United States v. Berkowitz
A district court may transfer a civil action under section 1404(a) even in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The United States filed a tax collection suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but the defendant, a New York resident, moved to quash service. The district court denied the government's motion to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), reasoning that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Third Circuit addresses whether a district court may transfer a civil action under § 1404(a) when it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Applying the rationale of Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, the court holds that personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite for transfer under § 1404(a). The court reverses the district court's order denying transfer and remands for further proceedings, finding the order appealable due to its finality in terminating the lawsuit.
At page 361Transfer authority under section 1404(a) despite lack of personal jurisdiction63 citing cases“are companion sections, remedial in nature, enacted at the same time, and both dealing with the expeditious transfer of an action from one district or division to another.”
- Southard v. Kipper Tool Co., No. 3:15-cv-03621-JSC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2023).(holding Goldlawr applies equally to 1404(1) 23 transfers)
- E. Controls, Inc. v. Borysowski, No. 1:22-cv-00096 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2022).Section 1404(a) and 1406 “are companion sections, remedial in nature, enacted at the same time, and both dealing with the expeditious transfer of an action from one district or division to another.” U.S. v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d…
- Thar Process, Inc. v. Sound Wellness, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00945 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2021).(finding the Supreme Court’s Goldlawr rationale permitting transfer under section 1406(a), equally applicable to section 1404(a))
- Thar Process, Inc. v. Sound Wellness, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00422 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021).(finding the Supreme Court’s Goldlawr rationale permitting transfer under section 1406(a), equally applicable to section 1404(a))
- G&C Fab-Con, LLC v. M&S Civil Consultants, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00269 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2021).unpublishedNov. 19, 2007) (citing United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964)).
- G&C Fab-con, LLC v. M & S Civil Consultants, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-08425, 2021 WL 268177 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2021).unpublishedNov. 19, 2007) (citing United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964)).
- DiaMedica Therapeutics, Inc. v. PRA Health Sciences, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-01318 (D. Del. Sept. 21, 2020).D.I. 46 at 8 (citing United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964)).
- Canca v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-12318 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2020).United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 , 466–67 (1962)).
- Williams v. Hon. Warrant Issuing Judge, No. 1:16-cv-00115 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2020).United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964). 19 survive review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) and 1915A is deferred to that court; and it is further ORDERED that Williams’s second motion to amend his complaint, Docket It…
- Geraci v. Red Robin Int'l, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-15542, 2019 WL 2574976 (D.N.J. June 24, 2019).United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3rd Cir. 1964) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962)).
Show 50 more citing cases
- Al-Ghena Int'l Corp. v. Radwan, 957 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D.N.J. 2013).published(The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases ... whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.)
- Cumberland Truck Equip. Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Pa. 2005).published(extending Goldlawr rationale to venue transfers under § 1404(a))
- CIBC World Markets, Inc. v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.N.J. 2004).publishedGeorge's School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539 , 544 (3d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1964). 18 . § 78aa provides, in relevant part process in [any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this…
- In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000, 257 F. Supp. 2d 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).publishedSong of Norway, 572 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1964).
- Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999).publishedSee Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 , 82 S.Ct. 913 , 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1964). 8 .Admittedly, that preference has been thrown into doubt in recent years.
- Rappoport v. Steven Spielberg, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D.N.J. 1998).publishedBank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225 , 231 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1964); Telesis Mergers & Acquisitions, Inc. v. Atlis Fed.
- Exton v. Our Farm, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 432 (D.N.J. 1996).publishedThomas v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir.1995); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164-65 (3d Cir.1980), rev’d on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 , 102 S.Ct. 252 , 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1982); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361…
- Kitces v. Wood, 917 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.J. 1996).publishedGeorge’s School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539 , 544 (3d Cir.1985); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); Database America v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publ…
- Telesis Mergers & Acquisitions, Inc. v. Atlis Fed. SVCS, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1996).publishedBank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 231 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Co…
- Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ'g Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1993).publishedGoldlawr, 369 U.S. at 465-66, 82 S.Ct. at 915; see also Carteret, 919 F.2d at 231; United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964).
- Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ'g Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1195 (D.N.J. 1993).publishedBank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225 , 231 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964).
- Abdulghani v. Virgin Islands Seaplane Shuttle, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 113 (D.V.I. 1990).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 821 (1964).
- Bakaj v. Arthur Levine, 733 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1990).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); see also Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 , 82 S.Ct. 913, 916 , 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962).
- Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705 (D.N.J. 1989).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3rd Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964).
- Datasouth Comput. Corp. v. Three Dimensional Tech., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 446 (W.D.N.C. 1989).publishedId.; Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514, 516-517 (4th Cir.1955); Ulman v. Boulevard Enters., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 813 , 815 & n. 7 (D.Md.1986) (“Where personal jurisdiction is lacking but venue is present, the original forum…
- Buckley v. Bourdon, 682 F. Supp. 95 (D.N.H. 1988).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); Koehring v. Hyde Const. Co., 324 F.2d 295, 297-98 (5th Cir.1963), cf. Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 , 82 S.Ct. 913…
- Beh v. Ostergard, 657 F. Supp. 173 (D.N.M. 1987).publishedSee, e.g., Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164-165 (3d Cir.1980) rev’d on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 , 102 S.Ct. 252 , 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1982); Torres v. Torres, 603 F.Supp. 440, 442 (D.N.Y.1985); Welsh v. Cunara Lines, Ltd., 595…
- Shaw v. Boyd, 658 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1987).publishedSong of Norway, 572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.1978) (lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants does not preclude transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a)); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct.…
- Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1985).published Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164-65 (3d Cir.1980), rev’d on other grounds 454 U.S. 235 , 102 S.Ct. 252 , 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), reh’g denied 455 U.S. 928 , 102 S.Ct. 1296 , 71 L.Ed.2d 474 (1982); United States v. Berkowitz, 3…
- Nose v. Rementer, 610 F. Supp. 191 (D. Del. 1985).published(D.I. 7 at 4.) Although the court was apparently in error in relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1631 as the basis for its authority to transfer the case, 1 there is no doubt that court had authority to make the transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). 2 S…
- Omni Expl., Inc. v. Graham Eng'g Corp., 562 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1983).publishedU.S. v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164, 165 (3d Cir.), 454 U.S. 235 , 102 S.Ct. 252 , 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (rev’d on…
- Bhd. CIA Naviera S. A. v. Zapata Marine Serv., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1982).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964).
- CES Publ'g Corp. v. Dealerscope, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1982).publishedThe law is clear that I have the power to transfer this action even if there is no personal jurisdiction over Dealerscope, Inc. Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), c…
- Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981).published Although it cited Martin v. Stokes for purposes of comparison, the Third Circuit evidently felt bound by its previous decision in United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2…
- Hilferty v. Neesan, 506 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1980).publishedIn circumstances where venue is proper, but dismissal would cause the termination of an action because of statutes of limitations, courts have permitted transfer U. S. v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964); Corke v. Sameiet M.
- Baron & Co. v. Bank of New Jersey, 497 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1980).published United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964).
- Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980).published United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964). .
- City Partners, Ltd. v. Bradford Co., 484 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Fla. 1980).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3rd Cir. 1964); see Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 815-816 (5th Cir. 1967); Cf. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 , 82 S.Ct. 913 , 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (transfer under section 1406)…
- Coats Co. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1978).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); Shong Ching Lau v. Change, 415 F.Supp. 627, 632 (E.D.
- Kurtz v. Draur, 434 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1977).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964).
- Alfred Gerome Nelson v. Int'l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983).published
- McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513 (D. Md. 1977).published
- Founds v. Shedaker, 278 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1968).published
- Roberts Bros. v. Kurtz Bros., 231 F. Supp. 163 (D.N.J. 1964).published
- Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Allied Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Va. 1970).published
- Wesley v. H & D Wireless Ltd. P'ship, 678 F. Supp. 1540 (D.N.M. 1987).published
- Berkshire Int'l Corp. v. Alba-Waldensian, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).published
- Capitol Cabinet Corp. v. Interior Dynamics, Ltd., 541 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).published
- Celanese Corp. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 410 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1976).published
- US Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Boran, 716 F. Supp. 505 (D. Kan. 1988).published
- Carney v. Bill Head Trucking, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 2000).published
- Gallant v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in New York, 111 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2000).published
- Lomanno v. Black, 285 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Pa. 2003).published
- Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 234 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1964).published
- Roberts Bros. v. Kurtz Bros., 236 F. Supp. 471 (D.N.J. 1964).published
- Thomas v. Silver Creek Coal Co., 264 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Pa. 1967).published
- Auto Equity Loans of Delaware, LLC v. Shapiro, No. 1:18-cv-01470 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2019).
- H C & D LLC v. Cashman Equip. Corp, No. 6:23-cv-01386 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2023).
- HC&D, LLC v. Cashman Equip. Corp., No. 1:22-cv-10224 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2023).
- Fung v. Liberty Univ., No. 6:25-cv-00058 (W.D. Va. July 18, 2025).unpublished
At page 360Interlocutory orders are not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 129111 citing casesallowing appeal from a refusal to transfer venue because the order effectively terminated the plaintiffs lawsuit
- In re Donn Kemble, Debtor. Packerland Packing Co., Inc., a Wisconsin Corp. v. Griffith Brokerage Co., & Donn Kemble, 776 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1985).published (allowing appeal from a refusal to transfer venue because the order effectively terminated the plaintiffs lawsuit)
- Kathleen McCullough v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probatio, No. 20-2473 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2020).unpublished([B]ecause [orders either granting or denying a motion to transfer] are interlocutory in character, they are not appealable as ‘final decisions’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .)
- Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1990).published Thus, in United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 360 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964), orders denying transfer were immediately appealable because the transferor court lacked jurisdiction over th…
- Weber v. McDonald's Sys. of Eur., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 10 (D. Del. 1985).publishedUnited States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 360 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 , 85 S.Ct. 42 , 13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964). 8 .
- Welsh v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 595 F. Supp. 844 (D. Ariz. 1984).publishedSong of Norway, 572 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1978); Aguacate Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 360-61 (3d Cir.1963) cert. denied 379 U.S. 821, 85 S.Ct. 42 , 1…
- Lasseigne v. Nigerian Gulf Oil Co., 397 F. Supp. 465 (D. Del. 1975).publishedCf. United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1964).
- Fred Fischer v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, Omaha, 466 F.2d 511 (1st Cir. 1972).published
- Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1972).published
- Kaiser v. Mayo Clinic, 260 F. Supp. 900 (D. Minn. 1966).published
- Hugo Stinnes Steel & Metals Co. v. Oldendorff, 372 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Ga. 1974).published
At page 358“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”1 citing case
- Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999).publishedSee Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 , 82 S.Ct. 913 , 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1964). 8 .Admittedly, that preference has been thrown into doubt in recent years.
v.
Morton BERKOWITZ UNITED STATES of America v. Honorable Joseph S. LORD, III, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
The United States filed a civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to recover taxes it alleged were due and owing from the defendant, Morton Berkowitz. The complaint averred that a penalty assessment in the amount of $63,653.73 had been made against the defendant on May 31, 1956, because he was a responsible officer of a corporation which had become delinquent in the payment of withholding taxes. The suit was filed on May 14, 1962, just seventeen days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6502(a) (1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6502 (a) (1). A copy of the complaint and summons were served upon an individual at the Philadelphia address of the defendant as shown in the records of the Internal Revenue Service.[1] ****There-after, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the return of summons on the grounds that he was a resident and citizen of the state of New York and had not been properly served with process. The motion was supported by an affidavit stating that he had resided in New York since January of 1960 and had abandoned both his Philadelphia residence and his intention to make that residence his domicile.
Since the period provided in the statute of limitations had by this time expired, the Government filed a motion to transfer the action to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). That section provides:
“§ 1404. Change of venue
“(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”
The district court determined that it had no power to effect a transfer under § 1404(a) because it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 214 F.Supp. 579 (E.D.Pa., 1962). The court acknowledged that this had been held immaterial in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962), but it limited that decision to transfers under § 1406(a). Accordingly, an order was entered denying the motion to transfer and granting the motion of the defendant to quash the return of process.
Subsequently, the United States filed another motion to transfer, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). That section provides :
“§ 1406. Cure or waiver of defects
“(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a ease laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”
The district court reasoned that because the tax liability arose in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and as the tax returns were filed there, venue was properly laid in that district under 28 U.S.C. § 1396.[2] The court concluded that the action could not be transferred under § 1406(a) which, by its terms, is applicable to a case laying venue in the wrong[*360] division or district. 215 F.Supp. 615 (E.D.Pa., 1963).
[*359] “Any civil action for the collection of internal revenue taxes may be brought in the district where the liability for such tax accrues, in the district of the taxpayer’s residence, or in the district where the return was filed.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1396.
[*360] The Government filed timely notices of appeal from each of these orders and, as a precautionary measure, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to exercise its discretion to transfer this action. We granted a rule to show cause on this petition and consolidated it with the proceedings on the appeals.
We are faced with the threshold question of whether we have jurisdiction to review the orders of the district court by way of appeal. Several decisions of this court, as well as those of other circuits, have held that an order either granting or denying a motion to transfer is not appealable. Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (C.A.3, 1962) ; All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (C.A.3, 1952); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953, 71 S.Ct. 572, 95 L.Ed. 687 (1951); Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (C.A.6), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821, 79 S.Ct. 34, 3 L.Ed.2d 62 (1958); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (C.A.2), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851, 71 S.Ct. 79, 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950). Of course, the rationale underlying these decisions is that because such orders are interlocutory in character they are not appealable as “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and are not within the class of decisions made appealable by 28 U.S.C. § 1292. However, the orders denying transfer in the case at bar are unique, for they effectively terminate this lawsuit: the action in the Eastern District cannot be further prosecuted since the defendant cannot be properly served there, and the defendant can assert the statute of limitations as a defense to a new suit elsewhere. Though the district court has not dismissed the complaint, it has quashed the return of process in the first of its orders denying transfer. Thus, under the circumstances here, these orders have “sufficient indicia of finality for us to hold that the judgment is properly appealable at this time.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 308, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1514, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962).[3] See also Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229 (1963); Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527, 529, n. 2 (C.A.3, 1961), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 369 U.S. 659, 82 S.Ct. 1035, 8 L.Ed.2d 273 (1962).
On the merits, the Government argues that under the decision of the Supreme Court in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962), jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to the power of the district court to transfer this case either pursuant to § 1406(a) or under § 1404(a). The major portion of the argument is devoted to § 1406(a), although it is recognized that the finding of the district court that venue was properly laid in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania presents a serious obstacle to transfer under that section. However, the Government urges that though venue is technically proper in the Eastern District, this is nonetheless “a case laying venue in the wrong division or district” within the meaning of § 1406(a), because[*361] the defendant is not amenable to service there.
We find it unnecessary to consider the Government’s novel and intricate contention that venue may be properly laid in a district and, yet, the case may be one “laying venue in the wrong district” under § 1406(a), for we think that § 1404(a) clearly authorizes the transfer of this civil action. As we have seen, that section provides that for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, an action may be transferred to any district where it might have been brought. The district court believed that it was without power to transfer this case under § 1404(a) in the absence of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. But Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, supra, conclusively settled that question. It is true that Goldlawr involved an interpretation of § 1406(a). Nevertheless, we think that its rationale applies equally to § 1404(a), for these are companion sections, remedial in nature, enacted at the same time, and both dealing with the expeditious transfer of an action from one district or division to another. See Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (C.A.4, 1955). As the Supreme Court observed in Goldlawr:
“The language of § 1406 (a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not. The section is thus in accord with the general purpose which has prompted many of the procedural changes of the past few years — that of removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies on their merits.” 369 U.S. at 466-467, 82 S.Ct. at 916, 8 L.Ed.2d 39.
Of course, this does not mean that this action must be transferred; we hold only that the district court has power to do so if it determines that the considerations set forth in § 1404(a) warrant transfer in the circumstances of this case.
The motions of the defendant to dismiss the appeals as well as the Government’s petition for a writ of mandamus will be denied. The order of the district court denying transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) will be reversed and it, together with the order denying transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
The defendant states that he had formerly resided at this address with his sister. The return on the service of the writ indicates that it was served on his brother-in-law at that address.
“§ 1398. Internal revenue taxes
Because the Government has filed a precautionary petition for a writ of mandamus, the foregoing discussion as to the mode of our review is, in large measure, academic since we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the controversy in any event. In this regard, compare Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (C.A.4, 1955), where review was sought solely by way of mandamus. In response to a contention that review should have been by appeal, Judge Parker noted that no order of dismissal had been entered and said:
“ * * * We think, however, it would be an idle formality fraught with unnecessary delay to dismiss the present application or merely direct the entry of an order of dismissal so that libellants might appeal from it. We think that we should come at once to the real question at issue in the case so that the litigation may go forward without needless delay. We can do this because of our power to issue the writ of mandamus in aid of our appellate jurisdiction * * 218 F.2d at 517.