Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co., 445 P.2d 881 (Cal. 1968). · Go Syfert
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Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co., 445 P.2d 881 (Cal. 1968). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
313 citation events (222 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Soleimani Dental Corp. v. Baratian CA2/8 (calctapp, 2026-06-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 41 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Soleimani Dental Corp. v. Baratian CA2/8
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(Cf. City of Santa Maria v. Cohen (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 96 , 106– 108 [reversing based on a respondent’s argument despite its failure to cross-appeal].) 31 (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456, fn. 2 (Woodcock).) But we need not find forfeiture where, as here, the record does not demonstrate the failure to object stemmed from “a desire to reap a ‘technical advantage’ or engage in a ‘litigious strategy.’ ” (Ibid; see also Mixon v. Riverview Hospital (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 364, 377 (Mixon) [“[I]t is not universally true that clarification of…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JBS Carriers v. Mendoza CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452 , 456–457 (Woodcock).) On appeal, if “the trial judge does not interpret the verdict or interprets it erroneously, an appellate court will interpret the verdict if it is possible to give a correct interpretation.” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) The appellate court’s interpretation is de novo.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCullagh v. Kiosef CA5 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
When a special “verdict is hopelessly ambiguous, a reversal is required.” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 457 (Woodcock).) If the special verdict is “ ‘merely ambiguous,’ ” courts will either interpret the ambiguity or conclude it was forfeited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TRC Operating Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Legal Principles Governing the Timeliness of Objections “An objection to jury verdict forms is generally deemed waived if not raised in the trial court.” (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 976, fn.6 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558 .) “Frequently, failure to object to the form of a verdict before the jury is discharged has been held to be a waiver of any defect. [Citations.] However, waiver is not automatic, and there are many exceptions. [Citations.] [¶] Waiver is not found where the record indicates that the failure to object was not the result…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Quigley v. Bis Club & Bar CA4/1 (5×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Tavaglione, at pp. 1158–1159; Ruby, at p. 703.) On appeal, we must interpret the jury’s special verdict “if it is possible to give a correct interpretation.” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) In so interpreting the jury’s special verdict and the record on appeal, we conclude that, with two exceptions, the jury awarded Maya different awards of damages for different injuries or harms that she suffered relating to the four causes of action in question.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456.) C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456.) C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Epochal Enterprises v. LF Encinitas Properties CA4/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456.) C.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rodas v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/1 (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Proc., § 624.) The purpose of a special verdict is for the jury to determine the ultimate facts of each claim or defense in the case, so that “nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law.” (Ibid.) To the extent there is an ambiguity in the special verdict after the jury is discharged, the court must “ ‘interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 (Woodcock); accord, Fuller v. Dept. of Transportation (2019) 3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodas v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Proc., § 624.) The purpose of a special verdict is for the jury to determine the ultimate facts of each claim or defense in the case, so that “nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law.” (Ibid.) To the extent there is an ambiguity in the special verdict after the jury is discharged, the court must “ ‘interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 (Woodcock); accord, Fuller v. Dept. of Transportation (2019) 3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stevenson v. Farmers Ins. Exchange CA1/4 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 (Woodcock); Fuller v. Department of Transportation (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1038 (Fuller).) As our colleagues in Division One of this court have explained, “[g]eneral and special verdicts are deemed inconsistent when they are 7 ‘beyond possibility of reconciliation under any possible application of the evidence and instructions.’ [Citations.] ‘If any conclusions could be drawn thereunder which would explain the apparent conflict, the jury will be deemed to have drawn them.’ [Citation.] Where the jury’s fi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College etc. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(See Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 457 (Woodcock) [“[i]f the verdict is hopelessly ambiguous, a reversal [and retrial] is required”].) We disagree with Shirvanyan that such retrial should be limited to the issue of damages.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Plotts Real Estate v. Reidy CA4/1 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Proc., § 624.) To the extent there is an ambiguity in the special verdict that is not raised before the jury is discharged, the court must “ ‘interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 (Woodcock); accord, Fuller v. Dept. of Transportation (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1038 (Fuller) [consider pleadings, evidence, instructions, and arguments]; Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 718-719 [consider evidence, instructions, and…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College etc. CA2/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(See Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 457 (Woodcock) [“[i]f the verdict is hopelessly ambiguous, a reversal [and retrial] is required”].) We disagree with Shirvanyan that such retrial should be limited to the issue of damages.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Plotts Real Estate v. Reidy CA4/1 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Proc., § 624.) To the extent there is an ambiguity in the special verdict that is not raised before the jury is discharged, the court must “ ‘interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 (Woodcock); accord, Fuller v. Dept. of Transportation (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1038 (Fuller) [consider pleadings, evidence, instructions, and arguments]; Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 718-719 [consider evidence, instructions, and…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simgel Co., Inc. v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
As Woodcock tells us, we interpret a special verdict “ ‘from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456.) The only conceivable formulation was the one the court used: whether the car had a window defect that rendered it “not fit for the ordinary purpose of providing transportation.” While that formulation might have been inadequate under other evidentiary circumstances, such as those in Isip, there is no basis for finding it inappropriate in this case.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jose Flores v. City of Westminster
9th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Roby, 47 Cal.4th at 705 , 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 219 P.3d 749 (quoting Woodcock, 69 Cal.2d at 457, 72 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 445 P.2d 881 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456, fn. 2 [defect in special verdict waived if the failure to object was “the result of a desire to reap a ‘technical advantage’ or engage in a ‘litigious strategy’ ”].) And if we accepted the premise that HCR and Hemet had actually believed, during the trial, that the jury was required to assess their liability as to each of Jarman’s claims independently of each other, we would have to conclude that their failure to point out the insufficiency of this special verdict—which their own counsel drafted—demonstrated gamesmanship.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haynes v. Kim CA2/8 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456, fn. 2 ; see ibid. [“[w]aiver is not found where the record indicates that the failure to object was not the result of a desire to reap a ‘technical advantage’ or engage in a ‘litigious strategy’ ”; “waiver is not an issue where a defect is latent and there is no hint of ‘litigious strategy’ ”].) But as the Supreme Court explained in Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247 , “ ‘Failure to object to a verdict before the discharge of a jury and to request clarification or further deliberatio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weibezahl v. Raytheon Co. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Plaintiff disagrees, responding that a party forfeits an objection to an inconsistent or ambiguous jury verdict constitutes forfeiture only if his silence was “the result of a desire to reap a ‘technical 11 advantage’ or engage in a ‘litigious strategy.’” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456, fn. 2.) We need not resolve the issue of forfeiture because plaintiff’s argument for a new trial fails on its merits.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roger v. Magic Mountain CA2/8 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(E.g., Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1242-1243 [“Because appellant did not object and had expressly approved the erroneous verdict form, it forfeited its claim that the special verdict is defective because the jury did not answer questions five and six.”].) Plaintiff, however, cites authority to the effect that “waiver is not automatic, and there are many exceptions.” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 457, fn. 2 ; see ibid. [“[w]aiver is not found where the record indicates that the failure to object was not the re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephens & Stephens XII v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(All-West Design, Inc. v, Boozer, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1223 .) Reversal of an ambiguous special verdict is “required” only “[i]f the verdict is hopelessly ambiguous.” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) The special verdict here is far from hopelessly ambiguous.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wang v. TDS Group CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 454.) The jury rendered a general verdict of $13,000 20 with the special finding that the negligence of defendant scaffolding company was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scheinberg v. County of Sonoma CA1/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Seiler & Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 834, 858 [“where the record is devoid of any showing that [an] appellant[] objected to the special verdict questions, any inherent error therein is waived”].) Scheinberg argues that an inconsistent-verdict claim may only be waived where “the failure to object was ‘the result of a desire to reap a [“]technical advantage[”] or engage in a “litigious strategy.[”]’ ” (Quoting Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456, fn. 2 .) The two authorities he cites do not support his position.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) First American Title v. Lyons CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, we will independently consider whether “the record indicates that the failure to object was not the result of a desire to reap a ‘technical advantage’ or engage in a ‘litigious strategy.’ [Citations.]” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456, fn. 2.) In other words, Lyons’s silence will serve as a basis for implying a waiver if Lyons obtained an advantage in the litigation by failing to object.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cardinale v. Miller
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456-457 [courts interpret verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions]; Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Mining Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 557, 570 [verdict construed with reference to instructions].) In accordance with Cardinale’s theory of the case, the jury was instructed that Cardinale “claims that she was harmed by [Miller’s] fraudulent transfers to hide assets and drain asset equity, and that each of the defendants has responsibility for the har…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bushnell Landscape Ind. v. Grover Landscape Serv. CA3 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
If $13,000 represents the whole amount of damages, then Woodcock’s ‘damages must be reduced by the amount of workmen’s compensation he received’ to avoid double recovery. [Citations.]” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 455.) Woodcock is inapposite.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Martinez v. Rite Aid CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) IV.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCoy v. Gustafson (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the jury was confused by the special verdict form.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.
Cal. · 2009 · confidence medium
We upheld the defendants’ position, finding that, in light of the jury instructions, the verdict was not ambiguous, that it included workers’ compensation payments, and hence that the amount of thé damages awarded was required to be reduced accordingly. ( Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d 452 , 457-459.) Despite arriving at that conclusion, however, we also observed, in dictum, that when a verdict is truly ambiguous, the adversely affected party should request that the trial court act under Code of Civil Procedure section 619 29 to secure from the jury a “ ‘more formal and certain verdict.�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keener v. JELD-WEN, INC.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
There is no waiver of objections to an ambiguous verdict, where a failure to object is not gamesmanship. ( Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 456, 72 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 445 P.2d 881 .) Also, where an inconsistent verdict is rendered that is an impossibility under the facts of the case, such inconsistency can be preserved for consideration on appeal as error, even without an objection. ( Remy v. Exley Produce Exp., Inc. (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 550 , 307 P.2d 65 ( Remy ).) In Henrioulle, supra, 20 Cal.3d 512, 521 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 247 , 573 P.2d 465 , the jury polling revealed that there were at least ni…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Because the $30,000 judgment is reversed for retrial of damages only, the award of prejudgment interest also is reversed, subject to recalculation after the retrial of damages. 4 Code of Civil Procedure section 619 states, “When the verdict is announced, if it is informal or insufficient, in not covering the issue submitted, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the Court, or the jury may be again sent out.” 5 If the verdict is merely ambiguous, a party’s failure to request a correction or clarification of the verdict before the jury is discharged may amount to a waiver of …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hathaway v. Spiro
Cal. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
The court noted that: “Frequently, failure to object to the form of a verdict before the jury is discharged has been held to be a waiver of any defect. [Citations.] However, waiver is not automatic, and there are many exceptions. [Citations.] [|] Waiver is not found where the record indicates that the failure to object was not the result of a desire to reap a ‘technical advantage’ or engage in a ‘litigious strategy.’ [Citations.]” ( 69 Cal.2d at p. 456, fn. 2 .) Here again the facts are not analogous to those in the case at bar.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
Co., 69 Cal.2d 452, 457-458 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 445 P.2d 881 ]; Trelut v. Kazarian, supra, 110 Cal.App.2d 506, 512 .) It has also been recognized that an ambiguity in one instruction may be cured by another more explicit instruction which correctly states the applicable legal principles.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bakity v. County of Riverside
Cal. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
(Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co., 69 Cal.2d 452, 458 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 445 P.2d 881 ].) When the instructions, considered as a whole, state the law fairly and clearly, they are unobjectionable even though, by selecting isolated passages from single instructions, they may in some respects be subject to criticism.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Telles v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
While it is the duty of the trial court to make the judgment conform to the verdict when the intention of the jury is clear from the language of the verdict, considered in connection with the pleadings, the evidence and the instructions (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 445 P.2d 881 ]), the court has no power to make a judgment that does not conform to the intention of the jury.
discussed Cited "see" Humble Fitness Beaumont v. Bedazzling Beaumont CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
(Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 358 [“The proper remedy for an inconsistent special verdict is a new trial”]; see Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 457 [“If the verdict is hopelessly ambiguous, a reversal is required”].) But a potential inconsistency in the special verdict form is not enough to warrant reversal. “‘A special verdict is inconsistent if there is no possibility of reconciling its findings with each other.’” (Fuller v. Department 7 of Transportation (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1038 .) If the spe…
discussed Cited "see" Stanton v. Marques CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: accord · confidence high
Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668, 678 (Horton).) “With a special verdict, unlike a general verdict or a general verdict with special findings, a reviewing court will not infer findings to support the verdict.” (Singh, at p. 358; accord, Horton, at p. 679 [“‘“there is no such presumption in favor of upholding a special verdict”’”].) “Where there is an inconsistency between or among answers within a special verdict, both or all the questions are equally against the law” and “[t]he appellate court is not permitted to choose between inconsistent a…
discussed Cited "see" Ross v. Fox CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
This finding did not convert the general verdict into a special verdict. 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 358 [reviewing special verdict for inconsistency de novo, explaining that “[w]ith a special verdict, unlike a general verdict . . . a reviewing court will not infer findings to support the verdict”].) By contrast, “‘the jury’s general verdict “imports findings in favor of the prevailing party on all material issues; and if the evidence supports implied findings on any set of issues which will sustain the verdict, it will be assumed that the jury so found.”’” (Morin v. ABA Recovery Se…
discussed Cited "see" Ross v. Fox CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
This finding did not convert the general verdict into a special verdict. 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 358 [reviewing special verdict for inconsistency de novo, explaining that “[w]ith a special verdict, unlike a general verdict . . . a reviewing court will not infer findings to support the verdict”].) By contrast, “‘the jury’s general verdict “imports findings in favor of the prevailing party on all material issues; and if the evidence supports implied findings on any set of issues which will sustain the verdict, it will be assumed that the jury so found.”’” (Morin v. ABA Recovery Se…
examined Cited "see" District of Columbia v. Jackson (10×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Woodcock, 72 Cal.Rptr. at 220 , 445 P.2d at 884 . [20] In a case where none of the medical expense has been (or will be) paid by Medicaid, the jury need not make special findings as to the amount of medical expenses awarded as a part of each verdict unless there is some other basis for the District to claim an offset. [1] 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) was modified in 1981.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
WALDO E. WOODCOCK, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FONTANA SCAFFOLDING AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant; ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervener and Respondent
S. F. 22605.
California Supreme Court.
Oct 24, 1968.
445 P.2d 881
Ellwood Hoskins and Cyril Viadro for Defendant and Appellant., Boceardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell, David S. Lull and Edward J. Niland for Plaintiff and Respondent., ' No appearance for Intervener and Respondent.
Peters, McComb.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

PETERS, J.

Plaintiff Waldo E. Woodcock, an employee of Barrett Construction Company, was injured on December 16, 1963, at a construction site in Palo Alto. He commenced this action for damages for personal injuries against Fontana Scaffolding and Equipment Company, alleging that it had negligently stacked a number of metal scaffold frames which had fallen on him.

Fontana Scaffolding denied all material allegations of the complaint, alleged negligence on the part of Barrett Construction Company, and claimed a setoff of the workmen’s compensation benefits Woodcock had received. Argonaut Insurance Company, Barrett’s workmen’s compensation carrier, filed a $4,311.76 lien against any recovery under Labor Code section 3856, and intervened to protect its claim.

The cause was tried by a jury. After instructing on the law of negligence, the trial judge explained the interest of the intervener. “Plaintiff has received certain sums to wit, $4,311.76 as and for workmen’s compensation benefits from the Argonaut Insurance Company, which carried workmen’s compensation insurance for his employer, the Barrett Construction Company. If you find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Waldo E. Woodcock, the Argonaut Insurance Company may or may not be entitled to reimbursement from any such verdict. If you find that plaintiff’s employer, Barrett Construction Company, was negligent in providing for the safety of its employees and that such negligence was a proxi[*455] mate contributing cause of the injury in question to the plaintiff, then, the Argonaut Insurance Company will not be entitled to reimbursement from any such verdict. ’ ’

After completing instructions relative to the intervener’s claim, the judge expounded on the proper form for the verdict. “Now, if you determine that the plaintiff is entitled to recover against the defendant, then, you will determine the full amount of the damages and insert it in that blank there. Do not subtract this other compensation claim. You determine the whole amount of the damages. The Court will determine the other situation.” (Italics added.)

The jury returned a verdict and special finding which recited : “We, the jury in the above-entitled cause, find a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Waldo E. Woodcock, and against the Defendant, Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Company, a corporation, and assess the Plaintiff’s damages in the sum of $13,000.00. We further find that the Plaintiff’s injury was proximately contributed to by the negligence of the plaintiff’s employer, Barrett Construction Company.”[1] Judgment was entered in the full amount of the verdict. Woodcock moved for a new trial because of inadequate damages, and Fontana Scaffolding moved to correct the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 663, contending that $4,311.76 previously paid as workmen’s compensation benefits should have been deducted from the judgment. All motions were denied, and Fontana Scaffolding appealed.

The heart of this controversy is the question whether “damages in the sum of $13,000.00” represents the total or gross amount of damages to plaintiff or a reduced or net amount of damages after exclusion of the payments made to plaintiff by intervener. If $13,000 represents the whole amount of damages, then Woodcock’s “damages must be reduced by the amount of workmen’s compensation he received” to avoid double recovery. (Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.2d 57, 73 [17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641]; see Smith v. Trapp, [*456] 249 Cal.App.2d 929 [58 Cal.Rptr. 229]; Souza v. Pratico, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 651; Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co., 235 Cal.App2d 485 [45 Cal.Rptr. 454]; Castro v. Fowler Equipment Co., 233 Cal.App.2d 416 [43 Cal.Rptr. 589]; Conner v. Utah Constr. & Min. Co., 231 Cal.App.2d 263 [41 Cal. Rptr. 728]; Dauer v. Aerojet General Corp., 224 Cal.App.2d 175 [36 Cal.Rptr. 356]; Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal.App.2d 238 [28 Cal.Rptr. 548]; Chick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.2d 201 [25 Cal.Rptr. 725]; City of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 205 Cal.App.2d 398 [23 Cal.Rptr. 43].)

Standing alone, the verdict is ambiguous in not specifying whether the $13,000 represents the gross or net amount of damages. “If the verdict is ambiguous the party adversely affected should request a more formal and certain verdict. Then, if the trial judge has any doubts on the subject, he may send the jury out, under proper instructions, to correct the informal or insufficient verdict.” (Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 263; Phipps v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App.2d 371, 374-375 [89 P.2d 698] ; Code Civ. Proc., §619.)[2] But where no objection is made before the jury is discharged, it falls to “the trial judge to interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.” (Fer[*457] nandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 263; West v. Duncan, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d 140, 142.) Where the trial judge does not interpret the verdict or interprets it erroneously, an appellate court will interpret the verdict if it is possible to give a correct interpretation. (Mix-on v. Riverview Hospital, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 364, 374; Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.2d 231, 234; Weddle v. Loges, 52 Cal.App.2d 115, 118-119 [125 P.2d 914] ; cf. 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op.cit. supra, § 92 et seq., p. 1821 et seq.) If the verdict is hopelessly ambiguous, a reversal is required, although retrial may be limited to the issue of damages. (West v. Duncan, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d 140, 144; Shell v. Schmidt, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 294; Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 267.)

By denying defendant’s motion to correct the judgment and enter a new judgment, the trial judge interpreted the verdict’s award of $13,000 as representing the net or reduced amount of damages after exclusion of the workmen’s compensation benefits previously paid to plaintiff. This controversy is thus limited to the narrow question of whether the instructions support the trial judge’s interpretation.

The few instructions which weigh in favor of the trial court’s interpretation relate to damages. “If you find in favor of the plaintiff in this action, then, in determining the amount of the award, you shall take into consideration the following items of damages, if any: The reasonable value, not exceeding the cost to plaintiff, of the examinations, attention, and care by physicians . . . the reasonable value, not exceeding the cost to plaintiff, of the services of nurses. . . . [T]he loss which the evidence shows with reasonable certainty to have been suffered by him [Woodcock] as a result of his inability, if any, to pursue these occupations as a result of his disability, . . .” (Italics added.) (Compare BAJI Nos. 174-A, 174-D (identical medical expense instructions), 174-F (similar loss of earnings instruction).)

[*458] Without reference to the other instructions, these instructions are ambiguous insofar as they may suggest that the jury should determine a net cost to plaintiff for the elements covered.[3] However, the instructions cannot be read in k vacuum. They must be read with the other instructions. (Porter v. Bakersfield & Kern Elec. Ry. Co., 36 Cal.2d 582, 589 [225 P.2d 223]). The other instructions make it abundantly clear that a net figure was not desired.

Initially, the court cautioned: “Neither the allegations in the complaint as to the amount of damage plaintiff claims to have been suffered nor the prayer asking for certain compensation is to be considered by you in arriving at your verdict, except in this one respect: The amount of damages alleged in the complaint does fix a maximum limit, ...” It .then ordered: ‘ ‘ Now, if you determine that the plaintiff is entitled to recover against the defendant, then, you will determine the full amount of the damages and insert it in that blank there. Do not subtract this other compensation claim. You determine the whole amount of the damages. The Court will determine the other situation. ’ ’ (Italics added.)[4]

This last instruction is most significant because it relates to the form of the verdict and the mechanics of entering a dollar amount. It clearly and without ambiguity shows that the jury was directed to enter a gross figure. When read together with this instruction, earlier references to “cost” become comprehensible only as setting a maximum dollar limit equivalent to the total dollar amount charged for services, whether or not a larger charge might have been reasonable and justified. Keferences to “loss” become, in context, directives to fix the[*459] amount of injury or detriment without regard to the payment of workmen’s compensation.

Moreover, it is in this basic instruction, for the first time, that the trial judge indicated to the jury that plaintiff’s total damages would be reduced by the amount of workmen’s compensation he had received whether or not Barrett was found negligent. In other words, this was the first indication that plaintiff would receive a “net” amount even if Argonaut’s claim failed, and the revelation was contained in the injunction: “Bo not subtract this other compensation claim.’’’

Plaintiff argues that those instructions explaining that Argonaut could not recover if Barrett were found negligent indicated to the jury that they should return a net dollar amount. As noted, the jury’s only intimation that plaintiff would ultimately receive a net amount was contained in a directive to ignore that fact in assessing damages. Accordingly, the information regarding Argonaut’s rights in relation to Barrett’s culpability plainly did not have the effect suggested.

In summary, the pivotal instruction in this case is the one which commanded the jury to “determine the full amount of the damages.” It illuminates the content of both the verdict and the prior damages instructions, and dispels the ambiguity which appears when the verdict and instructions are read separately. The trial judge wrongly interpreted the verdict which was, in light of all the circumstances, unequivocal. His action was error, and the judgment in favor of plaintiff for $13,000 must be vacated, and a new judgment entered in the amount of $8,688.24, reflecting a reduction of $4,311.76 for workmen’s compensation benefits previously paid.

This order is without prejudice to a renewal by plaintiff of his motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages.[5] Where an appellate court vacates a[*460] judgment for plaintiff with directions to enter a new judgment in a greater amount, the defendant may move for a new trial after entry of the new judgment. (Bond v. United Railroads, 169 Cal. 273, 276 [146 P. 688] ; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, p. 2076; cf. Avery v. Associated Seed Growers, Inc., 211 Cal.App.2d 613, 631-633 [27 Cal.Rptr. 625].) Where the appellate court directs entry of judgment in an amount less than the original judgment, the same rule obviously applies. The plaintiff should be given an opportunity to move for a new trial after entry of the new judgment. In both situations, a party who may have been satisfied with the original judgment may in reliance upon it refrain from seeking a new trial or appealing or may have had his motion for new trial denied on the ground that the original judgment was sufficiently favorable to him. The judgment directed by the appellate court is less favorable to him, and he should be permitted to determine whether to seek a new trial and to have a motion for new trial considered in the light of the new judgment.

The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $8,688.24. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

Traynor, C. J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

1

Argonaut filed a complaint in intervention, and was accordingly entitled to a formal, separate verdict. (See Lab. Code, § 3852; Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 265 [255 P.2d 863].) The court did not submit a form which provided for such a verdict. Argonaut did not object, and Argonaut was the only party in a position to complain. (Of. 2 Within, Cal. Procedure (1954) Trial, § 88, pp. 1817-1818.) The general verdict-special finding procedure utilized by the court would appear to have been otherwise proper and not atypical. (See Souza v. Pratico, 245 Cal.App.2d 651, 653-654 [54 Cal.Rptr. 159].)

2

Frequently, failure to object to the form of a verdict before the jury is discharged has been held to be a waiver of any defect. (E.g., Lynch v. Birdwell, 44 Cal.2d 839, 851 [285 P.2d 919]; Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal.2d 519, 523-524 [75 P.2d 1063]; Fransen v. Washington, 229 Cal.App.2d 570, 574 [40 Cal.Rptr. 458]; County of Humboldt v. Shelly, 220 Cal.App.2d 194, 200 [33 Cal.Rptr. 758]; Fairfield v. Hamilton, 206 Cal.App.2d 594, 605 [24 Cal.Rptr. 73]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, § 97, pp. 1825-1827.) However, waiver is not automatic, and there are many exceptions. (E.g., Aynes v. Winans, 33 Cal.2d 206, 209 [200 P.2d 533]; Mixon v. Riverview Hospital, 254 Cal.App.2d 364, 376-377 [62 Cal.Rptr. 379]; Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, 215 Cal.App.2d 231, 234 [30 Cal.Rptr. 71]; West v. Duncan, 205 Cal.App.2d 140, 141-142 [22 Cal. Rptr. 833]; Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 293-294 [272 P.2d 82].)

Waiver is not found where the record indicates that the failure to object was not the result of a desire to reap a “technical advantage” or engage in a “litigious strategy.” (Phipps v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 371, 375; Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.2d 231, 234.) Thus, in Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 262-263, where plaintiff sought damages for negligence and the intervener sought reimbursement for its workmen’s compensation payments to plaintiff, the jury verdict was ambiguous when it awarded $50,000 to plaintiff and $8,813.87 to intervener without specifying whether the $50,000 represented the total amount of damages or a net sum to plaintiff. A more certain verdict was not requested. The court, weighing the merits, concluded that the trial judge had properly inter[*457] preted the verdict. In a Fernandez situation, as in many other eases, waiver is not an issue where a defect is latent and there is no hint of ‘‘ litigious strategy. ’ ’

There was no waiver here because, in light of the instructions, the verdict was not ambiguous. (See infra.) Accordingly, there was nothing to clarify. But even if the verdict were ambiguous, there is no hint of a purpose to achieve a "technical advantage” or fulfill a "litigious strategy,” and defendant should not be estopped to make his objections.

3

Authority, however, undermines such an interpretation. In Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 266-267, the court held that it was error to give a loss of earnings instruction similar to the one quoted above. In that case, the jury segregated damages to plaintiff and indemnity to his employer. The court held that the instruction was improper because it suggested that plaintiff could recover a gross amount, with the result that the defendant would be charged twice for the same injuries.

4

This instruction, by providing for a determination of the whole amount of damages, represents one of several acceptable procedures by which the trial judge could have effected a “segregation of items of damage so as to prevent a double recovery against the tort feasor.” (Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 254, 265; see Eckman v. Arnold Taxi Co., 64 Cal.App.2d 229, 235 [148 P.2d 677] ; cf. Sherrillo v. Stone Webster Engineering Corp., 110 Cal.App.2d 785, 789-790 [244 P.2d 70] ; Huber v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 71 Cal.App.2d 278, 285 [162 P.2d 693].)

5

In considering the motion to reduce the judgment by Fontana Scaffolding and plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, the trial court stated, “I will let the record show that I am going to deny the motion for a new trial of the plaintiff on the ground of inadequacy of damages on the assumption that the §13,000 that the jury awarded him, plus the §4,000 workmen’s compensation that he received, somewhere around §17,000, is a fair and adequate recovery, and if on appeal [Fontana Scaffolding] should prevail ... it should be retried also on the question of damages . . . .”

Plaintiff did not appeal, and we may not consider on this appeal the issue whether the damages are inadequate. (Harris v. National Union etc. Cooks & Stewards, 116 Cal.App.2d 759, 764 [254 P.2d 673].)

Dissent

McCOMB, J.

I dissent. I would affirm the judgment.

The petition of the plaintiff and respondent for a rehearing was denied November 20, 1968, and the judgment was modified to read as printed above.