Grano v. Dep't of Dev. of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Grano v. Dep't of Dev. of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1983).
Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitPublished opinionNo. Nos. 78-3161, 78-3162Feb 18, 1983

Grano v. Dep't of Dev. of Columbus

Quick Summary

Subjective employment evaluation processes require close scrutiny to determine whether the criteria were used as a pretext to disguise discriminatory action.

A female employee claimed sex discrimination after her supervisor hired a male for a new position without interviewing her, citing her inferior qualifications. The court addresses whether the employer’s subjective evaluation of the plaintiff’s performance sufficiently rebutted her prima facie case of discrimination. The court applies the rule that subjective evaluation processes provide ready mechanisms for discrimination and require close scrutiny to ensure they do not disguise discriminatory action. The court holds that the supervisor’s articulated reason was legally sufficient to justify the judgment, and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the subjective criteria were used as a pretext for sex discrimination.

110 citation events (57 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
At page 837Analyzing prima facie case and pretext in employment discrimination50 citing cases“the ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action.”9 citing courts quote it
  • Edelstein v. Stephens, No. 1:17-cv-00305 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2020).
    ([T]he legitimacy of the articulated reason for [an] employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective.)
  • Nieves v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1984).published
    ([SJubjeetive employment evaluations ... are not illegal per se. The ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discrimination.)
  • Deiter v. Tennessee Technological Univ., No. 2:22-cv-00030 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2024).
    “intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanisms for discrimination”
  • Karen Taylor v. Ingham Cnty. Cir. Ct., No. 23-1685 (6th Cir. June 27, 2024).unpublished
    Beginning with Taylor’s challenge to the circuit court’s scoring techniques for the interviews, even accepting that the technique was arbitrary, contra Harris v. City of Akron, 836 F. App’x 415 , 421 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that the use o…
  • SOLIS v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., No. 2:23-cv-01390 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2024).
    The ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action.” Grano v. Dep’t of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
  • Patricia Levine v. Louis DeJoy, 64 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2023).published
    “provide ‘ready mechanisms for discrimination”
  • Fijalkowski v. Belmont Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, No. 2:17-cv-00195 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2021).
    “the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority”
  • Pamela Harris v. City of Akron, 836 F. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2020).unpublished
    Grano v. Dep’t of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Dyan Hampton Aytch v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., No. 336790 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2018).unpublished
    See Riggs v AirTran Airways, Inc, 497 F3d 1108, 1120 (CA 10, 2007); Grano v Dep’t of Dev of City of Columbus, 699 F 2d 836, 837 (CA 6, 1983).5 However, “the existence of subjective criteria alone is not considered evidence of pretext; rath…
  • Hamilton v. McDonald, 247 F. Supp. 3d 812 (E.D. Ky. 2017).published
    “Courts have frequently noted that subjective evaluation processes intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanisms for discrimination”
Show 40 more citing cases
  • Van Winkle v. HM Ins. Grp., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 723 (E.D. Ky. 2014).published 2 cites
    “ready mechanisms for discrimination”
  • Van Buren v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Saf., 996 F. Supp. 2d 648 (S.D. Ohio 2014).published
    “subjective evaluation processes intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanisms for discrimination”
  • Dunn v. Chattanooga Publ'g Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).published
    Grp., Inc., 726 F.3d 789, 802 (6th Cir.2013) (quoting Grano v. Dep’t of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983)).
  • Tommy Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc, 726 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2013).published
    (Courts have frequently noted that subjective evaluation processes intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanisms for discrimination.)
  • Fledderman v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 899 (S.D. Ohio 2013).published
    “are not illegal per se[.]”
  • Duch v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 765 F. Supp. 2d 959 (E.D. Mich. 2011).published
    “the legitimacy of the articulated subjective reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny”
  • Bridget Ray v. Oakland Cnty. Circuit Court, 355 F. App'x 873 (6th Cir. 2009).unpublished 2 cites
    No. 08-2295 23 whole process may have been a contrivance to give the job to Hutson, not in and of itself a violation of Title VII unless motivated by invidious discrimination, but the irregularity suggests improper subjectivity, and “subje…
  • Plumb v. Potter, 212 F. App'x 472 (6th Cir. 2007).unpublished
    Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 461 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Grano v. Dep’t of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983)), here, these concerns are lessened because Ward, a male human resources employee who observed each o…
  • Joanne Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys. & Forum Health, 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004).published
    “ready mechanisms for discrimination”
  • Wortham v. Integrated Health Servs., 302 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Ohio 2004).published 2 cites
    “[T]he legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority”
  • Bush v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Ohio 2002).published
    “the legitimacy of the articulated reason' for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority”
  • Fritzsche v. Albuquerque Mun. Sch. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (D.N.M. 2002).published
    See Kelley v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 220 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (“The claim by [the plaintiff] that somehow the use of subjective factors renders the interview per se discriminatory is meritless.”); Grano v. Dept. of Develo…
  • Carberry v. Monarch Marking Sys., Inc., 30 F. App'x 389 (6th Cir. 2002).unpublished
    “[t]he ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action”
  • Drew v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 688 A.2d 274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).published
    Henry v. Lennox Industries, Inc., 768 F.2d 746, 761 (6th Cir.1985); Grano v. Department of Development of the City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983).
  • Terry v. Gallegos, 926 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).published
    Grano v. Dept. of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983.) The Court first' considers evidence regarding Livingston’s disagreement with plaintiffs judgment.
  • Wanda D. Smith v. City of Dayton, 37 F.3d 1499 (6th Cir. 1994).published
    Farber, 917 F.2d at 1399 (quoting Grano v. Department of Dev. of the City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983)).
  • Clement v. Madigan, 820 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mich. 1992).published
    However, “ ‘the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority.’ ” Id. (…
  • Bacon v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 785 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D. Ohio 1991).published
    Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95 ; McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804 , 93 S.Ct. at 1825 ; Wrenn, 808 F.2d at 501 ; Henry v. Lennox Inds., 768 F.2d 746 (6th Cir.1985); Grano v. Department of Development of…
  • Danielson v. Fletcher, 770 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1991).published
    Grano v. Dept. of Development of the City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
  • Therese A. Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1990).published
    “[t]he ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action”
  • Proffitt v. Anacomp, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Ohio 1990).published 2 cites
    Grano, 699 F.2d at 837; see also Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 528-29 (6th Cir.); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 , 97 S.Ct. 182 , 50 L.Ed.2d 150 (1976).
  • Therese A. Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1990).published
    “[t]he ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action”
  • Sallee R. Bruhwiler v. Univ. of Tennessee & Dr. D.T. Stafford, 859 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    “the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority”
  • Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    Moreover, the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority." 34 Id. at…
  • Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1988).published
    Grano v. Department of Development of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983).
  • Sally J. Childs v. Green Local Sch. Dist., 810 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986).unpublished 4 cites
    While it is true that such subjective procedures do not violate Title VII per se, Grano, 699 F.2d at 837, "they do provide a ready mechanism for discrimination, permitting ... prejudice to affect and often control promotion and hiring deci…
  • Adela Valverde v. State of Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights, 803 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1986).unpublished
    “the ultimate issue . . . is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action”
  • Sarah M. Goostree v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1986).published
    “the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective”
  • Sharon A. Henry v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 768 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1985).published
    “the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority”
  • Wolek v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:24-cv-00657 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2025).
    See Oliveira-Monte v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 24-5768, 2025 WL 1579907 , at *4 (6th Cir. June 4, 2025) (citing Grano v. Dep’t of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
  • Anderson v. Otis Elevator Co., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (E.D. Mich. 2013).published
    (finding that the question “is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action)
  • James Kimble v. Mark Wasylyshyn, 439 F. App'x 492 (6th Cir. 2011).unpublished 2 cites
    ([T]he legitimacy of the articulated reason for [an] employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective.)
  • Smith v. City of Dayton, 830 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1993).published
    See, Grano v. Dept. of Development of the City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.1983); Farber v. Massillon Board of Education, 917 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2851 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1991).
  • Paul v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 809 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Del. 1992).published
    (Courts have fre *1163 quently noted that subjective evaluation processes intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanism for discrimination.” (citations omitted))
  • Daniels v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ravenna City Sch. Dist., 805 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons 23 The reasons proffered by the defendant must be articulated with sufficient clarity and specificity to provide the plaintiff "a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, 450 U.S. at…
  • Conner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 273 F. App'x 438 (6th Cir. 2008).unpublished
  • Charlotte Beck v. Buckeye Pipe Line Servs. Co., 501 F. App'x 447 (6th Cir. 2012).unpublished
  • Tresha Neff v. City of East Lansing, No. 17-1818 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2018).unpublished
  • Pettay v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 2021-Ohio-1380.published
  • Emanuelle Oliveira-Monte v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 24-5768 (6th Cir. June 4, 2025).unpublished
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Barbara Grano
v.
The Department of Development of the City of Columbus
Nos. 78-3161, 78-3162.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Feb 18, 1983.
Published opinion
Gregory S. Lashutka, City of Columbus, Dept, of Law, Patrick M. McGrath, H. Ritchey Hollenbaugh, Paul M. Aucoin, Columbus, Ohio, for defendants-appellants, crossappellees., Frederick M. Gittes, Barbara A. Terzian, Spater, Gittes, Marshall & Terzian, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.
Engel, Keith, Martin.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

This is the second time this Court has addressed the issues presented in this sex discrimination action. On the first occasion this Court vacated the judgment of the district court because it had applied the wrong legal standards. The action was remanded to the district court for further fact-finding and additional proceedings. See Grano v. Department of Development of the City of Columbus, 637 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir.1980). On remand the parties declined the district court’s invitation to further develop the facts. Ultimately, the district court relied upon Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and held that plaintiff failed to prove sex discrimination. The district court reasoned that while “plaintiff Grano was in fact qualified for the disputed position, the Court nevertheless concludes that the defendants’ articulated belief in the inferiority of plaintiff’s qualifications is sufficient to satisfy their burden in Burdine.” We agree.

[*837] The facts in the instant case are fully set forth in this Court’s opinion in Grano, 637 F.2d 1073, and will not be repeated here. There are, however, several key facts which are critical to understanding this extremely complex and close case. Those facts are as follows. Defendant Huddle, plaintiff’s supervisor, was familiar with plaintiff’s performance and her desire for promotion. In January of 1974 he facilitated the creation of a new public relations position in his department. It was anticipated that the new position would encompass some of the job tasks which plaintiff had been performing. Subsequently, Huddle interviewed and hired a male for the position. Plaintiff was not formally interviewed. Huddle stated that the male was hired because plaintiff was not qualified for the job.

On this record, it cannot be seriously disputed that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Plaintiff’s proofs demonstrated that she was not formally interviewed even though her qualifications on their face were similar to those possessed by the male who was hired. This evidence was sufficient to create an inference of unlawful sex discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. Therefore, the only issues this Court must address are whether: 1) the prima facie case was rebutted by Huddle’s statement his decision was based on plaintiff’s inferior qualifications; and 2) plaintiff was able to show that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for sex discrimination.

In Burdine the Supreme Court explained that the prima facie case is rebutted where the employer “clearly sets forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.” Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. The employer’s explanation “must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment...” in its favor. Id. We hold that Huddle’s explanation meets this criteria.

Plaintiff contends that the articulated reason was erroneous and pretextual. Plaintiff relies on the district court’s finding that her qualifications were essentially the same as the male who was hired. Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive. Huddle subjectively evaluated plaintiff’s actual work performance and determined that she was not qualified. He did not interview her. Subsequently, he interviewed and hired a male who had similar credentials. Admittedly, the subjective nature of Huddle’s decision is troubling.

Courts have frequently noted that subjective evaluation processes intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanisms for discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben’s Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 426 (5th Cir.1980) vacated, 451 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 1967, 68 L.Ed.2d 290 (1981), on remand 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.1981); Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 642 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1981); Royal v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Comm’n, 655 F.2d 159, 164 (8th Cir.1981); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 528-29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870, 97 S.Ct. 182, 50 L.Ed.2d 150 (1976); Shack v. Southworth, 521 F.2d 51, 55-56 (6th Cir.1975); Harris v. Group Health Ass’n., 662 F.2d 869, 873 (D.C.Cir.1981). Moreover, the legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment decision is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority. See, e.g., Royal, 655 F.2d at 164. The Supreme Court in Burdine voiced similar concerns. The Court stated the articulated reasons must be “clear and specific” to rebut the prima facie case and guarantee that the plaintiff will be afforded “a full and fair opportunity” to demonstrate pretext. 450 U.S. at 253-256, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-1095. “Obviously the more subjective the qualification and the manner in which it is measured, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to meet the burden imposed by the court in Burdine.” Robbins, 642 F.2d at 156. Subjective employment evaluations, however, are not illegal per se. The ultimate issue in each case is whether the subjective criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action. Ramirez v. Hofheinz, 619 F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir.1980).

[*838] In the instant case the district court engaged in the probing analysis of Huddle’s evaluation process and concluded that the ultimate decision was not based on plaintiff’s sex. We cannot say that the subsidiary facts underlying the district court’s conclusion are clearly erroneous. Upon consideration of the briefs, the record, and the district court’s opinion, we affirm the judgment entered below. The explicit and probing character of United States District Court Judge Robert M. Duncan’s findings of fact greatly facilitated appellate review. Accordingly, it is so Ordered.