Black & White Child. of Pontiac Sch. Sys. v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972)
At page 1030Proper relief for unanticipated problems in court orders3 citing cases“the proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court's order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal case.”
- Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).published (The proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court's order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal case.)
- JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 505 F. App'x 430 (6th Cir. 2012).unpublished(applying collateral attack doctrine to bar a complaint because it was filed as “an attempt collaterally to attack” an order entered in “the principal case” handled by the same judge)
- Oburn v. Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1975).publishedThe proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court’s order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal case. 464 F.2d at 1030.
Other citing cases
- Meek v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 985 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1993).published
- Evelyn Marino v. Juan U. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986).published
- Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).published
- United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 654 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1981).unpublished
- New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church v. New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ., 654 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1981).published
- Glenn N. HEFNER v. NEW ORLEANS Pub. Serv., INC., 605 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1979).published
- Murphy v. Bd. of Educ., 455 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mo. 1978).published
- Tel. Workers Union, Local 827 v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 450 F. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1977).published
- Pennell v. Collector of Revenue, 703 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1989).published
- Mann v. City of Albany, 687 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Ga. 1988).published
Show 4 more citing cases
- United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983).published
- Kenneth Adams v. Terrel H. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983).published
- Soc'y Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1980).published
- Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975).published
v.
The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF PONTIAC, a Public Body Corporate of the State of Michigan, Dana P. Whitmer, Superintendent of Schools, School District of the City of Pontiac
_ Plaintiffs in this case sought an injunction restraining the School District the City of Pontiac from transporting children, pursuant to an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, Inc., 309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D.Mich.1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 233, 30 L.Ed.2d 186 (1971).
The complaint was referred to the same District Judge who had entered the order, the effect of which this suit sought to enjoin; and after oral argument, he dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ suit was an attempt collaterally to attack the desegregation order entered in the principal case.
We affirm.
Plainly, plaintiffs have mistaken their remedy. Most of their briefing and argument alleges difficulties in the earrying out of the desegregation order involved in the principal ease. The District Court has maintained jurisdiction of the case. The proper avenue for relief if there were unanticipated problems which had developed in the carrying out of the court’s order, was an application to intervene and a motion for additional relief in the principal ease.
[*1031] Dealing with a very similar argument, this court recently said:
“The District Court order in this case specifically retained jurisdiction. Thus, upon our affirmance, the door of the District Court is clearly open (as it has been!) to the parties to present any unanticipated problems (not resulting from failure to comply with its order) which may have arisen or may arise in the future.” Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville, Tennessee, 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972).
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.