United States v. Ernesto Rosa, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Ernesto Rosa, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“on a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that it has chosen the proper venue.”
135 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Florestal v. Henry (ctd, 2022-11-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Florestal v. Henry
D. Conn. · 2022 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
on a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that it has chosen the proper venue.
cited Cited "see" Cuevas v. Commissioner of Social Security
W.D.N.Y. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cassera v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734048, at *2 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1989).
discussed Cited "see" Holmes v. Town of East Lyme
D. Conn. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 551-52 (D.Conn.1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996) (statements about job performance, such as plaintiff “didn’t fit in” and “could not be recommended” were opinions, and therefore not defamatory).
discussed Cited "see" Newton v. City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2011 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Grant v. New York City Dept, of Corrs., 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734052, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1996) (table) ("Although it is unclear ... if 'gross negligence' or ‘recklessness’ would support a due process claim, this Court has held that the standard would, at the very least, require more than ordinary negligence.”). 50 .
cited Cited "see" Lorenzi v. Connecticut Judicial Branch
D. Conn. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Sadig
W.D.N.C. · 2005 · signal: accord · confidence high
United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir.1992) (footnote omitted); accord, United States v. Rogers, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 685759, at *1 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Aladekoba, 61 Fed.Appx. 27 (4th Cir.2003).
cited Cited "see" Rose v. Panolam Industries International Inc.
D. Conn. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996); Appleton, 254 Conn. at 210 , 757 A.2d 1059 .
cited Cited "see" Iosa v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc.
D. Conn. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 551 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734043 (2d Cir.1996).
discussed Cited "see" Davis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
D. Conn. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. ChesebroughPond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996), citing Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn.Supp. 17, 18 , 597 A.2d 846 (Conn.Super.Ct.1991).
cited Cited "see" Bloom v. Luis
D. Conn. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
cited Cited "see" Martin v. American Equity Insurance
D. Conn. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996); Appleton , 254 Conn, at 210, 757 A.2d 1059 .
discussed Cited "see" Etienne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
D. Conn. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996), citing Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn.Supp. 17, 18 , 597 A.2d 846 (Conn.Super.Ct.1991).
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. City of New Haven
D. Conn. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996), citing Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn. Supp. 17, 18 , 597 A.2d 846 (Conn.Super.Ct.1991).
discussed Cited "see" Whitaker v. Haynes Const. Co., Inc.
D. Conn. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Cheesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996), citing Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn.Supp. 17, 18 , 597 A.2d 846 (Conn.Super.Ct.1991).
discussed Cited "see" Richter v. Artuz
S.D.N.Y. · 1999 · signal: accord · confidence high
“In order to have fairly presented his [or her] federal claims to the state courts the petitioner must have informed the state court of both the factual and the legal premises of the claim he [or she] asserts in federal court.” Daye, 696 F.2d at 191 ; accord Lynes v. Mitchell, 894 F.Supp. 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y.1995), aff 'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
cited Cited "see" Zarzycki v. United Technologies Corp.
D. Conn. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
cited Cited "see" Sternberg v. Fletcher
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See LeBlanc-Sternberg II, 104 F.3d 355 . 32 C.
cited Cited "see" LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See LeBlanc-Sternberg II, 104 F.3d 355 .
cited Cited "see" Anonymous v. Kaye
N.D.N.Y. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anonymous v. Kaye, 1995 WL 617795 (S.D.N.Y.1995), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
cited Cited "see" Hill v. Pinkerton Security & Investigation Services, Inc.
D. Conn. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Chesebrough-Ponds, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734043, *2 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Murphy Medical Associates, LLC v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company
D. Conn. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Cigna interfered with contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and patients who are Cigna members or subscribers “by, among other things, making defamatory and malicious statements about Dr. Murphy and the Murphy Practice to their patients and other.” TAC ¶ 185; see also id. ¶¶ 182– 186.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kaplan Group Investments, LLC v. A.S.A.P. Logistics LTD
S.D.N.Y. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also Johnson v. Chesebrough- Ponds, Inc., 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734043, at *2 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table opinion) (“As the contracts do not exist, [the defendant] could not have violated implied covenants in them.”) The formation of a contract requires “a meeting of the minds of the parties, and, if there is no meeting of the minds on all essential terms, there is no contract.” Prince of Peace Enters., Inc. v. Top Quality Food Market, LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 384, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Duckett v. Williams, 86 F. Supp.…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dallio v. Hebert
N.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Photopaint Technol., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.2003) (citing, for similar purpose, unpublished table opinion of Gronager v. Gilmore Sec. & Co., 104 F.3d 355 [2d Cir.1996]). 12 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Village of Suffern
S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 U.S.App.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cusamano v. Sobek
N.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Photopaint Technol., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.2003) (citing, for similar purpose, unpublished table opinion of Gronager v. Gilmore Sec. & Co., 104 F.3d 355 [2d Cir.1996]). 69 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Crum v. Dodrill
N.D.N.Y. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Photopaint Technol., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.2003) (citing, for similar purpose, unpublished table opinion of Gronager v. Gilmore Sec. & Co., 104 F.3d 355 [2d Cir.1996]). 6 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Burns v. Trombly
N.D.N.Y. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Photopaint Technol., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.2003) (citing, for similar purpose, unpublished table opinion of Gronager v. Gilmore Sec. & Co., 104 F.3d 355 [2d Cir.1996]). 22 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jackson v. Onondaga County
N.D.N.Y. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Photopaint Tech., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.2003) (citing, for similar purpose, unpublished table opinion of Gronager v. Gilmore Sec. & Co., 104 F.3d 355 [(2d Cir.1996)]). 20 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Roberts v. Circuit-Wise, Inc.
D. Conn. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734043 (2d Cir.1996); Appleton , 254 Conn, at 210, 757 A.2d 1059 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Abate v. Circuit-Wise, Inc.
D. Conn. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734043 (2d Cir.1996); Appleton , 254 Conn, at 210, 757 A.2d 1059 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Newtown v. Shell Oil Co.
D. Conn. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Dobrich v. General Dynamics Corp., Elec. Boat Div.
D. Conn. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 , 1996 WL 734043 (2d Cir.1996).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Rose v. James River Paper Co.
D. Conn. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 552 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Malik v. Carrier Corp.
D. Conn. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 918 F.Supp. 543, 553 (D.Conn.) (dismissing claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating that although methods employed by plaintiffs supervisor in terminating him “may not have been ideal employment practices, they [did] not constitute ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct”), aff 'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996); Jewett v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 530943, 1997 WL 255093 at *7 (Conn.Super., May 7, 1997) (holding that defendant-employer’s failure to follow mandatory personnel policies governing performance evaluations, a…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Ernesto Rosa
96-1268.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Nov 25, 1996.
104 F.3d 355
Unpublished
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 69%
Citer courts: D. Connecticut (1)

104 F.3d 355

NOTICE: THIS SUMMARY ORDER MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA. SEE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 0.23.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Ernesto ROSA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-1268.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 25, 1996.

APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: Lee Ginsberg, Freeman, Nooter & Ginsberg, New York, N.Y.

APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Michael A. Rogoff, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York, N.Y.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and CARDAMONE and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.

1

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and was taken on submission.

2

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

3

Ernesto Rosa appeals from the District Court's April 16, 1996, judgment of conviction following a guilty plea. Rosa's sole contention on appeal is that the District Judge erred in refusing to grant a downward departure on the ground of Rosa's diminished mental capacity and disadvantaged upbringing.

4

Rosa and sixteen others were charged in September 1994 in an eighty-six count indictment with numerous offenses arising from their participation in a criminal gang. In August 1995, Rosa pled guilty to a two-count superseding information charging him with one count of conspiracy to murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), and one count of conspiracy to assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6). These charges carried a combined statutory maximum sentence of thirteen years' imprisonment, in contrast to the sentence of 360 months to life imprisonment required by the Sentencing Guidelines for the same offenses. Under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a), where the statutorily authorized maximum is less than the minimum applicable guideline range, the statutory maximum--here, thirteen years--is the appropriate sentence. The parties therefore stipulated in the plea agreement that the applicable sentence was thirteen years' imprisonment. They further stipulated that neither a downward nor upward departure was warranted, but provided that the defendant may move for a downward departure on the ground of mental capacity.

5

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel urged the District Judge to depart downward because of Rosa's "childhood neglect and abuse" and diminished psychological capacity. The District Judge agreed with counsel that Rosa came from a "very unfortunate background" and is "of diminished mental capacity." He concluded, however, that because the criminal activities that defendant engaged in were "terribly harmful to the community at large"--and because the plea agreement of thirteen years' imprisonment was already the functional equivalent of a downward departure of seventeen years--it was inappropriate to grant a further departure. When the Government requested the Court to clarify whether it "realizes that it has the power to depart in these circumstances but chooses on these facts not to," the District Judge responded: "I have the power always to depart, I understand that. I'm choosing not to."

6

Rosa's appellate brief explicitly concedes that the District Judge recognized that he had the authority to depart downward and chose not to do so. Rosa nonetheless asks us to review the propriety of the District Judge's discretionary decision. However, "[i]t is settled law in this circuit that a defendant generally may not appeal from a district court's decision not to depart downwardly from the applicable Guidelines range because the decision is 'discretionary' and because 'Congress did not intend to provide appellate review of sentences that are within the Guidelines correctly applied and are not illegal.' " United States v. Sharpsteen, 913 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1990) (citation omitted); see United States v. Martin, 78 F.3d 808, 815 (2d Cir.1996) (sentencing court's refusal to depart downward is unreviewable where it explicitly stated that its decision was discretionary). Because the District Court recognized its authority to depart downward and did not base its refusal to do so on impermis sible considerations, its decision is not reviewable by this Court. Moreover, Rosa's claim that the District Judge failed to "take into account" his "psychological characteristics" and "unfortunate and difficult upbringing" at sentencing is flatly contradicted by the record. Since no other issue is raised, we affirm the judgment of conviction.