Robert W. Stark, Jr. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 466 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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Robert W. Stark, Jr. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 466 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
68 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Donald J. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG (ca2, 2019-12-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Donald J. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG
2d Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Three years later, in Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, 466 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1972), we shortened the formulation to just “serious questions going to the merits.” Id. at 744.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust
E.D.N.Y · 1984 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund
N.D.N.Y. · 1984 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) TIME-DC v. NY St. Teamsters Conf. Pen. & Ret.
N.D.N.Y. · 1984 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rockwell International Systems, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Citibank, N.A. And Bank Tejarat, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees
2d Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr. Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam), we do not think it is necessary for Rockwell to show that without an injunction “rigor mortis [would] set in forthwith.” Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir.1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. Corp.
2d Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Forts v. Malcolm
S.D.N.Y. · 1977 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dellwood Foods, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1976 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McIntyre v. New York City Department of Correction
S.D.N.Y. · 1976 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FRA S. P. A. v. Surg-O-Flex of America, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1975 · confidence medium
Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir.1972); Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 405 F.2d at 323 ; Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 346 F.Supp. 1256, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
2d Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
For example, in Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, 466 F.2d 743 (2 Cir. 1972), we recently stated: “Appellants assumed the burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable injury or that they had raised serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor.” 466 F.2d at 744.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., and Third-Party v. Charles G. Bluhdorn, Third-Party and Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., Third-Party
2d Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
For example, in Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, 466 F.2d 743 (2 Cir. 1972), we recently stated: 20 "Appellants assumed the burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable injury or that they had raised serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor." 466 F.2d at 744. 21 And in Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969), the standard which we find particularly applicable here was set forth as follows: 22 "The purpose of a preliminary …
cited Cited "see" Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,498 Manes Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 743 , 744 (2 Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited "see" General Host Corporation v. Triumph American, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 476 F.2d 687 , at 692, 2 Cir., March 12, 1973, quoting Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, 466 F.2d 743 , 744 (2 Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n
2d Cir. · 1972 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, 466 F.2d 743 , 744 (2 Cir.1972); Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Dino DeLaurentiis Cinematografica, S.p.A, v. D-150, Inc., 366 F.2d 373, 375 (2 Cir.1966).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Association, International
2d Cir. · 1972 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Stark v. New York Stock Exchange, 466 F.2d 743 , 744 (2 Cir.1972); Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Dino DeLaurentiis Cinematografica, S.p.A. v. D-150, Inc., 366 F.2d 373, 375 (2 Cir.1966). 14 The requirement that a party seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief necessitates more than a mere showing that the party seeking relief will see its relative position deteriorate.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,607, 1972 Trade Cases P 74,158 Robert w.stark, Jr., Inc., Robert W. Stark, Jr., and Kansas City Securities Corporation
v.
New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
928.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Aug 29, 1972.
466 F.2d 743
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published

466 F.2d 743

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,607, 1972 Trade Cases P 74,158
ROBERT W.STARK, JR., INC., Robert
W. Stark, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Kansas City
Securities Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 928, Docket 72-1810.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued Aug. 14, 1972.
Decided Aug. 29, 1972.

George D. Reycraft, New York City (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, P. Jay Flocken and Haven C. Roosevelt, New York City, on brief), for plaintiffs- appellants.

William E. Jackson, New York City (Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Floyd E.Brandow, Jr., and Isaac Shapiro, New York City, on brief), for defendant-appellee New York Stock Exchange, Inc.

Alan Blank, Sp. Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. (Walter P.North, Acting Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C., on brief), for Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae.

Before MANSFIELD and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges and GURFEIN, District Judge.[*]

PER CURIAM:

[*~743]1

On July 6, 1972 the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange (Exchange), following a hearing in accordance with its Constitution, unanimously voted to expel from Exchange membership Robert W. Stark, Jr., a member, and Robert W. Stark, Jr., Inc., a member corporation. The expulsion arose out of a recapitalization of Stark, Inc. by Kansas City Securities Corporation (KCSC) in violation of the Exchange's Rule 318, which imposes upon members a "parent test" designed to limit membership to organizations having as their primary purpose the transaction of business as brokers or dealers in securities. The effect of the rule has been to preclude membership that would enable institutions affiliated with a member to recapture commissions. KCSC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Waddell & Reed, Inc., an investment advisor, which in turn is wholly owned by Continental Investment Corp., a holding company that owns or controls various subsidiaries engaged in financial or related activities, including mutual funds.

2

On June 15, 1972 plaintiffs commenced an action against the Exchange for treble damages and injunctive relief alleging among other things that they had been excluded from membership through discriminatory rules and regulations in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, Sherman Act Secs. 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1, 2. On July 20, 1972, 346 F.Supp. 217 the district court denied preliminary injunctive relief as to Stark, Inc. but granted a preliminary injunction as to Stark individually, restraining the Exchange from taking action pending trial to implement its order expelling him from membership. Stark, Inc. and Stark individually appealed.[1] We affirm.

3

Reversal would be warranted only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the district court. Appellants assumed the burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable injury or that they had raised serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999, 89 S.Ct. 1595, 22 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969), Dino deLaurentiis Cinematographica S.p.A. v. D-150 Inc., 366 F.2d 373 (2 Cir. 1966). No such showing has been made here.

4

The district court found that there has been a failure to demonstrate a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits or that appellants will suffer irreparable injury unless preliminary relief is granted. These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Even if this were treated as a government antitrust suit the record before us would not warrant our upsetting the denial of injunctive relief. See, e.g., United States v. International Telephone and Tel. Corp., 306 F.Supp. 766 (D.Conn.1969). Under the district court's order the business of Stark, Inc., which has been derived almost entirely from KCSC, can continue to be carried on by Stark individually, thus permitting any alleged losses to Stark, Inc. to be measured in dollars. Under such circumstances Judge Brieant acted well within the bounds of permissible discretion in denying preliminary relief.

[*~744]5

The order is affirmed.

*

Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation

1

An appeal taken by the Exchange from the order granting partial relief as to Stark individually has not yet been perfected