Chester R. Fultz v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney Gen. Kentucky Court of Appeals Dewey Sowders, Warden J. Kirk Griggs, Ii, Pub. Def. David L. Knox, Judge Thomas F. Towles, Pub. Def. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy, 907 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
Search
Chester R. Fultz v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney Gen. Kentucky Court of Appeals Dewey Sowders, Warden J. Kirk Griggs, Ii, Pub. Def. David L. Knox, Judge Thomas F. Towles, Pub. Def. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy, 907 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
50 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Klorer v. Bennett (ca6, 1990-07-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Klorer v. Bennett (2×)
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Bennett will agree to assign his franchise rights to this unit to the operating corporation." Id. at 298.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hunt v. Licking County Sheriff Randy Thorp
S.D. Ohio · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Dixon court explained this test as follows: In Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2002), we reiterated, “the general rule in this circuit . . . that the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted); see also Bray v. Palm Beach Co., 907 F.2d 150 , 1990 WL 92672, at *2 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding “the facts alleged in the body of the EEOC charge, rather than merely the boxes that are marked on the charge, are the major determi…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Zickefoose v. Austin
S.D. Ohio · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
That standard is the “expected scope of the investigation” test, which the Sixth Circuit has explained as follows: In Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2002), we reiterated, “the general rule in this circuit . . . that the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted); see also Bray v. Palm Beach Co., 907 F.2d 150 , 1990 WL 92672, at *2 (6th Cir. June 29, 1990) (finding “the facts alleged in the body of the EEOC charge, r…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Murphy v. Magna Seating of America, Inc.
E.D. Mich. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Sixth Circuit has further explained the “reasonably related” rule as follows: In Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2002), we reiterated, “the general rule in this circuit ... that the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted); see also Bray v. Palm Beach Co., 907 F.2d 150 , 1990 WL 92672, at *2 (6th Cir. June 29, 1990) (finding “the facts alleged in the body of the EEOC charge, rather than merely the boxes that ar…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dixon v. Ashcroft
6th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
In Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367 (6th Cir.2002), we reiterated, “the general rule in this circuit ... that the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted); see also Bray v. Palm Beach Co., 907 F.2d 150 , 1990 WL 92672, at *2 (6th Cir. June 29, 1990) (finding “the facts alleged in the body of the EEOC charge, rather than merely the boxes that are marked on the charge, are the major determinants of the scope of the charge”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dixon v. Ashcroft
6th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
Plaintiff-Appellant concedes that he did not check the "Reprisal" box on the Complaint of Discrimination; however, in this Circuit, that failure is not dispositive of whether Dixon exhausted his administrative remedies. 24 In Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367 (6th Cir.2002), we reiterated, "the general rule in this circuit ... that the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted); see also Bray v. Palm Beach Co., 907 F.2d 150 , 1990 WL 9267…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Green v. United States Ex Rel. Department of Agriculture
W.D. Mich. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court applied the four-part test set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), to determine whether an implied right of action exists and held that “we can find no intent to create a private right of action.” Lundstrum, 954 F.2d at 1145 ; see also Frick v. United States, 907 F.2d 150 , 1990 WL 94209, at *3 (6th Cir.1990)(per curiam)(finding no explicit or implicit intent to create a private right of action for violation of regulations promulgated under CFRDA); Kenny v. Block, 884 F.2d 579 , 1989 WL 99032, at *3 (6th Cir.1989)(per curiam)(“[r]eview of t…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Chester R. Fultz
v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General Kentucky Court of Appeals Dewey Sowders, Warden J. Kirk Griggs, Ii, Public Defender David L. Knox, Judge Thomas F. Towles, Public Defender Department of Public Advocacy
89-6580.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Jun 27, 1990.
907 F.2d 150
Unpublished

907 F.2d 150

Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
Chester R. FULTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney
General; Kentucky Court of Appeals; Dewey Sowders, Warden;
J. Kirk Griggs, II, Public Defender; David L. Knox, Judge;
Thomas F. Towles, Public Defender; Department of Public
Advocacy, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-6580.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 27, 1990.

Before MILBURN and DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.

ORDER

1

This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination of the record and the briefs, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

2

Chester R. Fultz, a pro se Kentucky prisoner, appeals from the district court's order dismissing his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

3

Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, Fultz sued the defendants alleging that the filing of an unauthorized appeal from his May 2, 1988, conviction, on charges of first degree wanton endangerment, deprived him of his rights to due process and equal protection, to the effective assistance of counsel, and of access to the courts and that the actions of the attorneys involved in the unauthorized appeal constitute "legal fraud."

4

After a review of the magistrate's report and Fultz's objections, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and dismissed the case as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Fultz has filed a timely appeal. He has also filed separate motions for the appointment of counsel and for transportation to the hearing to be held in this case. Further, an appellee, J. Kirk Griggs, II, seeks to be dismissed as a party to this action, claiming that this court lacks jurisdiction because he was never served with process.

5

Upon review, we affirm the district court's judgment dismissing Fultz's complaint as frivolous as it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989).

6

This disposition renders Griggs's motion moot.

7

The motions for the appointment of counsel and for transportation to the hearing are hereby denied. The district court's judgment is hereby affirmed pursuant to Rule 9(b)(5), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.