Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983).
Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitPublished opinionNo. 703, Dockets 82-7679, 82-7681May 12, 1983

Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.

Quick Summary

To establish waiver under New York law, a party must show the charged party relinquished a right with knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it.

A beneficiary of a letter of credit presented documents containing date discrepancies regarding the shipment of goods. The confirming bank advised the issuing bank that the documents conformed to the credit terms and stated that payment would be made at maturity. The beneficiary sued, alleging the bank waived its right to strict compliance. Under New York law, a waiver requires showing that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it. Because the beneficiary presented evidence that could establish the bank's intentional relinquishment of its right to demand strict compliance, summary judgment was improper.

147 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 30 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Cited for
At page 682Promoting certainty and facilitating prompt recoveries for beneficiaries16 citing cases[T]he bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction.4 citing courts put it this way · 15 listed here
  • Great Wall de Venezuela C.A. v. Interaudi Bank, 117 F. Supp. 3d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).published 3 cites
    ([T]he bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction.)
  • MSF Holding Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l, 435 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published 2 cites
    Ala. Textile Co., 982 F.2d at 816 (“There is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Voest- Alpine, 707 F.2d at 683 (“Documents nearly the same as those required…
  • Party Prods., LLC v. Spirit Realty, L.P., No. 25-50062 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 1, 2026).
    This concept is known as the “independence principle.” As explained further below, this independence promotes certainty and is intended to facilitate prompt recoveries to beneficiaries of a letter of credit. 33 Voest-Alpine International C…
  • Mago Int'l v. LBH AG, 833 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2016).published
    Literal compliance with the credit therefore is also essential so as not to impose an obligation upon the bank that it did not undertake and so as not to jeopardize the bank’s right to indemnity from its customer.” Voest-Alpine, 707 F.2d a…
  • 3com Corp. v. Banco Do Brasil, S.A., 171 F.3d 739 (2d Cir. 1999).published 2 cites
    See id. at 816 ; Voest-Alpine, 707 F.2d at 682-83.
  • E & H Partners v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 39 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published 4 cites
    For submissions under letters of credit, “[falsified documents are the same as no documents at all.” Voest-Alpine Int’l Corp., 707 F.2d at 686.
  • Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co. v. Chem. Bank (In re Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co.), 224 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).published 5 cites
    “the bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction”
  • Fed. Deposit Ins. v. United States Trust Co., 793 F. Supp. 368 (D. Mass. 1992).published
    “the bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying ... transaction”
  • Weyerhaeuser Co. v. UBAF Arab Am. Bank, 768 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).published
    Significantly, the bank’s obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction.” Voest-Alpine, 707 F.2d at 682.
  • Lines v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 743 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).published 4 cites
    “primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying ... transaction”
Show 5 more citing cases
  • Banque Worms v. Banque Commerciale Privee, 679 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).published 2 cites
    Cf. Voest-Alpine International Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir.1983) (“a confirming bank may waive the requirements contained in the credit without approval of either the issuing bank or its customer”).
  • Dessaleng Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 762 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1985).published
    The nature and functions of commercial letters of credit have recently been explored by this Court, see Voest-Alpine International Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 682-83 (2d Cir.1983); Marino Industries Corp. v. Chase Ma…
  • Sound of Mkt. Street, Inc. v. Cont'l Bank Int'l, 819 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1987).published
    In the ordinary letter of credit transaction, there are at least three distinct agreements: “the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary which gave rise to their resort to the letter of credit mechanism to arrange paym…
  • Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 596 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).published 2 cites
    See Voest-Alpine International Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680 , 684-85 (2d Cir.1983); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile National Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1237 (5th Cir.1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1139 , 94 S.Ct. 888 , 39 L.Ed.2…
  • Philadelphia Gear Corp v. Fed. Deposit Ins., 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984).published
At page 685Determining waiver of known rights under new york law14 citing casesTo establish waiver under New York law, one must show that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right and an intention to relinquish it.” (citing City of New York v. State of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 659, 669 (1976))5 citing courts put it this way
  • Mirza v. Orange Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 7:20-cv-00556 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2022).
    (To establish waiver under New York law one must show that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right and an intention to relinquish it.)
  • In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 544 B.R. 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).published 2 cites
    “intentional relinquishment of a known right”
  • Jordan v. Can You Imagine, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).published
    Voestr-Alpine International Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 685 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox, 3 N.Y.2d 395, 403 , 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 , 144 N.E.2d 387 (1957)).
  • Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co. v. Chem. Bank (In re Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co.), 224 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).published 5 cites
    Additionally, and perhaps most significant to the controversy here, “the bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction.”…
  • Semetex Corp. v. UBAF Arab Am. Bank, 853 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).published 3 cites
    “To establish waiver under New York law one must show that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right' and an intention to relinquish it.” Alaska Textile, 982 F.2d at 820 ; Voest-Al…
  • Bingham v. Zolt, 823 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
    See Christian Dior-New York, Inc. v. Koret, Inc., 792 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.1986); Voest-Alpine International Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 685 (2d Cir.1983); Rosenthal v. National Life Insurance Co., 486 F.Supp. 1018, 1…
  • Petra Int'l Banking Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 758 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Va. 1991).published
    (holding that confirming bank had either constructive or actual knowledge of its right to demand strict compliance with letters of credit)
  • Scherling v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (In re Tilston Roberts Corp.), 75 B.R. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).published
    (New York law requires knowledge of the existence of a right and an intention to relinquish it before waiver is established)
  • Christian Dior-New York, Inc. v. Koret, Inc., 792 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986).published
    “To establish waiver under New York law one must show that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right and an intention to relinquish it”
  • Marsala Int'l Trading Co. v. Comerica Bank, Inc., 976 P.2d 275 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).published
    “both knowledge of the existence of the right and intention to relinquish it”
Show 4 more citing cases
  • O'Quinn v. City of New York, No. 1:19-cv-09663 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025).
    (To establish waiver under New York law, one must show that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right and an intention to relinquish it.” (citing City of New Yo…)
  • Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corporations, 756 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).published
    See e.g., Voest-Alpine Int’l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680 , 685 (2d Cir.1983).
  • Wyeth v. King Pharm., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).published
    Portland Cement Works v. Degnon Contracting Co., 118 N.E. 210, 210 , 222 N.Y. 34, 37 (N.Y.1917); see also Voest-Alpine International Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 685 (2d Cir.1983). ‘Waiver cannot be created by neglige…
  • Gcca, LLC v. Maccg LLC, No. 1:21-cv-05022 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2024).
At page 686“falsified documents are the same as no documents at all.”8 citing cases2 citing courts quote it
At page 684Analyzing waiver of letter of credit terms5 citing casesa confirming bank may waive the requirements contained in the credit without approval of either the issuing bank or its customer1 citing court put it this way
  • Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co. v. Chem. Bank (In re Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co.), 224 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).published 5 cites
    Additionally, and perhaps most significant to the controversy here, “the bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction.”…
  • Banque Worms v. Banque Commerciale Privee, 679 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).published 2 cites
    (a confirming bank may waive the requirements contained in the credit without approval of either the issuing bank or its customer)
  • Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).published 3 cites
    It ruled that if the confirming bank waived material discrepancies in the drafts, the confirming bank would not be entitled to reimbursement from the issuing bank, which timely discovered the mistakes, because “the issuing bank[] was entit…
  • Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1984).published 3 cites
    However, Voest-Alpine indicates that an issuing bank is entitled to demand strict compliance with the confirming bank’s initial engagement to the ultimate beneficiary of the letter of credit, regardless of the confirming bank’s modificatio…
  • Trifinery v. Banque Paribas, 762 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).published 3 cites
    See Voest-Alpine, supra, 707 F.2d at 684-85; Marino Indus., supra, 686 F.2d at 117 .
At page 683Documents nearly the same as those required are not good enough.3 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • MSF Holding Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l, 435 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published 2 cites
    (Documents nearly the same as those required are not good enough.)
  • Brenntag Int'l Chemicals, Inc. v. Norddeutsche Landesbank GZ, 70 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).published 2 cites
    Under New York U.C.C § 5-114(2), Brenntag is entitled to relief if BOI’s demand for payment relates to a fraudulent transaction or is accompanied by false or forged documents, unless the holder of the documents received them under “circums…
  • Texpor Traders, Inc. v. Trust Co. Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).published
    Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances 73 (5th ed. 1974) (quoting Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, [1927] 27 Lloyds List 49, 52), cited with approval in Voest-Alpine, 707 F.2d at 683; Bank of Cochin, 612 F.Supp. at 1537 .
stating that where waiver is not established “directly, unmistakably or unequivocally,” issue of intent to waive right is “properly left to the trier of factno pin page on record · 1 citing case listed
  • Kroshnyi v. U.S. Pack Courier Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2014).published
    (stating that where waiver is not established “directly, unmistakably or unequivocally,” issue of intent to waive right is “properly left to the trier of fact)
Other citing cases12 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Show 2 more citing cases
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Voest-Alpine International Corporation, Cross-Appellee
v.
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Bank of Baroda, Third-Party Cross-Appellee
No. 703, Dockets 82-7679, 82-7681.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
May 12, 1983.
Published opinion
707 F.2d 680
1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28024
Christopher F. Meatto, New York City (Andrew Berger, Stanley T. Stairs, Breed, Stairs & Berger, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee., Andrew J. Connick, New York City (Eugene F. Farabaugh, Scott H. Wyner, Mil-bank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant., Robert A. Jaffe, New York City (Thomas W. Evans, Shari J. Levitan, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander, New York City, of counsel), for third-party defendant, crossappellee.
Cardamone, Davis, Feinberg.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves an interpretation of the law applied to commercial letters of credit. When analyzing that law the unique characteristics of a letter of credit must be kept firmly in mind. Otherwise, a court may unknowingly paint broadly over the letter of credit’s salient features and compromise its reliability and fluidity.

BACKGROUND

Originally devised to function in international trade, a letter of credit reduced the risk of nonpayment in cases where credit was extended to strangers in distant places. Interposing a known and solvent institution’s (usually a bank’s) credit for that of a foreign buyer in a sale of goods transaction accomplished this objective. See Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Functions, 94 Banking L.J. 816, 816-17 (1977) (Letters of Credit: Developing Concepts). A typical letter of credit transaction, as the case before us illustrates, involves three separate and independent relationships — an underlying sale of goods contract between buyer and seller, an agreement between a bank and its customer (buyer) in which the bank undertakes to issue a letter of credit, and the bank’s resulting engagement to pay the beneficiary (seller) providing that certain documents presented to the bank conform with the terms and conditions of the credit issued on its customer’s behalf. Significantly, the bank’s payment obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct and completely independent of any claims which may arise in the underlying sale of goods transaction.

Several distinct features characterize letters of credit. By conditioning payment solely upon the terms set forth in the letter of credit, the justifications for an issuing bank’s refusal to honor the credit are severely restricted, thereby assuring the reliability of letters of credit as a payment mechanism. Banks readily issue these instruments because they are simple in form. Hence, they are convenient and economical for a customer (buyer) to obtain. Further, employing concepts which underlie letters of credit in non-sale of goods transactions enables these devices to serve a financing function, see Letters of Credit: Developing Concepts at 818-19. And it is this flexibility that makes letters of credit adaptable to a broad range of commercial uses. See id. at 820-51; Note, Judicial Development of Letters of Credit Law: A Reappraisal, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 144, 146-47 (1980) (Judicial Development of Letters of Credit Law).

Letters of credit evolved as a mercantile specialty entirely separate from common law contract concepts and they must still be viewed as entities unto themselves. Completely .absorbed into the English common law by the 1700s along with the Law Merchant — of which it had become an integral part by the year 1200 — 2 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 570-72 (1922), letter of credit law found its way into American jurisprudence where it flourishes today. Its origins may be traced even more deeply into history. There is evidence letters of credit were used by bankers in Renaissance Europe, Imperial Rome, ancient Greece, Phoenicia and even early Egypt. See Trimble, The Law Merchant and The Letter of Credit, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 981, 982-85 (1948). These simple instruments survived despite their nearly 3000-year-old lineage because of their inherent reliability, convenience, economy and flexibility.

Since the great utility of letters of credit arises from the independent obligation of the issuing bank, attempts to avoid payment premised on extrinsic considerations — contrary to the instruments’ formal documentary nature — tend to compromise their chief virtue of predictable reliability as a payment mechanism. See Judicial Development of Letters of Credit Law at 160; Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations — Part 2, 94 Banking L.J. 493, 505-06 (1977). Viewed in this light it becomes clear that the doctrine of strict compliance with the terms of the letter of credit functions to protect the bank which carries the absolute obligation to pay the beneficiary. Adherence to this rule ensures[*683] that banks, dealing only in documents, will be able to act quickly, enhancing the letter of credit’s fluidity. Literal compliance with the credit therefore is also essential so as not to impose an obligation upon the bank that it did not undertake and so as not to jeopardize the bank’s right to indemnity from its customer. Documents nearly the same as those required are not good enough. See H. Harfield, Letters of Credit 51 (1979). See generally Marino Industries v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir.1982); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.1970).

We note that there is a distinction between rights obtained and obligations assumed under letter of credit concepts. While a party may not unilaterally alter its obligations, nothing in the purpose or function of letters of credit forecloses the party from giving up its rights.

FACTS

Metal Scrap Trading Corporation (MSTC) is an agency of the Indian government that had contracted to buy 7000 tons of scrap steel from Voest-Alpine International Corporation (Voest), a trading subsidiary of an Austrian company. In late 1980 MSTC asked the Bank of Baroda to issue two letters of credit in the total amount of $1,415,550 — one for $810,600 and the other $604,950 — to Voest to assure payment for the sale. The credits were expressly made subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.

The parties originally contemplated that Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (Chase or Bank) would serve as an advising bank in the transaction. As such, Chase was to review documents submitted by Voest in connection with its drafts for payment. Amendments to the letters of credit increased Chase’s responsibilities and changed its status to that of a confirming bank, independently obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation.

The contract between MSTC and Voest provided that Voest, as seller, would ship the scrap metal no later than January 31, 1981. The terms and conditions of the credits required proof of shipment, evidenced by clean-on-board bills of lading; certificates of inspection indicating date of shipment; and weight certificates issued by an independent inspector. Sometime between February 2 and February 6 (beyond the January 31 deadline), the cargo was partially loaded aboard the M.V. ATRA at New Haven. Unfortunately, the ATRA never set sail for India. A mutiny by the ship’s crew disabled the ship and rendered it unseaworthy. The scrap steel was later sold to another buyer for slightly over a half million dollars, nearly a million dollars less than the original contract price.

On February 13, two days before the expiration date of the credits, Voest presented three drafts with the required documentation to Chase. The documents contained what the district court termed “irreconcilable” inconsistencies. The bills of lading indicating receipt on board of the scrap metal were signed and dated January 31 by the captain of the ATRA. The weight and inspection certificates accompanying the drafts revealed, however, that the cargo was loaded aboard the ATRA sometime between February 2 and February 6.

Despite this glaring discrepancy Chase advised the Bank of Baroda on February 25 that the drafts and documents presented to it by Voest conformed to the terms and conditions set forth in the letters of credit. At Voest’s request (Chase having provided Voest with an advance copy of the advice it planned to forward to the Bank of Baroda), Chase added the following language: “PAYMENT OF ABOVE-MENTIONED DRAFT ... WILL BE MADE AT MATURITY ON JULY 30,1981, TO VOEST....” The Bank of Baroda apparently looked at the documents with more care than Chase. It promptly advised Chase that the documents did not comply with the requirements of the letters of credit, that it would therefore not honor the drafts, and that it would hold the documents at Chase’s disposal. When Voest presented the drafts for payment on July 30 Chase refused to honor them.

[*684] Voest thereupon instituted the present suit. It asserted that Chase waived the right to demand strict compliance with the terms of the credits and therefore wrongfully dishonored the drafts. Voest further alleged that regardless of whether the documents conformed to the letters of credit Chase was liable on the drafts because it accepted them. Chase, in turn, served a third-party complaint on the Bank of Baroda, alleging that were Chase to be held liable for wrongfully dishonoring the drafts, the Bank of Baroda should be liable to Chase in the same amount. In granting summary judgment against Voest the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Duffy, J.), 545 F.Supp. 301, found that Chase had not waived compliance with the terms and conditions of the letters of credit and that the drafts had not been wrongfully dishonored. The district court also rejected Chase’s affirmative defense that Voest committed fraud in presenting documents which contained such obvious discrepancies. Voest has appealed from the order insofar as it granted summary judgment against it and Chase has cross-appealed from that part of the order which dismissed its third-party complaint against the Bank of Baroda.

DISCUSSION

I. Waiver

Voest urges that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed factual issues as to whether Chase accepted the documents submitted and, if so, thereby waived any deficiencies in them. Chase contends that a waiver analysis is inappropriate because the defects in Voest’s documentation were “incurable.” In urging that such defects preclude any waiver on its part, Chase relies upon Flagship Cruises Ltd. v. New England Merchants National Bank of Boston, 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir.1978) and American Employers Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Bank and Trust Co., 538 F.Supp. 1354 (N.D.Ill.1981). These cases afford the Bank little comfort. In neither case was there any indication that the issuing or confirming bank accepted defective or untimely documents.

Two other cases including a decision of this Court have indicated that the terms and conditions of a letter of credit may be waived. In Marino Industries Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d at 117, one of the questions raised was whether an official of Chase, with apparent authority to act, had waived the expiration date of a letter of credit. Since that issue had not been resolved by the trial court the case was remanded for further consideration. By remanding on the waiver issue, the Marino court impliedly approved a waiver analysis even though it reaffirmed its adherence to the rule of strict compliance expressed in Venizelos, S.A., 425 F.2d at 465. Moreover, the Court apparently recognized that a confirming bank may waive the requirements contained in the credit without approval of either the issuing bank or its customer who originally established the credit. Id. In the instant case Chase could have waived the right to demand strict compliance without approval from either the Bank of Baroda or MSTC.

In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir.1977), Chase, as beneficiary of a letter of credit, contended that its untimely presentation of documents resulted from an agreement with the issuing bank (Equibank) to extend the time beyond that specified in the credit. The Third Circuit held that the possibility of a waiver of the time requirement by Equibank existed. The court stated that in such instances the “beneficiary bases his claim on the letter of credit as modified by the bank and acceptable to him.” Equibank, 550 F.2d at 886. The court noted that such a waiver merely jeopardizes a bank’s right to reimbursement from its customer, in the case of an issuing bank, see Courtaulds North American, Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 806 (4th Cir.1975), or from the issuing bank, in the case of a confirming bank. Id. at 886-87 & n. 6.

Chase argues that Equibank is distinguishable because in that case the defects were arguably curable while in the present case they are not. Chase contends that[*685] incurability of defect defeats any possibility of waiver. We reject this argument because it is totally at odds with the concept of waiver, which is defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Whether or not a defect can be cured is irrelevant, for it is the right to demand an absence of defects that the party is deemed to have relinquished.

Since a waiver by Chase of the inconsistencies in the documents is possible, we must determine whether Voest presented sufficient evidence which, if believed,'could establish a waiver. As proof of waiver Voest relies most heavily on deposition testimony by the Chase official who inspected the documents that he “must have noticed” the discrepancy between the dates in the documents. Other evidence of waiver included: an initialed approval of the documents by a Chase official on. the Voest letter which accompanied the presentation of the documents; a letter from Voest to Bank of Baroda, allegedly co-authored by a Chase official, stating that the documents had been accepted; the statement which appeared at the bottom of Chase’s advice to Bank of Baroda that payment of the draft would occur on July 30; and a deposition by a Voest official in which he quotes an unknown Chase employee as stating that Chase had accepted the drafts and that payment would definitely be forthcoming.

All parties seem to agree that New York law governs. To establish waiver under New York law one must show that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right and an intention to relinquish it. See City of New York v. State of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 659, 669, 389 N.Y.S.2d 332, 357 N.E.2d 988 (1976); Werking v. Amity Estates, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 43, 52, 155 N.Y.S.2d 633, 137 N.E.2d 321 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 933, 77 S.Ct. 812, 1 L.Ed.2d 756 (1957). There is little doubt that Voest sufficiently established Chase’s knowledge of an existing right. Chase clearly had the right to demand strict compliance with the specifications required by the letters of credit, and since it is an established commercial bank we may assume that it had constructive, if not actual, knowledge of that right, see Barry-Dorn, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 74 Civ. 5526 (S.D.N.Y. October 30, 1978) (constructive knowledge of right sufficient), aff’d, 607 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.1979); Zeldman v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 269 A.D. 53, 53 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dep’t 1945) (same). The remaining question is whether that right had been intentionally relinquished.

The intention to relinquish a right may be established either as a matter of law or fact. Examples of the former include instances of express declarations by a party or situations where the party’s undisputed acts or language are “so inconsistent with his purpose to stand upon his rights as to leave no opportunity for a reasonable inference to the contrary.” Alsens American Portland Cement Works v. Degnon Contracting Co., 222 N.Y. 34, 37, 118 N.E. 210 (1917). More commonly, intention is proved through declarations, acts and nonfeasance which permit different inferences to be drawn and “do not directly, unmistakably or unequivocally establish it.” Id. In these instances intent is properly left to the trier of fact. See id.; Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox, 3 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 144 N.E.2d 387 (1957); see, e.g., Barry-Dorn, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., supra.

Claims by a beneficiary of a letter of credit that a bank has waived strict compliance with the terms of the credit should generally be viewed with a somewhat wary eye. As noted earlier, if equitable waiver claims are treated too hospitably by courts, letters of credit may become less useful payment devices because of the increased risk of forfeiting the right to reimbursement from their customers which banks would soon face. Nonetheless, because Voest offered evidence which, if believed by the trier of fact, could establish the requisite intentional relinquishment of Chase’s right to insist on strict compliance, summary judgment was inappropriately granted to Chase in this case.

II. Acceptance

Having discussed Voest’s claim that Chase waived strict compliance, we turn to[*686] Voest’s contention that Chase “accepted” the drafts drawn under the letters of credit. The issue is specifically addressed by Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 3-410. This section states that acceptance is the drawee’s signed engagement to honor the draft as presented and that it “must be written on the draft.” The official comment acknowledges that § 3-410 was intended to eliminate “virtual” acceptances by written promise to accept a draft still to be drawn and “collateral” acceptances proved by separate writing. By requiring written acceptance on the draft the U.C.C. impliedly eliminated oral acceptances as well. Id. The present record is silent as to whether Chase actually accepted the drafts by proper notation on them. Since this issue was not ruled on by the district court, it should be remanded for further consideration.

III. Fraud

Presentation of fraudulent documents to a bank by a beneficiary subverts not only the purposes which letters of credit are designed to serve in general, but also the entire transaction at hand in particular. Falsified documents are the same as no documents at all. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers’ Title & Trust Co., 297 F. 152, 158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 585, 44 S.Ct. 459, 68 L.Ed. 1192 (1924); Prutscher v. Fidelity International Bank, 502 F.Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.1980). We are not persuaded upon the present record, as was the trial court, that Voest did not intend to deceive Chase when it submitted deliberately backdated documents falsely indicating compliance with the terms of the credits in order to have the documents accepted. Since Chase has raised a sufficient question of fact regarding fraud, a trial of this issue is mandated. If it is found that fraud on the part of Voest caused Chase to act, then Voest would be estopped from claiming any benefit accruing to it from its misconduct.

IV. Chase’s Cross-Appeal

Finally, we affirm the judgment in favor of the Bank of Baroda. All parties have acknowledged that the documents tendered Chase did not conform to the established terms and conditions of the letters of credit. The Bank of Baroda, as the issuing bank, was entitled to strict compliance and there is no claim that it waived that right. Further, Chase itself has acknowledged that its cross-appeal has been rendered academic in light of Voest’s admission regarding the nonconformity of the documents.

CONCLUSION

This case must be remanded to determine the factual issues raised by the claims of waiver, acceptance and fraud. The order appealed from is thus affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.