In Re Olson, 916 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
In Re Olson, 916 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“while we are not prepared to say that value is irrelevant to materiality, we are certain that it is not determinative.”
123 citation events (81 in the last 25 years) across 22 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Premier Capital, LLC v. Crawford (ca1, 2016-10-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Premier Capital, LLC v. Crawford
1st Cir. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
while we are not prepared to say that value is irrelevant to materiality, we are certain that it is not determinative.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bob Sutton Realty & Loans, LLC v. Darnell (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. E.D. Mo. · 2025 · confidence medium
Mo. May 21, 2024). and transfers of other property prior to bankruptcy); Mertz, 955 F.2d at 598 (asset worth $1,358); Olson, 916 F.2d at 484 (asset of questionable value); cf. Willoughby, 103 F.2d at 824 (concluding, under prior law, that debtor’s misstatement about source of funds used by spouse to purchase property was not material; essential facts were that debtor had no interest in property and did not supply funds).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Solar Innovations, Inc. v. Plevyak
Bankr. M.D. Penn. · 2023 · confidence medium
Pa. 2015) (citing In re Olson, 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1990)); accord In re Sowers, 229 B.R. 151, 158 (Bankr.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Peterson
Bankr. D. Neb. · 2021 · confidence medium
Ark. 1992) (citing Barnett Bank of Tampa v. Muscatell, 113 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990) and Palatine National Bank of Palatine v. Olson, 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) First National Bank of Gordon v. Braun
Bankr. D. Neb. · 2019 · confidence medium
The -2- question of a debtor’s “knowledge and intent under § 727(a)(4) is a matter of fact.” In re Sears, 246 B.R. at 347 (citing In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Borges v. Placeres (In re Placeres)
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2017 · confidence medium
Premier Cap., LLC v. Crawford (In re Crawford), 841 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2016); Palantine Nat’l Bank v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1990); see In re Robinson, 506 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1974)(“Materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement.”) In determining fraudulent intent, the court can consider, among other factors, the debtor’s level of sophistication.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Loganbill
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 2016 · confidence medium
Palatine Nat’l Bank of Palatine, Ill. v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stoebner v. Larson (In re Larson) (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. D. Minn. · 2016 · confidence medium
Id. at 739 (quoting Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (quoted in Mertz, 955 F.2d at 598 and Palatine Nat’l Bank of Palatine, Ill. v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) First American Bank v. Andrews (In re Andrews)
Bankr. S.D. Iowa · 2015 · confidence medium
Huff, 349 B.R. at 592 (citing Palatine National Bank of Palatine, Illinois v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990)); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ng v. Adler (In re Adler)
Bankr. E.D.N.Y. · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1197-98 (9th Cir.2010); Palatine Nat’l Bank of Palatine v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) O'Connell v. DeMartino (In Re DeMartino)
Bankr. E.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484; see Ford v. Ford (In re Ford), 159 B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr.D.Or.1993); Sergent v. Haverland (In re Haverland), 150 B.R. 768, 771-72 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bernhardt v. Radloff (In Re Radloff) (2×)
Bankr. D. Minn. · 2009 · confidence medium
“The value of omitted assets is relevant to materiality, but materiality will not turn on value.” In re Sears, 246 B.R. at 347 (citing In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fokkena v. Rohde (Rohde)
Bankr. D. Iowa · 2009 · confidence medium
Id.,916 F.2d at 484.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fokkena v. Huff (In re Huff)
Bankr. S.D. Iowa · 2006 · confidence medium
Palatine National Bank of Palatine, Illinois v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ellsworth v. Bauder (In Re Bauder)
8th Cir. BAP · 2005 · confidence medium
Mertz v. Rott, 955 F.2d 596, 598 (8th Cir.1992); Palatine Nat’l Bank of Palatine, Illinois v. Olson, 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael W. Ellsworth v. Vicki Jo Bauder
8th Cir. BAP · 2005 · confidence medium
Both Mertz and Olson were unanimous decisions. 30 Mertz v. Rott, 955 F.2d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 1992); Palatine Nat’l Bank of Palatine, Illinois v. Olson, 916 F.2d 481 , 484 (8th Cir. 1990). 31 In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984), quoted in Mertz, 955 F.2d at 598 , and Olson, 916 F.2d at 484. 10 “concerns the discovery of assets” and the “existence of property” and is therefore material.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Office of the United States Trustee v. Zimmerman (In Re Zimmerman)
Bankr. M.D. Penn. · 2005 · confidence medium
Olson, 916 F.2d at 484; In re Sears, 246 B.R. 341, 347 (8th Cir. BAP 2000).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rasmussen v. Unruh (In Re Unruh) (4×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. D. Minn. · 2002 · confidence medium
“The question of a debtor’s ‘knowledge and intent under § 727(a)(4) is a matter of fact.’ ” See Cepelak v. Sears (In re Sears), 246 B.R. 341, 347 (8th Cir. BAP 2000); citing Olson, 916 F.2d at 484.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. J. Korte
8th Cir. BAP · 2001 · confidence medium
The question of a debtor's “knowledge and intent under § 727(a)(4) is a matter of fact.” In re Sears, 246 B.R. at 347 (citing In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Korte v. United States Internal Revenue Service (In Re Korte)
8th Cir. BAP · 2001 · confidence medium
The question of a debtor’s “knowledge and intent under § 727(a)(4) is a matter of fact.” In re Sears, 246 B.R. at 347 (citing In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cepelak v. Sears (In Re Sears) (3×)
8th Cir. BAP · 2000 · confidence medium
The threshold to materiality is fairly low: “The subject matter of a false oath is ‘material,’ and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (quoted and relied on in In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Cepelak, Jr. v. Donald Dean Sears (3×)
8th Cir. BAP · 2000 · confidence medium
The threshold to materiality is fairly low: “The subject matter of a false oath is ‘material,’ and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (quoted and relied on in In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rouse v. Stanke (In Re Stanke)
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1999 · confidence medium
“The subject matter of a false oath is material, and thus sufficient to bar discharge if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” Palatine National Bank of Palatine, Illinois v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Moorefield), 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Buchanan (2×)
Bankr. D. Minn. · 1998 · confidence medium
In Olson the Court of Appeals held that “[t]o bar a discharge, the debtor’s misrepresentation must be material.” Id. at 484.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Superior National Bank v. Schroff (In Re Schroff)
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1993 · confidence medium
Olson at 484.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Boles (In Re Boles)
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1993 · confidence medium
Olson held that “the subject matter of the false oath is ‘material’ and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” 916 F.2d at 484.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mervyn M. MERTZ, Appellee, v. JoAnn ROTT, Julie Rott Kessel, National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company, Appellants
8th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
In Olson, we quoted with approval the following standard of materiality announced in In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984): “The subject matter of a false oath is ‘material,’ and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” 916 F.2d at 484.
cited Cited "see" Lincoln Savings Bank v. Jay Freese
8th Cir. BAP · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Olson, 916 F.2d at 484.
cited Cited "see" Lincoln Savings Bank v. Freese (In Re Freese)
8th Cir. BAP · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Olson, 916 F.2d at 484.
cited Cited "see" In Re: Katherine D. Weiner, Debtor. Steven L. Weiner v. Perry, Settles & Lawson, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Olson, 916 F.2d 481 , 484 (8th Cir.1990) (“To bar a discharge, the debtor's misrepresentation must be material.”); In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984) (same). 6 .
cited Cited "see" National American Insurance v. Guajardo (In Re Guajardo)
Bankr. W.D. Ark. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
Barnett Bank of Tampa v. Muscatell, 113 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990); see Palatine National Bank of Palatine v. Olson, 916 F.2d 481 , 484 (8th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" Hutchins v. Fordyce Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Hutchins)
Bankr. E.D. Ark. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
Barnett Bank of Tampa v. Muscatell, 113 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990); see Pala *10 tine National Bank of Palatine v. Olson, 916 F.2d 481 ,484 (8th Cir. 1990).
cited Cited "see" Mosley v. Sims (In Re Sims)
Bankr. E.D. Ark. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
Barnett Bank of Tampa v. Muscatell, 113 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990); see Palatine National Bank of Palatine v. Olson, 916 F.2d 481 , 484 (8th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited "see" Thacker v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield
W.D. Ark. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Olson, 916 F.2d 481 (8th Cir.1990) [Minnesota case], “[I]f a provision is susceptible to more than one equally reasonable construction, one which would justify recovery and one which would not, the ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured.” American Cas.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Moore v. Strickland (In Re Strickland) (2×)
Bankr. D. Del. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Olson, 916 F.2d at 484 (concluding that omission of dinner theater which had “questionable value” was material for purposes of section 727(a)(4)(A)); Chalik, 748 F.2d at 619 (holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jacoway v. Mathis (In Re Mathis)
Bankr. W.D. Ark. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
A false statement is material if it “bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” Id. (quoting In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984)); see also Palatine Nat’l Bank of Palatine, Ill. v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481 , 484 (8th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Firstar Bank Iowa, N.A. v. Magnani (In Re Magnani)
Bankr. D. Iowa · 1997 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare In re Olson, 916 F.2d at 484 (debtor’s omission of interest in dinner theater was material because it related to his business transactions and the extent of his estate), with Applebaum v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 134 B.R. 147, 160-61 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (omission of assets owned by his corporations and transfers of corporate assets not relevant to debtor’s case).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,708 in Re Kenneth Palmer Olson, Debtor. Palatine National Bank of Palatine, Illinois, Appellee/cross-Appellant
v.
Kenneth Palmer Olson, Appellant/cross-Appellee
89-5288.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Oct 17, 1990.
916 F.2d 481

916 F.2d 481

Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,708
In re Kenneth Palmer OLSON, Debtor.
PALATINE NATIONAL BANK OF PALATINE, ILLINOIS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
Kenneth Palmer OLSON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 89-5288MN, 89-5312MN.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 16, 1990.
Decided Oct. 17, 1990.

Joseph A. Nilan, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant/cross-appellee.

Seth M. Colton, St. Paul, Minn., for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HEANEY and FRIEDMAN,[*] Senior Circuit Judges.

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

[*~481]1

This is a bankruptcy case. Kenneth Olson was denied a discharge from his debts because he failed to disclose his ongoing interest in a dinner theater nominally owned by his wife. The statutory basis for the Bankruptcy Court's[1] decision was 11 U.S.C. Sec. 727(a)(4)(A).[2] Olson appeals. He argues that the evidence does not support the Court's findings. He argues further that even if he did have some kind of interest in the theater, failing to tell the Bankruptcy Court about it did not violate the law. That is so, Olson says, because his (disputed) interest was worthless. The Palatine National Bank of Palatine, Illinois, is the creditor which prevented Olson's discharge. The bank contends that the Bankruptcy Court's decision was both right and wrong. The Court was right, the bank urges, in refusing to discharge Olson based on his material omissions regarding his financial status. The Court was wrong, the bank continues, because it should have also refused to discharge him on other grounds.[3] We affirm.I.

2

This is a case where the tangle of facts makes the legal issues appear more difficult than they are. Olson was a real-estate developer. He was initially very successful. His fortunes, however, eventually turned, and in 1984 he sought the protection of a bankruptcy court. Palatine National Bank was involved as a source of financing in many of Olson's ventures. The Bank is now one of his main creditors. Karen Strom is Olson's wife. She also played a role in many of his business dealings, and in 1987 she, too, filed for bankruptcy. Olson's petition was one for liquidation filed under Chapter Seven of the bankruptcy code, whereas Strom's petition was filed under Chapter Eleven, allowing her to reorganize her assets. Some of the assets listed in her petition ("scheduled" in the language of bankruptcy) involved the Carlton Bloomington Dinner Theater, Inc. Strom ostensibly owned all the outstanding shares of stock in that corporation, as well as the real estate where the theater was located.

3

The extent of Kenneth Olson's interest in the Carlton dinner theater when he filed bankruptcy is what this case is about. Olson, along with Carl Berndt, organized the CBDT corporation. Each man owned one-half of the corporation's stock. Their business objective was to purchase and renovate a decrepit bowling alley, making it a successful dinner theater featuring top entertainers. In 1978 Olson sold his stock to Strom. The purchase price was $500, the amount he paid for it. In 1979, Berndt sold his stock back to CBDT and ended his association with the project. Later that same year, the corporation sold Strom the bowling-alley property that it had since acquired. Strom then leased the property back to the corporation.

4

Meanwhile, preparations to open the theater were ongoing. A marketing plan was developed and implemented. While he was a stockholder, Berndt served as president of the corporation and general manager of the theater. Strom was involved in marketing the theater, and she oversaw some aspects of how the theater was decorated. When Berndt's stock was retired, Strom became president of CBDT and general manager of the theater. Despite the efforts of all concerned, the theater lost money from the day it opened. CBDT filed a Chapter Eleven bankruptcy petition in 1986, intending to reorganize its finances. The theater nonetheless closed in 1987, and its bankruptcy petition was converted to a Chapter Seven liquidation proceeding at the same time. Strom's Chapter Eleven petition (listing her interest in the CBDT and the dinner-theater property) followed.

5

While the Carlton theater and Strom were having their own financial problems, action on Olson's petition was proceeding apace. Olson omitted any reference to the dinner theater in the schedule of assets he prepared for the Bankruptcy Court. In his testimony he took the same position: the dinner theater was his wife's project, not his. Therefore, Olson contended, neither CBDT nor the theater real estate should be a part of his bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court disagreed. It found his claim that he lacked any interest in the dinner theater to be supported by the form but not the substance of the theater venture. It found that the following facts belied Olson's claims: his involvement in almost every aspect of the dinner theater's operation, the funneling of Olson's money into the theater enterprise through various entities that made up his "Byzantine" financial empire, and Strom's lack of experience with this kind of business venture. Relying on 11 U.S.C. Sec. 727(a)(4)(A), the Court held that Olson's claims of disinterest amounted to false representations of his finances under oath. Olson's request to have all his debts discharged was accordingly denied. The District Court adopted and affirmed these factual findings and legal conclusions.

II.

6

The Bankruptcy Code commands in Sec. 727(a)(4)(A) that a debtor shall not be discharged if he "knowingly and fraudulently ... made a false oath or account ..." in connection with his petition. Olson claims that the evidence of his intent to mislead the Court and his creditors is too thin to support denying him a discharge. We are unpersuaded. All during the bankruptcy proceeding Olson maintained that his financial interests in the dinner theater ended almost a decade ago when he sold his CBDT stock to Strom. The Bankruptcy Court was faced, however, with a record replete with contrary indications.

7

Every cent that Kenneth had, ultimately went into the Carlton [dinner theater] after the purported transfer.... Kenneth, not Karen, arranged all financing. Actual and prospective lenders dealt with Kenneth as the responsible person and looked to him for payment in connection with the project. Karen had no significant monetary investment in the project, was without any significant experience in the development and operation of such projects, and had no independent credit worthiness of the kind required for the participation of lenders. Aside from miscellaneous decorating decisions, every indication from the record and documents in this proceeding is that Kenneth controlled the project in concept, development, and operation.

8

98 B.R. at 953 n. 14. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Olson's claims of distance and disinterest were "preposterous." We can see no clear error in the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact regarding Olson's interest in and involvement with the dinner theater. They are accordingly affirmed. Moreover, as the Court held, that interest and involvement demonstrate the falsity of Olson's repeated contrary representations before the Bankruptcy Court.

[*481]9

Olson also contends, however, that the finding that he was financially interested in the Carlton theater does not end this case. He is correct. To bar a discharge, the debtor's misrepresentation must be material. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Code) Sec. 727.04 at 727-57 (15th ed. 1989). Olson argues that materiality is a function of value. Since, according to him, whatever (disputed) interest he had in the theater was worthless, his omission of that interest is not material. Olson's argument construes materiality too narrowly. While we are not prepared to say that value is irrelevant to materiality, we are certain that it is not determinative. Our sister circuits' analysis of this question supports our conclusion. "The subject matter of a false oath is 'material,' and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt's business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property." In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam); Williamson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir.1987) (adopting and applying this standard); see also 4 Collier, supra, at 727-58 n. 6a (citing cases). Olson's omission is material because it is related, and in a substantial way, to his business transactions and the extent of his estate. We have no difficulty reaching this conclusion, even though the Bankruptcy Court noted the dinner theater's "questionable" value, and the parties still disagree about its worth. The Carlton was intimately connected to Olson's financial situation, and that satisfies the requirement of materiality.

[*~483]10

Olson's last claim on appeal--that we should remand for a new trial in the interests of justice because of his lawyer's poor performance--lacks any merit. We will not discuss this point other than to note that we reject it. Palatine labors valiantly to convince this Court that Olson should also be denied his discharge on three other grounds. We decline the invitation in light of our disposition of the main appeal.

[*~484]11

Affirmed.

*

The Hon. Daniel M. Friedman, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation

1

The Honorable Dennis D. O'Brien. 98 B.R. 944. On appeal to the federal District Court for the District of Minnesota, the Honorable Robert G. Renner, United States District Judge, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision in all respects

2

Section 727(a)(4)(A) provides that "[t]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless ... the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case ... made a false oath or account."

3

Our decision to affirm on the ground used by the courts below makes it unnecessary to address the alternate grounds, which the Bank urges on cross-appeal. It was not necessary, in order to preserve these alternate grounds, for the Bank to file a cross-appeal. An appellee may argue any ground in support of the judgment below, even a ground on which it lost in the lower court