Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972).
Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 72-1315Dec 29, 1972

Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.

Quick Summary

A district court may exercise discretion to impanel an advisory jury under Rule 39(c) in cases not triable of right by a jury.

A plaintiff brought an individual and class action alleging employment discrimination under Title VII. After the district court found no discrimination occurred and dismissed the individual claim, it dismissed the class action on the grounds that the plaintiff was no longer a proper representative. The plaintiff challenged the use of an advisory jury and the dismissal of the class action. The court held that a district court has the discretion to impanel an advisory jury under Rule 39(c) in cases not triable of right by a jury. Although the plaintiff's individual claim was dismissed, the court remanded the class action with instructions to retain it on the docket for a reasonable time to allow for the presentation of proper claims for relief.

153 citation events (25 in the last 25 years) across 35 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
At page 15Admissibility of eec records and class action requirements49 citing cases“finally adjudged not to be a member of the class he seeks to represent,”1 citing court quotes it · 38 listed here · 1 cautionary
  • Jeanette J. PLUMMER v. W. Int'l HOTELS Co., INC., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981).published Cited "but see" · 2 cites
    But see Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972); Smith, 454 F.2d at 160-61 (Dyer, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
  • Medina v. Dc Gov't, No. 1997-0594 (D.D.C. June 18, 2010).published
    See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 (1984); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 , 74-75 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972).
  • Medina v. Dist. of Columbia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2010).published
    See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 , 105 S.Ct. 525 , 83 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471…
  • B.Y.R.D. v. BT Foods, Inc., 26 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1288 (11th Cir.2008); Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153-54 (7th Cir.1985); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972); Smith v. Universal…
  • McKenzie v. Carroll Int'l Corp., 610 S.E.2d 341 (W. Va. 2004).published
    See Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3rd Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1984); Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d *693 644, 65…
  • Shotwell v. Donahoe, 85 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. 2004).published
    (recognizing a trial court’s discretion over whether EEOC records are admissible)
  • Kimball, Bennett, Brooslin & Pava v. McGahan, 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 562 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003).published
    See id.; Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972).” Although the language of Massachusetts’ Proposed Rule 803(8) tracks the language of the analogous federal rul…
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Ford Motor Co., 98 F.3d 1341 (6th Cir. 1996).unpublished
    (noting that the reasons given to exclude EEOC cause determinations in the Smith dissent were "persuasive)
  • Brown v. Town of Chapel Hill, N.C., 79 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. 1996).unpublished
    Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 , 863 n. 39 (1976); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972).
  • Olson v. Largo-Springhill Ltd. P'ship, 919 F. Supp. 847 (D. Md. 1995).published
    See also Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1979) (“[An administrative agency] has no adjudicative power, and its proceedings are not binding upon the employer.”); Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.197…
Show 28 more citing cases
  • Barfield v. Orange Cnty., 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990).published 2 cites
    See id.; Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972).
  • Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1990).published
    Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848 n. 4 ("While the admission of such findings is within the discretion of the district court ... such findings may be more prejudicial than probative’’); Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972)…
  • William B. Smith v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1989).published
    “the admission of such records is discretionary with the District Court”
  • In re Richard Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1989).published
    See Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir.1978) (allowing counsel a “reasonable time” to find new plaintiffs with live claims); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15-16 (4th Cir.1972) (same).
  • Reed ex rel. Burns v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    Iowa 1974) Under the facts of this case, we need not decide whether to adopt the view, accepted in the Fourth Circuit, see Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir.1978); Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15-16 (4t…
  • Barry S. GOLDBERG v. B. GREEN & Co., INC., 836 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1988).published
    (relying on Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 160 (5th Cir.1972) (Dyer, J., dissenting))
  • Willard M. Mason v. Richmond Motor Co., 825 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1987).unpublished
    Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Company, 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972).
  • Bruce Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).published
    See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 , 105 S.Ct. 525 , 83 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 4…
  • McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 728 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    See Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corporation, 649 F.2d 816 , 821-22 (10th Cir.1981); Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Company, 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972); Heard v. Mueller Company, 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.1972).
  • Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    See Plummer v. Western Int’l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.1981); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972); Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.…
  • Int'l Woodworkers v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1981).published 4 cites
    Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972).
  • Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981).published 2 cites
    See Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977); Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972); Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972).
  • Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978).published 2 cites
    We have decided that point specifically in Cox at p. 15.
  • Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1977).published 2 cites
    In determining that Mrs. Walton's discharge was neither discriminatory nor a reprisal, the district court applied the correct standard of law 8 and its findings of facts were not "clearly erroneous." 9 The same is true of the district cour…
  • Booth v. Prince George's Cnty., 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975).published 2 cites
    The Fourth Circuit suggested a practical alternative in Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1972), where, after finding that the prospective representative in a class action did not have standing to bring the action on b…
  • Tuma v. Am. Can Co., 373 F. Supp. 218 (D.N.J. 1974).published
    Moss v. Lane Co., Inc., 471 F.2d 853, 856 (4th Cir. 1973) ; Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972).
  • Tuma v. Am. Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1973).published
    Moss v. Lane Co., Inc., 471 F.2d 853, 856 (4th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972); Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., 52 F.R.D. 383, 38…
  • Holley v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 846 F. Supp. 2d 416 (E.D.N.C. 2012).published 2 cites
    See id.
  • Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2005).published
    Accord- ingly, Miss Anderson no longer has any valid claims pending in this case.In Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972), and later in Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978), we considered almost the same…
  • Stetter v. Shalala, Sec, 13 F. App'x 79 (4th Cir. 2001).unpublished
    (rejecting admissibility of EEOC investigative report)
  • William Ray JOHNSON v. YELLOW FREIGHT Sys., INC., 734 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1984).published 4 cites
    See Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3d Cir.1977), and Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972).
  • Whatley v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 707 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1983).published
    See Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972); Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 160-61 (5th Cir.1972) (Dyer, Circuit Judge, dissenting); cf. Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., Inc., 479 F.2d 97, 99 (2d C…
  • East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).published
  • Nancy A. GILLIN v. Fed. PAPER Bd. Co., INC., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973).published
  • Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 557 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977).published
  • Nolvert P. SCOTT, Jr. v. Univ. OF DELAWARE, 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1979).published
  • Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 663 F.2d 1268 (4th Cir. 1981).published
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill. 1980).published
At page 14Discretionary use of advisory jury procedure6 citing casesnoting findings of advisory jury are merely advisory and the court must make its own findings1 citing court put it this way
  • Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 531 (M.D.N.C. 2006).published
    (noting findings of advisory jury are merely advisory and the court must make its own findings)
  • Redmond v. State Farm Ins., 728 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 1999).published
    “specifically authorizes a Court in its discretion to employ [an advisory jury] procedure in any case ‘not triable of right by a jury’ and the Court’s exercise of such discretion in these circumstances is not reviewable”
  • Michael E. Hubbard v. Adm'r, Env't Prot. Agency, Michael E. Hubbard v. Env't Prot. Agency, 982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992).published 2 cites
    See Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 379 , 116 L.Ed.2d 330 (1991); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 69, 84 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13,…
  • Cordell TROTTER v. James A. TODD, 719 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1983).published
    Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 14 (4th Cir.1972).
  • Michael E. Hubbard v. Env't Prot. Agency, Michael E. Hubbard v. Adm'r, Env't Prot. Agency, 949 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1992).published 2 cites
    See Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.1991); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 69, 84 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 14 (4th Cir.1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d…
  • Eppard, No. 6:25-cv-00001 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2026).
At page 16Remanding class action to allow new class representatives4 citing casesremanding case back to district court upon dismissal of named plaintiffs ease to permit new class representatives to be selected from the class1 citing court put it this way · 3 listed here
  • Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982).published 2 cites
    See East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 , 97 S.Ct. 1891 , 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977); International Woodworkers v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1270 (4 Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 13…
  • Booth v. Prince George's Cnty., 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975).published 2 cites
    The Fourth Circuit suggested a practical alternative in Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1972), where, after finding that the prospective representative in a class action did not have standing to bring the action on b…
  • Chisolm v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538 (E.D. Va. 2000).published 3 cites
    See Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 432 (7th Cir.1998); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir.1972); Booth v. Prince George’s County, 66 F.R.D. 466, 473 (D.Md.1975).
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Calvin A. COX, Individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated
v.
BABCOCK AND WILCOX COMPANY, a corporation
No. 72-1315.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Dec 29, 1972.
Published opinion
William L. Robinson, New York City (Charles M. L. Mangum, Henry B. Hinton, Jr., Lynchburg, Va., Jack Green-berg, Morris J. Bailer, Jonathan K. Harkavy, Nahomi Harkavy and Albert Rosenthal, New York City, on brief), for appellant., Norman K. Moon, Lynchburg, Va. (Edward S. Graves and Edmunds, Williams, Robertson, Sackett, Baldwin & Graves, Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Russell.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:

This is both an individual and class action, instituted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to redress alleged unlawful discrimination in employment practices on the part of the defendant. The parties stipulated the issues of fact in the case and agreed initially that the issues so stipulated should be submitted to a jury. The issues, as agreed upon, it seems, related only to plaintiff’s individual claim. After a jury trial had been agreed upon, the plaintiff withdrew his consent. The District Judge at this point convened an advisory jury under the terms of Rule 39(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and tried the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of the issues agreed upon by the parties. After a full trial, the advisory jury found a w¡)Tlt Pf «rÜBgfiWRipflti^p t.he plaintiff b_V the defendant.. The District Court reviewed these findings and proceeded to make its own findings that the plaintiff had not been discriminated against in violation of the Act and dismissed the individual action. Having made that determination of the plaintiff’s individual claim, the District Court proceeded to conclude that the plaintiff, being without any individual rights himself, was Lnot a nmner representative, to maintain a class action and dismissed the class action. The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of both the individual and the class action. We affirm the dismissal of the individual action, but remand, with instructions, the class action.

The denial of the plaintiff’s individual claim by the District Court is amply supported by the record and is binding on this Court. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Company (4th Cir. 1972) 457 F.2d 1377, 1379. The plaintiff, however, complains that, in the resolution of his individual claim, the District Court improperly impaneled an advisory jury under Rule 39(c). He argues that the Act contemplates that discrimination actions are to be tried by the Court itself and not to a jury. Such has been the construction given the Act. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. (5th Cir. 1969) 417 F.2d 1122, 1125; Moss v. Lane Company (D.C.Va. 1970) 50 F.R.D. 122, 128.[1] This does not, however, preclude a Court from impaneling an advisory jury under Rule 39(c). That Rule specifically authorizes a Court in its discretion to employ such procedure in any case “not triable of right by a jury” and the Court’s exercise of such discretion in these circumstances is not reviewable. In Re Pan-American Life Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 1951) 188 F.2d 833, 834. The findings of such a jury are, of course, merely advisory; the Court must, as it did in this case, make its own findings and “[r]eview on appeal is of the findings of the court as if there had been no verdict from an advisory jury”. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2335, at 127 (1971). While it may well be that the use of an advisory jury as provided by Rule 39(c) should be sparingly exercised in discrimination cases, its use in this case does not warrant a reversal of the findings of the Court itself, amply supported as they are in the record.

[*15] Neither may the plaintiff complain of the refusal of the District Court to admit into evidence the EEOC records. The dissenting opinion of Judge Dyer expresses persuasive reasons why such records should not be admitted. Smith v. Universal Services, Inc. (5th Cir. 1972) 454 F.2d 154, 160-161.[2] Generally, even in those cases where a contrary view is taken, it is stated that the admission of such records is discretionary with the District Court. Heard v. Mueller Company (6th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 190, 194; Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co. (D.C.Conn.1970) 52 F.R.D 383, 384-385; but see, Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., supra. Error cannot accordingly be sustained on account of the refusal of the District Court to admit such records in evidence.

The main thrust of plaintiff’s complaint on appeal is directed at the dismissal of his class action. The District Court delayed consideration of such action until it had disposed of the plaintiff’s individual claim. The plaintiff urges that the Court should have made an interim determination of the maintainability of the class action prior to any final disposition of the individual claim. In support of this position, he cites the language of Rule 23, which provides that, “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.” It may be argued with plausibility that this language contemplates an interim determination on the standing of the plaintiff to represent the class prior to any final determination on his individual claim. Whether such interim determination, essential to the maintenance of the class action, requires a finding of a substantial possibility that the plaintiff will be able to succeed on his individual claim on the merits, as is indicated in Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? 55 F.R.D. 365, 370 (1972), or merely that plaintiff’s individual claim is not frivolous, as the Eighth Circuit seems to hold in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (8th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 421, 428, is an issue that need not be determined here. The District Court has concluded that the plaintiff has no valid individual claim. That conclusion we have already found is binding on appeal. A party, such as the plaintiff, who has been finally adjudged not to be a member of the class he seeks to represent, it is urged, is hardly a proper representative to present the claims of such class. See Heard v. Mueller Company, supra, 464 F.2d at 193; Bradley v. Southern Pacific Company (D.C.Tex.1970) 51 F.R.D. 14, 15; Burney v. North American Rockwell Corporation (D.C.Cal.1969) 302 F.Supp. 86, 90-91; Note, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 Miss.LJ. 275, 283 (1972).[3] It has been suggested that it would be inappropriate in that situation to remand the class action to the District Court to permit a party to prosecute an action in behalf of a class of which he[*16] has already been adjudged not to be a member. However, affirmance of a dismissal of the class action on that ground would not foreclose any subsequent action on the part of any other party with standing to prosecute an action charging illegal discrimination. Recognizing the difficulties in this situation and conceding that the defendant has, in his view, taken commendable action to avoid future discrimination, counsel for the plaintiff has stated that as a possible alternative remedy, the Court might remand the class action to the District Court, with instructions that the class action be retained on the docket for a reasonable time to permit the presentation of any proper claims for further relief under such class action. No substantial prejudice to the defendant is perceived in granting such request. The class action will accordingly be remanded to the District Court with such instructions. Should no proper claims for further relief be presented within a reasonable time, the District Court shall strike the class action from the calendar and enter a final dismissal thereof.

Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions.

1

There have been instances, however, in which suits liave been tried to a jury— presumably by consent. Noto, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 107, 168 nn. 19 & 20. Moreover, there have been oases in which the plaintiff has sought a jury trial (Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co. (D.C.Conn.1970) 52 F.R.D. 383, 386) and in which the defendant has moved for a jury trial (Moss v. Lane Company, supra).

2

See, also, Butler v. Local No. 4 and Local No. 269, Laborers’ Int. U. (D.C.Ill. 1969) 308 F.Supp. 528, 533-534, 8 A.L.R. Fed. 452 ; Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft, Div. (D.C.Conn. 1970) 50 F.R.D. 242, 246, n. 4; Hart v. Buckeye Industries, Inc. (D.C.Ga. 1968) 46 F.R.D. 61, 62-63.

3

Apparently, a similar result was reached in Dolgow v. Anderson (D.C.N.Y.1971) 53 F.R.D. 664, 668, but when the individual claim in that case was reversed, the Court reversed the order dismissing the class action. Dolgow v. Anderson (2d Cir. 1971) 438 F.2d 825, 830.

See, also, Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc. (7th Cir. 1972) 463 F.2d 495, 499:

“Before one may successfully institute a class action, it is, of course, necessary generally that he be able to show injury to himself in order to entitle him to seek judicial relief. * * * A plaintiff who is unable to secure standing for himself is certainly not in a position to ‘fairly insure the adequate representation’ of those alleged to be similarly situated. In short, a predicate to a party’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right. What he may not achieve himself, ho may not accomplish as a representative of a class. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3 Cir. 1970).”