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Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
103 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 31 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lucas v. MGM Resorts International (nvd, 2024-03-19)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucas v. MGM Resorts International
D. Nev. · 2024 · confidence medium
But neither Dyson nor Jones develops it or calculates loss 16 based on the periods of time certain revenue-share dollars were held outside of Plan participants’ accounts before being returned to them, so it is entirely unclear how long certain tranches of 17 revenue-share dollars were held in Plan accounts before being returned to Plan participants, what those funds would have earned if they would have been invested during those periods, or 18 whether any potential investment earnings would have exceeded the net benefits that the revenue-sharing share classes provided. 19 102 ECF No. 149-1 a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Snitzer v. The Board of Trustees of the American Federation of Musicians and Employers' Pension Fund
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
See Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 457 (11th Cir. 1996) (denying class certification in an ERISA case because requirement that plaintiffs show that all members of the class would have deferred their retirement had the misrepresentation not been made defeated commonality); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1982) (requiring proof of a causal connection between breach of fiduciary duty and losses incurred).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Plasterers' Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper
4th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Allison v. Bank One —Denver, 289 F.3d 1223 , 1239 (10th Cir.2002) (“The phrase ‘resulting from’ indicates that there must be a showing of ‘some causal link between the alleged breach ... and the loss plaintiff seeks to recover.’ ”); Friend v. Sanwa Bank, 35 F.3d 466, 469 (9th Cir.1994) (“ERISA holds a trustee liable for a breach of fiduciary duty only to the extent that losses to the plan result from the breach.”); Willett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.1992) (“Section [1109(a) ] of ERISA establishes than an action exists to recover losses …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prudential Retirement Insurance v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776 , 781 & n. 21 (5th Cir.2007) (noting that “even if the plaintiffs were able to prove all the allegations in their respective Amended Complaints, they have not stated a cause of action” because “[t]he plaintiffs’ alleged loss of benefits did not ‘result[ ] from’ any of the misrepresentations that the plaintiffs contend [defendant] made” (citing Willett, 953 F.2d at 1343 )); Allison v. Bank One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223 , 1239 (10th Cir.2002) (“The phrase ‘resulting from’ indicates that there must be a showing of ‘some causal link betwe…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chesemore v. Alliance Holdings, Inc.
W.D. Wis. · 2011 · confidence medium
Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (noting that § 409(a) requires a “causal connection” between breach of fiduciary duty and loss).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dann v. Lincoln National Corp.
E.D. Pa. · 2011 · confidence medium
Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (a) (2006); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.1992); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pension & Employee Stock Ownership Plan Administrative Committee of Community Bancshares, Inc. v. Patterson
N.D. Ala. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 *1251 F.3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir.1995); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ferrer v. Chevron Corp.
5th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
See Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.1992) ("Section 409 of ERISA [ 29 U.S.C. § 1109 ] establishes that an action exists to recover losses that ‘resulted’ from the breach of fiduciary duty; thus, the statute does require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the proximate cause of the losses claimed ....”); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (requiring a causal connection between the breach of fiduciary duty and the alleged losses in a § 1109 action, based on the “resulting from” language in the statute). 22 .For example…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellis v. Rycenga Homes, Inc.
W.D. Mich. · 2007 · confidence medium
See Briscoe v. Fine, 444 F.3d 478, 494 (6th Cir.2006) (entities are not ERISA fiduciaries when they do no more than receive deposits from the plan from which the fund can draw checks); Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir.2003); Beddall v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.1998); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., N.A.
C.D. Ill. · 2004 · confidence medium
The “resulting from” language means that “a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan.” Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982); Silverman v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2nd Cir.1998). 76.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keach v. US TRUST CO. NA
C.D. Ill. · 2004 · confidence medium
The "resulting from" language means that "a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan." Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982); Silverman v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2nd Cir.1998). 76.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rankin v. Rots
E.D. Mich. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Willett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.1992) (“Section [1109] of ERISA establishes that an action exists to recover losses that ‘resulted’ from the breach of fiduciary duty; thus the statute does require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the proximate cause of the losses claimed.... ”); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (Under 29 U.S.C. § 1109 , where “a fiduciary ... who ... breaches ... shall be personally liable to make good ... any losses ... resulting from each such breach”, a causal connection is required …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wiseman v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.
W.D.N.C. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 457 (11th Cir. 1996) (denying class certification in an ERISA case because plaintiffs’ requirement of showing that all members of the class would have deferred their retirement, had the misrepresentation not been made, defeated commonality); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.1992) (noting that a breach of fiduciary duty must be the proximate cause of losses claimed by plaintiffs); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (requiring proof of a causal connection between breach of fiduciary …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peoples v. Sebring Capital Corp.
N.D. Ill. · 2002 · confidence medium
Marshall Int’l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815 , 819-20 (7th Cir.1991); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 899 (7th Cir.1982); Kamsler v. H.A.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John D. Allison William C. Hopkins, Jr. Galen G. McFayden Kirk R. Peterson Julie E. Peterson John W. Latta Nanette B. Latta James T. Link, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants v. Bank One-Denver, Formerly Known as Affiliated National Bank-Denver, Formerly Known as Denver National Bank, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee. Roger K. Crosby, Trustee of the Trust Created Under the Crosby Group, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Bank One-Denver, Formerly Known as Affiliated National Bank-Denver, Formerly Known as Denver National Bank, a National Banking Association, John D. Allison William C. Hopkins, Jr. Galen G. McFayden Kirk R. Peterson Julie E. Peterson John W. Latta Nanette B. Latta James T. Link, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Cross-Appellees v. Bank One-Denver, Formerly Known as Affiliated National Bank-Denver, Formerly Known as Denver National Bank, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Cross-Appellant. Roger K. Crosby, Trustee of the Trust Created Under the Crosby Group, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, Plaintiff-Cross-Appellee v. Bank One-Denver, Formerly Known as Affiliated National Bank-Denver, Formerly Known as Denver National Bank, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Cross-Appellant. John D. Allison William C. Hopkins, Jr. Galen G. McFayden Kirk R. Peterson Julie E. Peterson John W. Latta Nanette B. Latta James T. Link, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees v. Bank One-Denver, Formerly Known as Affiliated National Bank-Denver, Formerly Known as Denver National Bank, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant. Roger K. Crosby, Trustee of the Trust Created Under the Crosby Group, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Bank One-Denver, Formerly Known as Affiliated National Bank-Denver, Formerly Known as Denver National Bank, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
10th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.1998); Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1304-05 (5th Cir.1988); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (noting that the language of § 1109(a) "clearly indicates that a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred"). 39 We conclude that this causal link is established by Bank One's failure to make "adequate provision for the continued prudent management of plan assets." Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund, 93 F.3d 1171, 1183 (3d Cir.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allison v. Bank One - Denver (2×)
10th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1998); Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 , 1304–05 (5th Cir. 1988); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that the language of § 1109(a) “clearly indicates that a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guardsmark, Inc. v. Bluecross & Blueshield of Tennessee (2×)
W.D. Tenn. · 2001 · confidence medium
Id.; see also Maniace v. Commerce Bank, 40 F.3d 264 , 267 (8th Cir.1994); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gray v. Briggs
S.D.N.Y. · 1999 · confidence medium
Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 21 Employee Benefits Cas. 2761, Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23941u David W. Silverman, as Independent Fiduciary of the Unitron Graphics, Inc. Profit Sharing Trust and Unitron Graphics, Inc. Profit Sharing Trust-Union and Non-Union Division v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company and Helene Gorny, Jacob Zucker and Aaron Fertig
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to impose a fiduciary duty to inquire about the prudence of trustee's withdrawal of plan funds where bank had contractual duty to honor trustee's withdrawal slips).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Silverman v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to impose a fiduciary duty to inquire about the prudence of trustee’s withdrawal of plan funds where bank had contractual duty to honor trustee’s withdrawal slips).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beddall v. Trust Administration
1st Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Maniace v. Commerce Bank, 40 F.3d 264 , 267 (8th Cir. 1994); ___ _______ ______________ Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1982); NARDA, Inc. ______ _______ ___________ v. Rhode Island Hosp.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Beddall v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.
1st Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Maniace v. Commerce Bank, 40 F.3d 264 , 267 (8th Cir.1994); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982); NARDA, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 , 1150 (3d Cir.1989) (auditing firm that reviewed information provided by others who actually controlled assets was not a fiduciary); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to impose fiduciary obligation upon bank for performance of non-diseretionary function); and O’Toole v. Arlington Trust Co., 681 F.2d 94, 96 (1st Cir.1982) (bank acting merely as depository for trust fund, whose responsibility did not include discretionary advisor activities, was not a fiduciary).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 21 Employee Benefits Cas. 1657, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7191, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,688, Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23937g Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund, a Trust James R. McDonald Jr. And Mark Minter v. Citibank, (Arizona), an Arizona Banking Corporation
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 , 1150 (3d Cir.1989) (auditing firm that reviewed information provided by others who actually controlled assets was not a fiduciary); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to impose fiduciary obligation upon bank for performance of non-discretionary function); and O'Toole v. Arlington Trust Co., 681 F.2d 94, 96 (1st Cir.1982) (bank acting merely as depository for trust fund, whose responsibility did not include discretionary advisor activities, was not a fiduciary).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Loral Librascope Pension Plan v. Bicoastal Corp. (In re Bicoastal Corp.)
M.D. Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank (Arizona), an Arizona Banking Corporation
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 , 1150 (3d Cir.1989) (auditing firm that reviewed information provided by others who actually controlled assets was not a fiduciary); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to impose fiduciary obligation upon bank for performance of non-discretionary function); and O’Toole v. Arlington Trust Co., 681 F.2d 94, 96 (1st Cir.1982) (bank acting merely as depository for trust fund, whose responsibility did not include discretionary advisor activities, was not a fiduciary).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Silverman v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
E.D.N.Y · 1996 · confidence medium
See Diduck, 974 F.2d at 270; Brandt, 687 F.2d at 898.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation John P. Meinhardt, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03067) Michael Heck Joseph McCarthy Angelo Dipietro, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation the Administrative Committee of the Unisys Savings Plan the Investment Committee of the Unisys Savings Plan Jack A. Blaine John J. Loughlin Kenneth Miller David A. White Stefan Riesenfeld (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03276) Gary Vala, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Jack A. Blaine Michael R. Losey Kenneth L. Miller Stefan C. Riesenfeld Curtis A. Hessler David A. White Unisys Corporation the Northern Trust Company (d.c.civil No. 91-03278) Carolyn A. Gohlike, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03321) Dennis C. Stanga James M. Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-04689) John H. Burgess, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-04696) John P. Meinhardt, Michael Heck, Joseph McCarthy Angelo Dipietro, Gary Vala, Carolyn Gohlike, Dennis C. Stanga, James M. Collins and John H. Burgess, Jr., in No. 95-1156 in Re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation John P. Meinhardt, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03067) Bernard McDevitt on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03126) Parker C. Kean, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03164) Nadia F. Sos Farouk M. Sos, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03582) Kenneth Goers John J. Cieslicki, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation the Northern Trust Company (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-04678) William Torkildson v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-04754) Bernard McDevitt Parker Kean, Nadia F. Sos, Farouk M. Sos, Kenneth Goers, John J. Cieslicki and William Torkildson, in No. 95-1157 in Re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation John P. Meinhardt, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Unisys Corporation (d.c.civil No. 91-Cv-03067) Henry Zylla Richard Silver Ronald Grippo Edward Lawler Richard Andujar Clarence Muller Charles Wahler James McLaughlin Donald Rader Joseph Lau James Gangale Alfred Contarino Richard Colby John Marcucci Joseph Fiore Richard Mastrodomenico Nick Klemenz Peter Szczybek, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated Engineers Union Local 444 of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, MacHine and Furniture Workers, a.f.l.-c.i.o. Locals 445 of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, MacHine and Furniture Workers, a.f.l.-c.i.o. Locals 450 of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, MacHine and Furniture Workers, a.f.l.-c.i.o. Locals 470 of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, MacHine and Furniture Workers, a.f.l.-c.i.o. Locals 165 of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, MacHine and Furniture Workers, a.f.l.-c.i.o. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, a.f.l.-c.i.o. v. Unisys Corporation Edwin P. Gilbert John J. Loughlin Thomas Penhale, Individually and in Their Capacities as Members of the Unisys Employee Benefits Executive Committee and Administrators of the Unisys Retirement Investment Plan Richard H. Bierly Curtis A. Hessler Leon J. Level Kenneth L. Miller David A. White Jack A. Blaine Stefan C. Riesenfeld George T. Robson, Individually and in Their Capacities as Members of the Investment Committee of the Unisys Retirement Investment Plan (d.c. Civil No. 91-Cv-03772) Henry Zylla, Richard Silver, Ronald Grippo, Edward Lawler, Richard Andujar, Clarence Muller, Charles Wahler, James McLaughlin Donald Rader, Joseph Lau, James Gangale, Alfred Contarino, Richard Colby, John Marcucci, Joseph Fiore, Richard Mastrodomenico, Nick Klemenz and Peter Szczybek, Individually and on Behalf of the Class Certified, in No. 95-1186
3rd Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
See Willett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.1992) ("Section [1109] of ERISA establishes that an action exists to recover losses that 'resulted' from the breach of fiduciary duty; thus the statute does require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the proximate cause of the losses claimed...."); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (Under 29 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) IN RE: Unisys Svgs. Plan Litigation v. Unisys Corp. (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
See Willett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Section [1109] of ERISA establishes that an action exists to recover losses that `resulted' from the breach of fiduciary duty; thus the statute does require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the proximate cause of the losses claimed . . . ."); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1982) (Under 29 U.S.C. §1109 , where "a fiduciary . . . who . . . breaches . . . shall be personally liable to make good . . . any losses resulting from each such breach", a causal connection is required betw…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carson Friend Collene Friend Brad Friend Trav Friend Carson Lighting, Inc. Carson Lighting, Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Sanwa Bank California (2×)
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Sec. 1109 ; Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (Section 1109 "clearly indicates that a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Izzarelli v. Rexene Products Co.
5th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Bank was a fiduciary "only with respect to those aspects of the plan over which [it] exercise[d] authority or control." Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (5th Cir 1986) (citing Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987)); ERISA § 2(21)(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A).
cited Cited as authority (rule) First National Bank v. ACCO USA, Inc.-IBT Retirement Plan
N.D. Ill. · 1994 · confidence medium
Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (FR-16A)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc.
E.D. Wis. · 1993 · confidence medium
Goulding v. Feinglass, 811 F.2d 1099, 1103 (7th Cir.1987) (citing Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir.1979)); Glick v. Koenig, et al., 766 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir.1985); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 899 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Professional Helicopter Pilots Ass'n v. Denison
M.D. Ala. · 1992 · confidence medium
Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harry J. Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1304 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 , 109 S.Ct. 2428 , 104 L.Ed.2d 986 (1989); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1304 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 , 109 S.Ct. 2428 , 104 L.Ed.2d 986 (1989); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Physicians Healthchoice, Inc. v. Trustees of the Automotive Employee Benefit Trust
unknown court · 1992 · confidence medium
Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kennie Willett, Jessica Willett, a Minor Who Sues by and Through Her Father and Next Friend, Cross-Appellants v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Cross-Appellee. Ernest L. Roden, Sheila Roden, Cross-Appellants v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Cross-Appellee. Marvin A. Baugh Betty F. Baugh, Cross-Appellants v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Cross-Appellee. Rickey D. Silas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama
11th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
In addition, Blue Cross cites a case from the Seventh Circuit for the proposition that "[a] causal connection is required between the breach of the fiduciary duty and the losses incurred." Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982). 27 Although the legal principle set forth by Blue Cross is correct, its argument is unavailing at this point in the proceedings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
11th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
In addition, Blue Cross cites a case from the Seventh Circuit for the proposition that “[a] causal connection is required between the breach of the fiduciary duty and the losses incurred.” Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Useden v. Acker (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Regardless, the record is devoid of facts indicating that any erroneous entry on the form--even if Sun Bank's underlying overvaluation of the stock in some way harmed the Plan--can be causally linked to any damages suffered by the Plan. "[A] causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan." Brandt, 687 F.2d at 898. 18 In accordance with legislative history, we do not reject absolutely the proposition that consultants and advisors can, under some circumstances, assume fiduciary control While the ordinary functions of consultants and advisor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Useden v. Acker (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Regardless, the record is devoid of facts indicating that any erroneous entry on the form — even if Sun Bank’s underlying overvaluation of the stock in some way harmed the Plan — can be causally linked to any damages suffered by the Plan. "[A] causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan.” Brandt, 687 F.2d at 898. .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fechter v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
E.D. Pa. · 1991 · confidence medium
Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 , 107 S.Ct. 884 , 93 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133 (7th Cir.1984); Schulist v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 717 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (7th Cir.1983); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897-98 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hunt v. Magnell
D. Minnesota · 1991 · confidence medium
To establish liability under ERISA for a breach of fiduciary duty, “a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan.” Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 989 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank Landry v. Air Line Pilots Association International Afl-Cio, Taca Airlines, S.A. And Charles J. Huttinger (2×)
5th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
VII 1989) 38 American Federation of Unions Local 102 Health & Welfare Fund v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 841 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir.1988); Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir.1984) 39 Accord Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir.1985); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982); Holland v. Bank of America, 673 F.Supp. 1511, 1518 (S.D.Cal.1987) 40 In a practice all too common in summary judgment decisions, the trial court made no mention of the standard it was applying to reach its decision.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry v. Home Life Insurance
N.D. Ill. · 1989 · confidence medium
Co., 713 F.2d 254 , 259 (7th Cir.1983); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 896-98 (7th Cir. 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Sommers Drug Stores Company Employee Profit Sharing Trust, Cross-Appellee v. Walter N. Corrigan and Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., Cross-Appellants
5th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
(Emphasis added.) “The phrase ‘to the extent’ indicates that a person is a fiduciary only with respect to those aspects of the plan over which he exercises authority or control.” 793 F.2d at 1459-60 , citing Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Whitfield v. Lindemann
5th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Co. v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 685 F.2d 887, 895-97 (4th Cir.1982); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 137 (7th Cir.1984); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Whitfield v. Lindemann
5th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Co. v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 685 F.2d 887, 895-97 (4th Cir.1982); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 137 (7th Cir.1984); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arakelian v. National Western Life Insurance
D.D.C. · 1987 · confidence medium
Birmingham v. Sogen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515 , 521-22 (2d Cir.1983) (valid plan under ERISA must designate a “named fiduciary” so that responsibility for managing and operating the plan — and liability for mismanagement — are focused with a degree of certainty); Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1982) (party held fiduciary status only to extent it rendered investment advice because it was not a “named fiduciary”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leigh v. Engle
N.D. Ill. · 1987 · confidence medium
Id.; 727 F.2d at 137 ; Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kenneth Brandt, Glenn McHenry Henry Reitz, Trustees of the Smithco Fabricators, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust
v.
Edward Grounds and the Mount Prospect State Bank, an Illinois Banking Corporation
81-1100.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Jul 6, 1982.
687 F.2d 895
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

687 F.2d 895

3 Employee Benefits Ca 1780

Kenneth BRANDT, Glenn McHenry, Henry Reitz, Trustees of the
Smithco Fabricators, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan &
Trust, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Edward GROUNDS and The Mount Prospect State Bank, an
Illinois Banking Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-1100.

United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 6, 1981.
Decided July 6, 1982.

[*~895]1

Sigi Offenbach, Leoris & Cohen, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

2

Harry D. Lavery, Berger, Newmark & Fenchel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

3

Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.[*]

4

WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.

5

This is an appeal from two orders of the District Court. The first order dismissed Count III of the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (hereafter "the Act" or "ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The second order denied plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Count III. The plaintiffs, the Trustees of the Smithco Fabricators Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust (hereafter "the Trust"), contend that the District Court erred in its construction of ERISA and that it abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

6

Appellants brought this action against Edward Grounds, a former trustee, and the Mount Prospect State Bank (hereafter "the Bank") seeking to recover approximately $175,000 allegedly converted by Grounds. During the period from November 11, 1975 through August 17, 1978 Grounds withdrew the money from two savings accounts maintained by the Trust at the Bank.[1] Withdrawals from those accounts required the signatures of two trustees. Grounds obtained approximately $14,600 by forging the signature of another trustee, Glenn McHenry, on the withdrawal slips. The balance of the $175,000 was withdrawn by obtaining McHenry's signature under false pretenses.

7

When the defalcation was discovered, the trustees brought this action against Grounds and the Bank. As amended, Count I of the complaint alleged a breach of fiduciary duty (under ERISA) against Grounds, Count II alleged a breach of the Bank's duty as a depositor (for accepting the forged instruments) and Count III alleged a breach of fiduciary duty (under ERISA) against the Bank.

8

On October 6, 1980, the District Judge granted the Bank's Motion to Dismiss Count III for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Count III had alleged that the Bank had provided investment advice for a fee and therefore was a fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii). However, the Court reasoned that since there were no allegations that the losses were caused by any investment advice provided by the Bank, the Bank could not be held liable as a fiduciary under the Act. 502 F.Supp. 598, D.C.Ill.

9

Subsequent to the dismissal order, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Count III. The proposed amendment still claimed a breach of fiduciary duty by the Bank, but alleged that in addition to providing investment advice, the Bank had exercised significant control over the Trust assets by executing investment transactions approved by the trustees. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of that control, the Bank's fiduciary duty extended to the disposition and withdrawal of Trust assets. The alleged breach of this duty was the Bank's issuance of cashier's checks payable to Grounds personally (as distinguished from payable to him in his representative capacity as trustee). The trustees' Motion for Leave to Amend was denied on November 7, 1980.[2] The plaintiffs then filed this appeal.

[*~896]10

The definition of "fiduciary" for purposes of ERISA is stated in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A):

11

"... a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan ..."

12

An ERISA fiduciary must perform his duties in accordance with the standards provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1104. A violation of those standards can subject the fiduciary to liability under either 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (relating to general fiduciary liability) or 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (relating to liability for breach of a co-fiduciary).

13

Appellants claim that the Bank qualifies as a fiduciary as a result of its providing investment advice for a fee.[3] They contend that the Bank violated the prudent man standard of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b) by issuing cashier's checks to Grounds personally and should be liable for that breach under 29 U.S.C. § 1109 or alternatively, under 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) for the breach by Grounds.

14

We note that there is no allegation that the Bank was a "named fiduciary" as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). Therefore, assuming that the Bank became a fiduciary by providing investment advice, its fiduciary status existed only "to the extent" that it provided that advice, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). As noted by the District Judge, the phrase "to the extent" obviously suggests a limitation of the fiduciary responsibility. This is supported by the regulations:

15

"A fiduciary with respect to the plan who is not a named fiduciary is a fiduciary only to the extent that he or she performs one or more of the functions described in section 3(21)(A) of the Act. The personal liability of a fiduciary who is not a named fiduciary is generally limited to the fiduciary functions, which he or she performs with respect to the plan". 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8(FR-16A)[4]

16

Thus, it appears that the personal liability of the Bank would be limited to its violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1104 in performing its investment advising functions.

17

In support of their proposed amended Count III, Appellants contend that the Bank's alleged violations of its fiduciary duties fall within the parameters of investment advice as provided in the regulations, citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(a)(2).[5] That regulation provides:

[*~897]18

A person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan by reason of rendering investment advice (as defined in paragraph (c)(1) of this section) for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or having any authority or responsibility to do so, shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary regarding any assets of the plan with respect to which such person does not have any discretionary authority, discretionary control or discretionary responsibility, does not exercise any authority or control, does not render investment advice ..."Noting the emphasized portion quoted above, appellants argue that because the misappropriated money was held in savings accounts in the Bank, the Bank exercised control over those assets. However, as discussed previously, the Bank's fiduciary status was limited to its function as an investment advisor. The regulation cited by the appellants does not alter that limitation, but merely adds another, i.e. the investment advisor is a fiduciary only as to the assets with which he performs an advisory function. The regulation which defines the investment advisor's function is 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1)[6] and none of the activities described therein correspond to depository transactions.

19

Furthermore, to accept appellants' theory would impose inconsistent obligations on the Bank. Count II of the Second Amended Complaint alleged

20

9. "By the terms of the Agreement between Defendant Bank as a depository and the Trust as a depositor, the Defendant Bank was under a duty to honor or accept withdrawal slips signed by Trustees whose signatures were provided to the Bank on the aforementioned signature cards."

21

Thus, while the Bank was under a duty to honor the withdrawal slips, appellants would impose upon it the additional duty of analyzing the transaction, determining its prudence, and refusing the withdrawal if it appeared imprudent. These duties are not reconcilable.

22

Therefore, we conclude that the Bank was not acting as a fiduciary to the Trust when it performed its depository function in the withdrawal transactions. Thus, liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) could not exist for those actions. That statute provides in pertinent part:

23

Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach ... (emphasis supplied)

24

The emphasized language clearly indicates that a causal connection is required between the breach of fiduciary duty and the losses incurred by the plan. Since we have already concluded that the "responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter" were limited in application to the Bank's investment advising function, it is clear that without a causal connection between the advice and the loss no liability can exist under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). This conclusion is consistent with the regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (FR-16A) quoted supra p. 897. No such causal connection was alleged in the second amended complaint or the proposed amendment. Similarly, the Bank cannot be liable under 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) since that statute only creates co-fiduciary liability for violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) which occur in the fiduciary's performance of its "specific responsibilities which give rise to (its) status as fiduciary."

25

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court was correct in determining that Count III of the Second Amended Complaint and the proposed Count III submitted with plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend failed to state a claim under ERISA. Since the proposed Count III failed to state a claim, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Judge to deny leave to amend, Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1978).

[*~898]26

Affirmed.

*

Senior District Judge William J. Campbell of the Northern District of Illinois is sitting by designation

1

For purposes of reviewing an order on a motion to dismiss, we must consider all factual allegations of the complaint to be admitted, Jenkins v. McKeither, 395 U.S. 411, 421-422, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848-1849, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Parr v. Great Lakes Express Comp., 484 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1973)

2

On that same date the Trustees obtained a default judgment against Grounds for $175,000. On December 8, 1980, the Court entered a summary judgment against the Bank on Count II in the amount of $14,600 and a default judgment on the Bank's cross-claim against Grounds in an equal amount

3

The Bank vigorously contests the allegation that it was providing investment advice; however, as noted previously, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as admitted, see fn. 1 supra

4

These provisions are part of a regulation entitled "Questions and Answers Relating to Fiduciary Responsibility under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974." The entire question and answer reads:

Q. Is a fiduciary who is not a named fiduciary with respect to an employee benefit plan personally liable for all phases of the management and administration of the plan?

A. A fiduciary with respect to the plan who is not a named fiduciary is a fiduciary only to the extent that he or she performs one or more of the functions described in section 3(21)(A) of the Act. The personal liability of a fiduciary who is not a named fiduciary is generally limited to the fiduciary functions which he or she performs with respect to the plan. With respect to the extent of liability of a named fiduciary of a plan where duties are properly allocated among named fiduciaries or where named fiduciaries properly designate other persons to carry out certain fiduciary duties, see question FR-13 and FR-14.

In addition, any fiduciary may become liable for breaches of fiduciary responsibilities committed by another fiduciary of the same plan under circumstances giving rise to co-fiduciary liability, as provided in section 405(a) of the Act.

5

This regulation is reproduced in 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-9(c)(2)

6

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1) provides:

(c) Investment Advice. (1) A person shall be deemed to be rendering "investment advice" to an employee benefit plan, within the meaning of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act) and this paragraph, only if:

(i) Such person renders advice to the plan as to the value of securities or other property, or makes recommendation as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property; and

(ii) Such person either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any affiliate)-

(A) Has discretionary authority or control, whether or not pursuant to agreement, arrangement or understanding, with respect to purchasing or selling securities or other property for the plan; or

(B) Renders any advice described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section on a regular basis to the plan pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding, written or otherwise, between such person and the plan or a fiduciary with respect to the plan, that such services will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that such person will render individualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio composition, or diversification of plan investments.

This regulation is reproduced in 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-a(c)(1).