Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-215 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Family Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 624.

Arkansas Law Survey, Saunders, Torts, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Survey — Family Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The law in effect at the time of an ancestor's death controls the issue of inheritance, not the law in effect at the time of adoption; this section applies where the death occurs after this section's 1977 enactment, even if the adoption occurred before 1977. Wheeler v. Myers, 330 Ark. 728, 956 S.W.2d 863 (1997).

Because adoption, inheritance laws were not intended to modify the established meaning of terms used in deeds, a trial court did not err in refusing to consider § 56-109 (repealed) when determining whether or not an adopted child was entitled to a remainder interest in a deed that used the word “heirs.” Brown v. Johnson, 81 Ark. App. 60, 97 S.W.3d 924 (2003).

Disinterment.

Appellate court overruled appellants' assertion that the adoptive father's permission was not needed to disinter the decedent's remains, because either the adoptive father's consent was necessary or in cases where there was disagreement, the matter must be submitted for a judicial decision, when for all intents and purposes, the adoptive father was the decedent's legitimate blood descendent. Tozer v. Warden, 101 Ark. App. 396, 278 S.W.3d 134 (2008).

Exclusions Permitted.

Even though this section treats adopted persons as blood descendants for “all purposes,” it nevertheless allows documents or instruments to expressly exclude an adopted individual from their operation. Sides v. Beene, 327 Ark. 401, 938 S.W.2d 840 (1997).

Finality of Decree.

Adoptive parent who did not timely appeal a temporary order of adoption did not, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 41, have an absolute right to dismiss his petition for adoption anytime prior to the entry of a final order of adoption. Toai Cong Pham v. Hanh My Truong, 291 Ark. 442, 725 S.W.2d 569 (1987).

Once an interlocutory decree of adoption is entered, it is construed as a final decree if no subsequent hearing is required by the terms of that decree; and the natural parent cannot withdraw consent after entry of the decree unless fraud, duress, or intimidation is shown. In re Milam, 27 Ark. App. 100, 766 S.W.2d 944 (1989).

Subsection (b) of this section provides, in the last sentence, that an interlocutory decree can be set aside. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

Inheritance.

Child adopted after execution of will stood in the position of a natural born child born subsequently to the execution of the will, and inherited accordingly. Grimes v. Jones, 193 Ark. 858, 103 S.W.2d 359 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Where adoption was void, adopted child could not inherit real estate but was entitled to inherit personal property. Dean v. Brown, 216 Ark. 761, 227 S.W.2d 623 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Adopted son was heir of first adoptive father even though he was adopted by others prior to death of first adoptive father. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951) (decision under prior law).

Adopted son held not “heir of the body” of deceased foster parent. Davis v. Davis, 219 Ark. 623, 243 S.W.2d 739 (1951) (decision under prior law).

Children adopted by decedent shortly before his death were entitled to inherit from him even though the final decree was not entered during his lifetime. Williams v. Nash, 247 Ark. 135, 445 S.W.2d 69 (1969) (decision under prior law).

A final decree of adoption must be entered in this state if an adopted child is to inherit at all from his adoptive parents, as inheritance under the “virtual adoption” theory is unknown to the law of this jurisdiction. Wilks v. Langley, 248 Ark. 227, 451 S.W.2d 209 (1970) (decision under prior law).

The law in effect at the time of the death of the adopted child is controlling on matters of inheritance; thus, under this section, the heirs of the adoptive parents inherit to the exclusion of the blood relatives. In re Estate of Caisson, 289 Ark. 216, 710 S.W.2d 211 (1986).

Petition Denied.

Circuit court did not err in denying the adoption petition because it was the mother's burden to present credible evidence to convince the circuit judge that adoption was in the best interest of the child, and considering the circuit court's determination that the effect of this section was speculative and that the mother's allegations against the father could be afforded no weight, she failed to meet this burden. There was no corroborating testimony or evidence as to the mother's allegations regarding the father's use of alcohol and drugs or the father's abuse of his children, other than what the mother told her mother. In re Adoption of M.K.C., 2009 Ark. 114, 313 S.W.3d 513 (2009).

Termination of Legal Relationships.

Trial court erred in holding that before appellant's adoption of his wife's adopted child could go forward, appellant was required to either obtain the consent of the child's biological father or produce an order demonstrating that the biological father's parental rights had been terminated because by operation of law, the former adoption decree forever severed and held for naught the biological father's rights, responsibilities, and legal relationship with the child. In re Adoption of H.L.M., 99 Ark. App. 115, 257 S.W.3d 587 (2007).

Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as an expression of public policy favoring a complete severance of the relationship between an adopted child and his or her biological family in order to further the best interest of the child. In re Adoption of H.L.M., 99 Ark. App. 115, 257 S.W.3d 587 (2007).

—In General.

An adoption not only terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his natural parents and legally makes him a stranger to them, it also commands that all courts recognize that principle in construing all statutes. Webb v. Harvell, 563 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Ark. 1983).

Section 9-27-341(c)(1) and subdivision (a)(1) of this section point to a public policy which, in determining what is in the child's best interest, favors a complete severing of the ties between a child and its biological family when he is placed for adoption. Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 314 Ark. 92, 858 S.W.2d 122 (1993); Vice v. Andrews, 328 Ark. 573, 945 S.W.2d 914 (1997).

—Grandparents.

Decree of adoption would terminate the relational status between adopted grandchildren and their grandparents. Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981).

Paternal grandparents of adopted child were not entitled to obtain visitation privileges since this section terminates all legal relationships so that the adopted infant is for all legal purposes a stranger to his former relatives; it is unquestionably within the province of the legislature to decide that the reasons favoring the solidarity of the adoptive family outweigh those favoring the grandparents and other blood kin who are related to the child through its deceased parent. Wilson v. Wallace, 274 Ark. 48, 622 S.W.2d 164 (1981); Woodson v. Kilcrease, 7 Ark. App. 252, 648 S.W.2d 72 (1983).

When the public policy favoring maintenance of grandparental ties collides with the stronger public policy to strengthen the relationships within adoptive families, the former must give way to the latter. Woodson v. Kilcrease, 7 Ark. App. 252, 648 S.W.2d 72 (1983).

A grandmother's visitation and custody rights were derivative of her daughter's parental rights, and, as a result, were terminated when her daughter's parental rights were terminated. Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 314 Ark. 92, 858 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

The biological father's consent to an adoption terminated any rights of visitation that his mother might claim. Vice v. Andrews, 328 Ark. 573, 945 S.W.2d 914 (1997).

The maternal grandmother was not entitled to visitation with two children adopted by the natural father's new wife under subsection (a)(1) of this section, because she was barred from filing her custody/visitation action by the one-year statute of limitations found in § 9-9-216(b) as she clearly was challenging the effect of the adoption decree by claiming visitation rights. A contrary result was not required by the fact that the grandmother was not given notice of the adoption proceeding as required by § 9-9-212(f) because the Revised Uniform Adoption Act in effect at the time of the adoption proceedings did not provide for grandparent visitation rights. Tate v. Bennett, 341 Ark. 829, 20 S.W.3d 370 (2000).

Mother's adoption by adoptive parents severed a grandmother's relationship with the mother (her daughter), and therefore, the grandmother was no longer a grandparent entitled to visitation under § 9-13-103(b)(2) with the mother's child. The circuit court erred by continuing to recognize the grandmother's visitation rights following the adoption. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, 426 S.W.3d 427 (2013).

In a case in which the circuit court erroneously decided to forego a relative-placement option with the grandparents in favor of terminating the mother's parental rights, the Department of Human Services erred in saying that the grandparents could later become an adoptive placement for the children if they were able to meet all the necessary child protection standards and successfully petition to adopt the children because the grandparents were not parties to the termination of parental rights case and would not have standing to intervene as a matter of right in a subsequent adoption proceeding should the termination be affirmed; and, if the children were not placed with the grandparents now, it was unlikely the court would allow them to adopt the children later. Clark v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 223, 575 S.W.3d 578 (2019).

Wrongful Death Action.

The omission of any provision for an adoptive parent's death does not show a legislative intent to deny an adopted child the right to assert a cause of action for the death of the adoptive parent. Moon Distribs., Inc. v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W.2d 56 (1968) (decision under prior law).

Where the decedent's natural-born child had been adopted, the child was no longer the child of the decedent and was not one of the beneficiaries authorized to recover for the wrongful death of the decedent. Webb v. Harvell, 563 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Ark. 1983).

Cited: Irvan v. Kizer, 286 Ark. 105, 689 S.W.2d 548 (1985); In re Perkins/Pollnow, 300 Ark. 390, 779 S.W.2d 531 (1989); J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, 505 S.W.3d 211 (2016).