green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
36.5 score
“that collateral estoppel may apply to subsidiary facts actually litigated and necessarily decided- represents the predominant view of the other circuits that have considered the issue”
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Francine Klingman v. Melvin E. Levinson
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
that collateral estoppel may apply to subsidiary facts actually litigated and necessarily decided- represents the predominant view of the other circuits that have considered the issue
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Evans v. Marshall
Tex. Oct. 13, 2017); Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Century Recovery, LLC as assignee of Progress Sola v. Long
Tex. Oct. 13, 2017); Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
EBE, Inc., d/b/a EBE Technologies v. Wilhelms
Tex. Oct. 13, 2017); Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Veritas Vincit, LLC v. Brown
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284, n.11 (1991); Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Silver Dollar Sales, Inc. v. Olson
In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Samuel C. LeBlanc, Jr.
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1984)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Clay v. Whitten
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Francisco Garcia Huizar, III - Adversary Proceeding
Grogan, 498 U.S. at 285 n.11 (1991); Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stephen C Jenkins - Adversary Proceeding
By its very nature, the first element – “full and fair litigation” of relevant facts – requires actual litigation of such facts, and “[a]s a general rule, an issue is ‘actually litigated’ only when it is properly raised by the pleadings, submitted for a determination, and actually determined.”47 With this in mind, because under Texas law a defendant who fails to answer a state court petition is deemed to have admitted all properly pled factual allegations within the petition with respect to 43 Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Shul…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Anh Van Dang v. Gilbert (In re Anh Van Dang)
In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Tomlin, 2005 WL 6440629 (Bankr.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kahkeshani v. Hann (In re Hann)
The Poston court held, “The recitals and conclusions contained in the state court default judgment, therefore, must be supported by ‘detailed facts sufficient as findings to meet the federal test of nondisehargeability’ and allow the bankruptcy court ‘to discern from the record the subsidiary facts upon which the false pretense allegation was made.’” Id. at 869 (quoting Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1984).) IV.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Weatherall Radiation Oncology v. Caletri (In re Caletri)
Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1984); citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 , 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Offiiong v. Holder
While the broader “doctrine of res judicata forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously, collateral estoppel treats as final only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.” In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 , 139 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2205 , 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979)), cert, denied sub nom.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Berry v. Vollbracht (In Re Vollbracht)
We describe our reasoning in further detail in the text. 9 See, e.g., White v. World Finance of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1981) (defining collateral estoppel as issue preclusion). 10 See, e.g., id. at 150 (defining “true res judicata” as “claim preclusion”). 4 No. 06-60619 necessarily decided in a prior suit . . . .”11 yet we have also recognized the modern tendency to address the two issues under the broader term of “res judicata.”12 In the Fifth Circuit, we generally apply collateral estoppel when “(I) the issue to be precluded [is] identical to that involve…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Deere & Co. v. Dickerson (In Re Dickerson)
Second, in In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (1984), the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel may be invoked in a dischargeability action, but stated that the bankruptcy court is not bound by the earlier determination and, in fact, retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability of a debt.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cal-Bay International, Inc. v. Supertrail Manufacturing Co.
Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 114 (5th Cir.1993) (citing In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256, n. 2 (5th Cir.1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Colorado West Transportation Co. v. McMahon
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1984). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re McMahon
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1984). [5] See, e.g., Capital One Bank v. Bungert (In re Bungert), 315 B.R. 735 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.2004); FDS National Bank v. Alam (In re Alam), 314 B.R. 834 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004); Fleet Credit Card Svcs., L.P. v. Kendrick (In re Kendrick), 314 B.R. 468 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004); Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Brobsten (In re Brobsten), 2001 WL 34076352 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rain Bird Corp. v. Milton (In Re Milton)
Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 114 (5th Cir.1993) (citing In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256, n. 2 (5th Cir.1984)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rainey v. Davenport (In Re Davenport)
The Fifth Circuit has pointed out that “Congress intended to give the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine bankruptcy dischargeability issues.” In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1254 (5th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lincoln Trust Custodian FBO Wendell William Mercer No. 61067486 v. Parker (In Re Parker)
Cf. Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that a judge “must necessarily tailor his application of collateral estoppel to the circumstances of the case before him, consistent with its purposes and the countervailing intent of Congress”); In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089 , 1094-95 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that dischargeability is within the province of the bankruptcy court, which should not abdicate its authority lightly).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gilleylen v. Evans (In Re Evans)
Second, in In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984), the Fifth Circuit stated that collateral estoppel may be invoked in a dischargeability action, but held that the bankruptcy court is not bound by the earlier determination and, in fact, retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability of a debt.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sanders v. Nunley (In Re Nunley)
Second, in In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984), the Fifth Circuit stated that collateral estoppel may be invoked in a dischargeability action, but held that the bankruptcy court is not bound by the earlier determination and, in fact, retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability of a debt.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Angus v. Wald (In Re Wald)
Id. at 1258-1259 (footnote and internal parentheticals omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gober v. Terra + Corporation
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Simpson and Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Read v. Read (In re Read)
The debt- or cites the following language from Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1994) in support of this proposition: To be sure, “[t]he ultimate finding of whether [a debt is nondischargeable, as ‘defined’ by the bankruptcy law] is solely [in] the province of the bankruptcy court.” In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984) (quoting Franks v. Thomason, 4 B.R. 814, 820-21 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1980)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In the Matter of Lebaron Dennis, Debtor. Lebaron Dennis v. Audrey H. Dennis, A/K/A Joyce Dennis
To be sure, “[t]he ultimate finding of whether [a debt is nondischargeable, as ‘defined’ by the bankruptcy law] is solely [in] the province of the bankruptcy court.” In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984) (quoting Franks v. Thomason, 4 B.R. 814, 820-21 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1980)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Dennis
To be sure, "[t]he ultimate finding of whether [a debt is nondischargeable, as "defined' by the bankruptcy law] is solely [in] the province of the bankruptcy court." In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.), 5 This is not only a clearly established principle in this Circuit, but no other circuit to review this issue has ever taken a contrary view.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Union National Bank of Marseilles v. Leigh (In Re Leigh)
In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-1258 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tway v. Tway (In Re Tway)
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Simpson Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir.1981); In re Lombard, 739 F.2d 499 , 502 (10th Cir.1984); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 604 (10th Cir.1983). 7 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Crain v. Limbaugh (In Re Limbaugh)
(2×)
Shuler, supra at 1255-1256. 8 Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir.1979) provides guidance in interpreting the “actually litigated” requirement of collateral estoppel 9 , declining to interpret the requirement expansively.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Evans v. Dunston (In Re Dunston)
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Thompson Ex Rel. Snell v. Turner (In Re Turner)
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
In Lacy, the Fifth Circuit stated, “in In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984), we held that where the record of the state proceeding reflects ‘specific false pretense conduct, by which the federal bankruptcy court might determine the creditor’s claim for nondis-chargeability, measured by federal bankruptcy standards’ collateral estoppel can be applied to a default judgment.” Lacy, 947 F.2d at 1277 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Namer
Grogan v. Garner, 495 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 654 , 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (collateral estoppel applies to estab *609 lish discharge exception under § 523(a)(2)(A) based on prior judgment for violation of antifraud statute [like FTC Act] with preponderance-of-evidence proof standard), citing In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); see also, In re Chapman, 125 B.R. 284, 286 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (enumerating the above-stated collateral estoppel elements for § 523 discharge exception). 16.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Stanley v. Cole (In Re Cole)
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. L. Rep. P 74,343 in Re Ben F. Lacy, Debtor. Ben F. Lacy v. Don Dorsey
In Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984), we held that where the record of the state proceeding reflects “specific false-pretense conduct, by which the federal bankruptcy court might determine the creditor’s claim for nondischargeability, measured by federal bankruptcy standards” collateral estoppel can be applied to a default judgment.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Canganelli v. Lake County Indiana Department of Public Welfare (In Re Canganelli)
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Compare In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir.) (a prior state court judgment has no collateral estoppel force on a bankruptcy court considering dischargeability, but may establish a prima facie case of nondischarge-ability), cer t. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 313 , 70 L.Ed.2d 157 (1981); with Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.) ("collateral estoppel may apply to subsidiary facts actually litigated and necessarily decided”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 602-04 (10th Cir.1983), and Matter of Ross, 602 F.2d 604…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Punton v. Chapman (In Re Chapman)
Grogan v. Garner, supra; In re Tilbury, 74 B.R. 73 (9th Cir. BAP 1987); In re Wallace, 840 F.2d 762 (10th Cir.1988); Harold v. Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir.1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cablevision Systems Corp. v. Cohen (In Re Cohen)
Simpson & Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); Spillman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir.1981); Ma tter of Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 607-08 (3rd Cir.1979); contra, Gregg v. Rahm (In re Rahm), 641 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 313 , 70 L.Ed.2d 157 (1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,521 in the Matter Of: Brian Carl Foreman, Debtor. Allstate Insurance Company v. Brian Foreman
After all, this circuit has previously held that "[collateral estoppel— arising from an earlier nonbankruptcy suit’s determination of subsidiary facts that were actually litigated and necessary to the decision— may properly be invoked by the bankruptcy court to bar relitigation of those issues, even through the bankruptcy court retains the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability under federal bankruptcy law of the debt, upon the facts so based and other evidence before the court.” In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pasada Del Rey v. Pearson (In Re Pearson)
(2×)
In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); In re Church, 69 B.R. 425 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1987); In re McDonald, 73 B.R. 877 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Associated Growers, Inc. v. Horowitz (In Re Horowitz)
Second, in In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984), the Fifth Circuit stated that collateral estoppel may be invoked in a dischargeability action, but held that the bankruptcy court is not bound by the earlier determination and, in fact, retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability of a debt.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Graham v. Billings (In Re Billings)
Simpson and Company v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir.1981); Matter of Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 607-08 (3rd Cir.1979); Contra., Gregg v. Rahm (In re Rahm), 641 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 313 , 70 L.Ed.2d 157 (1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. Wilde (In Re Walker)
In re Wallace, 840 F.2d 762, 765 (10th Cir.1988) (citing In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.1984); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 604 (10 Cir.1983); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir.1981); see also In re Lombard, 739 F.2d 499 , 502 (10th Cir.1984)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Zervas v. Nix (In Re Nix)
The law in this Circuit has been enunciated in In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984) “that collateral estoppel — arising from an earlier non-bankruptcy suit’s determination of subsidiary facts that were actually litigated and necessary to the decision — may properly be invoked by the bankruptcy court to bar relitigation of those issues, even though the bankruptcy court retains the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability under federal bankruptcy law of the debt, upon th…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kwiat v. Doucette
See, e.g., Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir.1987) (“Where a state court determines factual questions using the same standards as the bankruptcy court would use, collateral es-toppel should be applied to promote judicial economy by encouraging the parties to present their strongest arguments”); In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (5th Cir.1984) (noting that the bankruptcy court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of dischargeability); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227-28 (6th Cir.1981); In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir.1979); cf. In r…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Epic Realty Services, Inc. v. Turner (In re Turner)
See also Matter of Lombard, 739 F.2d 499, 502 (10th Cir.1984); 469 U.S. 1086 (1984); Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 85 , 83 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Daves (In re Daves)
The Fifth Circuit has agreed finding that: “... collateral estoppel-arising from an earlier nonbankruptcy suit’s determination of subsidiary facts that were actually litigated and necessary to the decision — may properly be invoked by the bankruptcy court to bar relitigation of those issues, even though the bankruptcy court retains the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of the dischargeability under federal bankruptcy law of the debt, upon the facts so based and other evidence before the court.” Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dodson v. Church (In Re Church)
The Supreme Court, in Brown , stated: If, in the course of adjudicating a state-law question, a state court should determine factual issues using standards identical to those of sec. 17 [of the Bankruptcy Act, similar to sec. 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, see, Matter of Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1984)] then collateral estoppel, in the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar re-litigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Richard G. Wentworth, Vultron, Inc. And Transign, Inc., Cross-Appellants
v.
Gulton Industries, Inc., Cross-Appellee
v.
Gulton Industries, Inc., Cross-Appellee
82-1475.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jan 20, 1984.
Published
Richard G. WENTWORTH, Vultron, Inc. and Transign, Inc.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees Cross-Appellants,
v.
GULTON INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.
No. 82-1475.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 20, 1984.
Richards, Harris & Medlock, Roger C. Clapp, Dallas, Tex., Darby & Darby, Morris Relson, William E. Pelton, New York City, for defendant-appellant cross-appellee.
Reising, Ethington, Barnard, Perry & Milton, Owen E. Perry, Paul J. Ethington, Troy, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellees cross-appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge.
Before BROWN, REAVLEY, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
[*~1253]1
The judgment of the district court is affirmed on the grounds and for the reasons given in that court's opinion at 578 F.Supp. 508.
[*~1257]2
AFFIRMED.