of her children, and the mother's counsel complied with the requirements for a no-merit parental-rights-termination appeal; while the mother was provided a copy of her counsel's brief and motion and was given an opportunity to file pro se points, she declined to do so. Castillo-Chavez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 76 (2014).

There could be no challenge to the statutory grounds of aggravated circumstances because this finding was made by the trial court in its adjudication order, which was not appealed. Willingham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 568 (2014).

Parents' claim that they received ineffective assistance of counsel, which ultimately led to the termination of their parental rights, was not reviewed on appeal where they did not develop their claims or present evidence or testimony regarding the ineffectiveness, and the trial court did not rule on the issue. Taffner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. 231, 493 S.W.3d 319 (2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 687, 196 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2017).

Sufficient evidence supported an abuse finding where the findings regarding suspected abuse were litigated and determined at the dependency-neglect adjudication hearing, and no appeal of that order was filed. Even though the record on appeal includes the orders from all of the prior hearings, the appellate court is precluded from reviewing any adverse rulings from these portions of the record that were not appealed. Ekberg v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 103, 513 S.W.3d 307 (2017).

Appellate Review.

Even in a case involving termination of parental rights where constitutional issues are argued, the appellate court will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal; therefore, the judgment terminating the father's parental rights was affirmed. Myers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 91 Ark. App. 53, 208 S.W.3d 241 (2005).

Father argued for reversal of the termination of his parental rights because he had no notice of one ground, but given that the court could affirm a termination decision on any ground alleged in the petition and proven, the appellate court considered the other statutory ground that had been pleaded. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 412, 501 S.W.3d 391 (2016).

Although the mother developed some testimony at the termination of parental rights hearing that she had not been assessed for intellectual disabilities, she never argued that the department's failure in this respect should have precluded termination of her parental rights; as the circuit court made no ruling on the argument the mother raised on appeal, it was not preserved for appellate review. Thomas v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 355, 553 S.W.3d 175 (2018).

Mother whose parental rights were terminated did not specifically attack either the potential-harm or adoptability aspect of the circuit court's best-interest finding, and thus the argument was considered abandoned. Thomas v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 355, 553 S.W.3d 175 (2018).

Applicability of Amendments.

Appellate court did not apply the changes in the law that occurred after the termination of parental rights order had been entered but before the appeal of the order was decided (Acts 2019, No. 541, for example, had amended this section to add subdivision (b)(3)(B)(x)). Terry v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 591, 591 S.W.3d 824 (2019).

Availability of Remedy.

Termination of parental rights is a remedy available only to the Department of Human Services (DHS) (and to a guardian ad litem beginning in 1997) and not to private litigants; therefore, the right of dismissal accrues to DHS as the petitioner, and not to a parent. M.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997).

Subsection (a) of this section does not require that termination of parental rights be a predicate to permanent placement, but only that the Department of Human Services be attempting to clear the juvenile for permanent placement when parental rights are terminated. M.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997).

In a proceeding seeking to set aside a prior divorce decree adjudicating a purported father the legal parent of a minor child, a trial court lacked authority to terminate the father's parental rights because the action was not filed by an attorney ad litem or the Department of Human Services. Hudson v. Kyle, 352 Ark. 346, 101 S.W.3d 202 (2003).

Best Interest of Juvenile.

Trial court's finding that termination of the parental rights of a mother and a father under this section was in the child's best interest was clearly erroneous as there was no evidence that either parent had ever physically abused or harmed the child or were a threat to do so in the future. While time was of the essence in most termination proceedings, it was markedly less so in this case given the fact that the child lived with his maternal grandparents, and the grandmother expressly stated her desire that the child have continued contact with his parents. Cranford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 211, 378 S.W.3d 851 (2011).

Subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section required consideration of whether the termination of parental rights was in a child's best interest, which consideration had to include consideration of the likelihood that the child would be adopted, but such likelihood did not have to be established by clear and convincing evidence. Since one of the caseworkers testified that the mother's daughter was adoptable by someone who could handle her needs, there was some evidence of adoptability, and even so, limited evidence of adoptability made no legal difference given the clear potential harm of returning custody of the child to the mother, who, according to the evidence, could not provide the stable environment needed by her child. Dority v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 295 (2011).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3)(B)(i) of this section because there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Additionally, termination was in the children's best interest under subdivision (b)(3)(A) because there was a proper permanency plan for the children and the mother failed to maintain stable housing. Baker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 400 (2011).

Because the children were dependent-neglected by virtue of neglect and inadequate supervision, and because neither parent had achieved a degree of stability that would permit the safe return of the children, termination of their parental rights under subdivision (b)(3) of this section was in the children's best interest. Tucker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 430, 389 S.W.3d 1 (2011).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father had not demonstrated his ability to remain sober in an unstructured environment for a significant time period, and his disability benefits were inadequate to provide a home and all other necessities for his children. Although the father did make commendable progress in attaining sobriety, he did not demonstrate similar progress in achieving sufficient mental health and stability to be a parent to his children. Jessup v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 463, 385 S.W.3d 304 (2011).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the children had been out of the mother's care for over 12 months, and she had failed to remedy the conditions that had caused them to be removed from her custody. The mother moved in with a man with a lengthy criminal history, and she utterly failed to remedy her drug problems, having tested positive for every drug screen. Jessup v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 463, 385 S.W.3d 304 (2011).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court determination that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children under this section, as the parents did not show that they could consistently provide the children much-needed stability. Christian-Holderfield v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 534, 378 S.W.3d 916 (2011).

Evidence supported a trial court's determination that termination of parental rights was in a child's best interests, as the grounds for such relief under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section were met, and the court found that returning the child to his mother had the potential for unhealthy circumstances and harm. Cariker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 574, 385 S.W.3d 859 (2011).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her three children was affirmed because there was sufficient testimony presented on the issue of adoptability and there was evidence presented to establish potential harm to the children if returned to their mother; the mother was found to have subjected the children to aggravated circumstances due to their residence in a drug premises and her involvement in criminal activity. Threadgill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 642, 386 S.W.3d 543 (2011).

Order terminating the father's parental rights to his daughter was reversed because there was no evidence that any harm or real risk of potential harm was introduced into the child's life by the father's slight lapses in judgment, or that her best interests would be served by having her father permanently and irrevocably removed from her life. Rhine v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 649, 386 S.W.3d 577 (2011).

It was not clearly erroneous for a trial court to find that termination of parental rights was in children's best interest, under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section, because (1) the mother whose parental rights were terminated waived any objection to the admissibility of testimony supporting the finding, and (2) the court expressly considered statutorily mandated factors. Brabon v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 2, 388 S.W.3d 69 (2012).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her son was affirmed because the circuit court's focus was appropriately on the child's best interests and the risk posed to the child in this case, should the mother’s mental illnesses manifest, was not merely a risk of injury, but of death. Rossie-Fonner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 29, 388 S.W.3d 38 (2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her child on the ground that termination was in the child's best interest under subdivision (b)(3) of this section because the mother failed to accept any meaningful responsibility for the physical abuse that the child was forced to suffer at the hand of her boyfriend; she failed to demonstrate that she could protect and care for her child. Cole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 203, 394 S.W.3d 318 (2012).

Under this section, terminating the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child because the father was unable to obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing, employment, income, and transportation; the autistic child had significant special needs; and the child had progressed well while in the foster mother's care. Hall v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 245, 413 S.W.3d 542 (2012).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because a trial court relied upon the record in making its decision, pursuant to this section; even though the father had made some progress and had partially completed a case plan, he failed to complete drug rehabilitation or achieve sufficient stability to parent the child. The father had been given a reasonable opportunity to achieve the required goals, and there were no compelling reasons to give him more time to work on reunification; the trial court noted the child's need for permanency and found that termination was in her best interest. Crow v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 313, 416 S.W.3d 269 (2012).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated because the Department of Human Services presented clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(4) , (b)(3)(B)(viii), and (b)(3)(B)(ii) (a) of this section. Further, termination was in the child's best interest as the child was “readily adoptable,” and there would be a risk of harm, both physically and psychologically, if the child were placed with the father based on his long history of criminal behavior, unstable lifestyle that included drugs, domestic violence, homelessness, and child endangerment. Thus, counsel complied with Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 6-9(i), and the appeal was wholly without merit. Spangler v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 404 (2012).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was affirmed because the mother did not challenge the circuit court's determination that she was in no position to have her children returned to her and the circuit court's determination that termination was in the children's best interest in this case was not clearly erroneous. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 419 (2012).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in a child's best interest to terminate her mother's parental rights where it was clear that the mother's aggressive and oppositional behavior could potentially harm the health and safety of the child if the child were ever returned to her. Among other things: (1) the mother's foster mother testified that the mother was verbally aggressive, refused to comply with house rules, and became so unruly that the foster mother had to call the police; (2) the mother failed to complete her trial placement with her child because she would not cooperate with the Department of Human Services; and (3) the circuit court also specifically found that the mother failed to comply with its orders to attend school and to eliminate any social networking profiles. B.H.1 v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 532 (2012).

Trial court did not err in finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in her child's best interest under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section because the mother tested positive for drugs during the case, she had no job or her own residence, she had encountered criminal charges, and she rarely visited the child when allowed. Lovell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 547 (2012).

Termination of parental rights was proper, because despite efforts of the Department of Human Services, reunification would be contrary to the health, safety and welfare of the children, and termination was in the children's best interest; risk of potential harm to the children if returned to the father was evidenced by his continuing inability to maintain employment, stable housing or transportation, and his failure to avail himself of services offered by the department. Bradbury v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 680, 424 S.W.3d 896 (2012).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section because there was a proper permanency plan in place for the children, and there was a need for permanency where the case lasted more than two years. Moreover, despite the father's progress in some areas, he failed to consistently attend counseling and did not have stable housing for the children. Spencer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 96, 426 S.W.3d 494 (2013).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her two youngest children was in their best interests under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section because, although she completed portions of her case plan, including anger-management classes, testimony indicated that the anger-control problem had not been resolved and could expose the children to potential harm. Weatherspoon v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 104, 426 S.W.3d 520 (2013).

Court did not find that the trial court was mistaken in concluding that the potential of harm to the child existed if returned to the father, as he lived with persons who had drug and prison issues, he lacked stable housing and employment, he did not turn in requested information for a home study, and he had tested positive for drugs and had outstanding felony warrants against him. Austin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 406, 428 S.W.3d 573 (2013).

It was in the child's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights because the evidence showed that there was potential harm in returning the child to her custody as there was evidence that drugs were being sold from her apartment and that she made only last-ditch efforts to obtain treatment for her drug addiction. McBride v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 566 (2013).

Trial court properly awarded permanent custody of the mother's other son to his father under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section as the evidence showed that the father had an appropriate home and was financially secure, that the other son was doing well since being placed in his father's custody, and that the father provided stability for the child. Gaskill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 610 (2013).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because the mother was unable to provide a safe and suitable home for the children, she failed to comply with the case plan, and she had not visited the children since May 2012. The mother had a long history of alcohol abuse, and she was likely to continue in an abusive relationship; moreover, the fact that two of the children might not have been adopted was merely one factor that was considered, and the fact that one child might not have consented to adoption was not a necessary element of proof in a termination case. Mitchell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 715, 430 S.W.3d 851 (2013).

Where a mother appealed a circuit's termination of her parental rights and her counsel filed a no-merits brief pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 6-9(i), there was ample evidence to find that it was in the child's best interest for the mother's parental rights to be terminated, and statutory grounds for termination existed. The mother unquestionably failed to comply with the case plan, failed to maintain any meaningful contact with her child, and basically demonstrated a complete lack of interest in the child. Lockridge v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 91 (2014).

Circuit court found that, because the child was in a home where the foster parent stood ready to adopt and the father continued to expose the child to potential harm due to drug use and possible contact with the mother, termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest; the decision was affirmed. Skaggs v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 229 (2014).

Circuit court properly found that it was in a child's best interest to terminate a mother's parental rights because the mother conceded that her parental rights to another child had been terminated, stipulated to a dependency-neglect finding due to her inability to provide the child with a safe and stable home environment, was incarcerated, and the child was young and adoptable. Gwinup v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 337 (2014).

In a termination of parental rights case where the best interest of the child was at issue, appellate court was unable to say that the trial court erred by finding that the child was subject to potential harm if placed in the father's custody given his uncertain housing, missed visitation, and failure to participate in the early part of the case. Stockstill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 427, 439 S.W.3d 95 (2014).

Trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous where she had been incarcerated several times after the child's removal from the home, she had a history of mental instability and refused to take medication, her home life was unstable, and the only challenges were to witness credibility, which was not a sufficient basis for appeal. Treadwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 457 (2014).

Mother's parental rights to 6 children were terminated under this section because there was ample evidence upon which to find that it was in the best interest of the children and that statutory grounds for termination existed; in a no-merit brief seeking to withdraw, counsel pointed out that the children were adoptable, the mother failed to address mental health issues, and she used drugs. Moreover, the mother manifested an incapacity or indifference to remedy the issues or factors that prevented the children from returning to her care. Ware v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 467, 441 S.W.3d 913 (2014).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated under this section because it was in the child's best interest; despite the termination of the father's rights to two other children due to a mother's mental health issues, the father continued to assert that there was no danger to the child in this case. Drake v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 475, 442 S.W.3d 5 (2014).

Trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests was affirmed where she had not maintained stable employment, her lack of financial resources prevented her from obtaining stable housing or transportation and prevented her from keeping her child support payments current, and her new-found sobriety was questionable at best. Jung v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 523, 443 S.W.3d 555 (2014).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was affirmed where her lack of follow-through on her drug treatment, her use of alcohol during trial home placement, the state of the child in her care, and the higher stress that would be present with another child on the way would have endangered the child's health and safety in the mother's care. Schaible v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 541, 444 S.W.3d 366 (2014).

There was no meritorious argument on the best interest requirement, as the children were at risk of potential harm if returned to the father's custody, as he was addicted to drugs and incarcerated for five years, plus the children were adoptable. Frisby v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 566 (2014).

Trial court did not clearly err in its determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, given that the children had been in and out of foster care for more than two years, the children had been removed originally due to substantiated reports of drug use and domestic violence, the mother separated only recently from the father, the mother failed to benefit from services, and there was sufficient evidence that the children would find permanency through adoption. Willingham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 568 (2014).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of a child because of the potential harm that existed if the child was returned to the mother. After her other two children were killed by her husband, the mother failed to recognize the necessity of ongoing therapy and counseling and refused to acknowledge her role as protector. Fox v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 666, 448 S.W.3d 735 (2014).

There was no clear error in the circuit court's finding that termination of the mother's rights would be in the child's best interest, given that the mother had not shown through her eleventh-hour compliance that she was a safe placement for the child, the mother used drugs and had unstable housing and continuously made decisions contrary to the child's best interest, and she was in a relationship with a recovering addict who was a felon. Harbin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 715, 451 S.W.3d 231 (2014).

There was no clear error in the circuit court's finding that termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interest; after more than three years of treatment, the mother was unable to wean off methadone, the circuit court was not convinced she could safely parent the children, the mother failed to obtain stable housing and she was still married to the father, and the circuit court was concerned that continued contact with him would be harmful to the children. Sarut v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 76, 455 S.W.3d 341 (2015).

Termination of a father's parental rights was improperly found to be in the best interest of the children where there was no evidence of adoptability, as required by this section; moreover, the children had a stable home with their mother and there was no expectation that they would be put up for adoption. Lively v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 131, 456 S.W.3d 383 (2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the return of the children to the mother's custody was contrary to their health, safety, or welfare; and, despite the offer of appropriate family services, she had manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate her circumstances preventing the children's return to her custody. The mother was still not employed, had not resolved warrants that arose soon after the case was filed, was not close to being able to provide adequate housing, and had not even progressed to the point of having unsupervised visitation due to her outstanding warrants. Ramsey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 297 (2015).

Mother failed to demonstrate a close bond between her children and their maternal grandparents; the circuit court, which heard testimony that continued visits with the grandparents would not be in the children's best interest, did not clearly err when it terminated the mother's parental rights. Delacruz v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 387, 465 S.W.3d 867 (2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her children was in the children's best interests because the mother had made little or no progress learning sign language to effectively communicate with the eldest child; she was unemployed and unable to provide the court with any reasonable prospects of employment; she did not have reliable transportation or a driver's license; she had been inconsistent in attending therapy; and there was testimony that the children were adoptable. Singleton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 455, 468 S.W.3d 809 (2015).

Environmental, educational, and dental neglect were still issues and appropriately considered by the circuit court at the termination hearing; the mother lacked credibility and insight and had not remedied the conditions causing removal and potential harm was shown; the issue of the mother's drug abuse was highly relevant to the consideration of potential harm; and termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest. Whittiker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 467, 469 S.W.3d 396 (2015).

Trial court's finding that it was in the children's best interest for the mother's parental rights to be terminated was not erroneous, as the trial court found that if the mother were given additional time, it would not have made any appreciable difference toward reunification given her lack of progress in managing her mental illness. Oldham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 490, 469 S.W.3d 825 (2015).

Trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children was supported by evidence that the mother was never in full compliance with the case plan, as the mother stopped attending the required counseling sessions, was incarcerated for a short time, was not employed, had only visited the children eight to ten times in three years, and had no transportation, and that the children, who were all teenagers, did not want to live with the mother. Chaffin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 522, 471 S.W.3d 251 (2015).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was not error where there was evidence that the children had been harmed by ongoing domestic violence between the mother and her live-in boyfriend, and there was no evidence that they had any relationship with any members of the mother's family that would have been harmed by the termination. Wilson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 666, 476 S.W.3d 816 (2015).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her child. While the child was dependent-neglected and there was admittedly a ground for termination—the previous involuntary termination of the mother's rights to another child, the trial court failed to consider or address adoptability and other relevant evidence in performing its best-interest analysis where evidence that the child was not born with drugs in her system (in contrast to the child for whom the mother's previous rights had been terminated) was relevant under Ark. R. Evid. 401 and counsel was prevented from completing a proffer of that evidence. Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 725, 478 S.W.3d 272 (2015).

Where most of the testimony indicated that the children had severe behavioral and emotional problems and were not yet adoptable, the trial court's finding was upheld that the children's best chance for permanency was to terminate the mother's rights and allow them to heal from the emotional problems the mother had caused. Robinson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 53, 481 S.W.3d 474 (2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the Department of Human Services received a referral on April 21, 2014; the children reported that they had not been in school since February 14, 2013, and that they had lived in their father's truck on at least two occasions; the children later reported physical abuse by the father, and that he would deny them food as a form of punishment; there was evidence that the father physically abused the children; a family service worker testified that the children were afraid of him; and there was no evidence of a strong relationship between the children and the paternal grandparents, in the current case, which would be jeopardized by termination. Crowley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 66, 482 S.W.3d 360 (2016).

Conclusion that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous; the circuit court found that the child would have been at great risk of harm if returned to the father and mother, given their drug use, mental health issues, and inability to act lawfully as evidenced by their chronic incarceration. McElwee v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 214, 489 S.W.3d 704 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in determining that termination of a father's rights was in the children's best interest where he had been incarcerated throughout most of the proceeding, his compliance with directives to, inter alia, maintain appropriate housing and complete alcohol, drug abuse, and other treatments was poor, and he had visited the children only twice during the review period, and defendant's argument that the children were placed with the maternal grandmother was misplaced. Scrivner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 316, 497 S.W.3d 206 (2016).

Termination was in the children's best interest because returning them to the mother's care would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage; due to the chronic sexual abuse and educational neglect the children suffered while in her care, there was a significant risk of harm in returning the children to her. Geatches v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 344, 498 S.W.3d 326 (2016).

Circuit court's ruling that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous where there was no evidence that the child knew the aunt with whom she was placed two months before the termination hearing, there was no other evidence regarding whether placement with the aunt without termination was feasible or in the child's best interest, and the father had neither completed the case plan nor complied with important court orders. Villaros v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 399, 500 S.W.3d 763 (2016).

Mother, who was in jail, lacked standing to claim there was no potential harm in returning the children to the children's father. Murphey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 430, 502 S.W.3d 544 (2016).

Circuit court clearly considered and weighed the father's compliance throughout the entire case and did not lightly reject his last-minute efforts, and as the circuit court considered and weighed everything and excluded nothing, for best interest purposes, there was no reversible error under case law. Sharks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569 (2016).

While the mother accused the department of not adequately helping her with her anxiety issues, the trial court had found reasonable efforts on the part of the department, and reasonable efforts are typically associated with statutory grounds and not the best interest of the child. Bell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 446, 503 S.W.3d 112 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because, regarding adoptability, the trial court had before it testimony that 57 potential families matched the children's characteristics; they were adoptable; they had been well-behaved and helpful since entering foster care; the foster mother would adopt them herself if not for her age and lifestyle; the children had thrived in the foster mother's home and had benefitted from therapies and services; and the Department of Human Services had succeeded in finding families for similar children in the past; and because the mother maintained her relationship with the putative father after it was alleged that he sexually abused one of the children. Bair v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 481 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest where the father had failed to seek immediate medical care for the children's injuries, he had not obtained a divorce from the mother until the day of the termination hearing, and his hesitancy to believe that the mother had anything to do with the children's injuries justified the concern as to whether he would have protected the children. Martin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 115, 515 S.W.3d 599 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in finding that termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the children; to refuse to terminate the father's rights where the mother had relinquished her rights and the father was incapable or indifferent to remedying his situation so he could regain custody, solely to continue a relationship with grandparents who were unable to care for the children, was contrary to the need for permanency advocated by the statute. Fuls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 46, 510 S.W.3d 815 (2017).

Trial court did not err in finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests where an adoption specialist testified that there were no barriers to adoption, and the mother failed to recognize the necessity of ongoing therapy and counseling and refused to acknowledge that her husband and son were abusive and posed potential harm to the children. Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 60, 511 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Subdivision (b)(3) of this section requires that the termination of parental rights decision be based on a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the children's best interest while considering the potential for harm to the children's health and safety if the children are returned to the parent. The trial court must only find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interest, giving consideration to the likelihood of adoption and the risk of potential harm. The likelihood of adoption and the risk of potential harm are merely factors for the court to consider in its analysis. Bean v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 77, 513 S.W.3d 859 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children where the evidence showed that her delusions were likely to continue, her mental illness had prevented unsupervised visits during the entire two-year case period, supervision had increased over time, and the loss of mental health support once the case was closed favored termination rather than permanent placement with the grandmother. Cobb v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 85, 512 S.W.3d 694 (2017).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children where her lack of insight into her mental-health diagnoses, inability to take responsibility for her therapy and recovery, and her positive drug tests demonstrated that there was a real risk that she would revert to past practices once judicial supervision was removed. Brandau v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 87, 512 S.W.3d 636 (2017).

Circuit court's conclusion that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest was affirmed where, based on their inability to be forthcoming or honest with the court, it was unlikely that the parents would abstain from corporal punishment. Ekberg v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 103, 513 S.W.3d 307 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to five of her children was proper and in their best interests because there was a potential for harm if the children were returned to the mother. There were major concerns for the trial court, including testimony that one of the children made allegations of sexual abuse by her father, that the mother and the maternal grandmother were reluctant to believe the allegations, and that the domestic violence and sexual abuse in the home resulted in the post-traumatic-stress disorder exhibited by the child; and the family-service worker testified that the child alleging sexual abuse was adoptable as she was very sociable, and she had made progress in therapy that supported her being adopted. Vega v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 106, 513 S.W.3d 298 (2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest where the court was not required to identify a resulting potential harm from placing the children with the father, and the subsequent-factors evidence also supported the best-interest determination. Terrones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 115, 515 S.W.3d 144 (2017).

Termination was in the child's best interest where the mother's failure to maintain sobriety for any significant length of time, the child's exposure to violence during the mother's abusive relationship with a former boyfriend, and the child's deteriorating behavior when in the mother's custody demonstrated the potential harm in returning the child to the mother's custody. Greenhill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 194, 517 S.W.3d 473 (2017).

Circuit court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest was affirmed given her boyfriend's untreated schizophrenia; her financial deficiencies and reliance on her mother and sex-offender father for money, which situation was likely to be exacerbated by her current pregnancy and unemployment; and the fact that the child had been in the State's care for 21 of the 24 months of her life. Salazar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 218, 518 S.W.3d 713 (2017).

Although the father argued that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a risk of potential harm to the child to support the trial court's best-interest finding, termination of his parental rights was upheld as the father admitted his housing was not currently stable and that he had some trouble getting through life, maintaining a stable place, stable job, and making contact with probation officers; the father was put in jail on three separate occasions during the pendency of the case; and the trial court did not err in looking at the father's past instability and concluding that there was nothing to demonstrate that he would be able to acquire or maintain safe, stable housing in the future. Caruthers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 230, 519 S.W.3d 350 (2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests where the testimony and evidence supported the circuit court's conclusion that leaving the child in limbo for several more months in order to see if the mother's speculations about future employment, housing, and sobriety were realized, posed a potential harm to the child. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 368, 523 S.W.3d 920 (2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest, taking into consideration the likelihood the children would be adopted and the potential for harm if returned to the father, as the father did not provide proof of completed parenting classes or undergo drug-and-alcohol assessments, did not pay child support as ordered, and tested positive for THC. Miller v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 396, 525 S.W.3d 48 (2017).

There was no clear error in the circuit court's determination it was in the child's best interest for the mother's parental rights to be terminated because the mother failed to follow the circuit court's orders regarding proof that she remain drug-free, and she continued her relationship with her fiancé even after the circuit court found he was an inappropriate person to be in the child's life. Curtis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 465, 527 S.W.3d 762 (2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of her children because she posed a risk of potential harm to the children in that witnesses testified that they were concerned with her capacity to independently care for the children, due to her untreated mental-health issues, while a family-service worker testified that the mother had failed to maintain stable housing throughout the case and had admitted that her fiancé, who had a history of drug abuse, was living with her. Bynum v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 471, 528 S.W.3d 859 (2017).

Termination was in the child's best interest where an adoption specialist testified that the child was adoptable despite his medical issues, the mother was incarcerated and facing new felony charges at the time of the hearing, and the mother acknowledged that she had not participated in parenting classes or drug therapy classes. Baxter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 508 (2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest where the caseworker spoke specifically about her belief as to the adoptability of each individual child and discussed the potential barriers, or lack thereof, to adoption for each child, and the mother’s continued drug use was sufficient to support a finding of potential harm. Furnish v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 511, 529 S.W.3d 684 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest; the caseworker did not include sexual aggression in running the adoption match as the Department of Human Services had twice submitted the child for professional evaluations for sexual aggression and both evaluations determined that he was not sexually aggressive, and the father's sister had not completed the necessary steps for placement. Connors v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 579, 537 S.W.3d 736 (2017).

Decision that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous because the evidence showed that the mother had a history of drug use, the children had been out of her custody for 20 months at the time of the termination hearing, and she was arrested on four different occasions after the children were removed from her custody. Jacobs v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 586, 532 S.W.3d 627 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the record supported adoptability, and the children were three years old, but the father had not met, contacted, or sought visitation with them; the children had been in the custody of the Department of Human Services their entire lives; although the father testified that relatives would care for the children, he testified that he had not had any discussions with relatives about caring for them; he was unsure of his release date and had not secured stable housing and employment; and the father had not provided the caseworker with a list of relatives willing to care for the children. Earls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. 159, 544 S.W.3d 543 (2018).

Termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest where, inter alia, the parents had a history of neglecting his medical and dental needs, and there was testimony that the child would not reach his full potential without therapies to address his developmental delays. Allen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 136, 540 S.W.3d 742 (2018).

Finding that it was in the children's best interest for parental rights to be terminated was not clearly erroneous because one of the children had symptoms of anxiety leading up to the termination hearing, did not want to visit the parents, and was afraid that the parents would kidnap the child. The parents tested positive in drug-and-alcohol screens, the mother visited the children inconsistently, and the parents presented no evidence that there was an approved relative who was ready, willing, and able to take custody of the children. Pearson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 305, 549 S.W.3d 418 (2018).

Court of Appeals could not say that the trial court clearly erred in finding there was potential harm in returning the children to the father's custody; the father stayed in touch with the children's mother after their divorce despite their long-standing domestic violence problems, and although the therapist testified that the father's depression and anxiety would not harm the children, the therapist also testified that he could not get a full picture of the father's parenting skills because the father had attended so few counseling sessions and that he had made little progress in counseling. Scott v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 347, 552 S.W.3d 463 (2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the child was adoptable; the father and the child had no relationship; there was no evidence that the father, while in prison, tried to contact the child directly; during the four months that he was on parole, the only evidence of the father's contact with the child was his testimony that he called her a couple of times; he had an extensive criminal history; and there was evidence that the child was in a stable foster home and was thriving. Fraser v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 395, 557 S.W.3d 886 (2018).

After the mother's two younger children were found in a hotel room with three adults, at least two of whom appeared to be under the influence of drugs, where police found methamphetamine, needles, a spoon on the bathroom floor, and a firearm in a duffle bag on top of a dresser, termination of the mother's parental rights to a third child (her oldest child) was proper, and he would remain in the physical custody of his father. There was evidence that the mother posed a potential harm to all three of her children, there was no evidence that continued contact with the mother would serve the oldest child's best interest in any way, and the mother's dangerous behavior did not abate during the case. Foster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 418, 559 S.W.3d 762 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the adoption specialist for the Department of Human Services (DHS) testified that the child was healthy, young, and adoptable, that there were 398 adoptive families who matched the child's characteristics, and that DHS knew of specific families who might wish to adopt her; and returning the child to the mother's custody would subject her to potential harm as the mother tested positive for methamphetamine and agreed that she had a drug problem, but refused to complete the drug-treatment programs, counseling, or parenting classes, and she was incarcerated three times during the case and was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. Murphy v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the testimony showed that the mother had only minimally complied with the case plan, had tested positive on drug screens, had stopped visiting the child regularly, and was in no better position to regain custody of the child than when the child was removed; and the caseworker testified that it was highly likely that the child could be adopted. Harley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 428, 556 S.W.3d 544 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the child had been in the custody of the Department of Human Services for almost 15 months; the mother was incarcerated at the time of the hearing for drug court sanction, awaiting release to then enter a four-month drug treatment program; the mother lacked the stability of a home, an income, and transportation; and the child would be required to wait until the mother potentially reached a point of stability to care for the child. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 503, 560 S.W.3d 827 (2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to her teenage child was in the child's best interest; the trial court found that, notwithstanding the child's epilepsy, there were no barriers to adoption, the risk of harm to the child in returning the child to the mother was great, and a foster family wanted to adopt the child. Strickland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 608, 567 S.W.3d 870 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to four of her children was in the children's best interests because the mother's lack of stability posed a risk of potential harm to the children if returned to her custody; the mother had lived in five different locations throughout the pendency of the case, she had no housing, income, or transportation when the trial placement ended, which was over 12 months into the case, and she had tested positive for methamphetamine in January 2018, which was 12 months into the case. Bailey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 134, 572 S.W.3d 902 (2019).

Termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child as the circuit court's determination that the child would suffer potential harm if returned to the mother's custody was not clearly erroneous; the mother was unable to maintain sobriety for an extended period of time, and the circuit court did not find the mother's testimony that the mother was then sober and would remain so to be credible. Holdcraft v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 151, 573 S.W.3d 555 (2019).

Sufficient evidence supported the circuit court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights was necessary and in the child's best interest where placement with the maternal grandmother was not necessarily a permanent or stable option given that the child was still in the custody of the Department of Human Services and the mother's rights had been terminated. Moreover, the father was expected to remain in rehab for at least three more months, he failed to comply with the case plan throughout the case, he did not have employment for more than a year, and he did not have stable housing by the time of the termination hearing. Heath v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 255, 576 S.W.3d 86 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because she denied or minimized substance-abuse issues, domestic-violence issues, parenting issues, criminal acts, and overall stability issues; she had not demonstrated stability or fitness as a parent, she had abandoned her children for most of the case, and she had failed to comply with the case plan until just before the termination proceedings; and she did not acknowledge the physical danger she had placed her children in during her violent outbursts. Covin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 259, 576 S.W.3d 530 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because all three children were adoptable, and all three children would be at risk of harm if returned to the mother as her persistent, all-encompassing instability had been physically and emotionally traumatic to the children. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 263, 576 S.W.3d 537 (2019).

Although the father was in a drug rehabilitation program at the time of the hearing, termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests as the father was unable or unwilling to get his emotional, mental, criminal, and drug issues in check within a reasonable time; he failed to complete the steps necessary to reach the case-plan goals that were intended to help him become the safe, stable parent that the children needed; and the current caregivers had expressed an interest in adopting the children. Joslin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 273, 577 S.W.3d 26 (2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the father began serving a 30-year prison sentence for second-degree murder in 2016 — just two years before the termination hearing when the child was two years old; the duration of the father's prison sentence as well as the violent nature of the offense supported the court's potential-harm finding; and, as to relative placement, the father's mother also had a second-degree-murder conviction, and his grandmother did not appear at the termination hearing. Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 280, 577 S.W.3d 402 (2019).

Termination of both parents' rights was in the children's best interests as neither parent had ever maintained a home where the children could live; they had never demonstrated the ability to safely parent the children; and their drug rehabilitation was still a work in progress at the time of the hearing. Arnold v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 300, 578 S.W.3d 329 (2019).

Circuit court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his daughter for failure to remedy by the noncustodial parent, where the incarcerated father did not challenge that ground nor the adoptability prong or the potential-harm prong of the circuit court's best-interest finding. Carson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 399 (2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because there was a sufficient showing of potential harm to the child and the adoptability issue made no legal difference as there were serious and obvious concerns about the danger the father posed to his child and his indifference to protecting and caring for her and meeting her physical and developmental needs; an assistant professor of pediatrics testified at the adjudication hearing that the child was severely malnourished, dehydrated, and critically ill, she had severe electrolyte abnormalities, her condition was life-threatening, she was unable to stand without support, and she was uncomfortable with any movement. Davidson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 402, 585 S.W.3d 738 (2019).

Given the mother's no-contact-order violations, history of repeated abuse in her relationship with her boyfriend, and inability to protect the children from him, the circuit court's best-interest finding against her was not clearly erroneous. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 406, 587 S.W.3d 577 (2019).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children because its best-interest finding was not clearly erroneous; the mother was unstable and had a drug problem and had been arrested on multiple occasions during the case, and it was the second dependency-neglect case in which the children had been removed from the mother's custody. Cooper v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 425, 588 S.W.3d 43 (2019).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children despite the mother's best-interest argument concerning the circuit court's consideration of the children's sibling bond; the evidence showed that the children had already been placed in separate homes, one child's placement was potentially a long-term placement, and the other children could remain in their placement as long as necessary. Cooper v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 425, 588 S.W.3d 43 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that it was in the best interest of two male children, ages 13 and 16, to terminate their mother's parental rights; although the circuit court accepted and considered evidence concerning the children's preferences regarding placement and against adoption, the Department of Human Services was not required to provide any proof on the issue of consent to adoption. Further, the mother failed to preserve any argument regarding the children's preferences or likelihood of consent; the circuit court was not required to give the mother more time based on a vague hope of improvement, especially when the children had been out of her custody for 19 months; and no evidence was presented to the circuit court regarding a viable relative placement or custody option. Whitehead v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 442, 587 S.W.3d 590 (2019).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because he might have had housing and employment, but he had not provided the Department of Human Services with any proof of it; the trial court did not consider supervised visitation, likely because the father had not appeared at a special hearing to discuss the no-contact order and it was unclear whether he had asked for visitation after he missed that special hearing; the father did not seek to have the no-contact order lifted; and the trial court was not even aware that he wanted custody of his children until the 15-month review hearing. Hernandez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 449, 588 S.W.3d 102 (2019).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests, given that the mother had no relationship with the child, the mother lacked a stable income and was unemployed, and the child was extremely close with her half-sister and they could be adopted together. Chastain v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 503, 588 S.W.3d 419 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interest simply because the putative father's rights had yet to be determined as the mother lacked standing to argue that the court had ignored the father's parental rights, and subdivision (c)(2) of this section clearly contemplates the termination of only one parent's parental rights when it is in the child's best interest; however, adoption of the child was premature due to the unresolved paternity issue. Dominguez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 2, 592 S.W.3d 723 (2020).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate a mother's parental rights where the mother had allowed inappropriate people to be around her children, which led to the sexual abuse of one of the children, and there was evidence that the mother had not acknowledged the abuse suffered by the child and had not accepted her role in the abuse the child suffered. Huddleston v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 24, 592 S.W.3d 266 (2020).

Burden of Proof.

There was clear and convincing evidence for all five statutory grounds for termination, but the human services department was only required to prove one ground by clear and convincing evidence. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 717 (2014).

In a parental rights termination case, clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the placement plan for appellant's children was appropriate, and further, that the children were adoptable. Clear and convincing evidence also supported the trial court's finding that it was unlikely that services to the family would result in successful reunification within a reasonable period of time. Dunbar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 472, 503 S.W.3d 821 (2016).

Collateral Attack.

Because juvenile courts have exercised jurisdiction over juveniles in the past under color of state law, their proceedings and judgments are not subject to collateral attack. Hutton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 303 Ark. 512, 798 S.W.2d 418 (1990).

Confrontation of Witnesses.

Supreme Court of Arkansas declined to extend the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses to parental rights termination cases. Taffner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. 231, 493 S.W.3d 319 (2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 687, 196 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not commit reversible error by excluding the father from the courtroom during the child's testimony because the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applied to criminal prosecutions. Adams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 101, 572 S.W.3d 16 (2019).

Consent.

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother signed and filed a document with the court in which the mother voluntarily consented to the termination. The trial court did not err in failing to consider the mother's attempt to revoke the consent as the mother filed a handwritten pro se note that failed to comply with the statutory requirements and was filed seven days after the expiration of the withdrawal period. The trial court's order was modified to make it clear that the mother's termination of parental rights was consensual and voluntary. Parker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 394, 586 S.W.3d 655 (2019).

Continuance Denied.

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because the mother failed to show on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her request for a continuance. In her brief, the mother offered no discussion or analysis of why the circuit court's denial of her motion for continuance constituted an abuse of discretion or caused her prejudice; rather, she simply stated that by denying the motion, the trial court abused its discretion. Renfro v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 419, 385 S.W.3d 285 (2011).

Mother filed her motion for continuance only three business days prior to the scheduled termination hearing, and there was no good cause for continuance shown, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Mosher v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 111, 455 S.W.3d 367 (2015).

In a parental rights termination case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant father's request for a continuance; even if the court had allowed a continuance until the father was released from prison, his past behavior indicated that he was not likely to follow through with all of the steps necessary for reunification. The goal of this section, which is to provide permanency for the minor child, would have been thwarted had the trial court granted the father's request for an indefinite extension of time. Martin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 407, 465 S.W.3d 881 (2015).

In a termination of parental rights case, a circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the parents' request to continue the termination hearing until after the circuit court held a hearing on whether the children would be placed with their paternal grandmother; the circuit court thoroughly considered and discussed the motion for continuance at the hearing. Gregrich v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 564, 473 S.W.3d 41 (2015).

Mother's assertions did not provide good cause to grant another continuance in her termination case, as much of the discovery about which she complained related to a different child, not a party to this appeal, and much of the discovery sought was already in the record and readily available to the mother; as to her complaint that she was entitled to more time to prepare for the amended petition to terminate parental rights, this was rejected because the amendment was exactly the same content and contained the same allegations. Bell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 446, 503 S.W.3d 112 (2016).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's request for a continuance, and she could not demonstrate prejudice; she did not request the continuance until the beginning of the termination hearing, which demonstrated a lack of diligence, plus the circuit court had already granted two continuances, and her past behavior indicated that, even if the court allowed a continuance until she was released from prison, she was not likely to follow through with the steps necessary for reunification. McGaugh v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 485, 505 S.W.3d 227 (2016).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mother's motion for a continuance, when the mother expressed discomfort about being represented by an attorney who was a stranger to the mother, because the attorney was perfectly capable of providing representation for the mother, the witnesses were available and ready for the hearing, and the court was concerned that one of the children was extremely anxious about the hearing and a delay would not be good for the child's health and well-being. Pearson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 305, 549 S.W.3d 418 (2018).

Continuance for Good Cause.

There was good cause for a continuance of a mother's parental rights termination hearing — and a circuit court abused its discretion in denying the continuance — because the continuance would have allowed the mother to execute a consent and waiver so that her son could be adopted by his grandmother. Rhine v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 101 Ark. App. 370, 278 S.W.3d 118 (2008).

Default Judgment.

In a termination of parental rights case under this section, a trial court did not really enter a default judgment against a father due to a failure to appear, despite the use of such language, due to its extensive consideration of the evidence in the case. The trial court's approach satisfied its obligation to determine the best interest of the child and to safeguard the father's equal protection and due process rights to the children. Osborne v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 129, 252 S.W.3d 138 (2007).

Dependent-Neglected Juvenile.

On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, the mother's argument that it was a logical fallacy and inconsistent with legislative intent under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section that the definition of “dependent-neglected juvenile” under § 9-27-303 included a “dependent” child was without merit. The statute's clear and unambiguous language expressed that a dependent-neglected juvenile included a dependent juvenile. K.C. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 353, 374 S.W.3d 884 (2010).

As the parents' children were subjected to brutal physical beatings and were compelled to witness the public beatings of others at the order of their church leaders, and as the parents refused to seek and obtain safe and stable housing or employment outside the church, their parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to this section. Parrish v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 179 (2011).

Trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights under this section was not clearly erroneous where the infant, who was born prematurely and required special care, was adjudicated dependent-neglected due to medical neglect in June 2011, the guardian ad litem did not approve of the mother's overnight visitations with the infant, and the mother conceded that the infant was adoptable. Perkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 374, 439 S.W.3d 72 (2014).

Due Process.

Order terminating a mother's parental rights to her children pursuant to this section was upheld because she was not deprived of her parental rights without due process since she had notice of the hearing and was given the opportunity to voice her objection to fact that the trial court failed to order continuation of reunification services. Kight v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 94 Ark. App. 400, 231 S.W.3d 103 (2006).

Affirming the termination of the mother's parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section would have resulted in a violation of the mother's due-process rights because due process required, at a minimum, notice reasonably calculated to afford a natural parent the opportunity to be heard prior to terminating his or her parental rights. The mother had no notice that her parental rights might be terminated based upon her mental deficiencies. K.C. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 353, 374 S.W.3d 884 (2010).

Trial court relied on the failure to provide support or maintain contact as a ground to terminate, but this ground was not alleged, and because the father was never specifically informed that this ground was being asserted against him, he was denied the chance to fully develop a defense; the trial court's reliance on this ground was clearly erroneous, as due process mandated that the father be given a chance to properly defend the allegations against him. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 411, 429 S.W.3d 276 (2013).

Attorney's failure to require proof that a termination of parental rights petition was personally served on a mother in prison did not invoke the third Wicks exception where the attorney had been served pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 5, the mother had not challenged the finding that she was properly served at the outset of the case, and thus the attorney's lack of knowledge about whether the mother had also been personally served with the termination petition and notice of the termination hearing and counsel's failure to require proof of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 service of same were not flagrant and egregious errors that required the court to step in on its own. Vogel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 671, 476 S.W.3d 825 (2015).

Incarcerated mother's absence from the hearing did not violate due process where she was represented by counsel, counsel had presented the mother's case effectively, and it was unlikely that the mother's presence would have changed the outcome. Vogel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 671, 476 S.W.3d 825 (2015).

Although the incarcerated father was not present, his attorney fully participated during the termination of parental rights hearing; nothing indicated that the father's due process rights could not have been safeguarded in his absence, and thus there was no reason for the trial court to step in on its own motion and raise the father's due process argument. Consequently, the father's absence from the hearing did not fall within the third Wicks exception to issue preservation rules and his due process argument could not be addressed due to lack of preservation. Edwards v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 37, 480 S.W.3d 215 (2016).

Father's claims that his due process rights were violated when he was prevented from attending the permanency-planning hearing were not preserved for appeal as he only appealed the parental rights termination order. Scrivner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 316, 497 S.W.3d 206 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights based on the subsequent-factors ground where that ground was argued by the Department of Human Services at the termination hearing, the court ruled from the bench that it was terminating on that ground, and the father did not object or make any argument as to the reliance on that ground. Mitjans v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 472, 561 S.W.3d 747 (2018).

Evidence.

Evidence established that the Department of Human Services pursued meaningful efforts to rehabilitate the home and that the parents chose to ignore or failed to benefit from the services provided by the department where the department provided the parents with counseling and parenting classes and they were allowed visitation with the child, but, following their participation in the counseling and parenting classes, the child suffered a new injury at her initial unsupervised visit with them, and the department then changed the goal of its plan from reunification to termination of parental rights. Ullom v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 12 S.W.3d 204 (2000).

Evidence established that the parents manifested an incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors that demonstrated that return of the child to the family home would be contrary to her health, safety, or welfare where, when the child was only 21 days old, the parents caused her to suffer a spiral fracture and then, even after receiving family services provided by the Department of Human Services, on the very next occasion in which they were alone with the child, she suffered bruising to both sides of her face, for which no satisfactory explanation was provided. Ullom v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 12 S.W.3d 204 (2000).

The chancellor did not err in terminating the parental rights of a mother, who was in and out of jail during the pendency of the case, where she conceded that she did not correct the conditions that caused her children's removal, she made no attempt to comply with the court's orders even when she was not incarcerated, she remained out of jail or rehabilitation for only 24 days during the pendency of the case and admitted that she did not comply with the court orders for even that brief period of time. Malone v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 71 Ark. App. 441, 30 S.W.3d 758 (2000).

Evidence was insufficient to establish that the mother willfully refused to support her child where there was no appreciable evidence that she had the ability to pay even a nominal amount of support even after she stopped abusing drugs and started working at regular employment. Minton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 72 Ark. App. 290, 34 S.W.3d 776 (2000).

A chancellor's ultimate conclusion that the child at issue, a toddler, had not and was unlikely to bond with the mother was clearly erroneous where the mother was allowed only a single overnight visit; the child's foster mother acknowledged that the child required two or three weeks for “settling in,” and the Department of Human Services steadfastly opposed giving the mother that kind of time. Minton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 72 Ark. App. 290, 34 S.W.3d 776 (2000).

The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights where (1) the child came to the attention of the state because she suffered sexual abuse, and, as part of the investigation into the abuse, it was found that she was living under deplorable conditions, (2) during the first year of the child's life, the father provided no support, but was thereafter ordered to pay support and granted reasonable visitation after a paternity test, (3) the father never took any action to protect the child and to remove her from her situation and, although he asserted that he tried unsuccessfully to find her, such excuse was not persuasive, and (4) the father signed a consent that the child be adopted and never asked to intervene in the dependency/neglect case to request that custody be placed with him. Larscheid v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 343 Ark. 580, 36 S.W.3d 308 (2001).

A mother's parental rights were properly terminated on the ground that her children had been adjudicated to be dependent-neglected and had continued out of the home for 12 months and that, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions had not been remedied by the mother where she had not managed to consistently maintain her home in a sanitary condition or to acquire a steady job which would have enabled her to provide for her children and, in addition, there was evidence that the physical abuse of the children had not ended. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of a mother's parental rights where (1) the children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected, they continued out of the home for more than 12 months, and the conditions causing their removal from the home had not been remedied at the time of termination, (2) the Department of Human Services had made meaningful efforts to rehabilitate her home and correct the conditions that caused removal, but the mother failed to take advantage of any of the forms of assistance she was offered, (3) the foster family with whom the children were living wanted to adopt them, (4) the mother was incarcerated for drug abuse at the time of termination and would not be released on parole until she was able to obtain stable housing, a feat she had been unable to accomplish in the two years pending termination of her parental rights, and (5) the mother had been unable to maintain steady employment when not incarcerated, continued to test positive for drugs, and refused to obtain treatment. Bearden v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001).

Termination of parental rights upheld where mother failed to rehabilitate the home and misled the chancery court about her mental health status. Cassidy v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 76 Ark. App. 190, 61 S.W.3d 880 (2001).

Terminating a mother's parental rights was based on clear and convincing evidence where (1) the child was originally taken in custody by the state human services department based on sexual abuse allegations, (2) when the department took custody of the child, the mother had legal custody of the child, (3) the child had been adjudicated dependent-neglected, (4) the mother failed to resolve her legal problems, despite having received financial assistance from the department to do so, (5) the mother failed to regularly attend her counseling appointments and had either been fired from or quit her job, (6) the trial court found that the mother's behavior in failing to take advantage of the numerous services offered to her indicated that she was not willing to work toward having the child returned to her, and (7) termination was in the child's best interests. Jefferson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 356 Ark. 647, 158 S.W.3d 129 (2004).

Termination of father's parental rights was proper where the evidence demonstrated that the father failed to address his problems with alcohol and anger management, failed at any meaningful participation in therapy, and refused to establish a stable living environment for his children. Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004).

Where the Department of Human Services supervisor testified that she had overheard the mother asking for a phone number so she could call and cancel a therapy appointment and that the mother's house was cold, filled with trash, and smelled like rotting food, the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Trout v. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).

Trial court properly terminated the parental rights of the mother and father and found that each parent, either as the offender or as the accomplice, had committed a felony battery against a grandson of the mother because the mother's story that she was not involved was implausible considering the medical testimony; termination was in the child's best interests under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section given that the child was a dependent-neglected child under § 9-27-303, and one purpose of § 9-27-302(2)(B) was to protect a juvenile's safety. Todd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 174, 151 S.W.3d 315 (2004).

Evidence demonstrated that potential harm might result if the parents continued contact with the two children, including the fact that the case arose primarily from the parents' ongoing and adverse living arrangements that resulted in sexual abuse of their two-year-old daughter, exposure to drug use, pornography, and an unsafe environment, the parents failed to secure stable housing or employment, failed to complete their weekly counseling sessions, and refused on several occasions to submit to random drug testing. Carroll v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 255, 148 S.W.3d 780 (2004).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section where the child had been adjudicated neglected and had been living away from the home for more than 12 months and, despite the provision of counseling, transportation, furniture, and food stamps, the father had neglected the child's medical and educational needs during a trial placement. Chase v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 86 Ark. App. 237, 184 S.W.3d 453 (2004).

Appellant's parental rights were properly terminated given evidence that appellant did not have stable housing or a stable job and had failed to complete a case plan; appellant could not complain that the Department of Human Services had failed to make a referral for a psychological evaluation given appellant's failure to keep in contact with the department, and there was sufficient evidence to find that the children were adoptable. Cobbs v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 87 Ark. App. 188, 189 S.W.3d 487 (2004).

Trial court erred by terminating a mother's parental rights without giving the mother a reasonable time to demonstrate that her child could be safely returned to her home where, at the review hearing, testimony indicated that the mother had not tested positive for drugs, remained drug free throughout the entire program, and maintained stable employment; the evidence demonstrated that she had corrected the conditions which led to the removal of her son from her home. Kight v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 87 Ark. App. 230, 189 S.W.3d 498 (2004).

Termination of parental rights was proper where the evidence showed that the mother, who had three children before she was 18, failed to participate in reunification plans, left her children in a foster home in order to return to a relative's house, had no visible means of supporting the children, failed to comply with court orders for 30 months, and left the children unattended. Maxwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 90 Ark. App. 223, 205 S.W.3d 801 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of parental rights when parents were told to stop smoking in the home because of the children's health problems but they refused to do so, the house was filthy and in disarray, the oldest child came to school reeking of cigarette smoke, and the child had head lice and had to be bathed at school because of poor hygiene. Sowell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 325, 241 S.W.3d 767 (2006).

Parents' argument that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of counselor's testimony, which took place prior to the termination hearing, was rejected because the parents did not object to any portion of the counselor's testimony or argue that they were in any way inhibited by the lack of her case file in conducting their cross-examination; the parents were afforded the opportunity to subpoena the counselor but they failed to do so and they also failed to ask for a continuance. Sparkman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 363, 242 S.W.3d 282 (2006).

Trial court clearly erred in terminating the mother's parental rights as (1) since the mother's psychotic episode, she had made consistent efforts to improve her parenting skills and had reached point where she could raise her children despite her mental deficiencies; (2) the mother made sincere efforts to comply with every order of the court; (3) the only evidence of the mother's failure to comply with the trial court's orders was the evidence that she would sometimes neglect her housekeeping duties, but there was no evidence that the condition of her home reached the dangerous level that warranted the initial Department of Human Services intervention; (4) the evidence showed that the mother would need help in caring for her children, but it did not show that the mother was unable and unwilling to care for her children; (5) there was no evidence that mother's efforts to comply with the case plan were insincere; and (6) the children were comfortable with the mother, and she testified that she was ready to take the children into her home and that if she needed help, she knew where to go. Benedict v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 395, 242 S.W.3d 305 (2006).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper because the evidence showed that she failed to address her problems with drug abuse, failed at providing any meaningful proof of employment, and refused to establish proof of a stable living environment for her children. Long v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 369 Ark. 74, 250 S.W.3d 560 (2007).

Ordering terminating the father's parental rights to his two children was affirmed because: (1) termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children because there was substantial evidence of the strong likelihood that the children would be adopted, there was evidence of potential harm to the children if they were placed in the father's custody, given his drug problems, and it was entirely possible that the children would be left with the father's parents, who were charged with child endangerment; (2) there was clear and convincing evidence of the father's willful failure to maintain meaningful contact with his children because the evidence showed that he was incarcerated for the majority of the time that the children's case was pending, and during the six-month period that he was not in prison, the father only visited his children twice; instead of finding a job in Arkansas, the father moved out of state to seek work; and (3) there was clear and convincing evidence that the department had developed an appropriate permanency plan for the children because it presented evidence that the children were at an adoptable age, they had expressed a desire for stability and permanency, and it had contacted several family matches. Posey v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007).

Department of Human Services established that the father subjected his children to aggravated circumstances based on a finding that he sexually abused them; one child's statements were credible and, along with the other testimony at the hearing, were sufficient to establish that the father perpetrated sexual abuse. Albright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 97 Ark. App. 277, 248 S.W.3d 498 (2007).

In a termination of parental rights case, a trial court did not err by relying on evidence from prior hearings involving the children because proceedings in these type of cases were cumulative. Even if a trial court was required to take judicial notice and incorporate by reference all prior proceedings, such was done in a case where a trial court accepted into evidence numerous documents from prior proceedings without objection. Osborne v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 129, 252 S.W.3d 138 (2007).

Order terminating a mother's parental rights to her child was overturned and the case was remanded where subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) of this section did not prohibit the trial court's consideration of the mother's recent mental stability; the trial judge's statement that she had to terminate the mother's parental rights if the child was not able to go home with her immediately after the hearing was also incorrect. Prows v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 102 Ark. App. 205, 283 S.W.3d 637 (2008).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated, pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(A)(i), (ii), and (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section because the four children were adjudicated dependent-neglected and the father failed to maintain appropriate housing, employment, and transportation and because he exhibited anger problems and had current criminal charges. Belue v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 104 Ark. App. 139, 289 S.W.3d 500 (2008).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the mother's conduct posed a potential harm to the children and that termination was in the children's best interest, because the circuit court was not required to give the mother more time based on a vague hope of improvement, especially where the children had been out of her custody for 14 months, and the mother had a history of drug and alcohol abuse and inconsistent effort to remedy the abuse, and the mother could not predict when her situation would change for the better. Childress v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 322, 307 S.W.3d 50 (2009).

Judgment terminating a mother's parental rights to her minor children was affirmed because not only was the adoptability requirement of subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section satisfied by the testimony of the adoption specialist and a caseworker, who said that the children were in pre-adoptive foster placements and that 12 families willing to adopt children had been identified but the mother continued to use drugs and place the children in potential harm. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 815, 370 S.W.3d 283 (2009).

Termination of the father's parental rights to his child was appropriate pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(A) and (B) of this section because he continued to have contact with the child's mother after her persistent drug use caused her children to be removed from the home. The father further exhibited inappropriate and potentially dangerous anger and impulsiveness and those factors, coupled with the termination of the father's parental rights to the child's sibling under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(4) , provided a sufficient basis for the circuit court's termination decision. Tadlock v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 821, 373 S.W.3d 361 (2009).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section because it was in the child's best interest. In part, the father had not severed ties with the mother, who was a person with a long-term, unresolved drug problem, and evidence was presented that the father had an inability to control his anger, impulses, and emotions. Tadlock v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 841, 372 S.W.3d 403 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence of grounds for termination of a father's parental rights because the father's failure to pay court-ordered child support, despite the apparent means to do so, constituted a ground for termination under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ii) (a) of this section; additionally, the father's failure to comply with court orders, in particular the circuit court's repeated directions that he maintain weekly contact with the Department of Human Services and provide proof of income, demonstrated that factors arose during the case that evidenced his indifference or incapacity to rehabilitate his circumstances. Banks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 53 (2010).

Court properly terminated a parent's parental rights under this section as the evidence showed that the child was likely to be adopted by the foster parent and that the child's welfare and safety would be jeopardized if returned to the parent's custody; reunification had been unsuccessful, and the child had been in foster care for three years. Blakes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 379, 374 S.W.3d 898 (2010).

Sufficient clear and convincing evidence, as required by subdivision (b)(3) of this section showed that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child as the testimony showed that the child was likely to be adopted and that his mother failed, following incarceration, to show her ability to care for him or maintain stability. Reed v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 416, 375 S.W.3d 709 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported a trial court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights, pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section, to his 29-month-old child, was in the child's best interests because the father had abused the mother, suffered from a personality disorder, and admitted to having anger issues; the child had been previously adjudicated as dependent-neglected and had spent all but two months of his life in foster care. Porter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 680, 378 S.W.3d 246 (2010).

Although a mother claimed there was a complete lack of evidence supporting the likelihood of her children's adoptability, sufficient evidence supported a trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests, pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section, because a caseworker for the Department of Human Services testified there were prospective adoptive parents for the children if parental rights were terminated and someone had already inquired about adopting one child; the evidence of potential harm to the children was overwhelming because the mother failed to complete a drug treatment program, counseling, anger management classes, parenting classes. or drug screening. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 747, 379 S.W.3d 663 (2010).

Termination of a mother's parental rights pursuant to this section was supported by clear and convincing evidence as the mother abandoned the mother's child when the mother, who was a minor when the child was born, fled foster care for five to six months, and evidence indicated that the mother's failure to follow a circuit court's orders showed potential harm to the child. L.W. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 44, 380 S.W.3d 489 (2011).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a determination under subdivisions (b)(3)(A) and (B) of this section to terminate a mother's parental rights over her minor children; although she cooperated with the case plan, she made very little progress due to her lack of cognitive ability, inability to reason, and low level of functioning, and she was unable to provide for their basic necessities. Anderson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 526, 385 S.W.3d 373 (2011).

Sufficient evidence supported termination of the mother's parental rights under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section as she was unable to demonstrate that, once she was released from jail, she would be able to provide a stable home or sufficient income; prior to her incarceration, she had failed to maintain stable and sufficient income; the record was replete with incidents indicating her poor judgment; the children had spent over 75 percent of their lives in foster care; and the mother had been given ample opportunity to correct the problems giving rise to the children's removal from her home and had not done so. Torres v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 423 (2012).

Appellant's lack of compliance with the case plan and court orders, including his failure to submit to drug screens and testing positive for drugs, as well as his failure to obtain stable housing, employment, or income, supported a grant of termination of parental rights according to the “subsequent other factors” ground under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section. Because there was no meritorious argument that there was insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights, counsel's motion to withdraw was granted. Cotton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 455, 422 S.W.3d 130 (2012).

Trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of facts warranting termination of appellants' parental rights under subdivision (b)(3) of this section, because the child had been out of the home for 12 months due to unclean conditions and appellants' drug and alcohol abuse, appellants failed to remedy the situation that led to the removal of the child, and continued instability was hazardous to the child’s well-being. Bryant v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 491 (2012).

Clear and convincing evidence under subdivision (b)(3) of this section supported the termination of a mother's parental rights to her child because the mother lied to the trial court about her continued involvement with the child's father and allowed him to see the child despite orders forbidding such contact. Duncan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 13 (2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated because clear and convincing evidence showed (1) the mother's children were adoptable and faced possible harm if returned to the mother, and, (2) if services were provided, the children could not return to the mother in a reasonable time, and it had been found that there was little chance of reunification. Tatum v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 101 (2013).

Clear evidence supported the trial court's findings of best interests and statutory grounds for termination under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section, given that (1) the child had twice been adjudicated dependent-neglected and had been out of the father's custody for over 12 months, (2) after the child had been returned to the father in 2010, he was found in 2011 associating with known drugs users and tested positive for drugs, and (3) when the child was removed from the father's custody that time, he discontinued efforts to maintain contact with the human services department and he infrequently saw the child. Smart v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 257 (2013).

Parental rights were properly terminated because the caseworker testified that the children had been out of the home for 12 months, the mother admitted to having a bipolar disorder and failing to stay on medication, and the father failed to adequately understand the potential harm of the mother having unsupervised time with the children. Drake v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 274, 427 S.W.3d 710 (2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated because the mother was afforded reasonable assistance in meeting the goals of her case plan, she moved away without informing social services, she failed to attend therapy, counseling, and parenting classes, and she also failed to achieve stable housing and employment. Hayes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 294 (2013).

Termination of parental rights was proper, because neither parent was ready for custody of the children after two years and the children were adoptable; the mother failed to follow the court's placement order, and the father tested positive for illegal drugs during the pendency of the case. Knuckles v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 368, 428 S.W.3d 555 (2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated because the mother had not maintained regular contact with social services, she had not visited regularly with the children, the mother had not submitted to the court-ordered drug and alcohol assessment, and the mother had not submitted to the court-ordered psychological evaluation. Coleman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 458 (2013).

Child's siblings had suffered severe abuse while in the care of the parents, and it was clearly not in the child's best interest to be returned to the father's custody, and the trial court was not required to return the child to the father's custody to see if she would also be injured. Calahan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 508, 429 S.W.3d 372 (2013).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights to his four children because his actions did not cause the removal of the children, the mother's abandonment of the children did, and the trial court could not rely on a previous dependency-neglect case involving the father as the sole ground for termination as that matter was successfully resolved and ended with reunification of the children with their parents. Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 622 (2013).

Appellate court could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the Texas home study at the parental rights termination hearing as it had been introduced at an earlier hearing and the mother failed to object at the first opportunity; and in any event, any error was harmless because there was sufficient evidence to support termination without consideration of the home study. Hooks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 687, 536 S.W.3d 666 (2017).

Failure to Maintain Meaningful Contact.

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to maintain meaningful contact with the child, and thus termination of the mother's parental rights was proper; in four years, the mother visited the child only once and her claim that she was prevented from visiting the child because of the distance between Arizona and Arkansas failed, as she was able to travel to Arkansas multiple times to attend hearings in this case. Chastain v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 503, 588 S.W.3d 419 (2019).

Failure to Preserve.

Mother failed to preserve for appellate review her contention that a trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights was improper where the child had achieved permanency through a custodial placement with a relative under § 9-27-338(c). The mother failed to designate the permanency-planning hearing in her notice of appeal, the transcript of the permanency-planning hearing was not in the record, and there was no indication in the transcript of the termination hearing that the mother ever raised this argument before the trial court. Bryant v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 390, 383 S.W.3d 901 (2011).

Where a mother failed to appeal prior orders in which a trial court determined that the social service agency had made meaningful efforts towards reunification in a parental rights termination proceeding, the issue of whether reasonable efforts were made could not be raised on appeal as it was waived. Cariker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 574, 385 S.W.3d 859 (2011).

Appellant putative father could not argue on appeal that the trial court was not authorized to terminate his parental rights as another man had been named as the minor child's legal father due to his marriage to the child's mother because appellant did not raise that issue before the trial court. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 537 (2012).

Mother did not object concerning the adequacy of the services provided by the department, and the matter was waived. Weathers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 142, 433 S.W.3d 271 (2014).

Arkansas Supreme Court has never applied a Wicks v. State (270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980)) exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement in a parental rights termination case when the parents are represented by counsel. Weathers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 142, 433 S.W.3d 271 (2014).

In a termination of parental rights case, an argument that the “subsequent factors” statutory ground was not established was not reviewed on appeal because, prior to the termination hearing, the father did not attempt to challenge the findings that appropriate family services had been offered. Stockstill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 427, 439 S.W.3d 95 (2014).

In a termination of parental rights case, an alleged father did not waive his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the circuit court's findings in a civil bench trial, despite the lack of a motion to dismiss at that level. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 676, 449 S.W.3d 721 (2014).

Although the father raised improper service of process in his answer to the termination of parental rights petition, he never raised it again, and his attorney appeared at the termination hearing on his behalf and participated fully without ever objecting to lack of service; therefore, any argument concerning service was waived. Edwards v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 37, 480 S.W.3d 215 (2016).

To the extent that the father argued that his mother should have been given preference in place of termination of parental rights, the father failed to appeal from the order setting the goal of the case to termination of parental rights and adoption. Edwards v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 37, 480 S.W.3d 215 (2016).

In a parental rights termination case, a father waived his argument that the Department of Human Services failed to offer him appropriate services. The father had the opportunity to raise the issue at the termination hearing, but did not do so. Yarbrough v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 429, 501 S.W.3d 839 (2016).

Mother's failures to challenge the failure to remedy finding prevented the appellate court from considering the mother's meaningful-efforts argument with respect to the termination of her parental rights to her oldest child. Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 453, 503 S.W.3d 813 (2016).

Mother's claim that the Department of Human Services failed to make meaningful efforts to reunite the family was not preserved for review as she had not appealed from an earlier permanency-planning order finding reasonable efforts and did not object at the termination hearing. Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 565, 567 S.W.3d 502 (2018).

Failure to Remedy.

Trial court did not err in finding that a mother failed to remedy the conditions that caused removal of the children; although the Department of Human Services contributed to the delay in receiving some services, the mother took no responsibility for her actions in thwarting the attempt to contact her and failing to participate in services she had started. Tillman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119 (2015).

Trial court properly found that the mother manifested incapacity or indifference to remedy the issues that led to the children's removal where she failed to take advantage of the drug treatment programs offered, and she had 14 months to remedy her situation. Tillman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119 (2015).

Circuit court's termination of a mother's parental rights based on the 12-month failure to remedy ground was not clearly erroneous where the mother failed to provide a safe and stable environment for the child's essential needs for over 17 months, and although the mother was incarcerated at the time of the child's removal from the grandmother's home, she had been incarcerated only one week prior to the child's removal. Forbes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 508, 504 S.W.3d 663 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in determining that termination of a mother's parental rights was proper where the conditions that led to the child's removal, i.e., numerous unexplained injuries on the child's body, his fear of the mother, and the concerns for his safety, had not been remedied. Rodgers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 569, 506 S.W.3d 907 (2016).

Trial court's decision to terminate parental rights on the failure to remedy ground was not clearly erroneous; despite their completion of some services and partial compliance with the case plan, a trial home placement with three of the older children had failed and resulted in the subsequent removal of all four children for recurring environmental neglect, the parents had disregarded multiple warnings received throughout the case regarding the condition of the home and the health of the children, and they hesitated to cooperate with the department or ask for help when needed. Bean v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 77, 513 S.W.3d 859 (2017).

Mother failed to remedy the conditions that caused removal of the child where the caseworkers' testimony showed her inability to discipline her 17-year-old son, she was repeating that pattern with the second child, and despite years of parenting classes, her parenting skills had not improved. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 125, 515 S.W.3d 151 (2017).

Although the mother had completed a large portion of her case plan (including overcoming drug addiction), the two failed trial home placements, her disregard of offered parenting skills throughout the case, as well as her hesitation to ask for help when needed and surrounded by various service providers demonstrated her inability to remedy the conditions that caused removal. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 125, 515 S.W.3d 151 (2017).

In a parental rights termination case, the trial court did not err in finding that the parents failed to remedy; although they had achieved sobriety, acquired jobs, and had adequate income and reliable transportation, they failed to remedy the last element that warranted removal, i.e., a lack of stable housing. Selsor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 182, 516 S.W.3d 314 (2017).

Trial court made a mistake in concluding that the statutory “failure to remedy” ground was proved by clear and convincing evidence with respect to the mother because the family service worker stated that she had never been to the mother's home and had no idea if it was clean or stable; the Department of Human Services provided no evidence on which to base a conclusion that the father was doing anything the mother needed to protect the children from. Choate v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 319, 522 S.W.3d 156 (2017).

Trial court clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds for termination of a father's parental rights were proved because the statutory “failure to remedy” ground was not proved by clear and convincing evidence; at worst, it was established that a family service worker did not know whether the father's housing and employment were stable, and at best, it was established that the father had lived in the same home since before the parties divorced and had worked at a job for at least a year. Choate v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 319, 522 S.W.3d 156 (2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the appellate court found no reversible error in the circuit court's finding that a father's continued pattern of violence, arrests, and instability constituted a failure to remedy those conditions. Blasingame v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 71, 542 S.W.3d 873 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights as to all four children on the failure to remedy ground under this section was affirmed; one child was clearly adjudicated dependent-neglected and had been removed in part due to the mother's failure to protect him from sexual abuse by the father, the triplets were removed based on the same failure to protect their sibling, and the mother invited any error in the adjudication of dependency-neglect as to the triplets. Parnell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 108, 538 S.W.3d 264 (2018) (sub. op. on reh'g).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she did not remedy the condition that caused removal — her homelessness; and, although she had secured an apartment, signed a lease, paid a deposit, and lacked only having the utilities turned on, she still had not moved into the apartment; and because, although the mother contended that the efforts of the Department of Human Services (DHS) to help remedy her homelessness were not meaningful, her caseworker testified that one of DHS's requirements for providing cash assistance for housing was that the parent demonstrate an ability to maintain the home without DHS's support, and the mother never showed that ability based on an inconsistent employment history. Garlington v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 124, 542 S.W.3d 917 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to two of her children was proper based on the failure to remedy ground because one of the conditions that caused removal was that the mother was under the influence of illegal drugs while in the presence of the juveniles, and, despite numerous services throughout the case, that remained true; and the circuit court's failure to make a finding regarding the effect of termination on the familial relationship with a sibling who was not in the custody of the Department of Human Services, when there was never any court order in place allowing the children to visit with the sibling, was not reversible error. Rice v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 141, 572 S.W.3d 907 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in terminating parents' parental rights for failure to remedy because the parents' environmental neglect was the primary risk to the children's health, safety, and welfare that caused the Department of Human Services to get involved with the family, and the evidence established that the parents, despite 18 months of services from the department, were never able to keep their home clean on a consistent basis. Boomhower v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 397, 587 S.W.3d 231 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's parental rights pursuant to the failure to remedy ground; although the circuit court found that the mother had benefited somewhat from services, after 18 months of services, she could not safely be reunited with her children because she failed to acknowledge the violence and volatility that continued in her home, and she continued to minimize her boyfriend's violent behavior. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 406, 587 S.W.3d 577 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's parental rights under the failure to remedy statutory ground for persistent environmental neglect because the Department of Human Services caseworker observed feces and urine on the floor; trash, laundry, and dishes throughout the house; and wires, chemicals, tools, and cigarette butts that the children could access; and, although the parents had the ability to get the home clean and did so at times, they failed to demonstrate that they were capable of keeping the home clean. Morris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 411, 586 S.W.3d 203 (2019).

Failure to Support.

Trial court’s decision to terminate a father’s parental rights to his son on the ground that he willfully failed to provide significant material support was not clearly erroneous because the father was ordered to pay child support, but he failed to make any payments of child support. Rodgers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 299 (2015).

Ground for termination set forth in sub- division (b)(3)(B)(ii) of this section merely provides that the juvenile live outside the home of the parent for 12 months; it does not require that the child be removed from the custody of the parent as required by the ground found in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i). Rodgers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 299 (2015).

Father.

Alleged father's right to his presumptive child should not have been terminated because, when the circuit court in effect voided a default paternity order and determined that the alleged father was not the biological father, all references and connections to the alleged father should have been removed from the case. The alleged father could not have been the presumptive legal father or even a putative father. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 676, 449 S.W.3d 721 (2014).

Circuit court erred in terminating a putative father's parental rights where it had found that his three hour-long visits with the child did not establish any parental rights, and thus it was error to terminate parental rights it found to be nonexistent. Whitehead v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 42, 481 S.W.3d 469 (2016).

Although not initially included, appellant was added as a party and deemed by the circuit court to be the child's legal father because the child was conceived while appellant was married to the mother; the circuit court also deemed another man to be the child's legal father because he was listed on the birth certificate and was found to be the biological father through a paternity test. However, a review of case law from other jurisdictions showed a consensus that a child can have only one legal father and the Court of Appeals found those decisions to be persuasive. Howerton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 560, 506 S.W.3d 872 (2016).

Appellant could not be the child's legal father—presumptive or otherwise—once the circuit court found that another man was the legal father. By finding another man to be the child's legal father, the circuit court effectively divested appellant of all parental rights. Thus, the circuit court's ruling terminating appellant's parental rights was clearly erroneous because he had no rights. Howerton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 560, 506 S.W.3d 872 (2016).

Circuit court's order dismissing a putative father from a case seeking termination of parental rights was affirmed where he had waived his claim-preclusion and notice arguments by failing to raise them below, and the court had followed the proper procedure by dismissing him from the case once it determined that he was not the child's legal or biological father. Manohar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 482, 528 S.W.3d 881 (2017).

Trial court erred in terminating appellant's parental rights because there was no evidence that appellant's status as a “legal father” fell within the statutory definition of a parent for purposes of the aggravated-circumstances ground for termination. There was no evidence that appellant had been found by the court to be the biological father of the child; although the appellate court did have a finding by the trial court that appellant was the “legal father” of the child, the appellate court could not ascertain on what basis that determination was made; and the trial court's orders frequently exchanged the terms “legal father” and “putative father” when referring to both appellant and another “father” identified in the case. Tovias v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 228, 575 S.W.3d 621 (2019).

Where appellant argued only that DHS had not established that he was a “parent” and that DHS failed to offer sufficient proof that he was married to the mother when the child was born, the circuit court's decision terminating his parental rights was not clearly erroneous; the circuit court had found the appellant to be the “non-custodial parent who was a legal parent” in the adjudication order and appellant did not appeal that order, a family service worker testified at the termination hearing that from her understanding the child was born during the marriage, and the appellant's attorney ad litem stated that she had recognized the “legal issue and those potential consequences” of a DNA test and that the appellant had declined the test. Thacker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 379, 585 S.W.3d 698 (2019).

Findings.

An adjudication of dependency and neglect finding by a juvenile court referee is sufficient to satisfy this section. Hutton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 303 Ark. 512, 798 S.W.2d 418 (1990).

Finding parent was unable to be the type of parent child needed, and that parent was not able to learn how to be such a parent, was a sufficient finding by clear and convincing evidence of parent's unfitness to support termination of parental rights. J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997).

Even if the statute does not permit a termination petition to be filed until a child has been out of the home for 12 months, any error that might have occurred when a petition was filed after 11 months was cured where the hearing did not occur until the child had been out of the home for over 14 months. Donna S. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 61 Ark. App. 235, 966 S.W.2d 919 (1998).

Subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section does not require a second dependency-neglect adjudication at the final hearing; it simply requires the Department of Human Services to prove that the children have been adjudicated dependent-neglected. Bearden v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001).

Appellate court dismissed father's appeal of the decision finding that his son was dependent-neglected as moot where father had not appealed a subsequent ruling that terminated his parental rights; this section no longer required a dependent-neglected adjudication before parental rights are terminated. Masters v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 375, 237 S.W.3d 125 (2006).

Termination of the father's parental rights to his son was appropriate under this section because the father failed to prove that he was able to provide for one of his son's most basic needs, which was a stable home environment. The trial court was not required to ignore the fact that the father and his wife had a long history of a volatile relationship and the father failed to finish his anger-management course until after the permanency-planning hearing, and only two months prior to the termination hearing. Latham v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 99 Ark. App. 25, 256 S.W.3d 543 (2007).

The Department of Human Services (DHS) engaged in meaningful efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify the parent's family, as provided in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section; while DHS did not initially provide adequate services, it provided services and referrals for a full year prior to a termination hearing, and during that year, the parent either failed to take advantage of the services or participated in them inconsistently. Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 362 (2010).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence of grounds to terminate the parental rights of a mother and father under this section because they failed to remedy the causes for removal and demonstrated an incapacity or indifference to remedying the problems that prevented return of their children; the father failed to comply with the case plan, demonstrated poor judgment in remaining with the mother, and failed to establish any stable housing or employment, and the mother was unable or unwilling to discontinue drug use, she failed to attend counseling until the petition to terminate was filed, she never held a steady job, she failed to pay court-ordered child support, she failed to establish proper housing, and her psychological evaluation demonstrated that she was a multi-drug abuser and that she had a borderline personality disorder. Vance v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 778 (2010).

There was no issue of arguable merit as to whether termination of the parental rights of a mother and father was in their children's best interest because the trial court clearly considered both parts of the two-part inquiry that required consideration of the potential harm to the children if returned to the parents and the likelihood of adoption in deciding termination was in the children's best interest; there was potential harm because the mother and father had no employment or home, and at least one of them had significant drug and psychological problems, and the children were deemed adoptable, even as a sibling pair. Vance v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 778 (2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her daughter was proper under this section because the mother failed to maintain stable housing, her continuing drug use showed both an indifference to remedying the problems plaguing the family and the potential hardship to the child, and it was unclear how long it would take the mother to overcome her problem. Welch v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 798, 378 S.W.3d 290 (2010).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate because case law supported the finding that his failure to comply with the court orders and case plan were sufficient evidence of other factors arising subsequent to the filing of the original petition. Further, his post-removal decision not to take advantage of services showed his incapacity or indifference to rehabilitate his circumstances; his failure to comply with court orders constituted sufficient evidence under the statute. Clements v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 493 (2013).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate because the circuit court relied on the appropriate statutory ground in terminating the father's parental rights and that ground was alleged in the petition. Even though the circuit court failed to check the blank for “other factors” on its form order terminating appellant's parental rights, it circled “parents” within that section and indicated by hand-written remarks appropriate family services applicable to both parents were offered. Clements v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 493 (2013).

Under subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section, only one ground was necessary to terminate parental rights, but the trial court did not err in finding that the mother's driving under the influence conviction was a subsequent issue that showed placement of the child in the mother's custody was contrary to the child's healthy and safety. Aguilera v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 503 (2013).

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated because his child was adjudicated dependent-neglected in 2012 due to parental unfitness, the father was incapable or indifferent to remedying the issues or factors or rehabilitating his circumstances despite the provision of appropriate services, the father lacked any income or suitable home, had not resolved his criminal issues, and his incarceration effectively prevented any benefit from the services to which he had access. Washington v. Ark. Dept of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 293 (2014).

Language of the circuit court's order plainly tracked the language of the statute on subsequent factors and aggravated circumstances, and defendant cited no authority for the proposition that the circuit court's order had to specifically recite the subsection number of the statutory provision on which the circuit court relied. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 440, 503 S.W.3d 122 (2016).

Circuit court found that the Department of Human Services had proven six grounds supporting termination despite the fact that the Department alleged only three grounds in its petition; this was not a meritorious ground for reversal, however, because only one ground needed to be proven to support termination, and the circuit court found that the department proved all three grounds alleged in the termination petition. McGaugh v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 485, 505 S.W.3d 227 (2016).

Frivolous Appeal.

Where the children were removed from the mother's home after the youngest child died, allegations of sexual abuse arose and the court found the children dependent-neglected as a result of inadequate supervision; the mother's appeal of the decision terminating her parental rights for failure to remedy the cause of removal, nonsupport, and subjecting the children to aggravated circumstances lacked merit. The court found that termination was in the children's best interest. Gregory v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 420 (2013).

Mother's counsel properly found that there was no meritorious basis upon which to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights because, although the mother had completed many services, she had not maintained stable housing or employment, and she disobeyed the court's orders regarding her boyfriend. Watson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 28 (2014).

In a termination of parental rights case, counsel was allowed to withdraw because an appeal by a father would have been wholly without merit; the child had been in the custody of an agency for almost 16 months, and the father was incarcerated during most of the child’s life. Moreover, the child would have continued in foster care significantly longer if the father had maintained his parental rights, and the trial court’s finding of adoptability was supported by testimony from an adoption specialist. Criswell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 255, 435 S.W.3d 26 (2014).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights and his counsel could withdraw because it was in the child's best interest to terminate his parental rights where his appeal lacked merit, the child was adjudicated dependent-neglected, the father had not maintained contact with the Department of Human Services, had not visited with the child, had not attended drug-and-alcohol assessments or hair-follicle testing, had not resolved all criminal matters, and had not remained drug free. Freeman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 366 (2014).

Counsel complied with the requirements for no-merit appeals in termination cases, and the court granted counsel's motion to withdraw after finding the appeal without merit. Holmes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs, 2014 Ark. App. 482 (2014). Accord Horton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 370 (2014); Duncan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 489 (2014); White v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 506 (2014); Young v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 602 (2014); McPherson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 621 (2014); Windom v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 629 (2014); Spencer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 670 (2014); Murphree v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 677 (2014); Kilmer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 694 (2014); Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 735 (2014).

Mother's counsel was allowed, under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1), to withdraw from a termination-of-parental-rights appeal, under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section, despite failing to mention an overruled evidentiary objection, because an appeal was frivolous, as (1) the mother tested positive for drugs, did not appear for required drug screening, moved without notice, had not seen the children in over six months due to failure to pass a drug test, and (2) the evidence supported the trial court's best-interest finding. Poss v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 514, 443 S.W.3d 594 (2014).

Father's counsel was not allowed, under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1), to withdraw from a termination of parental rights appeal because (1) the father was not offered services, and (2) an arguable issue existed as to erroneous termination under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (vii) (a) of this section, since the father's incarceration was no cause for removal nor a subsequent “other factors or issues” ground. Poss v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 514, 443 S.W.3d 594 (2014).

Mother's appeal from the circuit court's decision to terminate her parental rights was wholly without merit and therefore frivolous. Because the mother's counsel complied with Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services and the appellate court's rules, the termination order and counsel's motion to withdraw were upheld. McDonald v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 277 (2015). Accord Studway v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 365 (2015); Morin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 695, 477 S.W.3d 548 (2015).

Trial court granted the termination petition, counsel stated there were no issues of arguable merit for appeal, and the appeal was found to be wholly without merit; the mother admitted using drugs shortly before giving birth to the child, and there was testimony that she had not worked diligently towards reunification or made an effort to maintain sobriety. Qualls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 371 (2015).

In a termination of parental rights case, the mother's and the father's appeals were wholly without merit because the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Human Services proved that the parents had their parental rights to another child involuntarily terminated. Abraham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 491 (2017).

In a termination of parental rights case in which the father's counsel filed a motion to be relieved as counsel and a no-merit brief, counsel's motion to withdraw was denied and rebriefing was ordered as counsel's brief did not adequately address all of the adverse rulings. Counsel did not address why challenging the aggravated-circumstances finding based on little likelihood of successful reunification was without merit; a finding of aggravated circumstances applies only to a “parent”, but counsel did not address why challenging the aggravated-circumstances finding based on the father's putative-father status at the time of the adjudication was without merit; and counsel failed to address the alternative grounds for termination. Kloss v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 121 (2019).

Grandparents.

A grandmother's visitation and custody rights were derivative of her daughter's parental rights, and, as a result, were terminated when her daughter's parental rights were terminated. Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 314 Ark. 92, 858 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

No error in refusing to place the children with the maternal grandmother when the evidence revealed an indifference to the children's welfare on her part. Baker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 42, 8 S.W.3d 499 (2000).

Termination of appellant father's parental rights was not in his daughter's best interests because termination of the father's parental rights endangered his daughter's relationship with her paternal grandmother, in light of subdivision (c)(1) of this section. The circuit court found that relationship to be the most stable influence on the daughter. Caldwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 102 (2010).

Termination of parental rights results in termination of all other familial rights flowing through that parent, pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Caldwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 102 (2010).

Trial court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous because the maternal grandmother's home did not meet all relevant child-protection standards, and placement in her home would not be in the children's best interests since the grandmother was married to a man who indicated that he did not want the children and had been accused of child maltreatment; the mother failed to demonstrate how the termination of her parental rights would completely remove the possibility that the grandmother could be a placement for the child because there was no indication that the grandmother would be ineligible to adopt the children if she met all of the necessary requirements. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 469, 375 S.W.3d 721 (2010), overruled, Ellis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. 441, 505 S.W.3d 678 (2016).

Termination of the parents' parental rights to their daughter was appropriate because the issue before the circuit court at the termination hearing was a petition for termination of parental rights and not a custody, guardianship, or adoption petition. The parents failed to advance any new or persuasive argument that a grandmother's willingness to care for the child somehow precluded the termination of their parental rights. Ogden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 577 (2012).

In a case in which the circuit court erroneously decided to forego a relative-placement option with the grandparents in favor of terminating the mother's parental rights, the Department of Human Services erred in saying that the grandparents could later become an adoptive placement for the children if they were able to meet all the necessary child protection standards and successfully petition to adopt the children because the grandparents were not parties to the termination of parental rights case and would not have standing to intervene as a matter of right in a subsequent adoption proceeding should the termination be affirmed; and, if the children were not placed with the grandparents now, it was unlikely the court would allow them to adopt the children later. Clark v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 223, 575 S.W.3d 578 (2019).

Grounds.

Evidence was sufficient to find that the Department of Human Services made a meaningful effort to rehabilitate the home, that the conditions which caused removal had not been remedied by the parent, and that grounds for the termination of parental rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Beeson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 37 Ark. App. 12, 823 S.W.2d 912 (1992).

Father's parental rights were terminated where there was clear and convincing evidence that the two sons lived apart from the father for 12 months and that he failed to provide monetary support for them or to make sufficient contact with them. Crawford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 330 Ark. 152, 951 S.W.2d 310 (1997).

Rights may be terminated if the juvenile has lived outside the home of the parent for 12 months and the parent has willfully failed to provide significant material support to his child as ordered by the chancery court and to have meaningful contact with him. Wade v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999).

Termination appropriate where mother failed to show any consistent improvements in terms of visitation, employment, or housing, and her pattern of inconsistent visitation continued to harm her children even while they were not in her custody. Baker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 42, 8 S.W.3d 499 (2000).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the appellant's parental rights where she had 18 months between the permanency planning hearing and the termination hearing to rehabilitate and correct the conditions that caused removal, but failed to provide a home and to demonstrate the ability to adequately parent the children even after receiving reasonable, rehabilitative services for over three years. Moore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 69 Ark. App. 1, 9 S.W.3d 531 (2000).

Father's rights to his children were not terminated because he was incarcerated, but rather because the statutory requirements for termination were met by clear and convincing evidence; the children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected, had been out of the home for more than 12 months, and the Department of Human Services made a meaningful effort to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions that caused removal, but despite that effort, the father did not remedy those conditions. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 78 Ark. App. 112, 82 S.W.3d 183 (2002).

Trial court erred in terminating parents' rights to their new-born daughter based solely on the fact that the parents' rights to an older sibling had previously been terminated; while the prior termination satisfied subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(4) of this section, such action still required a finding that termination was in the best interests of the child, and the prior termination, standing alone, was not sufficient to support such a finding. Conn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 79 Ark. App. 195, 85 S.W.3d 558 (2002).

Where a child was left partially paralyzed from a second incident of abuse committed by the mother's boyfriend, the mother was badly mistaken in the belief that her parental rights could not be terminated where the mother had complied with an earlier case plan and did not personally injure child, as it was the mother's duty to take affirmative steps to protect the child from harm. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 83 Ark. App. 1, 115 S.W.3d 332 (2003).

Trial court gave proper weight to the child's wishes when considering a termination petition; there was no error where the trial court found that the child's wishes were not the controlling factor in its decision to terminate the mother's parental rights. Jefferson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 356 Ark. 647, 158 S.W.3d 129 (2004).

Where appellant mother did little to disassociate herself with an abusive man who struck her son across the face hard enough to leave marks, the trial court properly terminated her parental rights. Trout v. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).

Nothing in § 9-27-338 prohibited the trial court from holding a permanency planning hearing immediately, given that it had already provided notice of no reunification and the DHS's petition to terminate; in addition, the trial court's subsequent termination of the parents' parental rights was not error when, under this section, the fact that the parents had had their parental rights terminated as to their other children was an immediate ground for termination. Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 450, 158 S.W.3d 691 (2004) (decided in part under prior version of § 9-27-341).

Parental rights were properly terminated where, although the children were not physically beaten, the parents physically endangered the children with a lack of medication, lack of heat, and exposure to items that could have seriously injured or killed them, such as plastic bags in the baby's crib, sharp knives on the floor, and a foot-long rat in the house; in addition, the parents demonstrated a lack of motivation to comply with the case plan by failing to maintain employment and complete classes, and the mother lacked a bond with two of the older children. Browning v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 495, 157 S.W.3d 540 (2004).

Parents' parental rights were properly terminated where, pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(4) of this section, the parents’ rights as to one child were terminated based upon the fact that their parental rights had been terminated as to another child. Browning v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 495, 157 S.W.3d 540 (2004).

Court properly terminated mother's parental rights where the mother failed to maintain meaningful contact with the child by moving to California prior to her adjudication hearing and, although the mother was offered services by the state during the pendency of the case, she refused to return to the state or avail herself of the services; moreover, while in California, the mother failed to maintain steady employment, never established her own residence, and moved in and out of her mother's apartment, which was found to be unsuitable in a California home study. Mayfield v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 88 Ark. App. 334, 198 S.W.3d 541 (2004).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated on the basis of her incapacity or indifference to remedy subsequent issues where she married a convicted sex offender who could not have unsupervised contact with minors, she did not maintain stable employment, and she stopped taking her medication; further, the children had been out of the home for at least 12 months and it was not until the end of the case, with the termination hearing looming near, that the mother began to take active steps to comply with the case plan. Camarillo-Cox v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 360 Ark. 340, 201 S.W.3d 391 (2005).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights where she repeatedly missed her appointments with her various doctors, and she could not budget her money, such that she routinely ran out of food in the middle of the month, but she maintained cable TV; the mother was given ample time to correct her situation and it was in the child's best interests to be placed for adoption because the child was six years old when the proceedings began and, when termination was granted, she was nearly nine. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 164, 205 S.W.3d 778 (2005).

Termination of mother's parental rights was proper as statutory grounds existed for the termination, including educational neglect and failure to protect, and evidence supported the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest. Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 364 Ark. 224, 217 S.W.3d 107 (2005).

There was clear and convincing evidence to terminate father's parental rights where the four children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and were out of the home for approximately 17 months, the father lacked stable housing and stable employment, he failed to comply with court orders to provide child support and, although he completed alcohol and drug inpatient treatment, as well as parenting classes and visitation, he repeatedly failed to comply with the circuit court's orders. Lewis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 364 Ark. 243, 217 S.W.3d 788 (2005).

Although it was very clear that the Department of Human Services did not follow the spirit or letter of the mandate in offering reunification services to a mother, the court could not say that, under the evidence presented at the termination hearing, it was reversible error to terminate the mother's rights without ordering further services to her, despite the outrageous and contemptuous conduct of the department, where the children had been out of the home for approximately three years and they could not have been returned to the home in a reasonable amount of time, and where the mother failed a drug test following a first review hearing after remand and she refused all subsequent drug tests. Kight v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 94 Ark. App. 400, 231 S.W.3d 103 (2006).

Trial court did not err in finding that the father had failed to maintain meaningful contact with his child and in terminating the father's parental rights to the child as (1) by the father's own testimony, it was established that his contact with his son was limited to a single two-week period; and (2) while it was true that the father was incarcerated for a portion of that time, there was other evidence that the father chose not to be a part of the child's life because he absented himself from the child's life as soon as he found out that the mother was pregnant and did not return until some three or four years later. Moore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 138, 234 S.W.3d 883 (2006).

Order terminating mother's parental rights to her three children was upheld as the trial court did not err in placing the oldest child in the custody of a family friend; § 9-27-338(c) clearly anticipated that one of the “goals” could be a plan for permanent custody. Griffin v. Ark. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 322, 236 S.W.3d 570 (2006).

Order terminating parents' rights to their three children was upheld where the parents subjected the children to aggravated circumstances, as provided in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3) of this section, and the mother's deep-seated psychological problems prevented her from becoming a fit parent in that they caused her to refuse to accept responsibility for her actions; the trial court did not err in finding, pursuant to § 9-27-303(6), that there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Yarborough v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006).

Order terminating a father's parental rights was upheld because any error resulting from the premature filing of the termination petition was cured once the 12-month time threshold was satisfied; because the child was placed in foster care on April 18, 2005, and the termination order was not entered until May 3, 2006, the child had been out of the father's custody for over one year. Riley v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 235, 253 S.W.3d 928 (2007).

According to the Arkansas Supreme Court's interpretation of the temporal mandate in this section, the clock commences on the date the child is removed from the home and does not stop until the termination of parental rights order is entered. Riley v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 235, 253 S.W.3d 928 (2007).

Termination of parental rights was proper due to aggravated circumstances because the mother engaged in repeated cruelty to the children by striking them, she left Arkansas and returned to Louisiana, despite the fact that she knew Louisiana was unable to provide necessary services to her, she was not credible in her testimony concerning her inability to complete basic case-plan goals, such as obtaining housing and employment, and she had remained unemployed over the previous two years. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 275, 254 S.W.3d 762 (2007).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper because a caseworker testified that in her opinion it was in the children's best interests to terminate the parental rights and to allow the children to have an opportunity to “unlearn” their aggressive, destructive behaviors. She explained that she had interacted with them and that they were sweet children, and she thought “working with the children with their therapy … that they can be adopted.” Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 275, 254 S.W.3d 762 (2007).

Mother's parental rights were terminated where, pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section, the legislature's overriding intent was to protect the best interest of the child; while the mother attempted to be a parent, she was not able to be, and improvement and compliance toward the end of a case plan would not necessarily bar termination of parental rights. Meriweather v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 328, 255 S.W.3d 505 (2007).

Termination of the parents' parental rights to their children was proper under subsection (b) of this section because the trial court had before it clear and convincing evidence of the children's abuse. Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 99 Ark. App. 95, 257 S.W.3d 574 (2007).

Clear and convincing evidence warranted a termination of parental rights where the evidence showed that a father left bruises and bite marks on his children, viewed pornography, abused their mother, refused to attend counseling, and failed to pay child support; it was not necessary to address the father's argument regarding the lack of findings of sexual abuse because there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and remained out of his custody for more than 12 months. The father did not argue that services were not provided to him; he argued that there were services that could have been provided, but were not. Hall v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 101 Ark. App. 417, 278 S.W.3d 609 (2008).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because despite the fact that parents complied with the case plan and with trial court orders, they were still not capable of caring for the children; the mother had not accepted responsibility for the removal, had not addressed environmental issues, and would reconnect with the father, and the father was unwilling to admit fault, was abusive and was incarcerated. In addition, the children had been removed from their parents’ care for a period in excess of 12 months. Lee v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277 (2008).

Mother's parental rights were improperly terminated, under this section, where the facts warranting the termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence; the mother maintained some type of housing, although it was not a fixed location, and the residences were not unsafe or inappropriate for her two children. Strickland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 103 Ark. App. 193, 287 S.W.3d 633 (2008).

Father's partial compliance with certain aspects of a case plan did not warrant reversal of a termination order because his compliance did not make him capable of caring for his children. Belue v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 104 Ark. App. 139, 289 S.W.3d 500 (2008).

Termination of parental rights was warranted under this section because the parents lacked the mental capacity to raise a child and because, despite meaningful services, the parents were unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the removal of the child within one year. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, 314 S.W.3d 722 (2009).

Trial court found aggravated circumstances in the mother's case by her guilty plea to manslaughter in the death of one of the children, her failure to report the sexual abuse of another child by her husband, her failure to obtain medical or psychological help for her daughter after the abuse, and her continuing to have sexual relations with the abuser after she learned of her daughter's abuse; there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification under this section. Vasquez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 575, 337 S.W.3d 552 (2009).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights under subdivisions (b)(3)(A) and (B) of this section, where the mother abandoned her children for 11 months and was unwilling to place their needs ahead of her own. Ridley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 618 (2009).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination of parental rights was in four children's best interest where the court considered the potential harm in returning the children, their mother exposed them to pornography and gave them alcohol, the mother's husband raped the six-year-old, the mother failed to get a job or suitable housing, and the mother was pregnant with another child the mother could not support at the time of the termination hearing. Thomsen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 687, 370 S.W.3d 842 (2009).

Although a father had taken all the recommended classes, maintained employment, stayed drug-free, and had a decent living environment, a trial court did not err in emphasizing the child's distress when his father was around and in terminating the father's rights pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section. Bearden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 754, 351 S.W.3d 186 (2009).

Trial court properly found that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest and that grounds existed pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) , (ii) (a) and (vii) (a) of this section, including that the parents remained unable or unwilling to appreciate the nutritional and medical needs of the child. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 872 (2009).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was appropriate pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i), (ii), (vii), and (viii) of this section because she was still, after all of the services she received, unable to provide a stable home for the child. At the time of the termination, the mother was incarcerated and unable to care for the child or achieve stability in a time frame consistent with the child's needs; further, the child had been out of her mother's custody for more than half of her young life. Ramsey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 1365, 377 S.W.3d 399 (2010).

Circuit court did not clearly err in considering the potential-harm factor of subdivision (b)(3)(A)(ii) of this section or in finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the father lacked stable housing, which was evidenced by the fact that home studies on his and his mother's residences were denied, he provided no proof of a stable income despite several court orders to do so, and he had paid only a fraction of the court-ordered child support, despite his claim of having substantial earnings; the father's lack of stable housing and income and his failure to pay child support were contrary to the child's best interest. Banks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 53 (2010).

Although, in cases of termination of parental rights, the circuit court considers the likelihood that the child would be adopted and the potential harm that could arise from returning the child into the parent's custody, pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section, that portion of the statute was inapplicable because appellant father's child was not being placed for adoption. Rather, the child was in the custody of her mother. Caldwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 102 (2010).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's rights to her three children after 19 months in custody under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section based on the determination that two children were behind in their development and had been neglected and abused, and the mother's incarceration and inability to have the children with her. Fredrick v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 104, 377 S.W.3d 306 (2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was affirmed because the evidence demonstrated that all of the children were likely to be adopted and that their welfare and safety would be jeopardized if returned to their mother's custody and the Department of Human Services adequately proved the statutory grounds as found by the trial court. Emmert v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 128, 374 S.W.3d 104 (2010).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper, pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section, because, although the mother maintained negative drug screenings after completing drug treatment, at the time of the termination hearing she still had not complied with the trial court's directive that she live independently and obtain employment. Thompson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 167, 374 S.W.3d 143 (2010).

In a case in which a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child's best interests, considering the likelihood that he would be adopted and the potential harm of returning him to his mother's custody. Churchwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 237, 374 S.W.3d 210 (2010).

Circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the mother caused one child's severe burns; (2) the children were dependent-neglected; (3) they had continued out of the custody of the mother for 12 months; and (4) despite a meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services to rehabilitate her and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions had not been remedied by the mother; and termination of parental rights was upheld. Mason v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 251 (2010).

On appeal from the termination of the mother's parental rights, while it was true that the mother was only separated from her child for three months prior to the termination hearing, the facts were undisputed that the child was not in the mother's custody during that time; rather, the child was in the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) and continued to be in DHS custody in excess of 12 months. As such, the second element of subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section was satisfied. K.C. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 353, 374 S.W.3d 884 (2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper because the third element of subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section, that the parent had not remedied the conditions that caused removal, was not satisfied. It was impossible for the mother to have remedied the problems that caused removal because she was not the cause of the removal of the child, the child's grandmother was. K.C. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 353, 374 S.W.3d 884 (2010).

In view of evidence that a mother failed to complete substance abuse programs and was indifferent to having her child in her life, which showed potential harm to the child if he were returned to her, her parental rights were properly terminated based on the “other factors” ground found in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) of this section. Rodgers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 452, 376 S.W.3d 496 (2010).

Trial court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous because there was no evidence showing that keeping the mother's parental rights intact was any more likely to allow the children to stay together than termination; the testimony indicated that the children would likely be adopted, keeping the children with the mother would likely expose them to harm, and it was not clear from the evidence that the maternal grandmother would be a suitable placement within a time frame suitable for the children, if at all. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 469, 375 S.W.3d 721 (2010), overruled, Ellis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. 441, 505 S.W.3d 678 (2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to children, who were previously adjudicated as dependent-neglected, was upheld because there was sufficient evidence to find that the mother failed to correct the conditions that caused the removal of the children. The termination was in the children's best interest because the foster parent was anxious to adopt, the children would suffer potential harm if they were returned to the mother's custody, and the mother was unable to maintain stable or adequate housing and was unemployed. Hughes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 526 (2010).

Finding that parents' ongoing issues with mental instability, environmental neglect, and marital troubles warranted termination of their parental rights was not clearly erroneous, and one ground to terminate their rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section was proven as their rights to an older child had previously been terminated. Masterson-Heard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 623 (2010).

Judgment terminating the mother's parental rights to her son was reversed because both the mother and the child had mental problems that required treatment and therapy, and their mutual love and affection was something that should not be lightly dismissed considering the child's prospects for happiness. Grant v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 636, 378 S.W.3d 227 2010).

Judgment terminating the mother's parental rights was affirmed because the trial court was faced with evidence that the mother drank during unsupervised visits with the child, that the mother exhibited resistance to constructive coaching, and the mother's job status was shaky. Edwards v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 739, 379 S.W.3d 609 (2010).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section because the children were very young when they were removed from the father's custody and they had resided in foster care for well over one year; the children's need for permanency and stability was evident; the father had little regard for the children's well-being while they were in his custody; he was convicted of the crime of endangering their welfare; he possessed multiple convictions for other criminal offenses; and his lack of judgment reflected poorly on his capacity to care for the children. Johnson. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 763 (2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to two of her sons was appropriate because the trial court specifically considered the likelihood that the juveniles would be adopted and the potential harm, specifically the negative impact on the health and safety of the juveniles, if they were returned to the custody of their mother. The trial court also found that two statutory grounds under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) and (ii) of this section were present; in part, the correction of the conditions that caused removal had not been remedied. Myers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 182, 380 S.W.3d 906, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943, 132 S. Ct. 403, 181 L. Ed. 2d 258 (2011).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (b)(3) of this section because he failed to remedy the conditions that caused removal by failing to obtain housing and employment separate and apart from the religious ministry, despite the Department of Human Service's meaningful efforts. Seago v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 184, 380 S.W.3d 894 (2011).

Grounds for termination of parental rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parents were under the sway of a quasi-religious organization headed by an individual who had been convicted of violating the Mann Act; the circuit court found parents' testimony that they would not permit abuse of their children was not credible. Krantz v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 185, 380 S.W.3d 927 (2011).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate because it was in the child's best interest under subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section to do so. An adoption specialist testified that the child would likely be adopted and potential harm included the father's unwillingness to comply with the case plan by failing to find suitable housing outside the religious ministry. Reid v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918 (2011).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section because the children had been out of the home for over 12 months and, despite a meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions had not been remedied. The father did not attend all of his required counseling sessions and attended only one staffing meeting; more significantly, he admitted that he failed to obtain housing and employment separate and apart from the religious ministry. Reid v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918 (2011).

Termination of a mother's parental rights in four children was appropriate under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section where the mother refused to address a drug problem, attend counseling, or complete parenting classes, in direct defiance of court orders and in contravention of recommendations. Richmond v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 36 (2011).

Although children were removed from a mother's home based on a report of sexual abuse, a circuit court did not err in relying on subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section to support termination of the mother's parental rights because subsequent issues arose concerning the chronic violence in the mother's home, including: (1) the mother's continuing cohabitation with the man who perpetrated the violence; (2) the mother's threats towards agency workers; and (3) the mother's need for counseling. Porter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 342 (2011).

Since a mother's appeal challenged only one of the three grounds listed by the trial court for termination of the mother's parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section, leaving unchallenged the two alternative grounds on which the trial court relied, the court would not reverse the judgment. Martin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 423, 384 S.W.3d 580 (2011).

Mother's rights were terminated pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section because within five months of having her children returned she was arrested for 16 felony counts of forgery, and three months after that, she was charged with six felony drug charges, including selling pain medication prescribed for her ill daughter. She was not employed, the children could not live at the halfway house she entered after being released from jail, and the children had been out of her custody for a total of nearly four years. Stewart v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 577 (2011).

Termination of the father's parental rights to his three children was affirmed because after appellant was allowed unsupervised overnight visits with the children, one of the children made new allegations of inappropriate touching and another developed nightmares and other issues that resolved when the visits stopped. Murray v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 588, 385 S.W.3d 897 (2011).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the written judgment referenced the Department of Human Services' petition, there was evidence to support termination under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section, and the mother had abandoned the child. Nespor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 745, 387 S.W.3d 239 (2011).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her five children because due to the children testing positive on their drug screens, they were subjected to aggravated circumstances, as defined in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) of this section. Reichard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 762, 387 S.W.3d 279 (2011).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her child under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3)(B)(i) of this section because there were no additional services that could be offered to make her a fit parent, and the services offered failed to give her any insight into proper parenting; there were also two different occurrences of unexplained injuries to the child's face. Anderson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 791, 387 S.W.3d 311 (2011).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3)(B)(i) of this section in terminating parents' rights to their child because the child had been subjected to aggravated circumstances based on sexual abuse by her adoptive father; given the family's attitudes and lack of progress toward reunification after more than one year of services, the finding that termination was in the child's best interest was not erroneous. Draper v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 112, 389 S.W.3d 58 (2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section because her children were removed from her custody due to inadequate supervision, environmental neglect, and her unfitness due to alcohol abuse; at the time of the termination hearing 13 months later, she was not in compliance with the majority of the case plan. Lewis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 154, 391 S.W.3d 695 (2012).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vi) (a) of this section in terminating a father's parental rights to his three children because one of the children maintained that he sexually abused her and that she did not want to go home with him because she believed the abuse would continue; a caseworker did not believe that the children could be safely placed back with him. Blanchard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 215, 395 S.W.3d 405 (2012).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights because the mother did not demonstrate that she was able to provide a stable home or sufficient income, she did not demonstrate appropriate decision-making regarding her relationships and roommates, and the children had a “high likelihood” of adoption. Reed v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 369, 417 S.W.3d 736 (2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights because there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that termination was in the child's best interest, and the Department of Human Services had proved that the mother had abandoned the child and had subjected him to aggravated circumstances under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) of this section and § 9-27-303. Thus, counsel complied with Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 6-9(i), and the appeal was wholly without merit. Fant v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 428 (2012).

In a termination of parental rights case under this section, even though a mother contended that a meaningful effort was not made to rehabilitate her and to correct the conditions that caused the removal of the children, she did not challenge either of the grounds upon which the trial court's order was based. Moreover, reasonable efforts did not require the cleaning of the mother's house for her. Lowery v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 478 (2012).

Finding that the Department of Human Services proved at least one ground for termination was not clearly erroneous, given in part that (1) there was testimony that while the mother had housing, it was not stable housing, (2) as of the date of the hearing, the only housing she had was inadequate to meet the basic needs of the children, (3) there was testimony that she had a spotty work history and she was at her current job for only one month, and (4) her visitation with the children was sporadic and it was disruptive to the children when she failed to attend visitations. Wittig v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 502, 423 S.W.3d 143 (2012).

Trial court's finding that the Department of Human Services proved that a father did not maintain meaningful contact with the children was not clearly erroneous, given in part that (1) he only saw them four times in the four months before his arrest, and in the time that followed, his only attempt at contact was two letters to the children, (2) nothing indicated that he asked for permission to see the children or that he took advantage of any chances to see them that would have been available while he was in prison, and (3) although the department did not produce evidence that he did not provide support, the ground the trial court found was met with either a lack of support or a lack of meaningful contact. Wittig v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 502, 423 S.W.3d 143 (2012).

It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that returning the child to the father would have subjected her to potential harm, given that he never advanced to a trial placement or overnight visits, nor did he request this, the child was bonded to her foster parents, and it was reasonable to find that taking her from them to live with the father who willingly had the bare minimum of contact with her would have subjected her to harm. Wittig v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 502, 423 S.W.3d 143 (2012).

Court affirmed the termination of a father's parental rights to his child; there was a lack of the payment of child support, plus there was evidence of questionable judgment on the father's part, including supporting the child being returned to the mother, although she was unfit to raise the child. Wittig v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 502, 423 S.W.3d 143 (2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights to his child pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section because the trial court's finding that the father had sexually abused his girlfriend's daughter and a psychiatrist's testimony that he was not a fit parent were sufficient evidence of potential harm; the alleged sexual abuse was the reason for removal more than 12 months before. Gipson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 554 (2012).

Court properly terminated parental rights because a visit to the parents' home showed a garbage-strewn yard, a filthy kitchen, a filthy bathroom, and a house filled with thick smoke; there was concern that the father was tracking sewage into the house and that bacteria were being brought into the house. Gray v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 24 (2013).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) of this section because she failed to obtain drug treatment, a relevant point given that illegal drug use was a contributing factor in the death of the children's sibling. She failed to complete a psychological evaluation or enter counseling; such factors arose after a petition for dependency-neglect was filed. Campbell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 84, 426 S.W.3d 501 (2013).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) of this section in terminating a father's parental rights to his three children because he failed to provide adequate and stable housing, did not have a driver's license, failed to complete drug and alcohol screening and treatment, and was unable to care for and provide for the special needs of his children. Fenstermacher v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 88, 426 S.W.3d 483 (2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated where it was shown that her children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected, they had remained out of their parents' custody for more than 12 months, and the conditions that caused removal had not been remedied, despite meaningful efforts by the Department of Human Services; the fact that one child was placed in the mother's custody for a period of time did not present a barrier to termination because the 12 months did not have to immediately precede the filing of the petition nor did it have to be for 12 consecutive months. In addition to the adoptability of the children and their need for permanency, the mother failed to secure employment until shortly before the termination hearing, and she admitted lying about her drug usage and falsifying a drug screen. Spencer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 96, 426 S.W.3d 494 (2013).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her two children pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section because the decision was fueled by her instability and drug use; she was unable to visit the children or do a trial placement with them in the nine months since they had been taken from her. Davison v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 136 (2013).

Mother's appeal from the termination of her parental rights under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section would have been frivolous and counsel was relieved from representation where the termination order followed all governing statutes; the trial court found that the children were in the Department of Human Services custody for 36 months, termination was in their best interest, and there was potential harm in returning them to the mother. Moreover, she failed to comply with the case plan, she tested positive for drugs, she lacked stable housing, she was living with a sex offender, and she had periods of incarceration. Robertson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 218 (2013).

Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's conclusion that termination of a mother's parental rights was in her children's best interest. Based on the mother's ongoing substance-abuse problems, there was evidence of potential harm to the children if they were reunited with her. Dang v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 251 (2013).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was warranted based on the fact that the children had been out of the home for more than one year and the conditions that caused removal had not been remedied. Although this ground was not alleged in the termination petition, there was substantial evidence supporting the circuit court's finding. Dang v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 251 (2013).

Although there was little direct evidence to show that the mother was responsible for the child's behavior, because the circumstantial evidence that she either abused the child or failed to protect him from abuse was overwhelming, under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) of this section, termination of her parental rights was proper and in the child's best interests. McDaniel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 263 (2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated because the mother had no home of her own, she still used illegal drugs, she had disobeyed court orders by failing to complete parenting classes and outpatient drug treatment, she had not obtained stable employment, and she did not maintain contact with the children. The trial court found that, since there had been a finding that there was little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification, aggravated circumstances existed. Strong v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 278 (2013).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated because there was testimony that, although the father had completed parenting classes, his parenting skills had not improved, and the father had an inability to control his temper and exhibited intimidating and aggressive behavior that negatively impacted his daughter. The father tested positive for marijuana and opiates, and at the time of the termination hearing he lived in a one-bedroom apartment and was unemployed with no transportation. Armstrong v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 295 (2013).

There was no clear error in the trial court's finding that the ground for termination was established, as the father lacked stable employment and housing, plus had anger issues, did not manage his medications well, lacked a driver's license and did not complete the home study information packet, had a drug relapse and outstanding warrants, and he was unable to care for the child despite the services that had been provided. Austin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 406, 428 S.W.3d 573 (2013).

There was no clear error in the trial court's finding that the ground for termination was established, as the child had been adjudicated dependent-neglected based on the drug use of her parents, and the father continued to have drug issues and lacked stable employment and housing. Austin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 406, 428 S.W.3d 573 (2013).

Termination ground related to other factors arising subsequent to the petition filing was not proven because the department failed to show it took steps to contact the father after his appearance, to determine his caregiver suitability, or to provide him with services. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 411, 429 S.W.3d 276 (2013).

Court did not interpret the ground as to failure to remedy conditions that caused removal as broadly as the department did, as the child came into custody because of the mother's drug use and the father's absence was not the cause of the removal, such that the provision was not applicable to him and could not support termination. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 411, 429 S.W.3d 276 (2013).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated because he did not go to alcohol classes because he did not like the people present, he had been jailed for failure to pay fines, and he did not provide documentation of employment. Sellers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 417 (2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated because she never completed a psychological evaluation until the end of July 2012, she did not obtain employment until a month before the termination hearing, and she did not complete the drug and alcohol assessment until a week before the termination hearing. Sellers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 417 (2013).

Court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the child had a deep cut on her foot that the school nurse believed should have had stitches, the father told her that it would be fine, and they did not have any medicine to clean the cut. The house was extremely messy — there was no place to sit, two children were sleeping on the floor because their beds had clothes on them, and the house smelled like wet dogs and urine. Morrison v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 479, 429 S.W.3d 329 (2013).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section because she repeatedly missed scheduled visitation with her children and had not rectified the problems of homelessness, unemployment, methamphetamine abuse, and failing to take her medications for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. McPherson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 525 (2013).

Parents' rights were properly terminated pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (vii) (a) of this section because they failed to remedy the conditions causing removal; the mother could not care for the children because she was incarcerated and the father, a quadriplegic, could not remain drug free. Emmons v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 541 (2013).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her two children was affirmed because (1) the mother could not provide for their basic needs, used drugs, and had demonstrated an inability to stay out of jail; and; (2) the mother made only marginal attempts at improving her situation since she reinstituted contact with Department of Human Services in August 2012. Anthony v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 556 (2013).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as (1) the testimony supported the determination that she made minimal progress because, despite three referrals, she delayed seeking drug treatment until the 11th hour, and she was arrested on drug-related charges only two months prior to the termination hearing; and (2) the mother failed to challenge the trial court's independent, alternative grounds for termination. McBride v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 566 (2013).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her five children was proper because the specific conditions that prompted removal were abuse and neglect, but the underlying cause of those conditions was a lack of stability, including her choice of abusive men for romantic partners and her issues with procuring stable housing and employment throughout the case; and there was sufficient evidence presented to support a finding that the mother had still not remedied the underlying lack of stability. Toney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 92 (2014).

As only one ground was required, and the court found one ground sufficient to support termination, the court did not address other issues on other grounds. McElroy v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 117, 432 S.W.3d 109 (2014).

Evidence supported the finding that the mother continued to use illegal drugs, plus she was unemployed throughout a majority of the case, and this was only a sampling of the actions the mother took that were against court orders; there was more than enough evidence to show that in the more than 12 months since the children went into care, the mother failed to remedy the unfitness and neglect that caused removal, and termination of the mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous. McElroy v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 117, 432 S.W.3d 109 (2014).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was affirmed, given that she dismissed the order of protection, moved in with the father and refused to leave the abusive relationship, and told the court she saw no reason to leave him, even at the cost of not having the child returned to her. Weathers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 142, 433 S.W.3d 271 (2014).

It was clear that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests and that grounds for termination were proven, given that more than 17 months had elapsed since the children had been removed, and despite services, the mother manifested the indifference or incapacity to remedy the issues that prevented the children's return to her custody. Carroll v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 199 (2014).

Trial court terminated the mother's parental rights because the trial court was not convinced that her changes would last because they were too new and too slow in coming, and the trial court, which had enough experience to ascertain whether the mother's current progress would continue, found her not to be credible, and given the court's deference to credibility determinations, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Henson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 225, 434 S.W.3d 371 (2014).

Father did not comprehend that he could not just take the child home and out of a nursing facility, as the child had profound developmental delays and medical needs, and this was the basis for the other factors ground; the father's incapacity to understand the level of the child's needs and his failure to prepare for them meant that his parental rights had to give way to the child's need for permanency and safety, and termination of the father's rights was affirmed. Ford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 226, 434 S.W.3d 378 (2014).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights to his sons because it found three bases for the termination under the statute; the father continued to have a relationship with the mother, who voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to the sons, and allowed phone contact between her and the sons despite a no-contact order, he denied knowledge of the severity of one of the son's injuries, and he knew of the abuse the son suffered yet did nothing to prevent it. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 288 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the parents’ rights under this section where it showed that the Department of Human Services (DHS) made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and correct the conditions that caused removal, as they did not cite any specific services that DHS should have or could have provided to them while they were incarcerated. Hamman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 295, 435 S.W.3d 495 (2014).

Trial court's decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents under this section was not clearly erroneous because both parents testified positive for methamphetamine on multiple occasions, the mother had no driver's license or transportation, the father expected to serve four years in prison, neither parent had visited their children for a few months, a caseworker testified that the children were adoptable and that due to drug use and environmental concerns the children would be in danger if returned to either parent. Thompkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 413, 439 S.W.3d 81 (2014).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights because the child's extensive injuries were consistent with child abuse, the child was at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of physical abuse and medical neglect, the child would be at significant risk of potential harm if returned to the mother's custody given that she was severely injured at the age of six months and shortly after being placed back with the mother, and the child was adoptable. Harris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 447 (2014), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2352, 192 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2015).

Circuit court's finding on the failure to remedy ground for termination was not clearly erroneous, as the mother had incurred a driving while intoxicated charge months after the children had been taken into custody and she completed substance abuse treatment, the mother testified that she did not attend counseling, and the circuit court was concerned that the mother just attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings alone was insufficient to address her ongoing problem. Tuck v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 468, 442 S.W.3d 20 (2014).

Finding that the termination ground of subsequent factors was proven as to both parents was not clearly erroneous, given the mother's mental health issues and refusal to take her medication, and her unstable housing and lack of employment until one month before the hearing, plus the father was in prison after having his parole revoked and his release date was uncertain. Tuck v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 468, 442 S.W.3d 20 (2014).

There could be no meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of the mother's parental rights, given that she tested positive several times for various drugs, she admitted using drugs while having custody of the children, she never completed drug treatment, and she refused to end her relationship with the father despite warnings to do based on the domestic altercations; termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children and statutory grounds were proven, as the children were at risk of harm, they were adoptable and had been out of the mother's custody for over 12 months, and the conditions causing removal had not been remedied. Compton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 501 (2014).

Mother's parental rights were terminated in part due to her inability or unwillingness to provide for the extensive special needs of her children, which was adverse to their health and safety. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 34 (2015).

While the circuit court's order found clear evidence to support all four grounds alleged in the termination petition, only one ground had to be proven; an order of termination as to the mother's four other children was entered into evidence, and thus the clear and convincing evidence establishing this termination ground was sufficient alone to support the termination order, and discussion of evidence supporting the other grounds was unnecessary. Mosher v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 111, 455 S.W.3d 367 (2015).

Termination of a father's parental rights was proper because, although he denied drug use, it was undisputed that he lost his job after testing positive for methamphetamine, and he missed multiple drug screens; moreover, he violated a court order by exposing the children to their drug-addicted mother, there was the potential for harm if the children were returned to their father's custody, and there was evidence that the children were highly adoptable. Other issues arose after this case began that demonstrated that the return of the children to the father's custody would have been contrary to their health, safety, or welfare. Humbert v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 266, 460 S.W.3d 316 (2015).

Ground for termination set forth in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ii) of this section merely provides that the juvenile live outside the home of the parent for 12 months; it does not require that the child be removed from the custody of the parent as required by the ground found in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i). Rodgers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 299 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of a father's parental rights under this section because the causes for the child's removal from the home had not been remedied where the father had refused to take drug tests and had been incarcerated for extended periods; as to the subsequent factors ground, the father did not object to a caseworker's testimony about his criminal history, and the father disobeyed a court order, despite knowing that his submission to a drug test was a condition of getting his child back. The father's failure to challenge the trial court's prior meaningful efforts findings precluded the appellate court from reviewing any of those adverse rulings. Norton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 43, 481 S.W.3d 780 (2016).

Imprisonment.

Former subdivision (2)(H)(ii) required only that a sentence exceed 15 years, not that 15 years actually be served; thus, the putative father of a child was sentenced to an amount of time that was “substantial” within the meaning of this section where, by virtue of his parole revocation, he was effectively “sentenced” to the remainder of his 30-year sentence and either had a new 15½ year sentence or had been “sentenced” to 30 years, of which he had already served 14½ years. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 70 Ark. App. 397, 19 S.W.3d 58 (2000).

There was clear and convincing evidence warranting termination of an incarcerated mother's parental rights to her minor child who came into care due to the mother's drug use and instability, the child had been out of the home in excess of 12 months, and conditions had not been remedied; further, the mother was incarcerated again for drugs and sentenced to 144 months in prison for having a methamphetamine lab in her home with the child present. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 93 Ark. App. 395, 219 S.W.3d 705 (2005).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section on the ground that he was sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period of time that would constitute a substantial period of the child's life because the child was 10 months old when the father received a 10-year sentence for drug offenses. Fields v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 104 Ark. App. 37, 289 S.W.3d 134 (2008).

There was no error in the termination of a parent's parental rights because the child was likely to be adopted, the child's safety was in jeopardy if returned to the parent, and the parent was incarcerated for 15 years. Barber v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 381 (2010).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(viii) of this section in terminating a mother's parental rights to her child because by the time she would be released from prison, the child would have spent more than half of the child's life in foster care; even then, there was no guarantee that the child would be immediately able to return to the mother's custody. Hill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 108, 389 S.W.3d 72 (2012).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her son was appropriate because, even if she would be released from prison when she hoped, she would not be able to immediately reunite with the child. The stated intent of this section was to provide permanency in a juvenile's life in all instances where return of a juvenile to the family home was contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare, and it appeared from the evidence that return to the family home could not be accomplished in a reasonable period of time under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(viii) of this section. Adams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 253 (2013).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper because the parents had been incarcerated since March 20, 2012, and had received sentences that would constitute a substantial period of the children's lives, as the mother received a five-year sentence and the father received a four-year sentence. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 753, 431 S.W.3d 364 (2013).

Trial court found that the father had been incarcerated for at least the previous two hearings, that he failed to present evidence that he had done anything to maintain a presence in the children's lives, plus he was in no position to care for the children even if released, as his plan was for them to go with their mother or grandmother, and these findings were supported by the evidence; the termination of his rights was affirmed. Henson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 225, 434 S.W.3d 371 (2014).

Under the incarceration ground for termination of parental rights, the trial court found that one child was less than one year old and the other child was less than one month old when the father went to jail, and he was sentenced to five years, such that by the time of his release, he would have been incarcerated for a substantial period of the children's lives, and this decision was within the bounds of case law. Moses v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 466, 441 S.W.3d 54 (2014).

Incarceration statutory ground for termination of parental rights does not require the Department of Human Services to provide services to the parent while he is in prison as a prerequisite to termination or to contemplate what it will do when he is released, so the trial court's seeming lack of consideration of services the department should have or could have offered in this case was not reversible error. Moses v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 466, 441 S.W.3d 54 (2014).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest, given in part that it was not certain that, even upon the father's release from prison, he would be approved to take the children, he had never lived with one child and had only seen pictures of the other, plus the trial court noted his significant history of violence, including physical abuse to the mother and a police officer. Moses v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 466, 441 S.W.3d 54 (2014).

Father's counsel was not allowed, under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1) (2013), to withdraw from a termination of parental rights appeal because (1) the father was not offered services, and (2) an arguable issue existed as to erroneous termination under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (vii) (a) of this section, since the father's incarceration was no cause for removal nor a subsequent “other factors or issues” ground. Poss v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 514, 443 S.W.3d 594 (2014).

Whether parental rights should be terminated on the imprisonment ground depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 356 (2015).

Although father had been in prison when the child was removed from mother’s home and the father expected to be released from prison six months after the termination hearing, the appellate court upheld termination of the father’s parental rights. Father's seven years of incarceration during the life of his nine-year-old son constituted a substantial period of the child's life under this section and was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights. Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 356 (2015).

The prison sentence, not the potential release date, determines whether the imprisonment ground for termination of parental rights is satisfied. Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 356 (2015).

Trial court did not clearly err by finding that the father's 12-year prison sentence was a substantial portion of his four-year-old son's life and terminating his parental rights under this section. Heflin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 182, 458 S.W.3d 262 (2015).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that the father's 20-year prison sentence was a substantial portion of the child's life where that decision fell within the bounds of Arkansas case law. Basham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 243, 459 S.W.3d 824 (2015).

Circuit court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights because termination was in the child's best interest, the likelihood of adoption was very good, there was a risk of potential harm if the child were returned to the father, the father's 10-year sentence for possession with the intent to deliver constituted a substantial period of the child's life, counsel complied with the requirements for no-merit appeals in termination cases, and the father's appeal was wholly without merit. Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 284 (2015).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated in January 2015 where he had been incarcerated for a substantial amount of time during the lives of his children, although his expected release date was May 2015; it was not necessary to address issues related to other grounds since only one was necessary to support termination. It was in the best interest of the children for the father's rights to be terminated because, inter alia, he failed to protect the children from the drug abuse of their mother, he had a history of not supporting a child from a previous relationship, and he was incarcerated and had no stable home at the time of the termination hearing. Sanford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 578, 474 S.W.3d 503 (2015).

Evidence of the length of the father's sentence was properly before the court in the form of his motion for a continuance; he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, which was a substantial period of time for a child less than three years of age, and thus the court affirmed the termination of the father's parental rights. Edwards v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 37, 480 S.W.3d 215 (2016).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interest, given that the father had been incarcerated throughout the life of the case, there was no evidence that he had any contact with the child during his incarceration, and even assuming he would be released when he hoped, he would not be able to immediately reunite with the child, who needed termination to achieve permanency; the father failed to demonstrate a close bond between the child and the father's mother, and thus his argument that termination adversely affected the child's relationship with the father's mother was not persuasive. Edwards v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 37, 480 S.W.3d 215 (2016).

Department of Human Services proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate where she had been sentenced to a 14-year term of imprisonment when the child was less than two years old, a caseworker testified that the child was likely to be adopted, placement in another relative's home was not relevant to the issue of termination, and the fact that the mother might have been eligible for early release was not relevant. Adams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 131, 485 S.W.3d 275 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper and in the child's best interests because, at the time of the hearing, she had been incarcerated for approximately one-third of the child's life; by the time of her ultimate release date, she would have been incarcerated for approximately one-half of the child's life; and the potential harm to the child if parental rights were not terminated was clear, as the child could conceivably remain in the custody of the Department of Human Services for up to three years waiting for the mother to be released from incarceration and to satisfactorily complete the case plan; and the child would be required to linger in limbo until the mother was released from jail and got her act together. Basham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 232, 490 S.W.3d 330 (2016).

Sufficient evidence showed that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest where the father had visited the child only three times while the child was in foster care, he made no attempt to contact the child once incarcerated, and there was no evidence that he would maintain his sobriety once released. Everett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 541, 506 S.W.3d 287 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in rejecting incarcerated father's request to have his child placed with relatives rather than terminate his parental rights; under § 9-27-338 and according to Arkansas public policy, termination and adoption are preferred to permanent relative placement when the child is not in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing. Everett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 541, 506 S.W.3d 287 (2016) (decided under prior version of statutes).

Circuit court's determination that the father had been sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a substantial portion of the 5-year-old child's life was not clearly erroneous where he had been unable to remain out of prison for more than a few years, and there was a substantial amount of incarceration remaining on his original sentence. Everett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 541, 506 S.W.3d 287 (2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(viii) of this section was affirmed; the father had received a three-year sentence but was no longer imprisoned as he had only served nine months before his release on parole, he had already tested positive for drugs since his release, and he was subject to parole until February 2018. The children were one, two, and three years old at the time of the termination hearing. Barnes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 618, 508 S.W.3d 917 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her son was proper because the child was six years old when he was removed from the mother's custody and eight years old at the time of termination; prior to the termination hearing, the mother was sentenced to four years in prison followed by a six-year suspended imposition of sentence; by the time the mother might be released from prison, the child could have spent several years in foster case; even then, it was unlikely that the child could be returned to the mother in a reasonable timeframe; and, from the child's perspective, the mother's sentence constituted a substantial period of the child's life and was not a reasonable period of time for him to remain without permanency. Campbell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 82 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of a father's parental rights based on incarceration where he had been sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, the court was not allowed to consider the possibility of early release, the child was nine years old at the time of sentencing, and the 10-year sentence represented the remainder of the child's juvenile life. Woodward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 91, 513 S.W.3d 284 (2017).

Termination of the parental rights of a father was appropriate, as termination was in the child's best interest, because the appellate court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. The trial court recited the father's repetitive criminal behavior and incarceration during the entirety of the child's life (child was born April 2015), the indefinite nature of the father's future parole, and the testimony that gave reasons to question the viability of the paternal grandparent's home as an appropriate temporary placement for the child. Romero v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 238, 519 S.W.3d 375 (2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights where he had been incarcerated essentially all of the child's life and remained incarcerated, the child was healthy and happy with no obvious impediments to adoption, and given his incarceration, the father had no home for the child. Jameson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 503, 529 S.W.3d 692 (2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the twins where the mother was incarcerated and serving a five-year sentence, there was uncontroverted evidence from the caseworker that the twins were adoptable, a placement meeting with an adoptive family was already scheduled pending the outcome of the termination hearing, and the twins' need for permanency overrode the mother's request for additional time to improve her circumstances. Butler v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 517 (2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest where he had been chronically incarcerated, his own poor choices led to his arrests, in the brief period he had not been incarcerated, he failed to comply with the case plan, and his failure to demonstrate stability or sobriety created an undue risk of harm to the child. White v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 529, 530 S.W.3d 402 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper as the father failed to address the subsequent factors that occurred since the original dependency-neglect petition was filed because he did not have a relationship with the children; he had not seen, met, sent letters, or talked to the children; he was unavailable to take custody of the children when they were removed from their mother; he had been incarcerated for all but two months of the children's lives; he had been eligible for early release since 2015, but he was deemed not eligible for early release based on his disciplinary infractions; and he did not have a plan for housing or employment upon his release. Earls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. 159, 544 S.W.3d 543 (2018).

Termination of father's parental rights was appropriate because the father testified that he had been incarcerated for 17 months on a probation violation for nonpayment of fines. Although the father testified that he would be released soon, it was in the 15-month-old child's best interest to terminate parental rights because the child had already been in the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) for the child's entire life and would have been required to linger in DHS custody at least until the father was released from jail. Sills v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 9, 538 S.W.3d 249 (2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on the sentenced-in-a-criminal-proceeding ground because the father testified that he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment; his 20-year sentence encompassed a substantial period of the child's life, who was eight years old at the time of the termination hearing; and, although the father testified that he expected to be released in February 2018, the appellate court looked at the length of the prison sentence, not the potential release date, when reviewing whether that statutory ground was met. Fraser v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 395, 557 S.W.3d 886 (2018).

Trial court did not err by terminating the father's parental rights rather than place the child with the paternal grandmother because it was undisputed that the father had been incarcerated since the birth of the child, the father admitted that his drug addiction led to his chronic incarcerations, he testified that unless he was granted parole he could be imprisoned until 2023, he was ineligible to even seek parole until at least four months after the termination hearing, and the child's foster mother indicated that she wished to adopt the child. Blackwood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 254, 576 S.W.3d 95 (2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother was sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period of time that would have constituted a substantial period of the juvenile's life. Furthermore, it was the prison sentence, not the potential release date, that determined whether this statutory ground was satisfied. Westbrook v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 352, 584 S.W.3d 258 (2019).

Indian Child Welfare Act.

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her child because its order could easily be construed as making the necessary finding under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f), that there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother's continued custody was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child; the trial court found that the Department of Human Services had proven beyond a reasonable doubt grounds under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section because the child had been in foster care for 17 months, and the mother had not corrected the conditions that caused removal. Allen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 608, 377 S.W.3d 491 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported the termination of a father's parental rights under this section due to the extreme nature of the abuse, the harm caused to an infant, and the fact that the child was in the custody of the father at the time the injuries occurred; a physical examination of the infant showed that she was suffering from fractures to her skull, ankle, wrist, and spine; moreover, she had suffered vaginal trauma and bleeding. The heightened standard of proof required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912, was applied by the trial court. Byrd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 32 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of parental rights under the heightened standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applicable to Indian Child Welfare Act cases under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). Newman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 207, 489 S.W.3d 186 (2016).

Circuit court was within its province in relying on a tribal representative's testimony in making its finding that active efforts had been made in a parental rights termination case where the representative gave her informed and expert opinion that active efforts had been put forth in the case, that the active efforts failed, and that returning the children to the care of their parents would have subjected them to physical and emotional harm; the representative had remained in contact with DHS and reviewed the juvenile-dependency petition, the probable-cause report, the adjudication order, and the permanency-planning order in reaching her conclusions. Ritter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 9, 511 S.W.3d 343 (2017).

Circuit court's finding under the heightened standard of proof of the Indian Child Welfare Act that the father failed to remedy the causes of the children's removal was not clearly erroneous; he admitted he tested positive for illegal drugs twice, there was testimony that he was unable to manage the children at visitations, and he was not in full compliance with his case plan based on his failure to complete certain required programs. Howell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 154, 517 S.W.3d 431 (2017).

Mother failed to timely appeal the adjudication order and therefore could not raise the argument in the appeal of the termination of her parental rights that the adjudication order failed to apply the higher burden of proof mandated by the Indian Child Welfare Act; also, the mother did not object during the termination hearing when a certified copy of the adjudication order was entered into evidence. Howell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 154, 517 S.W.3d 431 (2017).

Mother's challenge to the qualification of the expert witness under the Indian Child Welfare Act was not preserved for purposes of the appeal of the termination of her parental rights because she failed to raise the issue below. Howell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 154, 517 S.W.3d 431 (2017).

Despite the higher burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in parental rights termination cases under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., any challenge to the circuit court's determination that termination was warranted was wholly without merit and therefore counsel's motion to withdraw was granted. Riggs v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 185, 575 S.W.3d 129 (2019).

In a termination of parental rights case involving Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act, the trial court did not err in ordering termination of the mother's rights even though the children were living with the grandparents. The children were temporarily placed with the grandparents and were not in the legal custody of the grandparents, it was “not a given” that placement with the grandparents was a permanent or stable option, and the caseworker testified that the grandparents were not “on board” with any permanent arrangement that would have allowed the mother's parental rights to remain intact. Further, the unchallenged evidence was that the mother lacked the capacity to remedy the issues that arose after the children's removal, including the mother testing positive for drugs and being incarcerated multiple times. Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 383, 585 S.W.3d 703 (2019).

Indian Child Welfare Act expert's testimony that there was “a risk” of serious physical or emotional damage to the children if they were returned to the mother, as opposed to being “likely to result in” serious emotional or physical damage, did not provide grounds to reverse the circuit court's termination of the mother's parental rights. Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 383, 585 S.W.3d 703 (2019).

Jurisdiction.

The exercise of jurisdiction over juveniles is not a permissible function of the county courts. Hutton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 303 Ark. 512, 798 S.W.2d 418 (1990).

Mother did not preserve for review the argument that service of a petition to terminate parental rights by warning order pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f) was not sufficient because her attorney was provided with notice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 5, the Department of Human Services satisfied the requirement of diligent inquiry provided in Rule 4, and at no time during the initial hearing on the petition for termination of the mother's parental rights was an objection made or a ruling requested on the issue of whether service was proper; because the mother was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, service was properly made upon counsel of record pursuant to Rule 5, the circuit court had jurisdiction, and it was the mother's responsibility to stay informed and keep her attorney informed of her current address. Blackerby v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 858, 373 S.W.3d 375 (2009).

Moot.

Alleged father's appeal in a termination of parental rights case was not moot, even though he was not found to be the parent, because the circuit court subsequently entered an order terminating nonexistent parental rights; this could have resulted in the automatic termination of parental rights to another child. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 676, 449 S.W.3d 721 (2014).

Order.

Although this section speaks in mandatory terms with regard to the filing of a written order within 30 days of the date of the termination hearing, a loss of jurisdiction does not follow because the General Assembly did not provide a sanction for an untimely filing and because there is no evidence that such a result was intended. Wade v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying parents' motion to set aside the termination order or for a new trial because there was no evidence that the trial court's failure to timely file a termination order under subsection (e) of this section made the proceedings unfair or constituted a miscarriage of justice. The parents received a fair opportunity to litigate their rights, and they failed to present any evidence that in the five months following the termination hearing they improved their positions in regard to the case plan. Newman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 207, 489 S.W.3d 186 (2016).

Although the circuit court failed to file the written order terminating parental rights until 127 days after the hearing, precedent unequivocally establishes that a violation of subsection (e) of this section does not warrant reversal or any other sanction. Blasingame v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 71, 542 S.W.3d 873 (2018).

Circuit court's failure to timely enter a termination order did not warrant reversal or any other sanction. Furthermore, the order entered by the circuit court was simply a written judgment of what the court had announced in open court; thus, a parent suffered no real prejudice because the order was entered simply to show that which actually occurred. Nichols v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 85, 542 S.W.3d 197 (2018).

Permanency Planning Hearing.

Although subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section states that the circuit court may consider a petition to terminate parental rights if the court finds that there is an appropriate permanency-placement plan for the juvenile, this section does not require that this finding be made specifically at a permanency-planning hearing. A petition to terminate parental rights is not contingent on the outcome of a permanency-planning hearing. Bean v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 77, 513 S.W.3d 859 (2017).

Circuit court erred in failing to hold a permanency-planning hearing because by choosing to hold a termination of parental rights hearing before such a hearing, it placed itself in a position of determining whether a hearing was required, contrary to the mandatory language of the statute; however, to reverse the order terminating parental rights would be perfunctory in purpose given the record and contrary to the best interests of the children, who had already been out of the home. McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 475, 527 S.W.3d 778 (2017).

While a termination of parental rights petition may be filed and considered prior to a permanency-planning hearing, there is nothing in § 9-27-341 or § 9-27-338 that permits the circuit court to abdicate its duty to hold a permanency-planning hearing altogether. McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 475, 527 S.W.3d 778 (2017).

Placement With Relatives.

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her child because the statutory provision for preferential consideration of placement with relatives was not found in the termination statute, and that preference was not relevant when considering termination of parental rights. Donley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 335 (2014).

Termination was in a child's best interest, and the trial court considered relative placement, even at the termination phase and even though it was not required to do so by statute or case law. There was not an appropriate and available relative placement based on instability in the family, as well as safety and credibility issues; moreover, the child was highly bonded with his foster family, who wanted to adopt him. Roberts v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 226, 490 S.W.3d 334 (2016).

Circuit court properly terminated the mother's parental rights because the statutory provision for relative placement includes adoption, thus contemplating that parental rights may be terminated even when a relative is available for placement; as the child was not in the custody of a relative at the time of termination, and termination was in the child's best interest, the exceptions in § 9-27-338 did not apply. Robinson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 251, 520 S.W.3d 702 (2017) (decided under prior version of statutes).

Permanent custody with relatives instead of termination of parental rights rejected. Everly v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 528, 589 S.W.3d 425 (2019).

Circuit court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights in lieu of pursuing relative placement where there was no evidence that the child had a relationship with any of her relatives, the two relatives identified by the father had either refused to go further or there had not been a response from the home state for a home study, the father had not sought reunification, and the child had been in foster care for over 15 months. Fisher v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 39, 569 S.W.3d 886 (2019).

Decision to forego a relative-placement option with the Indiana grandparents in favor of terminating the mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous because the grandparents wanted to be involved in the case; the grandparents consistently attempted to communicate with some Arkansas authority about the children; the Department of Human Services did not fulfill its duty to try to locate the grandparents and communicate with them; the grandparents loved their grandchildren, had visited them, provided them gifts, wished to keep them in the family, and doggedly pursued that course; and the grandparents had a longstanding relationship with all four of the mother's children and stated that they would facilitate visits between all the children. Clark v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 223, 575 S.W.3d 578 (2019).

Circuit court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous where her Cranford-Bunch challenge lacked merit because even though the child was placed successfully with relatives at the time of the termination hearing the child was still in the custody of the Department of Human Services. Further, the mother missed some drug screens and failed others for illegal substances, failed to pay court-ordered child support, was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia and tampering with physical evidence, failed to maintain stable housing and employment, failed to complete inpatient drug treatment, and failed to complete individual counseling. Dye v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 10, 592 S.W.3d 254 (2020).

Pleadings.

All three termination grounds found by the trial court to support termination were specifically pleaded in the petition, contrary to the mother's claim, and she was on notice of all three grounds and had the opportunity in a hearing to be heard. Sarut v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 76, 455 S.W.3d 341 (2015).

Where the petition to terminate parental rights was filed 69 days after the permanency-planning hearing, contrary to the 30-day requirement in § 9-27-338(g), the circuit court was not required to dismiss the petition or hold a second permanency-planning hearing. Subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section provides that a permanency-planning hearing is not required as a prerequisite to termination and the statutes do not provide a remedy for late filing. In addition, prejudice was not shown, and time is viewed from the juvenile's perspective in termination cases. Faussett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 168 (2017).

Potential Harm.

Order terminating the father's parental rights was affirmed because potential harm to the child existed if returned to the father's custody due to the father's history of domestic violence, his diagnosis of a personality disorder and borderline intellectual functioning, and his wife's paranoid schizophrenia. Dozier v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 17, 372 S.W.3d 849 (2010).

Mother denied there was any evidence to show potential harm to the children if returned, but the trial court found that return could harm their health and safety because the parents lacked an appropriate lifestyle; the best interest determination was based largely on the circuit court’s assessment of the mother’s credibility, to which the court deferred, plus there was no guarantee that her release from prison was imminent or that she could establish stability within six months as she claimed. Loveday v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 282, 435 S.W.3d 504 (2014).

In terminating a father's parental rights, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that contact could have caused the child to suffer potential harm where the father had not been part of the child's life for the majority of it, the child was thriving in foster care, and the father owed significant back child support, had stopped taking prescribed medications for PTSD, and had tested positive for medications for which he did not have a prescription. McMahan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 556, 472 S.W.3d 518 (2015).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children because, inter alia, there had been two drug raids on her home, drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm were found within easy reach of the children, two of the children tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), a dead rat was on the kitchen counter, the home was infested with roaches, and while the mother showed progress in getting her life back on track, drugs continued to be sold out of her house, and she had not demonstrated her willingness to put the well-being of the children above her relationship with her husband and his criminal activity. Velasco v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 724, 479 S.W.3d 21 (2015).

Finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest was supported by the father's continued drug use and the fact that he allowed the child's mother to visit the child even though such visits had been prohibited by court order, showing potential harm. Dodd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 64, 481 S.W.3d 789 (2016).

Although a father argued there was no proof of potential harm if his child was returned to his custody, this argument ignored the fact that the caseworker testified that the child would be at great risk for potential harm because the father was not aware of what was happening with the child. Caldwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 144, 484 S.W.3d 719 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the three children would have been subjected to potential harm if returned to the mother's custody where the mother failed to undergo scheduled drug screens, the issues that caused the children to be placed in foster care for 668 days had not been remedied, and the children had made great progress in foster care. Hamilton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 420, 501 S.W.3d 406 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in its consideration of the potential-harm factor for best interest purposes; given the father's history of mixing prescription medications and alcohol, his arrests for public intoxication, and his odd behavior during court hearings, the circuit court was not clearly wrong to find a likelihood of potential harm if the child was returned to the father. Sharks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569 (2016).

There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that potential harm to the children would occur if returned to the father's custody because, with few exceptions, he had received every service and yet the children ended up back in the department's custody, and he chose to use drugs again. Stanley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 581, 507 S.W.3d 544 (2016).

For purposes of the best-interest analysis in parental rights termination cases, potential harm to the child is a factor to be considered, but a specific potential harm does not have to be identified or proved by clear and convincing evidence. Terrones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 115, 515 S.W.3d 144 (2017).

For purposes of the best interest analysis, continued contact with the mother would cause the children to suffer potential harm because she tested positive for a controlled substance for which she had no prescription; failed to pay her rent; failed to provide the children needed supervision; failed to keep her house clean; burned one of the children; and failed to obtain and maintain her own stable and appropriate home, instead living with her mother. Edgar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 312, 522 S.W.3d 127 (2017).

Circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the children would be at risk of potential harm if returned to their father's custody or that the children were adoptable because two days prior to the scheduled termination hearing, the father admitted and tested positive for using methamphetamine, the father had a history of leaving rehab, he was in and out of jail, and he provided no proof of employment, income, or stable housing. McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 475, 527 S.W.3d 778 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in finding that returning the children to the mother presented a risk of potential harm given evidence of her ongoing drug use, the testimony about the children's anxiety in not knowing where they would live, and the mother's incarceration at the time of the hearing. McNeer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 512, 529 S.W.3d 269 (2017).

Evidence introduced at the termination hearing supported the circuit court's potential-harm finding based on: (1) the mother's continued drug usage, as throughout the course of the proceeding, the mother never once provided a clean drug screen and she did not submit to a hair-follicle test; (2) the mother's lack of knowledge about the child's special needs; and (3) the mother's lack of stability, which was important due to the special needs of the child. Knight v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 602, 533 S.W.3d 592 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest as the mother was not drug free; there was a significant amount of time when she consistently tested negative, but she testified positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines only 19 days before the termination hearing, knowing full well that her parental rights were on the line; and her continued drug use in and of itself was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of potential harm. Hooks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 687, 536 S.W.3d 666 (2017).

Although the mother argued that the circuit court's reliance on its no-reunification order for evidence of potential harm was not sufficient, the potential harm determination was upheld where a caseworker testified that she had no information that the mother's status had significantly changed since the reunification services had been terminated several months earlier, the mother had not contacted the Department of Human Services to offer any evidence of changes, and the mother failed to provide any reports or other confirmation that she was compliant with counseling, medications, and other aspects of the court's prior orders. Rickman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 261, 548 S.W.3d 861 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in its potential-harm determination when terminating a mother's rights to her four children. Even though the mother completed an inpatient-drug-treatment program and obtained housing and employment, a trial placement of the children in her home had to be terminated because she tested positive for THC and she later tested positive for other illegal drugs and alcohol. Easter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 280, 550 S.W.3d 432 (2018).

Reunification.

Human services department was relieved from providing reunification services based on the unappealed finding of aggravated circumstances, specifically that there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Willingham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 568 (2014).

Level of reunification services provided to the father did not provide a basis for reversal of a termination order where he did not challenge the statutory grounds for termination, a no-contact order had remained in place throughout the proceedings, and appropriate reunification services were provided after his release from prison. McMahan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 556, 472 S.W.3d 518 (2015).

Regardless of the finality of earlier trial court orders, a parent had an opportunity to object to the failure of the Department of Human Services to provide reunification services at the termination of parental rights hearing, yet the parent failed to do so. Thus, the issue was waived. Contreras v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510 (2015).

Statutory ground involving neglect that endangered a child's life did not require any showing that the Department of Human Services provided meaningful services or that further services would not likely result in successful reunification. Elliott v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 526, 565 S.W.3d 487 (2018).

Although father in a parental rights termination case argued that the Department of Human Services (DHS) did not provide him additional services beyond parenting classes and a paternity test, a finding of aggravated circumstances does not require DHS to prove that meaningful services toward reunification were provided. Atwood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 448, 588 S.W.3d 48 (2019).

Right to Counsel.

Because a mother failed to file a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 2 from the trial court's adjudication order, the appellate court was unable to consider the mother's arguments relating to errors made during the adjudication hearing; however, the appellate court did consider whether the trial court's failure to provide counsel, pursuant to § 9-27-316, to the mother during the adjudication hearing tainted the remainder of the case, which resulted in termination of parental rights, and found no such taint. Jefferson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 356 Ark. 647, 158 S.W.3d 129 (2004).

Father could not show harm from the trial court failing to appoint counsel from the beginning of a proceeding because the father, who was incarcerated, was not a parent from whom custody was removed, and the father was not entitled to appointed counsel before the process moved to termination of the father's rights. Furthermore, the court did appoint counsel for the father almost three months before the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights. Sills v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 9, 538 S.W.3d 249 (2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was improper because he was denied his statutory right to counsel under § 9-27-316. The Department of Human Services did not dispute that the father was entitled to counsel at the onset and the failure to provide him counsel was error, but it claimed instead that the error was harmless; the appellate court disagreed, stating that there was no evidence that the father assented to the stipulations or that he understood the gravity of stipulations as they related to his parental rights. Buck v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 258, 548 S.W.3d 231 (2018).

Circuit court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights where the father argued on appeal that he was denied his right to timely appointed counsel; contrary to the father's assertion, the children were not removed from his legal custody, he and the mother were not married, and he was correctly identified as the putative father at the outset of the case. Instead of submitting the acknowledgments of paternity to the court that had been executed when the children were born, the father submitted to a DNA test and was only later found to be the children's “biological and legal father”, at which point he was entitled to counsel if requested, but he did not request counsel until the 15-month permanency planning hearing, at which time the court granted his request. Fox v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 13, 592 S.W.3d 260 (2020).

Service of Process.

Termination of a father's parental rights was improper because he was not properly served with the petition under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section; service was not effectuated by mail under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 because it was not established that a person who signed a green card was the father's authorized agent, and service was not shown under Ark. R. Civ. P. 5 where the alleged method for serving the father's lawyer was not shown. Awareness of the case did not cure a service defect, the error was not harmless, and the father did not waive his insufficient service objection since he raised it when the hearing on the petition to terminate began. Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 201 (2013).

Trial court clearly erred in denying an incarcerated father's motion to dismiss a petition to terminate his parental rights because, while service on the prison warden had been correctly performed, the father was not properly served where the only document sent to him that was entered into evidence was hand delivered, not mailed first-class mail with the notation of “legal mail,” and the letter indicated that only the summons was enclosed, not the petition for termination of parental rights. McMahan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 590, 446 S.W.3d 640 (2014).

In a termination of parental rights case, a father was unable to argue that he did not receive proper service of process of a dependency-neglect petition because a termination of parental rights case was a separate proceeding; it was undisputed that the father had been properly served in the termination case. His argument that alleged deficiencies in service at the adjudication stage prejudiced his due-process rights at the termination stage was not argued below. Lively v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 131, 456 S.W.3d 383 (2015).

Because the mother appeared at the adjudication hearing, review hearings, and termination hearing without raising an objection that the service of process was defective, the mother was represented by counsel in each of the pertinent hearings, and there was nothing in the record showing that the mother or her attorney requested any inquiry into improper service, the defective service of process argument was waived. Bane v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 617, 509 S.W.3d 647 (2016).

Department of Human Services failed to carry its burden of proving that the petition to terminate parental rights was effectively served. Ark. R. Civ. P. 5 was the basis of the mother's argument that neither she nor her attorney had received the emailed petition, and the trial court relied on that rule in making its finding that the mother was served through her attorney. The mother's awareness of the case could not cure the service defect. Howell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Serv., 2018 Ark. App. 117, 545 S.W.3d 218 (2018).

Sexual Abuse.

In the adjudication order, the trial court found that the child was sexually abused, probably by his father, and the failure to identify the perpetrator of the sexual abuse did not diminish the trial court's finding of dependency-neglect under § 9-27-303(18)(A)(iii) [now § 9-27-303(17)(A)(iii)]; at the termination hearing, the trial court found that the father had in fact sexually abused the child, a sibling of the triplets, and as the mother was aware of the father's status as a sex offender and failed to protect the child, termination of her rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vi) of this section was proper. Parnell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 108, 538 S.W.3d 264 (2018) (sub. op. on reh'g).

Termination of the father's rights was affirmed; neither the police nor the trial court believed the father's denials, and instead they found that he had sexually abused one child, and this represented potential harm that prevented all four children from being placed in his care, for purposes of this section. Parnell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 108, 538 S.W.3d 264 (2018) (sub. op. on reh'g).

Standards of Review.

When the burden of proving a disputed fact in chancery is by clear and convincing evidence, the question on appeal is whether the chancellor's finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. M.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997).

There are no cases in which the superior position, ability, and opportunity of the trial court to observe the parties carries as great a weight as when the interests of minor children are involved; thus, on review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas gives a high degree of deference to the trial court. Trout v. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).

In a termination of parental rights case, in reviewing the trial court's evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court will not reverse unless the trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous; in matters involving the welfare of young children, the appellate court will give great weight to the trial judge's personal observations. Chase v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 86 Ark. App. 237, 184 S.W.3d 453 (2004).

Appellate court reviews termination of parental rights cases de novo, and grounds for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Kight v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 87 Ark. App. 230, 189 S.W.3d 498 (2004).

Mother's parental rights were improperly terminated, under this section, where the facts warranting the termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence; the mother maintained some type of housing, although it was not a fixed location, and the residences were not unsafe or inappropriate for her two children. Strickland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 103 Ark. App. 193, 287 S.W.3d 633 (2008).

Father did not challenge the finding that the child was adoptable, and thus the court had to examine if the finding that returning the child to the father would subject her to potential harm was clearly erroneous. Wittig v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 502, 423 S.W.3d 143 (2012).

Issue of whether the condition that caused the child to be removed from his mother's custody, including her failure to protect her children despite her knowledge of her husband's abusive behavior, was remedied hinged on credibility entirely, and the trial court did not believe that the mother had changed and would be able to protect the child, and the court deferred to the trial court on credibility matters. Aguilera v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 503 (2013).

Because only one ground was necessary to support termination, and the court found no error on one ground, it was unnecessary to address the parents' arguments about another ground. Henson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 225, 434 S.W.3d 371 (2014).

Because the court affirmed the finding of termination on one ground, the court did not need to address the mother’s argument as to an alternative ground. Loveday v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 282, 435 S.W.3d 504 (2014).

Mother's argument on appeal from the termination of her parental rights pertained to only one ground, and other grounds for termination were properly alleged and went unchallenged, and the court would not reverse. Villasaldo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 465, 441 S.W.3d 62 (2014).

One ground for termination was not alleged, and although the statute was cited in the trial court's order, it was not clear to what extent the trial court relied on it; in any event, it would be inappropriate for the court to rely on a ground not alleged in the petition to support termination. Villasaldo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 465, 441 S.W.3d 62 (2014).

Only termination ground alleged by the Department of Human Services was the incarceration ground, and because the department never amended its petition or moved to conform the pleadings to the proof, as the trial court terminated the father's rights on three grounds, review was limited to the incarceration ground. Moses v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 466, 441 S.W.3d 54 (2014).

Parents challenged the best interest finding and the timing of the hearing, but these issues were not preserved for review because the specific arguments made on appeal were not made to the circuit court first. Tuck v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 468, 442 S.W.3d 20 (2014).

Subsequent Factors.

Mother's parental rights were terminated based on subsequent factors because she could not have been a placement option; the mother was incarcerated at the time of the hearing due to her drug involvement, and she could not estimate her sentence or term of imprisonment. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 34 (2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights under the subsequent issues ground because a mother was incapable of or indifferent to rehabilitating her circumstances; termination was in the children's best interest due to the risk of harm if they were returned to the mother. Reunification could not have occurred within a time frame that was consistent with the children's developmental needs, and they were found to be adoptable. Sims v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 137 (2015).

There was sufficient evidence presented to support the termination of a mother's parental rights based on the subsequent factors ground due to her slow response to efforts at treatment, her prior deceitfulness and lack of credibility, and the fact that she wanted the child to know the father's family, despite the fact that the father had been convicted of raping the mother; moreover, termination was in the best interest of the child due to the fact that she was adoptable and based on the potential harm to the child if returned to the mother. Therefore, there was no merit to the mother's appeal, and counsel was permitted to withdraw. B.M. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 283 (2015).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated under the other factors ground in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) of this section because the child and mother tested positive for drugs at his birth, the mother had been in prison, and she continued to use drugs after the child was born. Moreover, a best interest finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence since the child was adoptable, and there was potential harm due to the mother's unresolved drug issue, and lack of a home, job, and stability. Tribble v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 535 (2015).

Trial court did not clearly err in terminating parental rights because subsequent to the filing of the termination petition the parent pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was placed on probation, and, within a few months of being on probation, the parent had sex with a minor using an alias. Additionally, the parent had not obtained a stable home during the time when the child was in custody, and it was uncertain whether the parent was in a position to care for the child in the foreseeable future. Contreras v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510 (2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was affirmed under the subsequent factors ground; there is no limitation in the subsequent factors termination ground that a subsequent factor cannot be a factor that arose while a parent had custody of the juvenile during the dependency-neglect case, and the only temporal limitation is that the factor must arise subsequently to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, which all of the subsequent factors relied on by the circuit court satisfied because they occurred after the initial petition was filed. Bell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 113, 484 S.W.3d 704 (2016).

Subsequent-factor ground for termination of parental rights consists of multiple elements: first, this ground requires that subsequent issues arose after the original petition was filed, which demonstrate that it is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare to place the juvenile with the parent, and second, appropriate family services must have been offered; third, there must be evidence that the parent is indifferent or lacks the capacity to remedy the subsequent factors or rehabilitate the parent's circumstances that prevent placement of the juvenile with that parent. Bell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 113, 484 S.W.3d 704 (2016).

There is no limitation on the circuit court's consideration of factors that caused a removal after the initiation of the proceeding. Bell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 113, 484 S.W.3d 704 (2016).

Although counsel's brief did not discuss the proper ground for terminating the mother's rights to the child, counsel's motion to withdraw was granted as the circuit court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's rights; subsequent to the filing of the original termination petition, the mother had not obtained stable housing or employment and had tested positive for drugs despite the Department of Human Services' reasonable efforts to provide services. Houseman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 227, 491 S.W.3d 153 (2016).

Evidence supported a trial court's finding that factors arose subsequent to the filings of the dependency-neglect petitions as to a mother's older child—specifically as to the extent of the mother's increasing mental health issues—and the mother never challenged the appropriateness of any reunification services that were offered. However, there was not enough evidence to indicate other factors or issues in the mere days after the filing of the petition for dependency-neglect as to the infant child. Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 453, 503 S.W.3d 813 (2016).

Circuit court's decision that the Department of Human Services proved the subsequent-factors ground for terminating a father's parental rights was affirmed where the circuit court did not find the father credible as to his relationship with the children's abusive mother and the father failed to show he had a support group to help take care of the children if they were returned to his custody. Martin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 115, 515 S.W.3d 599 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in finding that the subsequent-factors ground, subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section, supported termination of a father's parental rights where it found that the Department of Human Services had made reasonable efforts to provide services at the permanency-planning hearing, the father had not completed the case plan, he maintained a relationship with the mother despite the fact that her drug use posed a serious threat to the children, and thus the evidence showed that the father manifested an indifference or inability to remedy the conditions that prevented placement. Terrones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 115, 515 S.W.3d 144 (2017).

Trial court clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds for termination of a father's parental rights were proved because the order provided no facts to support “subsequent factors” for the father; the only “subsequent factor” the trial court relied on appeared to be that the father had not demonstrated he was a fit and proper parent for the children, but it is the burden of the Department of Human Services to prove a parent is not fit and proper. Choate v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 319, 522 S.W.3d 156 (2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children on the ground that her return to living with the father was the subsequent factor that demonstrated placement of the children with her was contrary to their health, safety, or welfare because the Department of Human Services did not prove the father was a threat to the children. Choate v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 319, 522 S.W.3d 156 (2017).

In terminating a mother's parental rights to her child, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the Department of Human Services provided appropriate family services sufficient to support the subsequent-factors ground. Threadgill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 426, 526 S.W.3d 891 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights based on the subsequent-factors ground as he failed to engage in services recommended by the Department of Human Services and he was incarcerated during the pendency of the case. After the father met with his caseworker and was to be working on his case plan, he committed three crimes and was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment; the crimes were committed in his home during the time when he was supposedly trying to obtain stable housing; at the time of the termination hearing, the father still did not have stable housing or a job; and the father was still on parole. Rogers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 469, 529 S.W.3d 249 (2017).

Circuit court's findings supporting termination were not clearly erroneous; although a father's drug use was not a subsequent factor, there was sufficient evidence of other subsequent factors that were unrelated to his drug use, including criminal charges, periods of incarceration, and marrying the mother after her rights to the children had been terminated. McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 475, 527 S.W.3d 778 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the mother's parental rights based on the subsequent-factors ground where she failed to secure appropriate housing, stable employment, and transportation, and she exhibited indifference to remedying the situation. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 504, 529 S.W.3d 661 (2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights based on the subsequent-other-factors ground where her failure to follow the case plan and lack of motivation to resolve her substance-abuse issues until after the termination petition had been filed demonstrated a clear indifference to remedying the circumstances preventing the placement of the children in her custody. Furnish v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 511, 529 S.W.3d 684 (2017).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights because there was no doubt that other factors arose after the children were removed from her custody—her persistent alcohol abuse and her ongoing criminal troubles—that compromised her ability to visit the children and prevented their return to her custody. Brinkley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 625, 533 S.W.3d 639 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper under the other-subsequent factors ground; the father's drug use was a subsequent factor, having only become an issue after the filing of the dependency-neglect petition and because of its continuing nature, and the father's inability to separate himself from the mother was also a subsequent factor, given her drug use. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 221, 547 S.W.3d 489 (2018).

Trial court correctly found that the Department of Human Services proved the subsequent factors ground for termination of parental rights because it found that the mother's most significant problem was her lack of stability throughout the case and her inability, until the last moment, to obtain housing, employment, and transportation, despite being ordered to do so throughout the duration of the case. Gonzalez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 425, 555 S.W.3d 915 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that the Department of Human Services (DHS) proved that termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the court reviewed several subsequent factors, including that the mother had not maintained weekly contact with DHS, had not submitted to all requested random drug screens, had submitted a hair-follicle drug screen that was positive for marijuana, and had dyed her hair prior to a hair-follicle test in violation of the court's order not to do so. James v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 445, 562 S.W.3d 218 (2018).

Trial court's finding that the Department of Human Services proved the “subsequent factors” ground by clear and convincing evidence, and its termination of a mother's parental rights, was not clearly erroneous because the mother was unemployed and lacked her own stable housing, she twice tested positive for methamphetamine, and she had four periods of incarceration after the children's removal. Redden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 539, 589 S.W.3d 401 (2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to her children was appropriate under the subsequent-factors ground because, despite court orders and the offer of services by the Department of Human Services, the mother failed to consistently participate in individual counseling, used illegal substances, failed to submit to random drug screens, and missed several visits with the children. McCormick v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 44, 594 S.W.3d 115 (2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper under the subsequent-factors ground because there was evidence that he would continue a relationship with the child's mother, in which there was a history of domestic abuse, as the mother gave birth to another child fathered by the father two weeks before the termination hearing, and the mother and father had repeatedly ended their relationship but then would rekindle it; and the father had never been in full compliance with the case plan and court orders. Guerrero v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 160, 595 S.W.3d 437 (2020).

Substance Abuse.

Where the mother's children were removed from her home based on drug use, she failed to comply with the permanency plan and other reunification efforts, and her probation was revoked when she tested positive for drugs, the trial court properly terminated her parental rights. Causer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 93 Ark. App. 483, 220 S.W.3d 270 (2005).

Court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because the father demonstrated commendable resolve in seeking to remedy his drug problem; at all times since the State was involved with the case, the father had not been found to have any drugs in his system, and there was no evidence that the father's drug treatment would not be successful. Ivers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 57, 250 S.W.3d 279 (2007).

Father's parental rights to his child were properly terminated under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3)(B)(i) of this section where there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification; the father tested positive for drugs throughout the case, including on the date of the permanency-planning hearing. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 100 Ark. App. 74, 264 S.W.3d 559 (2007).

Where the father was arrested while driving to obtain opiates with his three-year-old child, the trial court adjudicated the child dependent based on neglect and the parents' drug abuse; the father was ordered to maintain stable housing and income, complete parenting classes, complete anger-management counseling, and submit to random drug screens. At the termination hearing, witnesses testified as to the father's failure to comply with the court's orders; because he continued to seek opiates, manipulated drug assessments, and did not maintain regular visits with the child, the trial court did not err by terminating his parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section. Loe v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 607 (2009).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) , (ii), and (viii) (a) of this section because, by the time she had begun any semblance of serious effort in the case, the child had been in the custody of the Department of Human Services for eight months or more; during that time the mother tested positive for drugs several times; she was arrested and convicted on drug-related charges; the mother failed to obtain a psychological evaluation as ordered; she was inconsistent in visiting the child; and the mother's stated desire to achieve the goals of employment and education, while admirable, did not warrant reversal. Devon v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 191, 377 S.W.3d 362 (2010).

Termination of parental rights was proper, as at the time of the termination hearing, the 22-month old child had been out of the parent's care for more than 17 months, and the parent had an ongoing drug problem. Timmons v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 419, 376 S.W.3d 466 (2010).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights over her children pursuant to this section; the mother was a long-term drug addict and had made no efforts to comply with the goals of her case plan, including resolving criminal matters and finding suitable housing. Watkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 467 (2010).

Trial court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous because the mother's testimony that she was living in a hotel and continuing to use drugs well over a year after her children were taken into custody made it clear that the children would be subjected to a substantial risk of harm if they were returned to her custody. Davis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 469, 375 S.W.3d 721 (2010), overruled, Ellis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. 441, 505 S.W.3d 678 (2016).

When a mother and father admitted to being alcoholics, a trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of the mother and father, pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section, because during the pendency of the case, the mother tested positive for alcohol on two occasions and the father not only tested positive for alcohol but was also arrested for being in control of a vehicle while intoxicated; the child, who was removed from the parents' home at the age of five months old and had been out of the parents' custody for more than a year, suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. Pine v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 781, 379 S.W.3d 703 (2010).

Order terminating a father's parental rights to his child pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section was proper because he had a disturbing history of drug abuse and had failed to learn from his previous drug conviction and incarceration; he had lived with the child only a few months during the child's lifetime and seemingly spent much of that time taking drugs. Hoffman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 856, 380 S.W.3d 454 (2010).

Trial court properly found that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children because at the termination hearing, the mother had no employment, no acceptable home for the children, and was still experiencing relapses with alcohol and methamphetamine. Dawson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 106, 391 S.W.3d 352 (2011).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section, as the evidence revealed that although the mother stopped using cocaine, the mother could not remain drug-free; the mother completed inpatient drug treatment only to later test positive for marijuana on a number of occasions. Billings v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 111 (2011).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her two children under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section because the record was clear that the mother had a problem abusing prescription drugs and refused to acknowledge it; adoptability of the children was not an issue, given testimony that families were prepared to adopt them. Harper v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 280, 378 S.W.3d 884 (2011).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights to his two children pursuant to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section because his continued use of illegal drugs showed an indifference to remedying the problems plaguing the family and potential harm to the children; he failed to submit to random drug screens. Allen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 288, 384 S.W.3d 7 (2011).

Termination of the parental rights of appellants to their two minor children was affirmed because despite the services provided by the Department of Human Services, the mother continued to abuse alcohol and thus failed to remedy the conditions that caused the children's removal from her custody. Burnett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 596, 385 S.W.3d 866 (2011).

Termination of the parental rights to appellants' three-year old son was affirmed because the court heard evidence that the 17-year-old father consumed alcohol in his home, as shown by the many empty bottles in his room, yet did not attend the drug-and-alcohol assessment for which he was referred. Landis-Maynard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 673, 386 S.W.3d 641 (2011).

Court properly terminated parental rights because the parents' drug use led to their inability to care for their children, causing them to leave the children in the custody of family members who could not provide for the children. While the parents had made progress while incarcerated, they had not shown the capacity to remain drug-free outside of prison or to properly provide for their children; they admittedly did not follow the case plan or take advantage of services offered. Tankersley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 109, 389 S.W.3d 96 (2012).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was appropriate pursuant to subdivisions (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) and (vii) (a) of this section because she had been unable to adequately deal with her methamphetamine addiction, despite services being offered; she refused to provide samples for several drug tests; she falsified her urine on other drug tests; and she had been held in contempt numerous times for failing drug tests. Fetters v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 152 (2012).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the children came into state custody due to her arrest for drug-related offenses, the mother chose to use methamphetamine, which only exacerbated her existing drug problem, and a witness recommended to the court that the mother's parental rights be terminated because the children needed permanency. Gutierrez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 575, 424 S.W.3d 329 (2012).

Court properly terminated parental rights because the parents had positive drug screens, their drug-and-alcohol assessments diagnosed both parents with cannabis and alcohol dependence, and they had a lengthy history with social services that was related to their drug use, resulting in the child being in foster care for two years. Kitchen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 260, 427 S.W.3d 165 (2013).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the mother's rights to five other children had been terminated due to her methamphetamine use, and the mother had undergone intensive therapy and was provided with numerous services on two separate occasions before having her parental rights to those children terminated. Despite losing five children due to her meth use, the mother still used the drug while pregnant. Porter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 299, 427 S.W.3d 738 (2013).

Clear and convincing evidence, including evidence that the mother failed to stop using drugs, supported a finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Eldredge v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 385 (2014).

Trial court found that the children had been out of the parents' custody for 15 months, that the father failed to follow drug treatment facility recommendations, that he had relapsed and used methamphetamine, that he had pleaded guilty to two offenses and was incarcerated, and that despite services, he still had a drug addiction, and these findings were sufficient to support termination of parental rights based on the failure to remedy ground. Frisby v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 566 (2014).

Because the Department of Human Services was required to prove only one statutory ground for termination, and one was proven in this case, it was not necessary for the court to consider arguments pertaining to the other statutory grounds. Frisby v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 566 (2014).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the drug abuse that led to the child's removal, as the mother did not complete treatment until the child had been out of her custody for over a year, and the mother was in a relationship with a former addict and it was unknown if she could remain drug free outside the confines of the rules of her current inpatient treatment. Harbin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 715, 451 S.W.3d 231 (2014).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate under the failure to remedy ground because the mother had a longstanding drug problem, she did not finish drug treatment while incarcerated, and she intentionally avoided drug testing. The mother's self-serving statement that she did not believe that she had an addiction and was not interested in drugs anymore did not have to be believed by the trial court, and the mother's recent progress was not a bar to termination where she failed to demonstrate an ability to remain sober in an unstructured environment for a significant period of time. Moore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 87 (2015).

Circuit court did not err by finding that the Department of Human Services proved that terminating the mother's parental rights was in her children's best interest where there was evidence that the mother continued to test positive for drug use on multiple occasions following her participation in a drug-treatment program, she did not provide proof that she attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings, she failed to obtain and maintain clean, safe, and stable housing until the permanency-planning hearing, and the finding that she did not maintain stable employment was supported by evidence that she had been employed only one month prior to the permanency-planning hearing. Simmons v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 374, 466 S.W.3d 440 (2015).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of her children because the mother's continued use of illegal drugs for years was sufficient evidence of potential harm; the assessment of best interest was a credibility call, and the appellate court deferred to the circuit court's assessment of the mother's credibility. Morton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 388, 465 S.W.3d 871, 465 S.W.3d 871 (2015).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper under the failure to remedy ground because the mother did not request financial assistance or other services from the Department of Human Services from the permanency planning order until the date of termination; moreover, the mother did not specifically request additional services during the termination hearing, but only asked for more time. Since the mother did not appeal from prior reasonable efforts findings that were made in this case, they were not reviewed. Morton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 388, 465 S.W.3d 871, 465 S.W.3d 871 (2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her twin children was proper and in the children's best interests because the children had been out of their mother's custody for approximately a year and a half at the time of the termination, and, even by the mother's own calculation, she would be unavailable and unable to regain custody of them for another six months; the mother was in a drug-treatment facility where she could not have her children with her and she did not anticipate graduating from the program until June 2015. Knuckles v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 463, 469 S.W.3d 377 (2015).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights as in her child's best interest; the most critical requirement imposed by the court was for the mother to complete inpatient drug treatment, but she never took personal responsibility for her addiction, which demonstrated incapacity or indifference to remedy the issues that caused the removal of her child. Blankenship v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 620 (2015).

There was no meritorious issue that could be raised on appeal regarding the grounds for termination; the child was removed from the mother's custody when she was arrested on March 27, 2014, the child was adjudicated dependent-neglected based on the mother's drug use, and at the termination hearing in July 2015, the mother was again incarcerated and tested positive for drugs, for which she admitted she needed inpatient drug treatment. Hunter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 95 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper and in the child's best interests as there was no clear error in the trial court's finding that the mother had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. There was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification as the mother had an admitted problem with drug addiction; she refused rehabilitation services offered by the department; and she would not commit to a timeframe within which she would undergo treatment. King v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 368 (2016).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights where the mother had tested positive for drug use, she refused to participate in drug screening or counseling until the petition to terminate had been filed, a therapist and physician testified that continued treatment and progress were needed for at least six months, and the child's behavior had improved dramatically since being placed in foster care. Garrett v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 401, 499 S.W.3d 659 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in terminating a father's parental rights based on aggravated circumstances where giving the father more time to participate in a drug court program was contrary to the statutory mandate to provide permanency for the child. Helvey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 418, 501 S.W.3d 398 (2016).

Termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest where the trial court properly considered evidence of the father's past behavior in determining that potential harm could befall the child in his custody, recognized that completion of the drug-court program was a condition of his suspended sentence, and concluded that whether he could maintain his sobriety was uncertain given that he had another year of drug treatment. Helvey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 418, 501 S.W.3d 398 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights on the other factors ground; subsequent factors bearing on the father's parental fitness arose after the filing of the original dependency-neglect petition, including a positive alcohol screen, missed drug screens, and the father's arrests and incarceration on public-intoxication charges, plus he did not begin to comply with the case plan until the last minute. Sharks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569 (2016).

There was no error in the circuit court's potential harm finding; the father missed drug screens and tested positive for cocaine on other screens, and the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the children would be at risk of potential harm if returned to the father's custody due to his ongoing drug usage. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 440, 503 S.W.3d 122 (2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a mother's parental rights were properly terminated for failure to remedy conditions causing her children's removal from her custody for more than 12 months because the children were taken into custody due to the mother's drug use, and over two years later, the mother continued to test positive for drugs. Sutton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 459, 503 S.W.3d 842 (2016).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this rule because (1) the mother's child was removed due to the mother's drug abuse, (2) the mother refused drug treatment, and (3) the mother was arrested during the case for possessing marijuana, so the reason for removal was not remedied and could harm the child if the child were returned to the mother. Sanders v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 462, 503 S.W.3d 128 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper and in the children's best interest because, throughout the case, the mother continued to test positive for illegal substances; although several different drug-treatment programs were recommended and offered, the mother refused to address her drug issues or complete a treatment program; she continued to demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to accept rehabilitation services offered to address her drug use; the caseworker testified that the children were adoptable; and the children were at great risk of potential harm if returned to the mother given her lack of stable housing and continued drug use. Ware v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 480, 503 S.W.3d 874 (2016).

In a parental rights termination case, there was little likelihood that services to a father would have resulted in successful reunification where he admitted to having a drug problem, he failed to address his drug usage, he had not completed the drug treatment provided and had relapsed, he did not have stable employment, and there was no proof of his current “under the table” employment. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 615, 508 S.W.3d 897 (2016).

There was sufficient evidence to support an aggravated circumstances termination of the mother's parental rights; although she completed an inpatient treatment for drug addiction, she failed to follow through with recommended outpatient treatment or attend AA meetings after her release, she had not maintained stable employment, and had not visited the child since removal because of positive drug screens. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 615, 508 S.W.3d 897 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in finding that the mother had not remedied the conditions that led to the child's removal from the home where her hospitalization was due to infections caused by drug use, she tested positive for drugs when the child had been in state custody for almost a year, and the court was not required to believe her claim of being drug-free or to conduct a drug test to verify her claim. Troglin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 89, 513 S.W.3d 278 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the circuit court found that the child would be at a substantial risk of serious harm if he were returned to the mother based on her drug use and instability; the circuit court was permitted to weigh the mother's progress toward sobriety, which occurred after the permanency-planning hearing, against the long periods of instability and drug use during the case's course; and the appellate court deferred to the circuit court's assessment of the potential harm the child faced if returned to his mother's custody. Meredith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 120, 513 S.W.3d 909 (2017).

Trial court's findings that termination of a mother's and father's parental rights was in the children's best interest was not clearly erroneous where the record demonstrated that they had repeatedly chosen methamphetamine over their children, they admitted that they had not visited the children in over a year, and there was evidence that the children were adoptable. Ford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 211 (2017).

Trial court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's parental rights, given that during the time the child was out of the mother's custody, over 18 months, the mother attempted drug treatment unsuccessfully four times and was currently on her fifth attempt, and while her several negative drug tests just prior to the hearing were noted, they were not conclusive. Duncan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 252, 520 S.W.3d 307 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in determining that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the 15-month-old child where, considering the mother's past behavior, allowing her more time to address her mental health issues was unlikely to be beneficial, she exhibited a lack of initiative in complying with her case plan, she never obtained a sponsor, she tested positive for cocaine a month prior to the hearing, and she candidly admitted drinking green tea in an effort to defeat drug screens. Wallace v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 376, 524 S.W.3d 439 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she had consistently failed to keep her child out of foster care by returning to drugs each time custody of the child had been returned to her; at the time of the termination hearing, she had been sober approximately three months; the mother had been given numerous chances to benefit from services and keep her daughter with her, but she had returned to drugs each time; and the child needed permanency, and the current foster parents wanted to adopt the child; thus, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's parental rights and, for the same reasons, in terminating reunification services. Ladd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 419, 526 S.W.3d 883 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in finding that it was in the best interest of a child to terminate the mother's parental rights because the mother was dependent on others for income and housing and had unresolved criminal charges, as the mother had significant time remaining in a drug-court program, and if she failed, she could be sentenced to imprisonment for a period of years. Moreover, the child had spent more than half of her life in foster care and people had expressed an interest in adopting the child. Brasher v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 455, 527 S.W.3d 756 (2017).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children under the failure to remedy ground. Although the mother made some progress on her drug issues during the pendency of the case, she did not complete the court-ordered drug treatment; she did not sufficiently demonstrate the capacity to remain drug-free; the children would be subjected to potential instability should the mother again relapse into drug use, which was more than a speculative possibility; the mother's relapse after at least 11 months of court supervision demonstrated the potential harm the children would face if returned to the mother; and the mother did not challenge the trial court's finding regarding the likelihood of the children's adoptability. Hollinger v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 458, 529 S.W.3d 242 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the 12-month failure to remedy ground because it was undisputed that the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected by the court and had remained out of the mother's custody for over 12 months; the conditions that caused their removal were the mother's drug usage and her inability to properly supervise the children; the Department of Human Services had made reasonable efforts to provide services necessary to achieve reunification; the mother did not complete a 90-day outpatient treatment for drugs and alcohol; she repeatedly tested positive for controlled substances, attempted to manipulate the outcome of several of her drug screens, and failed to show for others; and the children would be at risk of harm if returned to her custody. Beck v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 467, 528 S.W.3d 869 (2017).

There was sufficient evidence that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the evidence showed that the mother, despite a year of services, could not maintain sobriety, and that she had used methamphetamine just a week before the termination hearing; the children had been out of the mother's custody for 13 months; she had a two-month trial placement that ended when she was arrested for drug-related crimes; and she testified at the termination hearing that she was incapable of caring for the children at that time and had no concrete timetable for rehabilitation. Allen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 489 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the failure to remedy ground and was in the child's best interest because it was the mother's second attempt at maintaining sobriety, as the child had previously been adjudicated dependent-neglected based on the mother's drug use; she was still subject to supervised visitation; she continued to abuse drugs 10 months into the case; although the mother remained drug-free for four months, the circuit court found that she was not actually dealing with her drug problem as she refused to seek treatment and had failed to follow the case plan; and the circuit court explained that the mother had a drug addiction and she had not been treated for that disease. Garner (Conrad) v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 563, 531 S.W.3d 452 (2017).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children because the children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness based on the mother's drug use, had been in the custody of the Department of Human Services for over 12 months, evidence at the hearing demonstrated that the mother had failed to resolve her drug problem, even after having completed inpatient drug treatment, her counsel complied with the requirements for no-merit appeals, and the appeal was wholly without merit. Griffin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 635 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights on the aggravated-circumstances ground based on a finding that there was little likelihood that further services would result in successful reunification; despite having received drug counseling and drug treatment while incarcerated, the mother testified at the termination hearing that she did not think her drug use had affected her child or her ability to parent her child. McLemore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 57, 540 S.W.3d 730 (2018).

Trial court did not err in determining that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest; even if the mother was released from prison when she expected, she would not be ready to take custody of the child. Although there was testimony that the mother had secured a home with relatives and a temporary job, she had not demonstrated her sobriety. McLemore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 57, 540 S.W.3d 730 (2018).

Sufficient evidence supported the aggravated-circumstances ground for terminating a father's parental rights where the adjudication order stated that he needed to stop drinking alcohol altogether, he tested positive for alcohol throughout the case, his alcohol abuse was a significant problem, and thus there was little likelihood that services would have resulted in successful reunification. Abdi v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 173, 544 S.W.3d 603 (2018).

It was in the child's best interest to terminate the father's parental rights where the father introduced a risk of potential harm into the child's life when he drank alcohol during an unsupervised visitation, and the father was in denial of his alcohol problem, lied at the termination hearing about the last time he drank alcohol, and delayed completing his drug-and-alcohol assessment. Abdi v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 173, 544 S.W.3d 603 (2018).

Trial court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights based on the subsequent-factors ground was not clearly erroneous where she had received extensive services to address her drug and alcohol problems, she continued to test positive for drugs and alcohol after she was released from residential drug treatment, and she failed to show up for drug screens. Harjo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 268, 548 S.W.3d 865 (2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because both parents testing positive for methamphetamine two weeks before the termination hearing was more significant than minor incidents of noncompliance; the parents' use of methamphetamine was the primary risk to the children's health, safety, and welfare because the case began when, among other things, a young child and his two parents tested positive for methamphetamine, and they lived in a dirty home in which the children were unsupervised due to the parents' drug use. Corley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 397, 556 S.W.3d 538 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the child was highly adoptable with hundreds of families interested in adopting the child or a child sharing his characteristics; the circuit court considered the mother's newfound efforts toward being drug-free and applauded her efforts in that regard, yet that simply did not outweigh the child's need for permanency after 18 months in foster care; the mother apparently started using drugs after the Department of Human Services (DHS) had begun providing reunification services to her; her drug use continued throughout the remainder of the DHS case; and she tested positive for methamphetamine one month before the termination hearing. Bridges v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 50, 571 S.W.3d 506 (2019).

Trial court's finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's children was not clearly erroneous because the record supported the trial court's finding that the children would be subjected to potential harm if returned to the mother's custody. The mother lacked a stable home two years after the children's removal and had a long history of drug use and had relapsed, and there was testimony that the children were adoptable and in need of permanency. Middleton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 97, 572 S.W.3d 410 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because the child was removed from her custody for failure to protect and drug use; the mother did not complete the recommendations of her first drug-and-alcohol assessment, failed to complete an ordered second drug-and-alcohol assessment, did not attend NA meetings until a month before the termination hearing, tested positive on drug screens, and never admitted that she abused drugs. Termination was in the child's best interest and adoption was upheld rather than placement with the paternal uncle and aunt as potential harm to the child existed due to the mother's drug abuse; she remained unemployed and had not taken steps to reinstate her nursing license, though so ordered; and she had only recently obtained her own housing, but it was acquired and paid for by her father. Glover v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 278, 577 S.W.3d 13 (2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of her twin children because she continued to use illegal drugs throughout the dependency-neglect case (positive tests for THC and two positive hair-follicle tests for cocaine metabolites in July 2018); a caseworker testified that the twins would be at risk of potential harm if returned to the mother's custody; the court-appointed special advocate's report recommended termination based on the mother’s drug use and its negative effect on the twins; and a clinical psychologist deferred making a reunification recommendation until the mother had shown sustained abstinence from illicit drugs; further, there was little evidence of a genuine relationship or bond between the twins and their infant sister; and there was no evidence that termination would affect the twins' relationship. Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 370, 584 S.W.3d 276 (2019).

Appellate court could not say that the trial court clearly erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on the failure to remedy ground because the children were removed from her custody as a result of her drug abuse; they remained out of her custody for a period of over two years; there was evidence that the mother had not remedied her drug abuse as she admitted having used marijuana about a month before the hearing; and her continued use of illegal drugs after two years of drug-treatment classes and meetings represented potential harm to the children. Hernandez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 449, 588 S.W.3d 102 (2019).

Continued drug use demonstrates potential harm sufficient to support a best-interest finding in a termination of parental rights case. Redden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 539, 589 S.W.3d 401 (2019).

Although the child was in a foster-care placement with relatives, the trial court did not err by finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother tested positive for alcohol three times, including in the interim between the two-day termination hearing, the child had been in foster care for 23 months of her three-year life based on the mother's substance abuse issues, and the mother had relapsed on multiple occasions. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 95, 595 S.W.3d 418 (2020).

Termination Not Proper.

Mother's parental rights were improperly terminated because the record contained no information about an order of child support or the payments made by the mother; moreover, the mother had remedied the issues causing removal since she was capable of maintaining housing and utilities without the assistance of the father, she had caught up on her bills, and she was receiving food stamps. It was clearly erroneous to find that additional services would not result in successful reunification with the mother since she was in compliance with the case plan and making progress in therapy. Duncan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 489 (2014).

Although initially identified as a putative parent and a paternity test established that he was the father, nothing in the record showed that the father's legal status as a putative parent or biological parent, as defined in § 9-27-303, was established to apply the 12-month time period described in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (b) or (b)(3)(B)(ii) (a) of this section, and therefore the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights. This interpretation supported the goal of the juvenile system provided in § 9-27-302, which shall be liberally construed. Earls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 171, 518 S.W.3d 81 (2017).

Order terminating a mother's parental rights was reversed where the circuit court had erroneously defined the condition causing removal of the mother's children as poor judgment, her uncontradicted testimony was that her relationship with an inappropriate boyfriend had ended, and there was no evidence that her current boyfriend, who had supported the mother's efforts to maintain sobriety, was a negative influence, and the evidence established that the mother had successfully remedied her drug problems and remedied the other issues that led to the children's removal. Guthrey v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 19, 510 S.W.3d 793 (2017).

Trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest where the children were in the custody of their grandmother, the children were strongly bonded with the mother, at the time of the termination the mother lived in appropriate housing and was trying to find employment, she had only a single positive drug test for marijuana several months before the termination hearing, she had ended her relationship with the children's father, who had consistently tested positive for drugs during the case, she had been complying with the case-plan requirements, there was no evidence that she had ever harmed the children, and the only apparent reason for the termination was her lack of financial means. Bunch v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 374, 523 S.W.3d 913 (2017).

Termination of appellant's parental rights was reversed because the trial court made no finding regarding paternity or whether appellant had contacts with the children sufficient for parental rights to attach, even though a positive DNA test was admitted into evidence and the DHS specifically requested in its petition that the trial court make a finding of paternity. Northcross v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 320, 550 S.W.3d 919 (2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a putative father's rights because the Department of Human Services did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was the “parent” under § 9-27-303, and the circuit court did not make an express finding that he was the parent, as required before his rights could be terminated under this section. Terry v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 591, 591 S.W.3d 824 (2019).

Termination Proper.

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate in a case where an infant almost died from being malnourished and children were exposed to a sex offender because the evidence was sufficient to show that potential harm could have resulted from returning the children to the mother since she was unable to learn how to properly feed her children, and she failed to recognize dangerous situations; despite completion of a case plan and numerous services, the mother still had no stable transportation, housing, or employment. An argument that the mother was not provided with meaningful reunification services was not addressed by the appellate court since it was not raised below. King v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 278 (2014).

Termination of parental rights was not clearly erroneous in part because the mother was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing for at least another year, and there was no evidence that she could provide for the child; furthermore, she failed to attempt to remedy the issues prohibiting reunification even when she was not incarcerated by refusing services and openly admitting that she missed visitation with the child in part because she was using drugs and lacked a stable home. Matlock v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 184, 458 S.W.3d 253 (2015).

Mother's claim that the child should have been placed with a relative lacked merit. According to the public policy of this state, termination and adoption are preferred to permanent relative placement, and the court's order terminating the mother's parental rights did not preclude a family member from seeking the child's adoption. Matlock v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 184, 458 S.W.3d 253 (2015) (decision under prior versions of statutes).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected, were out of the parent's custody for 12 months, the conditions that caused the removal were not remedied despite a meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services to correct the conditions, the parent willfully failed to provide significant material support, and the return of the children to the parent was contrary to their health, safety, and welfare. Herron v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 195 (2015).

Circuit court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the child had been adjudicated dependent-neglected, return of the child to the father's custody was contrary to the child's health, safety, or welfare, the father did not participate in the case plan, manifested incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate his circumstances, constructively abandoned the child, and subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. Shannon v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 227 (2015).

Termination of parental rights was not clearly erroneous because the circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest as the children were adoptable and there was potential harm to the safety and welfare of the children if they were returned to their parent's custody. Moreover, aggravated circumstances were present as there was little likelihood that continued services would have resulted in successful reunification and the parent had abandoned the children. Ozuna v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 381, 466 S.W.3d 434 (2015).

Trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous based on the aggravated-circumstances ground and the trial court's finding that there was little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification. The trial court believed the testimony of the mother's older daughters regarding sexual abuse at the hands of the mother's then husband and the fact that they both told their mother about the abuse, but that the mother chose to ignore that information and continued to allow her then husband access to her younger daughters when they were put in their trial home placement. Wallace v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 481, 470 S.W.3d 286 (2015).

Trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights under the “other factors” ground in this section was not clearly erroneous, as the evidence showed that the mother lacked insight into her bipolar disorder, refused to acknowledge her mental illness despite participation in counseling, and lacked stable housing and income. Oldham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 490, 469 S.W.3d 825 (2015).

There could be no meritorious argument made with respect to grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights for neglect where the record showed that the children were removed from the mother's custody for environmental neglect and failure to protect, she failed to maintain stable housing for more than a month or two throughout the three years that the children were in DHS custody, she failed to complete her counseling sessions, and at the time of the termination hearing the mother was living in a shelter and had not obtained stable housing to which her children could be returned. Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 513, 470 S.W.3d 690 (2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the other factors ground and was in the children's best interests because the mother failed to complete court-ordered counseling and was noncompliant with taking her medication for mental-health issues; although the mother was partially compliant with the case plan and used some of the appropriate family services offered to her, she was not able to demonstrate safe and effective parenting during visits with the children, several of whom had special needs; an adoption specialist testified that there were 58 families willing to adopt a sibling group like the mother's children; and placement of the children in the mother's custody was contrary to their health, safety, and welfare. Carroll v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 3 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of the parents' rights was in the best interest of the children, as neither parent could sustain consistent employment or housing, both tested positive for marijuana shortly before the termination hearing, and after 14 months of involvement from the department, the parents were unable to accept custody of the children. Dunn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 34, 480 S.W.3d 186 (2016).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to four children where the children had been outside the mother's home for 12 months without the conditions that caused removal corrected, the mother was currently incarcerated for attempting to run over one of the children's fathers, the children were adoptable, and prior to her incarceration, the mother had not made substantial progress under the permanency plans. Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 110 (2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because his positive drug tests were a subsequent factor; moreover, the father was difficult to keep track of, he moved numerous times, his expenses were higher than his income, and he demonstrated instability in relationships with women. Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interest because potential harm was shown based on financial, relationship, and housing instability and uncertainty, as well as the father's continued use of drugs. Vail v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 150, 486 S.W.3d 229 (2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child; even though the mother had completed her case plan, it did not achieve the desired result of making her capable to care for the child. After nearly two years of services, the mother was not employed and was not ready to take care of the child. Vail v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 150, 486 S.W.3d 229 (2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because it was unclear whether the children would have been placed with their father permanently; the children faced future harm if the mother's rights were not terminated based on her severe mental illness. The mother was living in a temporary shelter at the time of termination; moreover, she lacked insight and made no progress in recognizing the extent of her mental illness. Robinson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 202, 489 S.W.3d 218 (2016).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his child because he did not challenge the court's “best interest” determination, demonstrated a pattern of instability, refused to address his substance-abuse issues, was uncooperative with the Department of Human Services, and failed to comply with the case plan and case orders, such that despite the offer of services, he was incapable of, or indifferent to, remedying the subsequent issues and there was little likelihood that further services would result in the father successfully reunifying with the child. Shaffer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 208, 489 S.W.3d 182 (2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous because clear and convincing evidence supported the decision; proof of only one statutory ground was required, and there was substantial evidence that the mother was unable to correct the conditions that caused the removal. The child, who had been out of the mother's custody for 16 months at the time of the termination hearing, could not have been returned to the mother within a time period commensurate with her developmental needs, if ever. Greenhaw v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 294, 495 S.W.3d 109 (2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating parents' rights, as efforts to rectify environmental conditions that led to removal of children occurred after hearing, parents failed to complete parenting classes until six weeks after permanency-planning hearing, and parents did not timely comply with recommendations stemming from psychological evaluation. Dowden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 296 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of a mother's parental rights because she did not participate in her case plan after her incarceration, she did not maintain a separate residence from the father, she failed to obtain employment, and she did not complete an evaluation; a best interest finding was not clearly erroneous because the parents admitted to being long-time drug abusers, the father would not submit to drug treatment, the mother refused to obtain separate living arrangements, and two of the children were born with drugs in their system. As to the father, he did not address the issues preventing reunification until more than a year into the case, and significant issues remained. Wafford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 299, 495 S.W.3d 96 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to her three children was proper and in the children's best interests because the children had been out of the mother's custody for 12 months, and she failed to remedy the conditions that had caused the children's removal as the trial court was concerned the mother had not made enough progress to successfully parent her children; while the mother had begun participating in the oldest child's medical visits, there was no indication she would be able to manage that child's sickle-cell anemia on her own; and the trial court found that the mother was not credible, and that she continued to lead a chaotic lifestyle. Gulley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 367, 498 S.W.3d 754 (2016).

Circuit court found that the mother had placed the children at substantial risk of serious harm by exposing them to drug sales and methamphetamine, and the resolution of the mother's criminal charges and clean drug screens was not sufficient to remedy the neglect and unfitness that caused the children's removal, plus the mother failed to comply with the case plan, and thus termination of the mother's rights was proper. Abram v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 437, 502 S.W.3d 563 (2016).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her youngest child because the child had been adjudicated to be dependent-neglected, the mother had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances where she failed to protect him from abuse—multiple broken bones and an injury that had the appearance of a burn that had removed a portion of the child's nose, the treating physician suspected that the child's injuries were the result of abuse, and there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Beard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 467, 503 S.W.3d 89 (2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence that the mother took little advantage of the services offered to her, was incarcerated, had borderline intellectual functioning, and continued having interactions with the children's abusive father. Scarver v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 474 (2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights because the children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected after the father furnished alcohol to his 12-year-old daughter and failed to report a sexual assault of his 12-year-old daughter; the children were deemed, by stipulation of the parents, to be at serious risk of harm due to neglect; 14 months after the children's removal, they could not be safely returned to their parents' custody as the conditions causing the children's removal had not been remedied by the parents; the mother was incapable of caring for the children as a result of her stroke; and the children were making remarkable progress in their structured and stable foster-care placement and were adoptable. Bane v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 617, 509 S.W.3d 647 (2016).

Terminating a mother's parental rights was not error; although she had successfully completed parenting classes, she still had to be redirected during visitation with her children, and thus, there was little likelihood that continued services to the family would have resulted in successful reunification. Barnes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 618, 508 S.W.3d 917 (2016).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights given her failure to attend counseling and poor decision-making in living with the children's father who was uninterested in working toward reunification, had abused the mother in the past, and who would not follow court orders. Holland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 205 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper as the appropriate services had been provided to the father. While it was true that it was not until the third order that he was ordered to live separately from his live-in girlfriend, it had been ordered from the beginning of the case that his child was not to have any unsupervised contact with her, and the father had not remedied that; the father stated repeatedly during the case that he would not remove the girlfriend from his home, and if he did, it would be only temporary, which indicated that the father had no intention of putting his child first; and the father did not indicate what services could have been offered to him that would have remedied the situation. Grosso v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 305, 521 S.W.3d 519 (2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because, with respect to the failure-to-remedy ground, the trial court found that the children had been subjected to neglect and abuse; and, although the mother was subsequently able to have the children returned to her, they were removed from her custody again for neglect and abuse. Edgar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 312, 522 S.W.3d 127 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights as she failed to remedy her parental unfitness due to her instability; the mother suffered from mental instability, and instability relating to her housing and employment; the caseworker was not sure whether the mother was drug free as she had not been able to administer any drug screens due to the mother's unstable housing; despite submitting to a psychological evaluation, the mother had not followed the recommendations to completion and had missed several appointments; and she had failed to exercise visitation for over a year. Barris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 380 (2017).

Trial court did not clearly err in terminating a mother's parental rights where it was open to considering improvements the mother had made after the first permanency-planning hearing, the goal of permanency planning was not changed until after the second permanency planning hearing, and even after the additional time following the second hearing, the mother was still not ready to have the children returned to her custody. Jameson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 503, 529 S.W.3d 692 (2017).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper, as the mother was offered many services, but the mother submitted to only one random drug screen, did not obtain a drug-and-alcohol assessment or a psychological evaluation, completed parenting classes before the case was opened, was homeless, had no job, and failed to maintain contact with the department. Marion v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 591 (2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother did not demonstrate the ability to adequately supervise the children; although the mother had maintained sobriety and had gone for months without a positive drug screen, she had not demonstrated the ability to maintain a sober lifestyle and provide for the children's needs. The mother had not yet begun a newly obtained job and the house in which she and the children were to live was not ready for occupation. Gann v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 275, 550 S.W.3d 18 (2018).

Trial court did not err in finding that the Department of Human Services had made reasonable efforts to provide services that addressed the father's needs due to his disability, because there was no specific accommodation that the father requested that was denied, he never requested the “auxiliary parent aide” that he suggested on appeal, the case never progressed to the point at which an at-home trial placement was feasible, and there was no indication that any additional services would have changed the outcome of the case or made it more likely for the child to be placed in the father's custody. Harris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 421, 560 S.W.3d 778 (2018).

Trial court did not err by finding that the father had not remedied his drug issues because he tested positive for cocaine three times after being identified as the child's father, and the trial court found that he had not been credible or truthful regarding his drug use or affiliations with drug users. Harris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 421, 560 S.W.3d 778 (2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights and placement of the child in the permanent custody of the father was not contrary to subdivision (a)(3) of this section; the trial court found that returning the child to the mother's home was contrary to the child's health, safety, and welfare, and the statutory provision did not prohibit the termination of only one parent's rights. White v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 459, 558 S.W.3d 423 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish neglect that endangered a child's life as the infant suffered severe injuries from rat bites while in the father's care. Furthermore, returning the child to the father's custody would have exposed the child to a significant risk of potential harm as the father was incarcerated, suffered from addiction issues, lacked stable housing, lacked a stable income, and faced pending felony charges. Elliott v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 526, 565 S.W.3d 487 (2018).

Circuit court did not clearly err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children; while the mother maintained her sobriety, she failed to follow the court's other orders and show that she could maintain stability in housing and employment, her lack of urgency supported a finding of indifference to remedying subsequent factors despite appropriate family services being offered, and termination was in the children's best interests where, despite 20 months of services from the Department of Human Services, the mother did not yet have a home that even she deemed appropriate for the children, and the children had spent a significant portion of their lives in foster care. Easter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 441, 587 S.W.3d 604 (2019).

Termination of parental rights upheld. Conway v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 30, 453 S.W.3d 703 (2015); Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 171, 458 S.W.3d 271 (2015); Cox v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 202, 462 S.W.3d 670 (2015); Gritton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 219 (2015); Buckley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 266, 520 S.W.3d 716 (2017); Krecker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 537, 530 S.W.3d 393 (2017); Burleson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 616, 535 S.W.3d 655 (2017); Stampley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 628, 533 S.W.3d 669 (2017); Hudson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 629, 536 S.W.3d 617 (2017); Fisher v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 693, 542 S.W.3d 168 (2017); Mouse v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 705 (2017); Ewasiuk v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 59, 540 S.W.3d 318 (2018); Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 104, 542 S.W.3d 899 (2018); McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 140, 544 S.W.3d 101 (2018); Bolden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 218, 547 S.W.3d 129 (2018); Lawrence v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 223, 548 S.W.3d 192 (2018); Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 233 (2018); Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 264 (2018); McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 325, 551 S.W.3d 412 (2018); Rylie v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 366, 554 S.W.3d 275 (2018); Bentley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 374, 554 S.W.3d 285 (2018); Bryant v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 375, 554 S.W.3d 295 (2018); Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 380, 555 S.W.3d 896 (2018); Rivera v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 405, 558 S.W.3d 876 (2018); King v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 464, 562 S.W.3d 226 (2018); Lancaster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 557, 566 S.W.3d 484 (2018); Hedrick v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 568 (2018); Androff v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 602, 567 S.W.3d 533 (2018); Anderson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 13, 568 S.W.3d 768 (2019); Hegi v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 20, 568 S.W.3d 776 (2019); Smith-McLeod v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 25, 571 S.W.3d 491 (2019); Moore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 37, 568 S.W.3d 305 (2019); Reyes-Ramos v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 46, 571 S.W.3d 32 (2019); Hopfner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 236, 576 S.W.3d 76 (2019); Allen-Grace v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 286, 577 S.W.3d 397 (2019); Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 299, 578 S.W.3d 312 (2019); Choate v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 387, 587 S.W.3d 553 (2019); Bratton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 392, 586 S.W.3d 662 (2019); Crawford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 474, 588 S.W.3d 383 (2019); Smallwood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 598, 589 S.W.3d 523 (2019).

Termination of parental rights upheld (no-merit brief). Conley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 267 (2016); Norton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 285 (2017); Allison v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 424 (2017); Cotton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 479, 529 S.W.3d 264 (2017); Mercado v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 495 (2017); Snow v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 655 (2017); Hall v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 4 (2018); Baltimore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 313, 578 S.W.3d 319 (2019); McDaniel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 335, 579 S.W.3d 184 (2019); Taylor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 358, 584 S.W.3d 266 (2019); Howard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 381 (2019); Danes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 388, 585 S.W.3d 731 (2019); Beaird v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 415, 585 S.W.3d 172 (2019); Cogburn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 446, 587 S.W.3d 609 (2019); Westbrook v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 504 (2019); Pace v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 533, 589 S.W.3d 433 (2019); Hardiman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 542, 589 S.W.3d 412 (2019).

Circuit court's aggravated-circumstances finding and termination of a father's parental rights to his child was not clearly erroneous because the father continued to allow the mother to live with him despite her severe violence toward the children in the past and even when he knew that doing so would jeopardize his parental rights to the child. Tovias v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 147, 596 S.W.3d 66 (2020).

Termination of parental rights upheld. Carpenter v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 21, 592 S.W.3d 718 (2020); Peterson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 75, 595 S.W.3d 38 (2020); Hensley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 78, 595 S.W.3d 68 (2020); Musick v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 87, 595 S.W.3d 406 (2020); Chavez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 91, 595 S.W.3d 59 (2020); Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 169, 596 S.W.3d 91 (2020); Martin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 192, 596 S.W.3d 98 (2020).

Termination of parental rights upheld (no-merit brief). Wallace v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 67, 595 S.W.3d 396 (2020); Holt v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 170, 597 S.W.3d 142 (2020); Frisby v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 197, 598 S.W.3d 63 (2020); Shipp v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 230, 599 S.W.3d 149 (2020).

Timeliness of Hearing.

Failure of a trial court to hold a termination of parental rights hearing within 90 days of the filing of the petition, as required by subsection (d) of this section, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and the trial court did not err in denying the mother's motion to dismiss; the mother failed to prove prejudice by the delay. Hill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 108, 389 S.W.3d 72 (2012).

Even if the trial court did not articulate good cause for setting the termination of parental rights hearing outside the 90-day limit of subsection (d) of this section, the father's argument failed; although subsection (d) provides that a hearing “shall” be held within 90 days, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction as the General Assembly did not provide a sanction for an untimely filing and the father was not harmed by the delay. Caruthers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 230, 519 S.W.3d 350 (2017).

Unfitness of Parent.

Merely being uninterested is insufficient to support termination of parental rights, but a lack of interest which results in a failure to learn the special feeding techniques and therapies required to care for a child is tantamount to unfitness. Beeson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 37 Ark. App. 12, 823 S.W.2d 912 (1992).

Parent held not to have the capacity to be the type of parent needed by child with high needs, in light of testimony by therapists and psychiatrist that parent could not provide stable environment child required because of parent's mental illness. J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997).

Parental rights terminated where there was clear and convincing evidence that the child was the victim of neglect or abuse perpetrated by the parents. Gregg v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 337, 952 S.W.2d 183 (1997).

Where the court terminated a mother's parental rights to her oldest child after a two-year custody proceeding in which the mother demonstrated she was an unfit parent and indifferent to the needs of her children by failing to comply with the court's orders to get counseling and disassociate herself from an abusive man, the court also properly terminated her parental rights to her younger son, who had only been in her custody for five months, as there was little likelihood that continued services would result in reunification. Trout v. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).

Parents' argument that the Department of Human Services failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the father was rejected because the department was relieved of the burden to provide reunification services where the father was found to have subjected the daughter to sexual abuse, which was aggravated circumstances under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix) of this section. Sparkman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 363, 242 S.W.3d 282 (2006).

Where a daycare worker reported that a child had an adult-sized hand print on her face, she often wore dirty diapers, and her clothes smelled of marijuana, the father partially complied with the case plan and court orders while the child was in foster custody but did not correct the underlying problems that led to the child's abuse and neglect; the father failed to take his medication, his mental illness was untreated, and his work history showed frequent job changes. The trial court did not err by terminating the father's parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) (a) of this section based on a finding that the child would be subject to potential harm if returned to his custody. Byers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 581 (2009).

When the children were removed from the home and adjudicated dependent based on physical abuse and parental unfitness due to drug use, the mother failed to maintain appropriate housing and employment, did not follow the recommendations of her psychological evaluation, or remain drug free. The trial court did not err by terminating her parental rights under subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii) (a) of this section; the mother's appeal was frivolous. McKellar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 781 (2009).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a parent's parental rights where the psychological examiner who examined the parent testified that the parent presented with frank paranoia and mistrust and that any possibility for reunification would come only after the parent received psychiatric treatment and substance-abuse analysis. Aday v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 677 (2010).

Termination of a father's parental rights was proper under this section as it removed the children from the father's continuing violence and was in the best interests of the children; the fact that the children were remaining with the mother did not deprive the children of permanency as the mother was their most stable influence. Hayes v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 21 (2011).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights to her son because she failed to seek treatment for drug abuse even though she had 16 months to comply with the case plan, she continued to associate with drug addicts, she did not maintain stable employment and housing, she did not have reliable transportation even though it was critical due to her son's medical needs for his cancer, and she showed little interest in learning about her son's cancer until shortly before termination. Gaskill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 610 (2013).

There was sufficient evidence to support the finding of a statutory ground for termination where the child had been outside the mother's care for 12 months, the mother failed to remedy the cause for removal, i.e., her drug use. Jung v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 523, 443 S.W.3d 555 (2014).

Termination of the parental rights of a putative father and stepfather and the mother to the mother's biological children was appropriate because the father physically abused the children and the mother consistently failed to protect the children and denied the abuse even in the face of the father's criminal prosecution for the abuse. Nguyen v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 565 (2014).

Giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the mother remained an unfit parent. The mother remained married to the stepfather and there was evidence that he parented by use of fear, the mother's daycare plan was contrary to the prohibition against having other adults living with and caring for her children, and she exercised poor judgment when visiting the children. In light of the list of extensive services provided, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that DHS made meaningful efforts to rehabilitate the mother. Hernandez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 250, 492 S.W.3d 119 (2016).

Voluntary Termination.

Discretion was not abused where a circuit court did not allow a mother to execute a consent to termination; she was not present at the hearing to even voice her consent, and it had already been concluded that the case was an involuntary termination based on the mother's credibility and the circumstances. Russell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 734 (2014).

Cited: Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Lawrence, 57 Ark. App. 300, 944 S.W.2d 566 (1997); Tackett v. Merchant's Sec. Patrol, 73 Ark. App. 358, 44 S.W.3d 349 (2001); Burks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 76 Ark. App. 71, 61 S.W.3d 184 (2001); Murray v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 431, 429 S.W.3d 288 (2013); Duncan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 489 (2014); McPherson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 621 (2014); Windom v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 629 (2014); Murphree v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 677 (2014); Morin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 695, 477 S.W.3d 548 (2015).