State v. Hamilton, 688 P.2d 983 (Ariz. 1984). · Go Syfert
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State v. Hamilton, 688 P.2d 983 (Ariz. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2007 · …it is well established that entry of a valid guilty plea forecloses a defendant from raising nonjurisdictional defects. at p. 986 ✓
102 citation events (48 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Valdez (arizctapp, 2017-08-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 47 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Valdez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a defendant must not tell the judge that his plea is entered into voluntarily if it is not.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Carter (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
it is well established that entry of a valid guilty plea forecloses a defendant from raising nonjurisdictional defects.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Smith
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶6 Here, the court explained to Smith the rights he would give up by entering the plea agreement.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Campos
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
As the court explained in its dismissal order, the record reflects that during the change-of-plea colloquy, Campos acknowledged that he had “read [the] plea agreement in its entirety and that [he] understood its contents,” that he had “discussed [the] plea agreement with [his] attorney,” and that his attorney had “answered all of [his] questions.” See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (entitling courts to rely on a defendant’s responses at the change-of-plea hearing in determining whether a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered a guilty plea).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Taylor
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶11 Here, while the prosecutor stated she probably would recommend the sentencing floor so long as she received approval from her supervising attorney, she did not promise to do so.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bonney
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Claims regarding the voluntariness of a plea are meritless if the record shows the trial court questioned the defendant in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the defendant’s responses to those questions indicate the defendant entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily, see State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶16 The trial court did not err in dismissing Bonney’s claim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Emedi
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (counsel); State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 509 (1998) (counsel); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 242–44 (1969) (decision to plead guilty); State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 94, n.3 (1984) (decision to plead guilty); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (right to appeal).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Begay
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Vick (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (claims regarding the voluntariness of a plea are meritless if the record shows the trial court questioned the defendant in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the defendant’s responses to those questions indicate the defendant entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily); State v. Pritchett, 27 Ariz. App. 701, 703 (1976) (honest, mistaken subjective impression about the sentence to be received, absent substantial objective evidence showing impression to be reasonably justified, is insufficient to support a claim of involuntar…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Granado
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶6 Granado also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the search warrant, causing fundamental error.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Estling
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Finally, Estling informed the court he did not “[have] any drugs, alcohol or medication in the last 24 hours[.]” See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (statements to court at change of plea regarding voluntariness are normally binding on defendant).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Benjamin
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
At the change of plea hearing, the judge asked Benjamin whether anyone had forced, threatened or coerced her guilty plea and she responded “No.” “A defendant must not tell the judge that [her] plea is entered into voluntarily if it is not.” State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶10 As part of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Benjamin alleged the official transcript of the change of plea hearing was falsified.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Perez-Tapia
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bunescu
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Scroggins
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Valenzuela
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶7 Valenzuela’s remaining claims are either unsupported by the record or are waived.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Barriga
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sullivan
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Manuel Ovante, Jr.
Ariz. · 2013 · confidence medium
State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 365 , 728 P.2d 232, 235 (1986) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984)); State v. Diaz, 121 Ariz. 16, 18 , 588 P.2d 309, 311 (1978) (holding that a reviewing court can consider the record, and not only plea colloquy, to determine if there is a factual basis for a plea). ¶ 13 To support a plea to first degree, premeditated murder, a court must find that facts support a conclusion that the accused (1) intended to cause the death of another, (2) caused the death of another, and (3) acted with premeditation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Draper
Ariz. · 1989 · confidence medium
State v. King, 116 Ariz. 353, 355 , 569 P.2d 295, 297 (App.1977) (factual basis for Alford plea was established by prosecutor’s recitation of the state’s case rather than by defendant); State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984) (factual basis for Alford plea can be established by “the record as a whole or any part of it, including a preliminary hearing”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Denning
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Lerch, 107 Ariz. at 530 , 490 P.2d at 2 ; State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wallace
Ariz. · 1986 · confidence medium
State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Murphy-Richardson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
Leyva, 241 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 12; see State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (defendant’s statements at a plea hearing regarding voluntariness ordinarily bind the defendant).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Becker
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521 , 525 ¶ 12 (App. 2017); see State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (recognizing statements to court at a change of plea hearing about voluntariness normally bind the defendant).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Lewis
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
P. 33.2(a)(1); see State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 94 (1984) (“It is well established that entry of a valid guilty plea[] forecloses a defendant from raising nonjurisdictional defects.” (cleaned up)); State v. Popejoy, 9 Ariz. App. 170, 172 (1969) (recognizing an arrest warrant defect as a nonjurisdictional question). ¶14 Fourth, Lewis asserts the superior court erred because he is entitled to relief because he was designated with an “improper party status” before he entered his plea, and currently still holds the status.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Edwards (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 94 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jones
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91 , 93 (1984) (claims regarding the voluntariness of a plea are meritless if the record shows the superior court questioned the defendant in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)); State v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, 635, ¶ 18 (App. 2005) (to raise a colorable claim, defendant must establish counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable based on applicable professional standards, and counsel’s performance prejudiced defendant); see also Ariz. R.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Acuna
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (noting defendant’s statements to the court during a change of plea colloquy regarding voluntariness are normally binding).
cited Cited "see" State v. Brock
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶10 The record establishes that Brock knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to the Sentencing Jury Waiver at the change of plea hearing.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Wauneka
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (statements to the court at a change of plea hearing regarding the voluntariness of the plea are normally binding on the defendant). ¶8 Nonetheless, Wauneka claims plea counsel “coerced” the plea.
cited Cited "see" State v. Douglas
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
cited Cited "see" State v. Neal
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 92-93 (1984). ¶9 Neal’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel hinge on a finding that his convictions and sentences were illegal.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Marques
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶7 Additionally, when Marques originally sought to avoid his plea agreement just before sentencing via his own pro per request, the superior court made a finding on the record, again, that his plea was 2 STATE v. MARQUES Decision of the Court voluntary, and found no “manifest injustice” to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea.
cited Cited "see" State v. Czarniecki
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). ¶5 Czarniecki took part in a settlement conference.
cited Cited "see" State v. Nelson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984).
cited Cited "see" State v. Soto-Portillo
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91 , 92-93 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Chairez (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984); see also State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶25 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1283 (1998) (“defendant’s appropriate and rational responses” relevant to conclusion that defendant fully understood consequences of waiver), abrogated on other grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 , 124 S.Ct. 2562 , 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004). ¶ 9 Moreover, contrary to Chairez’s assertions, the record shows there was a sufficient factual basis for each plea.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Soto (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91 , 94 n. 3, 688 P.2d 983 , 986 n. 3 (1984); State v. Reed, 121 Ariz. 547, 548 , 592 P.2d 381, 382 (App.1979); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (applying Sixth Amendment standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in guilty plea context); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (requiring knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver for valid guilty plea); State v. Johnson, 181 Ariz. 346, 349-50 , 890 P.2d 641, 644-45 (App.1995) (reviewing whether sufficient factual b…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Marshall (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. 205 , 688 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Ct.App.1984) (citing cases from other jurisdictions and stating that "[eluhanced punishment statutes for repeat offenders have been consistently upheld against arguments that they violate ex post facto proscriptions" and holding that, in the case before it, "[the punishment imposed under [the Arizona DWI recidivist statute] is based on the third DWI [and] does not increase the penalty for the [two] prior convictions"), approved en bane by 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2d 983 (1984); Roberts v. State, 494 A.2d 156, 157 (Del.1985) (holding …
cited Cited "see" State v. Wiley
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2.d 983 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Rosario (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984). ¶22 Rosario states that his counsel did not take into consideration the victim’s wishes.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Griffith (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984).
examined Cited "see" State v. Stilling (8×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Utah Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2d 983, 985 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arizona Department of Public Safety v. Superior Court (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
Second, the law “change[d] the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 965 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); see also State v. Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. 205, 207 , 688 P.2d 1097, 1099 (App.) (a statute is retroactive if it applies “to events occurring before its enactment” and “disadvantagefs] the offender”), adopted and approved, 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2d 983 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Olvera (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
“A law is retrospective if it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ ” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 , 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); see also State v. Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. 205 , 688 P.2d 1097 (App.1984), adopted and approved, 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2d 983 (1984).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Butler v. State (4×)
Ind. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
Seq, eg., Broadie v. Wisconsin, 68 Wis. 2d 420 , 228 NW.2d 687 (1975); see also Arizona v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2d 983 (1984) (factual basis may be established by strong evidence of guilt, but need not be shown beyond reasonable doubt).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Driggs (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. 205, 208 , 688 P.2d 1097, 1100 (App.), approved, 142 Ariz. 91 , 688 P.2d 983 (1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Kelly HAMILTON, Appellant
5985.
Arizona Supreme Court.
Sep 25, 1984.
688 P.2d 983
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, and Diane D. Hienton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee., Kemper & Henze by James Hamilton Kemper, Phoenix, for appellant., Kelly Hamilton, pro se.
Hays, Holohan, Gordon, Cameron, Feldman.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 70%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Arizona (1)
HAYS, Justice.

Appellant, Kelly Hamilton, was charged with first degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery. He entered an Alford [1] plea of guilty to the first degree murder charge in exchange for the state’s promise not to seek the death .penalty and to drop the kidnapping and armed robbery charges. The trial court conducted a presentence hearing and considered a presentence report, and then sentenced appellant to a term of life imprisonment. See A.R.S. § 13-703.

The period to appeal the sentence and conviction lapsed. Subsequently, the trial court, pursuant to a petition for post-conviction relief, granted a delayed appeal. See Ariz.Rules of Crim.Pro., rules 31.3(b) and 32.1(f). Appellant’s counsel on appeal could not find any error that would support a normal appellate presentation and therefore filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Appellant was allowed to file a supplemental brief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const.Art. 6, § 5(3), A.R.S. § 13-4031, and A.R.S. § 13-4035. We affirm.

Appellant asserts that he entered the plea agreement because he was coerced by threats. The record shows, however,[*93] that during the hearing on the change of plea, the trial court questioned appellant extensively in accord with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and found that appellant entered the plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. More specifically, the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: Was any force used to get you to plead guilty in this matter?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Were any threats made to get you to plead guilty in this matter?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

Appellant now claims that he did not tell the court (or even his own counsel) about the alleged coercion because he felt that the detectives who allegedly coerced him had influenced other officials so that no officials could be trusted. Appellant also claims that he waited until he was transferred to the state prison to bring this issue because the detectives who allegedly threatened him had access to the Maricopa County Jail, where he was being detained, and could have carried out their threats at the jail.

Both of these claims are meritless. A defendant must not tell the judge that his plea is entered into voluntarily if it is not. It is no excuse that appellant thought the judge might not be trustworthy. If we were to grant any type of relief on this ground, every intelligent defendant entering a plea would tell the trial judge that the plea was entered into voluntarily and then wait for imposition of the sentence; if the sentence imposed were more harsh than anticipated or desired, the defendant would claim he entered the plea involuntarily but could not tell the judge, fearing the judge could not be trusted. Such a sequence of events would make a mockery of our justice system and of course will not be allowed. It is also no excuse that appellant feared being returned to the Maricopa County Jail. If told about the threats, the judge could have ascertained if there really were any danger to appellant and, if so, could have arranged appropriate safety precautions. Both of these claims are foreclosed by the trial judge’s Boykin questioning and appellant’s responses at the time of the change of plea.

Appellant also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The standard for determining whether legal assistance was effective is “whether under the circumstances the attorney showed at least minimal competence in representing the criminal defendant.” The burden of proving ineffectiveness is on the claimant, and the proof must be a demonstrable reality, not a matter of speculation. State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 198, 665 P.2d 70, 80 (1983).

We have reviewed the record and find no indication of incompetency. Appellant’s trial counsel filed numerous motions, including a motion requesting a voluntariness hearing and a motion requesting examination of appellant’s mental condition. Also, the record reflects that trial counsel adequately represented appellant at the change of plea and at sentencing. Further, the record clearly reflects that appellant benefitted from the plea by not being exposed to the death penalty and by having other charges, which could have significantly added to appellant’s sentence, dropped. Appellant received effective assistance of counsel.

Appellant also argues that he should have been granted an acquittal because there was no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction. Our rules of criminal procedure require that a judgment may be entered on a guilty plea only when there is a factual basis for that plea. See 17 A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 17.3. The factual basis need not be, as at a trial, established beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the court need only find strong, evidence of guilt. E.g., State v. McGuire, 131 Ariz. 93, 95, 638 P.2d 1339, 1341 (1981); State v. Freda, 121 Ariz. 430, 432, 590 P.2d 1376, 1378 (1979). The evidence of guilt may be derived from the record as a whole or any part of it, including a preliminary hearing. See State v. McVay, 131 Ariz. 369, 373, 641 P.2d 857,[*94] 861 (1982); State v. Diaz, 121 Ariz. 16, 18, 588 P.2d 309, 311 (1978) (a presentence report); State v. Brooks, 120 Ariz. 458, 461, 586 P.2d 1270, 1273 (1978) (admissions by the defendant).

During the hearing on the change of plea, the state set forth the evidence it would prove were a trial held. The evidence consisted of admissions by appellant and other substantive evidence. Appellant argues that the admissions the state alluded to were coerced, see infra. Even assuming that they were coerced such that they could not be used to establish a factual basis, there was still other evidence establishing “strong evidence of guilt.” The presentence report contains numerous incriminating statements by appellant. (Appellant states that at the presentence interview he was asked only to repeat an earlier coerced statement, not to relate what specifically happened the day of the murder. The presentence report, however, indicates otherwise.) We find that the evidence the state set forth at the hearing on the change of plea, and the incriminating statements contained in the presentence report, clearly establish a factual basis for the guilty plea.

Finally, appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed because threats were made to coerce him to confess to the murder and because his Miranda [2] warnings were not timely given. We need not address the merits of appellant’s argument because the issues raised are foreclosed by the entry of the guilty plea. It is well established that entry of a valid guilty plea [3] forecloses a defendant from raising nonjurisdictional defects. E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1607, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); State v. Diaz, 121 Ariz. 16, 17, 588 P.2d 309, 310 (1978). This rule includes the situation in which the defendant claims, as in the present case, that he confessed involuntarily, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); State v. Leinweber 121 Ariz. 435, 437, 590 P.2d 1381, 1383 (1979), and the situation in which the defendant claims, again as in the instant case, that his Miranda warnings were not timely given, see id; State v. Bazan, 119 Ariz. 260, 580 P.2d 721 (1978). Thus, appellant is foreclosed from raising the claim that his confession was coerced and that his Miranda warnings were not timely given.

Judgment of conviction and sentence affirmed.

HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, Y.C.J., and CAMERON and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.
1

. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (the situation in which the defendant enters a guilty plea but does not admit guilt).

2

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3

. A guilty plea is valid if entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and with competent advice of counsel, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and there is strong evidence of guilt, see State v. DeCoe, 118 Ariz. 502, 578 P.2d 181 (1978). See State v. Leinweber, 121 Ariz. 435, 437 n. 2, 590 P.2d 1381, 1383 n. 2 (1979).