Black & White Child. of Pontiac Sch. Sys. v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Black & White Child. of Pontiac Sch. Sys. v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972).
Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 71-1845Jul 20, 1972

Black & White Child. of Pontiac Sch. Sys. v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972)

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42 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Cited for
At page 1030Proper relief for unanticipated problems in court orders3 citing cases“the proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court's order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal case.”1 citing court quotes it
  • Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).published 2 cites
    (The proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court's order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal case.)
  • JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 505 F. App'x 430 (6th Cir. 2012).unpublished
    (applying collateral attack doctrine to bar a complaint because it was filed as “an attempt collaterally to attack” an order entered in “the principal case” handled by the same judge)
  • Oburn v. Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1975).published
    The proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court’s order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal case. 464 F.2d at 1030.
Other citing cases14 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
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Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
BLACK AND WHITE CHILDREN OF the PONTIAC SCHOOL SYSTEM, a class of
v.
The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF PONTIAC, a Public Body Corporate of the State of Michigan, Dana P. Whitmer, Superintendent of Schools, School District of the City of Pontiac
No. 71-1845.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Jul 20, 1972.
Published opinion
464 F.2d 1030
1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8317
Parvin Lee, Jr., Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants; Charles J. Porter, Bloomfield Hills, Mich., of counsel., Robert E_ Manley; Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants-appellees; Beirne, Wirthlin & Manley) Cincinnati, Ohio, Dudley & Patterson, Harold W. Dudley and William R. Lightbody, Pontiac, Mich., of counsel.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Citer courts: Fifth Circuit (2)
PER CURIAM

_ Plaintiffs in this case sought an injunction restraining the School District the City of Pontiac from transporting children, pursuant to an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, Inc., 309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D.Mich.1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 233, 30 L.Ed.2d 186 (1971).

The complaint was referred to the same District Judge who had entered the order, the effect of which this suit sought to enjoin; and after oral argument, he dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ suit was an attempt collaterally to attack the desegregation order entered in the principal case.

We affirm.

Plainly, plaintiffs have mistaken their remedy. Most of their briefing and argument alleges difficulties in the earrying out of the desegregation order involved in the principal ease. The District Court has maintained jurisdiction of the case. The proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court’s order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal ease.

[*1031] Dealing with a very similar argument, this court recently said:

“The District Court order in this case specifically retained jurisdiction. Thus, upon our affirmance, the door of the District Court is clearly open (as it has been!) to the parties to present any unanticipated problems (not resulting from failure to comply with its order) which may have arisen or may arise in the future.” Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville, Tennessee, 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972).

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.