green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
46.1 score
“under the 'automobile exception' then, the police conduct in moving lopez from interstate 40 to the santa rosa state police office is proper if it was supported by probable cause.”
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Christopher Maya Caballero v. Travis Braswell, Individually, Kyle Admire, Individually, Dustin Tiner, Individually, Bethany Hibbs, Individually
probable cause must be evaluated in relation to the circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious and trained police officer.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Ibarra
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
holding the odor of 'an ether-like substance' in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Anderson
under the 'automobile exception' then, the police conduct in moving lopez from interstate 40 to the santa rosa state police office is proper if it was supported by probable cause.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hal Edwards v. City of Leadville
Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-99 (1981); In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “critical component of the [attorney-client] privilege ‘is whether the communication between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence’”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Maturin v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.
Wyo. 2016) (citing, among others, United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Utah First Federal Credit Union v. University First Federal Credit Union
Defendant has thus waived the attorney-client privilege for the documents sought by Plaintiff’s Motion unless one of the three exceptions Defendant invokes applies: the joint client doctrine, the functional 61 Id. (quoting Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 , 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1995)). 62 Id. (quoting United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998)). 63 Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)). 64 Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985)). 65 Id. (quoting United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 , 741 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Schroeder v. Hutchinson Regional Medical Center
"Under the common law, a critical component of the privilege 'is whether the communication between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence.'" In re Qwest, 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garcia v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana
For these reasons, and mindful that “[t]he party seeking to assert a privilege has the burden of establishing its applicability,” United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985), the Court is not persuaded that Defendant’s stated purpose in crafting the mortality review report was to the exclusion of other apparently applicable and non-discretionary purposes.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hedquist v. Patterson
Cir. 2014); In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (2000); Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney Client-Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 35 (3d ed. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lozado
See Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786 (finding the de-clarant made statements against his penal interest because the statements were “sufficiently against [the declarant’s] penal in *1130 terest such that no reasonable person would say those things without believing them to be true,” and “[u]nder the circumstances presented, a reasonable person would not falsely admit to participating in [the victim’s] murder aware of the possibility, however slight, that such admission could subject him to criminal prosecution and punishment”); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (10th Cir.1985) (“W…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martensen v. Koch
Under the common law, “a critical component of the privilege ‘is whether the communication between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence.’ ” In re Qwest Communications International, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bernacet
“The law does not require the police to ignore evidence of other crimes in conducting legitimate roadblocks.” United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir.1985); see also United *274 States v. Morales, 788 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
New Jersey v. Sprint Corp.
Under the common law, a critical component of the privilege “is whether the communication between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence.” United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kansas City Board of Public Utilities
Under the common law, a critical component of the privilege “is whether the communication between the client and the attorney is máde in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence.” United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Estrada
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 , 52 n. 10, 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (observing that it "was not unreasonable ... to take the car to the station house”); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir.1994) ("[T]he justification to conduct a warrantless search under the automobile exception does not disappear merely because the car has been immobilized and impounded.”); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir.1985) ("Under the 'automobile exception' then, the police conduct in moving Lopez from Interstate 40 to the Santa Rosa State Police office is…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Qwest Communications International Inc.
Under the common law, a critical component of the privilege “is whether the communication between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence.” United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Schoonover
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir. 1985) (fire odor of a legal substance, “an ether-like substance,” in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Fenstermaker
The facts and circumstances must warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been or will be committed.” United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir.1986)(citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir.1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Molina
See e.g., United States v. Wilson, 96 Fed.Appx. 640, 647 , 2004 WL 928270 , *7 (10th Cir.2004) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer noted ether-like odor, knew defendant was suspected of involvement in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and saw a covered object between defendant’s feet large enough to contain implements used to manufacture methamphetamine); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir.1989) (holding the odor of Patchouli oil, the officer’s knowledge that the oil was often used to mask the odor of illegal drugs, and the officer’s learning from the DEA that …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Wilson
(2×)
See United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding the odor of Patchouli oil, the officer’s knowledge that the oil was often used to mask the odor of illegal drugs, and the officer’s learning from the -17- DEA that the driver was suspected of involvement in drug smuggling gave rise to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding the odor of “an ether-like substance” in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Oliver
(2×)
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir.1985) (absent an exception to the warrant requirement, “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Paul
See United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1367 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 , 119 S.Ct. 236 , 142 L.Ed.2d 194 (1998) (finding statement “go ahead” provided specific and unequivocal consent when given in direct response to a search request); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (finding defendants gave specific and unequivocal consent in response to search request where they told officers they had “nothing to hide” and then “stood by and watched as the officers searched the vehicle and at no time objected”); see also United States v. Patten, 183 F…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez
(2×)
Cf. United States v. Sukiz-Grado, 22 F.3d 1006, 1009 (10th Cir.1994) (referral to secondary for a dog sniff held lawful following agent's having noticed a temporary license tag, the driver having said that the car belonged to a friend, the agent having noticed the driver's nervousness, and after the driver gave permission at primary to a dog sniff of the exterior of the car); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him a…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Salais-Perea
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
O'Hearon v. Castleview
For many of the questions to which this objection was lodged, however, the elicited information -8- was not related to “communication between the client and the attorney . . . made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence.” United States v. Lopez , 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Louise L. O'hearon, Cross-Appellee v. Castleview Hospital and Anna Mae Perez
For many of the questions to which this objection was lodged, however, the elicited information was not related to "communication between the client and the attorney ... made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence." United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mendez
See, e.g., Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1062 (where observation of “fresh tool marks on the gas tank” led to the discovery of a drug-filled compartment in the gas tank); United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1512 (10th Cir.1990) (where “loose, crooked and missing screws on the interior molding” led officer to discover cocaine in the quarter panel); United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir.1988) (where presence of bondo and glued-down carpeting led to discovery of cocaine under trunk’s carpeting); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.1986) (drugs found …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jasso-Trevino
United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890-92 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 546-48 (10th Cir.1985)). -12- Because we find no unlawful detention, search or seizure, Mr. Jasso- Trevino's argument his statements to Immigration and Naturalization Services agents are inadmissible "fruit of the poisonous tree" must fail.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Juan Francisco Jasso-Trevino
United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890-92 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 546-48 (10th Cir.1985)). 21 Because we find no unlawful detention, search or seizure, Mr. Jasso-Trevino's argument his statements to Immigration and Naturalization Services agents are inadmissible "fruit of the poisonous tree" must fail. 22 AFFIRMED.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pueblo v. Yip Berríos
(2×)
De forma cons-tante, la Corte de Apelaciones de Estados Unidos para el Décimo Circuito encontró razonable un bloqueo similar que llevó a un registro comparable del vehículo en United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 856-857 (10mo Cir. 1981); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10mo Cir. 1984), y United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10mo Cir. 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Barrera
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (C.A.10, 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marta M. MOTLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARATHON OIL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Motley v. Marathon Oil Company
United States v. Lopez , 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. George David McManus
See United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir.1975) (NCIC check justified when officer observed various scratches and marks surrounding the VIN plate on car); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 546-48 (10th Cir.1985) (NCIC cheek warranted when out-of-state automobile was not registered in name of either passenger); United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 , 108 S.Ct. 82 , 98 L.Ed.2d 45 (1987) (NCIC check authorized when driver’s license and registration did not match).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. George David McManus
See United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir. 1975) (NCIC check justified when officer observed various scratches and marks surrounding the VIN plate on car); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 546-48 (10th Cir. 1985) (NCIC check warranted when out-of-state automobile was not registered in name of either passenger); United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987) (NCIC check authorized when driver's license and registration did not match).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Shoulderblade
(2×)
See United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 , 108 S.Ct. 2820 , 100 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 , 102 S.Ct. 130 , 70 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Donald Albert Massie and Carson Lewis
See United States v. Gonzalez-Acosta, 989 F.2d 384, 387-88 (10th Cir.1993) (in stop at fixed checkpoint, agents not limited to inquiring into the immigration-related reason supporting the initial detention); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.1986) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to close their eyes to suspicious circumstances.”); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir.1985) (“The law does not require the police to ignore evidence of other crimes in conducting legitimate roadblocks.... ”); cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pueblo v. Santiago Alicea
Al examinar el ambiente en el cual se prestó el consenti-miento, los tribunales deben examinar si la persona que con-sintió: “(1) estaba detenida o fue interrogada por un período largo o corto de tiempo, Bustamonte , 412 U.S., pág. 226, 93 S.Ct., pág. 2047; (2) si fue amenazada, intimidada físicamente, o maltratada por la policía, Watson, 423 U.S., pág. 424, 96 S.Ct. pág. 828; Bustamonte , 412 U.S., pág. 226, 93 S.Ct., pág. 2047; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1961); Laing , 891 F.2d, pág. 686; (3) si descansó en promesas o falsas representaciones rea-lizadas por la policí…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hampton v. Director of Revenue
Whether a law enforcement officer had probable cause to make an arrest must be determined “in relation to the circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, and trained police officer.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir.1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chinnery v. Director of Revenue
The determination of whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest must be made “in relation to the circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, and trained police officer.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir.1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. State
(2×)
United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1393 (10th Cir.1987), ce rt. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 , 108 S.Ct. 2820 , 100 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547-48 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Annette Gonzalez-Acosta
Thus, she claims the marijuana seized by the agents must be “suppressed as a fruit of her unlawful detention.” The standard of review for denial of a motion to suppress “is well established.” United States v. Benitez, 899 F.2d 995, 997 (10th Cir.1990). “[T]he trial court’s finding of fact must be accepted by this court unless clearly erroneous, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s finding.” United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.1986) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Isidro Aispuro-Angulo
See Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(5) (a declarant is unavailable if he or she is "absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance ... by process or other reasonable means"); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (10th Cir.1985). 10 To meet the second requirement for admission under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3), "the statement must so clearly implicate the declarant that a reasonable person 'would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.' " United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 , 1310-11 n. 1 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Fed.R.E…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Wayne David Simms
Therefore, defendant claims his referral to the secondary for drug-related reasons was constitutionally permissible only if supported by reasonable suspicion. 5 "In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's finding of fact must be accepted by this court unless clearly erroneous." United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Leroy Merritt
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985). 6 The record reveals that Tulsa police officers observed the defendant staggering down the street.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. McKneely
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Efrain Grageda-Mendoza
United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Two & 43/100 Dollars ($149,442.43) in United States Currency
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 , 104 S.Ct. 3543 , 82 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Two and 43 100 Dollars
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 , 104 S.Ct. 3543 , 82 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Manuel M. Saavedra and Sylvia L. Saavedra
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Dario Dicesare, United States of America v. Kathleen Flannery, United States of America v. Jose Marin
v.
Dario Dicesare, United States of America v. Kathleen Flannery, United States of America v. Jose Marin
85-5021.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Dec 2, 1985.
777 F.2d 543
Published
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Dario DiCESARE, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Kathleen FLANNERY, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jose MARIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 84-5013, 85-5021 and 84-5056.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Dec. 2, 1985.
Christine W.S. Byrd, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Stanley I. Greenberg, Los Angeles, Cal., Manuel Araujo, Santa Ana, Cal., for defendants-appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before GOODWIN, WALLACE, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AMENDING OPINION
[*~543]1
The opinion filed in the above case on July 10, 1985, and reported at 765 F.2d 890, is amended as follows:
[*~544]2
The second full paragraph, left hand column, on page 901 of 765 F.2d is hereby deleted, and the following is inserted in its place:
[*~553]3
We affirm DiCesare's conviction and vacate Marin's conviction and remand for a new trial. Since Flannery entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to rule 11(a)(2), Fed.R.Crim.P., and has prevailed on appeal from the district court's denial of her pretrial motions for evidentiary hearings on the August and September entries, we vacate her conviction and remand so that she may withdraw her conditional guilty plea and stand trial. Since we find no merit to any of Flannery's other assigned errors, if she does not withdraw her plea and the district court finds, after a hearing, that the officers complied with the knock and announce statute or that their compliance was excused, the district court may re-enter the judgment of her conviction.