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“hether or not one is to be deported .. . prior to completing a prison term is a matter solely within the discretion of the attorney general.”
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Gouveia v. Warden
hether or not one is to be deported .. . prior to completing a prison term is a matter solely within the discretion of the attorney general.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Drew v. Figueredo
Ind. 2011) (citing Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2004) (a placement decision, itself, is not subject to an APA challenge); Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651 , 655 n.1 (6th Cir. 1998); Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1997)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mustafa
The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is charged by law with the responsibility for designating convicted federal defendants to appropriate penal facilities, see 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (b), and while the BOP is required to consider a district court’s designation recommendation, among other factors, see id. § 3621(b)(4)(B), the statute does not require either that district courts make such recommendations or that the BOP follow those that are made, see United States v. Williams, 35 65 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that “sentencing court has no authority to order that a convicted defendant b…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Regnante v. Securities & Exchange Officials
Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 , 101 S.Ct. 1451 , 67 L.Ed.2d 662 (1981) (noting “that there ‘would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons’ where Congress, rather than drafting the legislation ‘with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class,’ instead has framed the statute simply as a general prohibition or a command to a federal agency” (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-92 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 )); Shah v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 523 Fed.Appx. 828, 831 (2d Cir.2013) (summary order) (“ ‘Statutory provisions tha…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shah v. New York State Office of Mental Health
“Statutory provisions that are phrased as general prohibitions or commands to federal agencies are unlikely to give rise to private rights of action,” Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.1997), and there is no indication that Congress intended to create a private remedy for domestic workers who were passed over by employers in favor of alien workers.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MEDEROS v. Murphy
Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (h)(2)(A), whether or not one is to be deported prior to completing a prison term is a matter solely within the discretion of the Attorney General, and there is no private right of action to compel the Attorney General to exercise his/her discretion).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Potoski
While a sentencing court may recommend the place of imprisonment, see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 165 (2d Cir.2003), whether to place a convicted defendant within a particular facility is within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons, see Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Muniz v. Sabol
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See Levine, 455 F.3d at 82 n. 6; Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir.1998) (“[Section 3621(b) gives] the BOP ample room for judgment by listing a non-exhaustive set of factors for the BOP to consider and leaving to the BOP what weight to assign to any particular factor.”); Thye, 109 F.3d at 130 (holding it “well within Bureau’s discretion” to consider alienage in placing inmate).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Valerie Manzella
United States v. Melendez, 279 F.3d 16, 18 (1 st Cir.2002); Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Manzella
United States v. Melendez, 279 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Guerrette
The First Circuit has stated that “ ‘[decisions to place a convicted defendant within a particular treatment program or a particular facility are decisions within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons.’” United States v. Melendez, 279 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir.2002) (per curiam), ce rt. denied, 535 U.S. 1120 , 122 S.Ct. 2346 , 153 L.Ed.2d 173 (2002) (quoting Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1997)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Duaut A. Duamutef v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Apr.6, 2004) (“There is no private right to compel deportation prior to the completion of a sentence of incarceration.”); Cepeda 273 F.Supp.2d at 224 (same); cf. Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that, under § 1252(h)(2)(A), the predecessor statute to § 1231(a), “whether or not one is to be deported ... prior to completing a prison term is a matter solely within the discretion of the Attorney General” and the INA “does not create a private right of action that would allow a party to compel the Attorney General to act”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Melendez
With respect to the first argument, we lack jurisdiction to review the sentencing court’s failure to recommend to the BOP that it admit Melendez to a drug treatment program. 1 “Decisions to place a convicted defendant within a particular treatment program or a particular facility are decisions within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons.” Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Klawonn v. United States
Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir.1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richard Dattner Architects
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See, e.g., Universities Research Assoc., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 , 101 S.Ct. 1451, 1462 , 67 L.Ed.2d 662 (1981) (“[T]here would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons where Congress, rather than drafting the legislation with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, instead has framed the status simply as a general prohibition or command to a federal agency”) (quotations and citations omitted); Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.1997) (“Statutory provisions that are phrased as general prohibitions or commands to federal agen…
discussed
Cited "see"
Crowe v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127 , 129–30 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the BOP has “extensive latitude in assigning prisoners to correctional facilities”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Haapaniemi v. Garland
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127 , 128–29 (2nd Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s denial of criminal alien’s motion for order of immediate deportation prior to completion of criminal sentence). 2 Third, there is no private right of action under 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (a)(1).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Murchison
See Melendez, 279 F.3d at 18 (quoting Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Decisions to place a convicted defendant within a particular treatment program or a particular facility are decisions within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons.”)); see also Hopkins, 824 F.3d at 735 . 9 .
cited
Cited "see"
Sheldon Wolfchild v. Redwood County
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Wolfchild, 731 F.3d at 1292 (holding the Secretary of the Interior’s power under Section 9 of the 1863 Act is discretionary).
cited
Cited "see"
Wolfchild v. Redwood County
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Wolfchild, 731 F.3d at 1292 (holding the Secretary of the Interior’s power under Section 9 of the 1863 Act is discretionary).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Daza-Mosquera
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam) (denying inmate’s motion for immediate deportation, and holding that “whether or not one is to be deported under § 1252(h)(2)(A) prior to completing a prison term is a matter solely within the discretion of the Attorney General”).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Marin-Quintero
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127 , 128 (2d Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited "see"
Goldings v. Winn
(2×)
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1997) ("Decisions to place a convicted defendant within a particular treatment program or a particular facility are decisions within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons."); Falcon v. Knowles, 807 F.Supp. 1531, 1533 (S.D.Fla.1992) ("[A]ny approach that puts the judicial branch in charge of designating the place of confinement for a federal prisoner — no matter how well justified on utilitarian grounds — collides with ... [BOP's] unfettered authority to decide where to house federal prisoners;); see also Cohen v. United States, 15…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Marin Castaneda
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Attorney General's authority to deport "creates no private right of action" for a criminal alien because Attorney General must act in best interest of United States, not the criminal alien).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Gabriel Jesus Marin-Castaneda, Gabriel Jesus Marin Castaneda
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that Attorney General’s authority to deport “creates no private right of action” for a criminal alien because Attorney General must act in best interest of United States, not the criminal alien).
discussed
Cited "see"
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angel Meza AISPURO, Defendant-Appellant
See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 128-29 (2nd Cir.1997) (per curiam); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S: 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2087-88 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (establishing test to determine if private right of action exists).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF J.C. (SVP-678-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)
See, e.g., Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Elliott Levine v. Craig Apker
(2×)
Congress’s use of the language “may designate” in this provision seemingly endows the BOP with “broad discretion.” See McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 122-23 (2d Cir.1998); see also Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129-30 (2d Cir.1997) (“The Bureau of Prisons has extensive latitude in assigning prisoners to correctional facilities and in assigning them within those facilities once they have arrived.”) Moreover, the fact that the statute differentiates between the use of “may” and “shall” in adjacent sentences indicates the drafters’ mindfulness of the significance of…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Boyd v. Comm'r
(2×)
See, e.g., Rocanova v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) , affd. 109 F.3d 127 ↩ (2d Cir. 1997) .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Gary G. Boyd v. Commissioner
See, e.g., Rocanova v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd. 109 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Lucina Rojas-Reyes, A/K/A Lucina Mendoza v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
See, e.g., Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam) (“Statutory provisions that are phrased as general prohibitions or commands to federal agencies are unlikely to give rise to private rights of action .... [and] it is even more unlikely that ... discretionary language ... could support finding a private right of action by implication.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Tapia-Garcia v. United States
See, e.g., Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 128-29 (2d Cir.1997) (under former § 1252(h)(2)(A), the predecessor to § 1231(a)(4), alien does not have private right of action to compel the Attor *387 ney General to deport alien prior to completion of prison term or even to exercise her discretion (citing cases)); United States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134 F.3d 551, 556 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1855 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1998); United States v. Bedoya-Tabarda, 950 F.Supp. 612, 613 (S.D.N.Y.1997). 7 B.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mark Rocanova
v.
United States of America and Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v.
United States of America and Commissioner of Internal Revenue
1210.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 24, 1997.
Published
79 A.F.T.R.2d 97-1654, 97-1 USTC P 50,300
Mark ROCANOVA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1210, Docket 96-5079.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued March 18, 1997.
Decided March 24, 1997.
Appeal from a grant of summary judgment for defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denny Chin, Judge) in an action seeking a declaration that it is unconstitutional to extend a statute of limitations for collection actions that were not already time-barred. We affirm.
Richard M. Kraver, Kraver & Levy, LLP, New York City, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Linda A. Riffkin, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York City (Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, Gideon A. Schor, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: FEINBERG, CARDAMONE, and WINTER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
1
We affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court's opinion. See Rocanova v. United States, 955 F.Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y.1996).