Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974). · Go Syfert
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 72-1362Mar 29, 1974

Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974)

Quick Summary

A state remedy is adequate under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 if it is plain, speedy, and efficient, even if it is not the best available remedy.

A veteran challenges California’s residency requirement for property tax exemptions, alleging constitutional violations and seeking federal injunctive relief. The district court dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The Ninth Circuit reviews whether the state provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. The court applies the rule that a state remedy is adequate under § 1341 if it is plain, speedy, and efficient, even if not the best available or superior to federal remedies. Finding that California’s refund procedures meet this standard, the court holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to enjoin state tax collection. The court affirms the dismissal.

87 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Cited for
At page 367Determining adequacy of state remedy under section 134122 citing casesFor a state remedy to be `adequate' under [§ 1341] it need not necessarily be `the best available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts.'" (quoting Bland, 463 F.2d at 29 )6 citing courts put it this way
  • Chaudry v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:21-cv-01847 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2022). 2 cites
    (We have held previously that 15 the California refund procedure is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.)
  • Big Sandy Rancheria Enter. v. Becerra, No. 1:18-cv-00958 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019).
    (We have held 5 previously that the California refund procedure is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.)
  • Topolewski Am., Inc. v. State of California Emp. Dev. Dep't, No. 2:22-cv-02045 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2023).
    (We have held previously that the California refund procedure is a plain, 22 speedy and efficient remedy.)
  • Ronald Arashi v. Cnty. of Nevada, No. 2:25-cv-01753 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2025).
    “the best remedy available or 19 even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts”
  • Chanstapornkul v. Sisolak, No. 2:21-cv-01589 (D. Nev. Sept. 26, 2022).
    “The state court remedy need not be ‘the best remedy 8 available or even better than the remedy which might be available in the federal 9 courts.’” Id. (quoting Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1974)). 10 The Nevada state…
  • Rubinas v. Maduros, No. 1:21-cv-00096 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2021). 2 cites
    See Grace Brethren Church 457 U.S. at 415-16 (1982); Hyatt v. Yee, 871 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 , 338 (1990)); see also Jerron West, Inc. v. State of Cal.…
  • Rubinas v. Maduros, 513 F. Supp. 3d 994 (N.D. Ill. 2021).published
    The Ninth Circuit recently explained that, generally speaking, “the U.S. Supreme Court and our court have held that, to the extent they are available, California’s refund procedures constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.” Hyatt…
  • Ecklein v. State of Hawai'i, No. 2:20-cv-01267 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2020).
    The available state court remedy “need not necessarily be the best remedy available 7 or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts.” Id. 8 (citing Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Ci…
  • Gilbert Hyatt v. Betty Yee, 871 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2017).published 2 cites
    Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1974) (internal quotations and citations removed). 31 .
  • Washington Trucking Ass'n v. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 192 Wash. App. 621 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).published
    (addressing standard under the TIA)
Show 12 more citing cases
  • Jessica Matheson v. Lee Smith, 551 F. App'x 292 (9th Cir. 2013).unpublished
    “need not ... be ‘the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts”
  • Lowe v. Washoe Cnty., 627 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2010).published 2 cites
    “the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts”
  • Kerr v. Waddell, 916 P.2d 1173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).published
    “we are not convinced that if a few litigants are successful, each of the oth *467 ers will separately have to file, and carry to a completely litigated conclusion, a full-blown adversary lawsuit”
  • Gen. Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, 671 A.2d 560 (N.J. 1996).published
    It need not be the best remedy available, Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F. 2d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir.1991); Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F. 2d 364, 367 (9th Cir.1974); the most convenient remedy, Behe v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment…
  • Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1994).published 2 cites
    (For a state remedy to be `adequate' under [§ 1341] it need not necessarily be `the best available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts.'" (quoting Bland, 463 F.2d at…)
  • Edward Ashton v. Kenneth Cory, 780 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1986).published
    Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir.1974).
  • Dewitt Dillon v. State of Montana, 634 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980).published 2 cites
    Housing Authority of City of Seattle v. State of Washington, 629 F.2d *465 1307 (9th Cir. 1980); Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1974).
  • First United Methodist Church v. City of Syracuse, 489 F. Supp. 185 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).published
    Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1974); Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 29 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 410 U.S. 966 , 93 S.Ct. 1438 , 35 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973).
  • Grp. Assisting Sewer Proposal-Ansonia v. City of Ansonia, 448 F. Supp. 45 (D. Conn. 1978).published
    “the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts”
  • Eichler O. Kelly v. H. E. Springett, 527 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1975).published 3 cites
    Interestingly enough, we cited Bland with approval in Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (CA9 1974), where we held that the California tax refund procedure provides a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.
  • State Tax Comm'n v. Union Carbide Corp., 386 F. Supp. 250 (D. Idaho 1974).published
    “the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts”
  • Bunte Candies, Inc. v. Cartwright, 508 F. Supp. 229 (W.D. Okla. 1981).published
    See Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d at 367 (9th Cir.); Miller v. Bauer, 517 F.2d at 32 (7th Cir.); Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d at 28, n.24 (5th Cir.).
At page 366Jurisdictional bar preventing constitutional challenges to state taxes14 citing casesholding that “[t]he jurisdictional bar of” the TIA could not be overcome by mounting a constitutional challenge to the state's tax collection scheme brought under § 19831 citing court put it this way · 9 listed here
  • Key v. Detroit, City of, No. 2:24-cv-10458 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2025).
    (holding that “[t]he jurisdictional bar of” the TIA could not be overcome by mounting a constitutional challenge to the state's tax collection scheme brought under § 1983)
  • Todd v. Johnson, 718 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Miss. 1989).published
    Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir.1974); Archer Daniels, 544 F.Supp. at 101 .
  • Brooks v. Nance, 801 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Whitler, 585 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir.1978); King v. Sloane, 545 F.2d 7, 8 (6th Cir.1976); Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir.1974).
  • Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 691 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1982).published 2 cites
    Fair Assessment in Real Estate, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 , 102 S.Ct. 177 , 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 , 522 n. 29, 522-28, 101 S.Ct. 1221 , 1233 n. 29, 1233-37, 67 L.Ed.2d 464 (1981); Mandel v.…
  • Capitol Indus.-EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982).published 4 cites
    Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1974) citing Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525-26 , 52 S.Ct. 217, 219 , 76 L.Ed. 447 (1932).
  • Arizona v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 656 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981).published 2 cites
    Section 1341 provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” We ha…
  • Dewitt Dillon v. State of Montana, 634 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980).published 2 cites
    Housing Authority of City of Seattle v. State of Washington, 629 F.2d *465 1307 (9th Cir. 1980); Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1974).
  • Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 474 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 2007).published 2 cites
    (strong public policy of federal noninterference with state taxation schemes has been statutorily embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1341 .)
  • Berry v. Alameda Bd. of Supervisors, 753 F. Supp. 1508 (N.D. Cal. 1990).published
    See also Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir.1974). 10 .
in which it was held that the jurisdictional bar of section 1341 was not avoided by challenging state tax statute on federal groundsno pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Bernard Allen Fried v. Bernard Carey Etc., 620 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978).published
    (in which it was held that the jurisdictional bar of section 1341 was not avoided by challenging state tax statute on federal grounds)
  • 28 East Jackson Enter., Inc. v. Cullerton, 551 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1977).published 2 cites
    (in which it was held that the jurisdictional bar of section 1341 was not avoided by challenging state tax statute on federal grounds)
At page 365holding that TIA prohibits federal court from intervening in a tax suit regarding residency requirements, even where plaintiff alleges the tax is unconstitutional2 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Mirin v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Nevada, 415 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Nev. 1976).published
    But the law in the Ninth Circuit has been settled in Mandel v. Hutchinson, 336 F.Supp. 772, 776 (C.D.Cal.1971), aff’d, 494 F.2d 364, 365 (9th Cir. 1974) and California Teachers Association v. Newport Mesa Unified School District, 333 F.Sup…
  • Lister v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 167 F. App'x 34 (10th Cir. 2006).unpublished
    (holding that TIA prohibits federal court from intervening in a tax suit regarding residency requirements, even where plaintiff alleges the tax is unconstitutional)
Other citing cases3 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Leonard Howard MANDEL, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v.
Donald J. HUTCHINSON, Assessor, Alameda County, and the Assessors and Tax Collectors of each of the other fifty-eight Counties of the State of California
No. 72-1362.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 29, 1974.
Published opinion
494 F.2d 364
1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9423
Iraehmil B. Taus, II (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant., James Dexter Clark, Deputy County Counsel (argued), John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Douglas V. Hart, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Trask.
Cited by 43 opinions  |  Published
Citer courts: D. Nevada (1)
TRASK, Circuit Judge:

This appeal comes to us from the dismissal of appellant’s complaint seeking state tax relief. Dismissal was based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of 28 U.S.C. § 1341. In the court below jurisdiction was asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (civil rights); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (declaratory judgment); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (injunction by three-judge court). The District Court’s decision and opinion are reported at 336 F.Supp. 772 (C.D.Cal.1971).

The complaint of the plaintiff-appellant was filed on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against the assessors and tax collectors of each of the 58 counties of the State of California. It asserted that as a veteran he would be entitled to a limited property tax exemption but for a residency requirement imposed by the California Constitution in Article XIII, Section 1This, together with implementing statutes, it is alleged, is unconstitutional as applied because the provisions are in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, it is contended that they interfere with interstate commerce and impose a chilling effect upon the right of veterans of other states to move to California. Therefore, appellant argues, he and the class he represents are entitled to the tax relief they would otherwise obtain. The District Court denied all relief sought.

When an application to convene a three-judge court is made to a district court, the initial inquiry is whether the constitutional question sought to be raised is substantial; whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief; and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the jurisdiction of the statute. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962); Howfield, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1969). The three-judge requirement is a technical one to be construed narrowly. Bailey v. Patterson, supra, 369 U.S. at 33-34, 82 S.Ct. 549; Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941).

Here the district judge made the initial determination that a basis for federal jurisdiction was lacking and he therefore declined to convene a three-judge court. Mandel v. Hutchinson, 336 F. Supp. 772, 776 (C.D.Cal.1971). This determination was solely his responsibility and we concur with his decision.

Even without a consideration of 28 U.S.C. § 1341, serious questions could well be raised in opposition to appellant’s efforts to obtain exemption from payment of state property taxes by initially filing suit in a court of the United States. The availability of such a remedy would pose a grave threat to the operation of a fiscal system of a state.[1] Moreover, in many such cases in which[*366] injunctive relief is sought, the allowance of an immediate federal remedy would ignore traditional doctrine foreclosing such relief until after the alternative remedies at law have been demonstrated to be inadequate.

We need not, however, resolve this suit by resort to self-imposed judicial abstention grounded upon notions of comity and equity. Rather, the strong public policy of federal noninterference with state taxation schemes has been statutorily embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which provides as follows:

“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”

The jurisdictional bar of section 1341 is not avoided by challenging the constitutionality of the state tax statute that authorizes the challenged collection. This has been the teaching of the Supreme Court for some time:

“Whenever the question has been presented, this Court has uniformly held that the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax is not in itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. If the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state courts from which the cause may be brought to this Court for review . ” Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525-526, 52 S.Ct. 217, 219, 76 L.Ed. 447 (1932).

See also Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L. Ed. 1407 (1943); Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 1033, 87 S.Ct. 1484, 18 L.Ed.2d 596 (1967).

Here, then, the inquiry must be whether the State affords a “plain, speedy and efficient” remedy. If so, a federal court lacks jurisdiction either to consider the matter and grant relief or to convene a three-judge court to do so. The three-judge court under these circumstances would have no greater jurisdiction than that of the single district judge. See Carrigan v. Sunland-Tujunga Telephone Co., 263 F.2d 568, 572-573 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 359 U.S. 975, 79 S.Ct. 893, 3 L.Ed.2d 841 (1959).

The trial court found that the appellant had three alternative remedies under California law that were “plain, speedy and efficient.” First, the tax may be paid under protest, a suit may be commenced to recover the same, and interest will be allowed. Cal.Rev. & Tax Code §§ 5136, 5138, 5141 (West 1970). This procedure may be used to obtain a judgment declaring that a tax exemption must be allowed, and to require that the illegally collected tax be refunded. City of Long Beach v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Cal.2d 674, 675, 680, 328 P.2d 964, 965, 967 (1958). Second, the Board of Supervisors may refund taxes erroneously or illegally collected if a claim for refund of these monies is filed within 3 years of the date of payment. Cal.Rev. & Tax Code §§ 5096, 5097 (West 1970). If the Board of Supervisors denies the claim, the taxpayer may sue for a refund and collect interest. Cal.Rev. & Tax Code §§ 5103, 5105 (West 1970). This procedure is available to a taxpayer who alleges that he was wrongfully de[*367]prived of the veterans’ exemption of Article XIII, Section 1%, of the California Constitution. Sherman v. Quinn, 31 Cal.2d 661, 665, 192 P.2d 17, 19 (1948). Third, the taxpayer may obtain a writ of mandate if there is no adequate remedy at law. Cal.Code Civ.P. § 1086 (West 1955). In Lockhart v. Wolden, 17 Cal.2d 628, 633, 111 P.2d 319, 322 (1941), the California Supreme Court granted a writ of mandate to a taxpayer who claimed that the county assessor denied her a veteran’s exemption on the ground the exemption was not available to women. The court suggested that a writ of mandate was appropriate because of the large group of individuals in the petitioner’s class. More recently, however, the California Supreme Court has generally refused to grant a writ of mandate because of the adequacy of the State’s refund procedure at law.[2]

For a state remedy to be “adequate” under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 it need not necessarily be “the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts.” Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 29 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 1438, 35 L. Ed.2d 700 (1973). We have held previously that the California refund procedure is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy. Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board, 348 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1965); Harsh California Corp. v. County of San Bernardino, 262 F.2d 626, 628, 630 (9th Cir. 1958).

Appellant contends that the remedy in state court is not adequate under section 1341 because litigation involving 58 counties and several thousand potential plaintiffs would engender multiple court costs and burdensome attorneys’ fees. Court costs, of course, are recoverable by a successful litigant. Moreover, liberal joinder provisions may dissipate much of the objection. See DeMille v. Los Angeles County, 25 Cal.App.2d 506, 77 P.2d 905 (Dist.Ct.App.1938). Finally, we are not convinced that if a few litigants are successful, each of the others will separately have to file, and carry to a completely litigated conclusion, a full-blown adversary lawsuit.

We find that the California State court remedies are “plain, speedy and efficient,” and affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Judgment affirmed.

1

Mr. Justice Brennan in another context has addressed himself to some of the problems such proceedings might entail:

“The special reasons justifying the policy of federal non-interference with state tax collection are obvious. The procedures for mass assessment and collection of state taxes and for administration and adjudication of taxpayers’ disputes with tax of-fieials are generally complex and necessarily designed to operate according to established rules. State tax agencies are organized to discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the state procedures. If federal declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape[*366] the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts. See generally S.Rep.No.1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). These considerations make clear that the underlying policy of the anti-tax-injunction statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1341, relied on in Great Lakes, bars all anticipatory federal adjudication in this field, not merely federal injunctions.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n. 17, 91 S.Ct. 674, 698, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971) (separate opinion).
2

The particular exigencies of a given case have, from time to time, caused the California Supreme Court to view the refund procedure as inadequate for that individual case and have thus necessitated equitable relief through a writ of mandate. E. g., County of Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal.2d 841, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593, 595-596 (1967); Corona Unified Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.2d 846, 40 Cal.Rptr. 745, 395 P.2d 817 (1964).