Plaintiffs Connie Barrios and Louise Lopez appeal to this court from a judgment entered by a United States magistrate on their claims of employment discrimination. We hold that in the circumstances of this case, the magistrate was not empowered to enter final judgment. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In the district court, plaintiffs claimed that they were members of the class entitled to distribution from a fund established in settlement of an employment discrimination class action brought against defendant food processors. See Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D.Cal.1976), aff'd sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 123, 58 L.Ed.2d 134 (1978). On March 31, 1977, the district judge, "pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636," appointed the magistrate as a special master to rule on individual claims brought in accordance with the consent decree. On June 19, 1982, the district judge entered an "Order of Reference to the Magistrate as Special Master" which, tracking the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(4),^[1] provided that the decision of the special master would be the final decision of the court on factual issues and that appeals on matters of policy and issues of law affecting implementation of the decree could be taken to the district court.

The claims underlying this appeal were raised by requests for hearing filed in October 1980 and January 1981. The matters were jointly tried to the magistrate as provided for by the orders of reference. The magistrate issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 14, 1982 and soon thereafter entered final judgment in favor of defendant. The question of this court's jurisdiction over plaintiffs' joint appeal from the judgment entered by the magistrate was raised at the prebriefing conference held in this case, and the parties have briefed the issue at the court's direction.

Were the issue of appellate jurisdiction to be decided solely on the basis of the district judge's orders of reference of March 1977 and June 1979, there would be no question but that dismissal would be required. A magistrate's decision in a case referred under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2)^[2] and Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 is not a decision of the district court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and is not directly appealable to a court of appeals. United States v. Haley, 541 F.2d 678, 678 (8th Cir. 1974); cf. Coolidge v. Schooner California, 637 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1981) (requirement that district judge review de novo decision of magistrate in case referred for trial).

In the circumstances of this case, however, the proper resolution is not apparent at first blush. As of October 10, 1979, federal magistrates are empowered to exercise plenary civil jurisdiction, including the entry of final judgment, when so designated by the district courts in which they serve and at the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).^[3] If the statutory requirements are met, the final judgment entered by a magistrate is directly appealable to the court of appeals without intervening review by a district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).^[4] Our concern then is whether, as contended by the parties in their responses to our orders, the magistrate was authorized to exercise subsection (c) jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.

We read the statute as imposing two express requirements for a magistrate's exercise of such jurisdiction. First, the magistrate must have been "specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves." 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Second, the parties must consent, without coercion by the judge or magistrate, to the magistrate's authority to hear the case and to enter judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2).^[5]

We have little difficulty in determining that the first requirement was met here. Although the parties have failed, despite our explicit inquiry, to establish that the magistrate has been specially designated by the district court to exercise subsection (c) jurisdiction in appropriate cases, we are willing to assume for purposes of this opinion that the designation has in fact been made in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection (c).

This does not, however, establish that the magistrate was acting in this case pursuant to any authority granted him under subsection (c) as opposed to subsection (b), for the requirement of full and voluntary consent remains. Relying on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that the proper analysis in this regard "involves determining the scope of authority to which the parties consented," Glover v. Alabama Bd. of Corrections, 660 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1981), the parties ask us to view their conduct throughout the proceedings below as constituting the necessary consent. This we decline to do.

We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the scope of authority to which the parties consented is an appropriate means of resolving this question and one preferable to a mechanical test such as the date the magistrate assumed jurisdiction over the case. What the parties apparently fail to perceive, however, is that we nonetheless must determine how their consent is to be manifested. In this as well, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that a clear and unambiguous expression of consent is required to vest the magistrate with authority under subsection (c). Id. at 124. In the absence of a clear statement by the parties, the voluntariness of consent cannot be protected and we could be faced in any case with a retroactive attempt to expand or contract the magistrate's authority. We will not permit our jurisdiction to depend on inferences when both the statute and common sense call for precision.

In sum, we hold that jurisdiction is lacking over this appeal. Even assuming that the magistrate was specially designated to exercise subsection (c) jurisdiction, there is no clear and unambiguous statement on the record that the parties consented to that broad authority. The record reflects only a consent to proceed before the magistrate in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 as provided for by the district judge's orders of reference. Only the district judge, and not the magistrate, is therefore empowered to enter final judgment, and any review in this court must await further proceedings below.^[6]

Appeal DISMISSED.