Barber v. Miller
An award of Rule 11 sanctions is invalid if the moving party fails to provide the required twenty-one day safe harbor period to allow for the withdrawal of the contention.
An attorney filed a complaint containing a patent infringement claim that lacked standing, which the opposing party repeatedly warned was deficient. The opposing party later moved for Rule 11 sanctions after the complaint had already been dismissed, serving the motion simultaneously with filing. The district court awarded sanctions despite the failure to provide the required 21-day safe harbor period. The appellate court reviews whether the award complies with the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. The court applies the rule that a motion for sanctions must be served before filing to allow the offending party an opportunity to withdraw the contention and avoid sanctions. Because the motion was filed immediately, the attorney was denied this protection. The court reverses the sanctions award.
At page 710Enforcing rule 11 sanctions requires proper notice and safe harbor100 citing casesIt would 6 therefore wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment [of Rule 11] to permit an 7 informal warning to substitute for service of a motion.
- Ramachandran v. City of Los Altos, No. 5:18-cv-01223 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2025).(An award of sanctions cannot be upheld” if the 5 opposing party “was not given the opportunity to respond to [the sanctions] motion by 6 withdrawing his claim.)
- Roe v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. NA, No. 3:24-cv-05338 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2024). ([W]arnings [are] not motions . . . and the Rule requires service of a 15 motion.)
- Garrow v. Tucson Clips LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00243 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2023).(It 5 would . . . wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment to the Rule to permit an 6 informal warning to substitute for service of a motion.)
- Setliff v. ZOCCAM Tech. Inc, No. 3:21-cv-02025 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2022). ([T]he Rule requires service of a motion.)
- Arnold v. Beemer Haus LLC, No. 2:21-cv-01450 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2022).(The purpose 19 of the safe harbor, however, is to give the offending party [a 21-day] opportunity . . . to 20 withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions.)
- Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 773 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2014).published (That requirement, too, was deliberately imposed, with a recognition of the likelihood of other warnings.)
- Hutchinson (Godlove) v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2000).published See Barber, 146 F.3d at 711 (“ ‘safe harbor’ provision applies only to sanctions imposed upon motion of a party,” and “[njothing in the Rule or the history of the 1993 amendments prevents the district court from [imposing sanctions on its…
- Monterrosa v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-01563, 2021 WL 516736 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2021).(It would 6 therefore wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment [of Rule 11] to permit an 7 informal warning to substitute for service of a motion.)
- Segui, No. 2:25-cv-01849 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2026). (holding that “[a]n award of [Rule 15 11] sanctions cannot be upheld” where party seeking sanctions did not provide twenty-one 16 day notice period)
- Marti, No. 1:21-cv-00471 (D. Or. Jan. 27, 2026).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R.
Show 83 more citing cases
- Dundon Capital Partners LLC v. Ebersol, No. 22-05077 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2025).(agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that a party must move for sanctions before summary judgment)
- Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cash Cloud, INC. v. Christopher Mcalary, No. 2:23-cv-01738 (D. Nev. Apr. 30, 2025).“permit an informal 14 warning to substitute for service of a motion”
- Cruz v. Cruz, No. 1:22-cv-00002 (D. Guam July 3, 2024).This is referred to as the 6 “safe harbor” period and gives the nonmoving party an opportunity to withdraw or amend the 7 “offending pleading” and avoid sanctions.5 Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998). 8 The court applies t…
- ALD Soc., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-02695 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2023).“The purpose of the safe harbor . . . is to give the offending 11 party the opportunity, within 21 days after service of the motion for sanctions, to withdraw the 12 offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions”
- Roberts v. Gallagher, No. 3:21-cv-08255 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2023). “The purpose of the safe harbor . . . is to 3|| give the offending party the opportunity ...to withdraw the offending pleading and 4|| thereby escape sanctions.” Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis 5|| in original…
- Stearns v. Stearns, No. 2:22-cv-01579 (W.D. Wash. May 1, 2023). Co., 254 F.3d 772 , 789 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 14 Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1998)).
- Owens v. Dzurenda, No. 2:19-cv-00126 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2022). “The 12 purpose of the safe harbor . . . is to give the offending party the opportunity . . . to withdraw the 13 offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions.” Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 14 1998) (emphasis in original…
- In re Gary Abrams, No. CC-21-1240-SGF CC-21-1241-SGF (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 12, 2022).unpublishedCo., 254 F.3d 772 , 789 (9th Cir. 2001) (enforcing Civil Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).
- Williams v. OPVHHJV LLC, No. 2:21-cv-00165 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2022). “is to give the offending party the opportunity, within 21 days after service 7 of the motion for sanctions, to withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape 8 sanctions”
- Riser v. Cent. Portfolio Control Inc, No. 3:21-cv-05238 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2022).A motion served after the complaint had been dismissed 11 [does] not give [the offending party] that opportunity.” Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th 12 Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original).
- Burns v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 2:20-cv-01555 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2021).Rule 11(c)(2) 16 states that the motion for sanctions “must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be 17 presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn 18 19 or appropriately…
- Russell v. Samec, No. 2:20-cv-00263 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2021).Specifically, 17 Rule 11(c)(2) states that the motion for sanctions “must be served under Rule 5, but it must not 18 be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial 19 is withdrawn or ap…
- Childs v. Dist. Ct. (Wlab Inv., LLC), No. 82967 (Nev. Oct. 19, 2021).publishedThe purpose of that provision is to allow the offending party to correct or withdraw a problematic pleading, and petitioner was not afforded the benefit of that provision, which would allow him to avoid sanctions under that rule.3 Watson R…
- Off. Comm. OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF T v. Ace Gallery New York Corp., No. 2:15-ap-01679 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2021).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710-711 (9th Cir. 22 1998); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction Co., 254 F.3d 772, 788-789 ; In re Crystal 23 Cathedral Ministries, No. 2:12-bk-15665-RK, 2020 WL 1649619 (Bankr.
- BCB Contracting Servs., LLC, No. 2:19-bk-15555 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2021).Co., 254 F.3d 772 , 789 (9th Cir. 2001); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998). 21 38 In re Silberkraus, 336 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2003). 39 DE 143, fn.9. 40 Even though the Statements and Schedules were filed with the Peti…
- Little v. Haynes, No. 2:20-cv-01071 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2021).P. 11(c)(1)-(2); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998).
- Cadle Co. v. Pratt, 524 F.3d 580 (5th Cir. 2008).published
- Sneller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 2010).published
- Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).published
- Lawrence v. Richman Grp. of CT LLC, 620 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2010).published
- Eon-Net Lp v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App'x 189 (Fed. Cir. 2007).unpublished
- Edwin Rector v. Approved Fed. Sav. Bank, 265 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2001).published
- Dyan A. Truesdell v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 293 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- In re Barbara Gail Markus, Debtor, Barbara Gail Markus v. Mary-Ann Gschwend, 313 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).published
- Retail Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 339 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2003).published
- Levinson v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2005).published
- Dietz v. Kautzman, 2004 ND 119, 681 N.W.2d 437.published
- Islamic Shura Council v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 725 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2013).published
- Ettinger & Assocs., LLC v. Miller (In re Miller), 730 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2013).published
- Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins., 556 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2009).published
- Ten Mile Investments, LLC v. Sherman, 2007 WI App 253, 743 N.W.2d 442.published
- Troost v. Kitchin (In re Kitchin), 327 B.R. 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).published
- In re Jazz Photo Corp., 312 B.R. 524 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004).published
- In re Kilgore, 253 B.R. 179 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000).published
- Polo Bldg. Grp., Inc. v. Rakita (In re Shubov), 253 B.R. 540 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).published
- In re Kirk-Murphy Holding, Inc., 313 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2004).published
- Brown v. Eppler, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2011).published
- Gibson v. Coldwell Banker Burnet, 659 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).published
- Monahan Corp. N v. v. Whitty, 319 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D. Mass. 2004).published
- Langdon v. Cnty. of Columbia, 321 F. Supp. 2d 481 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- Harding Univ. v. Consulting Servs. Grp., L.P., 48 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Ill. 1999).published
- Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Ariz. 2003).published
- Matsumaru v. Sato, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Ariz. 2007).published
- Ardisam, Inc. v. Ameristep, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 726 (W.D. Wis. 2004).published
- VanDanacker v. Main Motor Sales Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2000).published
- Lydia Cornell v. George Del Junco, 544 F. App'x 738 (9th Cir. 2013).unpublished
- In re Joan Borsten Vidov & Oleg Vidov (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014).unpublished
- C.W. ex rel. K.S. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2015).published
- Rector v. Approved Fed. Sav. Bank, 265 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2001).published
- Winterrowd v. Am. Gen., No. 07-56541 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2009).published
- In re Adam Lee, No. HI-20-1036-BGTa (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020).unpublished
- Quintis v. Aerospace Corp., 6 F. App'x 642 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Enercon GMBH v. Erdman, 13 F. App'x 651 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Habib v. Cruz, 17 F. App'x 666 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Ochoa v. Hous. Auth., 47 F. App'x 484 (9th Cir. 2002).unpublished
- Kersten v. Quick Collect, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1301 (D. Or. 2016).published
- Wlab Inv., LLC v. Tknr, Inc. C/W 83051, No. 82835 (Nev. May 12, 2022).published
- N. Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2017).published
- Metcalf v. Anchorage Daily News, Inc., 78 F. App'x 24 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- Blumberg v. Gates, 152 F. App'x 652 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublished
- Wild Game NG, LLC v. Wong's Int'l (USA) Corp., 329 F. App'x 131 (9th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Villa v. Heller, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2012).published
- Intravaia ex rel. Intravaia v. Rocky Point Union Free Sch. Dist., 919 F. Supp. 2d 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).published
- Oliver v. IN-N-Out Burgers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2013).published
- Gottschalk v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2013).published
- Pendleton v. Cent. New Mexico Corr. Facility, 184 F.R.D. 637 (D.N.M. 1999).published
- Miller v. Credit Collection Servs., 200 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 2000).published
- Giganti v. Gen-X Strategies, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. Va. 2004).published
- Eon-Net v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609 (W.D. Wash. 2006).published
- Eggers 198846 v. Trujillo, No. 2:18-cv-03913 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2019).
- (PS) Alston v. LLoyd, No. 2:18-cv-02420 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2020).
- (PC) Hamilton v. Ables, No. 2:23-cv-01342 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2024).
- Richter v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 5:22-cv-04795 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2023).
- Arturo Gonzalez, No. 2:15-bk-25283 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2019).unpublished
- Thomas v. Walmart Inc, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2023).
- Mills v. Zeichner, No. 2:23-cv-01130 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2024).
- Freeze v. Gallagher, No. 2:23-cv-01135 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2024).
- Freeze v. Gallagher, No. 2:23-cv-01135 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2024).
- Fresh Mix, LLC v. Pisanelli Bice, PLLC, No. 2:24-cv-00397 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2025).
- Pickens, No. 6:23-cv-01718 (D. Or. Dec. 19, 2025).
- Stephen Lohbeck v. CSL Plasma Inc., No. 2:26-cv-01493 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2026).
- William T. Divane, Jr. v. Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999).published
At page 711Imposing sanctions under rule 11 and inherent authority79 citing cases‘safe harbor’ provision applies only to sanctions imposed upon motion of a party,” and “[njothing in the Rule or the history of the 1993 amendments prevents the district court from [imposing sanctions on its own initiative] after judgment
- Williams v. Estates LLC, 663 F. Supp. 3d 466 (M.D.N.C. 2023).published(Nothing in [Rule 11] . . . prevents the district court from taking [sua sponte] action after judgment.)
- Bojicic v. DeWine, No. 3:21-cv-00630 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2023).(Nothing in the Rule or the history of the 1993 amendments prevents the district court from taking . . . action [on its own initiative] after judgment.)
- Bellah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (E.D. Cal. 2009).published(An award of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the district court’s inherent authority requires a finding of recklessness or bad faith.)
- Hutchinson (Godlove) v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2000).published (‘safe harbor’ provision applies only to sanctions imposed upon motion of a party,” and “[njothing in the Rule or the history of the 1993 amendments prevents the district court from [imposing sanctions on its own initi…)
- Greene, No. 1:24-cv-00316 (D. Idaho June 1, 2026).See, e.g., West Theatre Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519 , 1528 (9th Cir. 1990); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998).
- Barton v. Delfgauw, No. 3:21-cv-05610 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2025). Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 7 F.3d 1102 , 1116 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir.1998)).1 8 This is so because the “safe harbor” provision, Rule 11(c), does not apply when a court orders 9 sanctions on i…
- R.Y.N.N. v. Jennings, No. 4:24-cv-00594 (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2025).P. 11(c)(3), (5)(B). “[A]ny 13 Rule 11 monetary sanction imposed pursuant to the court’s initiative must be . . . payable 14 to the court.” Gonzales v. Texaco Inc., 344 F. App’x 304, 309 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Barber 15 v. Miller, 146 F.3…
- Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Thomason (MAG2), No. 2:24-cv-00517 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 19, 2025).(explaining that the fact that a district court decided to award sanctions on a party’s motion “does not necessarily mean that the court would . . . impose sanctions on its own motion for the same conduct,” citing the Ad…)
- In re Megan Christine Fiedler, No. 23-1185 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 13, 2024).unpublishedHowever, when a bankruptcy court initiates Rule 9011 proceedings on its own initiative, as it did here, the conduct must be “akin to contempt” which “requires more than ignorance or negligence on the part of [the attorney].” In re Nakhuda,…
- Humphries v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (D. Nev. Mar. 25, 2024).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989 , 993 22 (9th Cir. 2001); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 Defendants do not identify the source upon which they r…
Show 59 more citing cases
- Humphries v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2024).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989 , 993 21 (9th Cir. 2001); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 Defendants do not identify the source upon which they r…
- Humphries v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (D. Nev. Feb. 13, 2024).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th 21 Cir. 1998); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2001); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department, 22 276 F.3d 1091, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 While Defendants argue for sanction, their Motion is…
- Benanav v. Healthy Paws Pet Ins. LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00421 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2023).And sanctions under the Court’s inherent 1 authority require a showing of recklessness or bad faith, Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th 2 Cir. 1998), which Healthy Paws has neither alleged nor demonstrated.7 3 Healthy Paws also conte…
- Brockman v. Friedman, No. 3:23-cv-00162 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2023). Id. at 709.
- Brooke v. Superb Hosp. LLC, No. 1:20-cv-00103 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2023).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998) 16 (citing In re Keegan Management Co., 78 F.3d 431 , 436 (9th Cir. 1996) and Chambers v. NASCO, 17 Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)).
- Latanya Williams v. P.I. Props. No. 42, L.P., No. 2:22-cv-05023 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2022).“will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of 17 court”
- Dumace Leonard LeGrand, No. 19-21198 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2022).publishedBarber v. 3]}Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 Courts reserve show cause orders for situations that are 5] “akin to contempt.” Fed.
- Bustanoby v. Preserver Trans LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00200 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2022).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 In this case, the 25-day delay in providing the agreed upon settlement money 21 does not rise to the level of willful bad faith or reckless frivolity for purposes of 1 ordering attorn…
- Battle Born Munitions Inc v. Dick's Sporting Goods Inc, No. 3:19-cv-00561 (D. Nev. Jan. 5, 2021). (holding that “[a]n award of sanctions under . . . the court’s inherent authority 27 requires a finding of recklessness or bad faith)
- Yan Sui v. 2176 Pac. Homeowners Assoc., 691 F. App'x 376 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- Rebecca Alexander v. King Cnty., No. 17-35677 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019).unpublished
- Freeman v. Heiderich, 177 F. App'x 553 (9th Cir. 2006).unpublished
- In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).published
- Matsumaru v. Sato, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Ariz. 2007).published
- ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 579 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009).published
- Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003).published
- Marteen Moore v. USC Univ. Hosp., Inc., 416 F. App'x 640 (9th Cir. 2011).unpublished
- David M. Fink v. James H. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- United Nat'l Ins. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).published
- Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Local 996, 302 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Nicholas Oliva v. Nat'l City Mortg. Co., 490 F. App'x 904 (9th Cir. 2012).unpublished
- Santa Fe Minerals, Inc. v. BEPCO, L.P. (In re 15375 Mem'l Corp.), 430 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).published
- Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2006 WI App 219, 724 N.W.2d 259.published
- In re Martinez, 393 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008).published
- In re Melendez, 235 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).published
- Gschwend v. Markus (In re Markus), 268 B.R. 556 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001).published
- In re Aston-Nevada Ltd. P'ship, 391 B.R. 84 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).published
- Fink v. Gomez, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1999).published
- East Cascade Women's Grp., P.C. v. Tutthill, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (D. Or. 2002).published
- Truesdell v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2001).published
- Barnard v. Mansell, 2009 UT App 298, 221 P.3d 874.published
- Marwan Mohtadi v. Homecomings Fin., 554 F. App'x 629 (9th Cir. 2014).unpublished
- Shalaby v. Mansdorf (In re Nakhuda), 544 B.R. 886 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016).published
- In re Farouk E. Nakhuda, No. NC-15-1149-JuKuW (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016).published
- In re Rosario M. Carrera Trisha Ainne Vizconde, No. NC-15-1383-KiTaJu and NC-15-1384-KiTaJu (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016).unpublished
- Kollander v. Kollander, 400 P.3d 91 (Alaska 2017).published
- Lisa Wong v. Kracksmith, Inc., No. 17-56765 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2019).unpublished
- Pratt v. California, 11 F. App'x 833 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Stiver v. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care Inc., 24 F. App'x 666 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Barley v. Fox Chase Cancer Ctr., 54 F. Supp. 3d 396 (E.D. Pa. 2014).published
- In re Engle Cases, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2017).published
- Gonzales v. Texaco Inc., 344 F. App'x 304 (9th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Chase v. Kosmala (In re Loyd), 304 B.R. 372 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003).published
- Wavetronix, LLC v. Myers, 704 F. App'x 696 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- Calop Bus. Sys., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 984 F. Supp. 2d 981 (C.D. Cal. 2013).published
- Truesdell v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 209 F.R.D. 169 (C.D. Cal. 2002).published
- Willis v. City of Oakland, 231 F.R.D. 597 (N.D. Cal. 2005).published
- (PC) Caruso v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cv-00780 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2022).
- Perez v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04880 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2019).
- Mogan v. Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP, No. 3:21-cv-08431 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2022).
- Manipoun v. Dibela, No. 3:17-cv-02325 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2020).
- Kellogg v. Wilson, No. 3:21-cv-00963 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2021).
- Gonzalez v. Allied Collection Servs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02909 (D. Nev. Aug. 6, 2019).
- Joshua James Sharpe, No. 20-61168 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 31, 2021).
- Thompson v. Wallace Com. Landscape, No. 3:23-cv-01530 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2024).
- K.W. Brock Directories Inc. v. Arvig Enter. Inc., No. 3:25-cv-08172 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2026).
- Melissa Romano v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:26-cv-01862 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2026).
At page 709Reviewing standard of review for sanctions and fees23 citing casessetting forth standard of review and requirements for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
- Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Fps Food Process Solutions Corp., No. 22-35832 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2023).unpublishedBarber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1998).
- Brockman v. Friedman, No. 3:23-cv-00162 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2023). Id. at 709.
- Stephen Yagman v. Jesse Bray, No. 21-55681 (9th Cir. July 18, 2022).unpublished(setting forth standard of review and requirements for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927)
- Karla Gonzalez v. Allied Collection Servs., Inc., 852 F. App'x 264 (9th Cir. 2021).unpublishedThe district court did not abuse its discretion, see Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1998), in denying Allied’s pre-trial motion to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 .
- Smith v. Wilson, No. 6:17-cv-00119 (D. Mont. Nov. 5, 2020).Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1998).
- Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- DeMarco v. Depotech Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (S.D. Cal. 2001).published
- Yan Sui v. 2176 Pac. Homeowners Assoc., 691 F. App'x 376 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- Rebecca Alexander v. King Cnty., No. 17-35677 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019).unpublished
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v.
Jim Miller, an Individual Arthur Blank Imageware Software, Inc., a California Corporation Mfo Management Co., a Michigan Business Organization Paul Yager Stewart Dansby Mark Wooster Rita Garwood, Defendants-Appellees/cross-Appellants
47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1055, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4489,
98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6192
Pamela BARBER, Plaintiff,
and
Miles Carlsen, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Jim MILLER, an individual, et al.; Arthur Blank; Imageware
Software, Inc., a California corporation; MFO Management
Co., a Michigan business organization; Paul Yager; Stewart
Dansby; Mark Wooster; Rita Garwood,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 96-55725, 96-55860.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 7, 1997.
Decided June 12, 1998.
Andrew S. Kierstead, Carlsen & Kierstead, Santa Monica, California, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Phyllis E. Andelin, Miller, Mailliard & Culver, L.L.P., San Francisco, California, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California; Judith N. Keep, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-00675-JNK.
Before: CANBY, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,[*] District Judge.
CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Attorney Miles Carlsen appeals an award of Rule 11 sanctions against him, while Imageware cross-appeals the amount of the award and the refusal to give other sanctions. We reverse the award of sanctions, because the motion for sanctions was not served upon Carlsen 21 days before filing, as required by the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, so as to give Carlsen an opportunity to withdraw the complaint without suffering sanctions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A).
BACKGROUND
Carlsen initially filed in the district court, on behalf of his client Pamela Barber, a forty page complaint against Imageware Software, Inc. et al. The complaint alleged eight state law causes of action and two federal claims: patent infringement and a RICO violation. Carlsen concedes that Barber did not own the patent in question; the complaint alleged that she had transferred it to another. Shortly thereafter, Imageware's attorney telephoned Carlsen. That attorney declared that she offered to provide Carlsen with authority indicating that only the owner of a patent has standing to sue for its infringement, and that Carlsen declined to discuss the matter.
Subsequently, Imageware's attorneys requested by letter that Carlsen dismiss the complaint with prejudice, citing a lack of federal jurisdiction and a Mutual General Release between Barber and Imageware that allegedly barred most of the claims. The letter added:
Please allow this letter to serve as formal notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) that, unless the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice forthwith, my clients reserve the right to seek appropriate sanctions, including all fees and costs incurred in defending this matter.
Carlsen replied by letter, demanding that Imageware "stop threatening sanctions." Imageware replied and gave notice that it intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions. It then filed a motion to dismiss which cited authority for the proposition that only the owner of a patent has standing to sue for its infringement. Imageware argued that this rule is so well-settled that sanctions should be imposed on a complainant that cannot allege ownership of the patent.
Carlsen did not oppose Imageware's motion. Instead, he filed an amended complaint which dropped the RICO claim but added four new state law claims. He now sought federal jurisdiction over twelve state claims on the basis of a single claim for the infringement of a patent that Barber did not own.
At a hearing, the district court commented on Carlsen's "tactical bad faith" and suggested that his was a nuisance suit brought to extract a settlement. On October 16, 1995, the court granted Imageware's motion to dismiss with prejudice.[1] It cited the same lack of standing of which Imageware had complained since the beginning of the litigation. By this point, Imageware, a small company, had incurred $26,488.15 in legal expenses and allegedly had lost much of its anticipated venture capital financing as a result of the lawsuit. The district court's order indicated that the court would retain jurisdiction to consider sanctions.
On December 19, 1995, Imageware informed Carlsen by letter that it would seek sanctions. On January 19, 1996, Imageware both moved for sanctions and served Carlsen with the motion. After a hearing on April 8, 1996, the district court awarded Imageware $2,500 in sanctions against Carlsen. Carlsen appeals the award; Imageware cross-appeals the amount of the award and the denial of its request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's "inherent authority."
DISCUSSION
We review for an abuse of discretion the award of Rule 11 sanctions and the denial of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the district court's inherent authority. Mark Indus. Ltd. v. Sea Captain's Choice, Inc., 50 F.3d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1995)(Rule 11); Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 74 F.3d 183, 184 (9th Cir.1996) (§ 1927); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (inherent authority).The Rule 11
Sanctions
There is no doubt that Carlsen's patent claim, upon which federal jurisdiction was founded, was not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2). It is also abundantly clear that Imageware gave Carlsen repeated notice of that deficiency. Unfortunately for Imageware, however, it did not follow the procedure required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A) for an award of sanctions upon its motion. By the time Imageware filed its motion, the offending complaint had long since been dismissed.
Rule 11(c) authorizes the court to award sanctions "subject to the conditions stated below." One of those conditions, part of the 1993 amendments to the Rule, states:
[A motion for sanctions] shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contentions, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.
Fed.R.Civ.P. § 11(c)(1)(A). The purpose of the amendments is made abundantly clear by the Advisory Committee Notes:
These provisions are intended to provide a type of "safe harbor" against motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refused to withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation. Under the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party against a motion for sanctions.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11; Adv. Comm. Notes, 1993 Amend. Carlsen was not given the opportunity to respond to Imageware's motion by withdrawing his claim, thereby protecting himself totally from sanctions pursuant to that motion. The purpose of the amendment was entirely defeated. An award of sanctions cannot be upheld under those circumstances. See Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1995); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir.1995).
The district court observed that Imageware had given multiple warnings to Carlsen about the defects of his claim. Those warnings were not motions, however, and the Rule requires service of a motion. That requirement, too, was deliberately imposed, with a recognition of the likelihood of other warnings. As the Advisory Committee stated:
To stress the seriousness of a motion for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the rule, the revision provides that the "safe harbor" period begins to run only upon service of the motion. In most cases, however, counsel should be expected to give informal notice to the other party, whether in person or by a telephone call or letter, of a potential violation before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion.
Id. It would therefore wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment to the Rule to permit an informal warning to substitute for service of a motion.
The district court stated that observance of the Rule in this case would have been futile, because the offending complaint had already been dismissed. Moreover, the motion was both served and filed on a day that preceded by more than 21 days the deadline for filing papers for the scheduled motion hearing. According to the district court, "Defendants missed complying with the 'safe harbor' provision only by filing their motion with the court too early, not by serving it on Plaintiff too late."
The purpose of the safe harbor, however, is to give the offending party the opportunity, within 21 days after service of the motion for sanctions, to withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions. A motion served after the complaint had been dismissed did not give Carlsen that opportunity. As the Advisory Committee noted:
Given the "safe harbor" provisions discussed below, a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the offending contention).
Id. In light of the clear language and intent of the amended Rule, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that "a party cannot wait until after summary judgment to move for sanctions under Rule 11." Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 687, 139 L.Ed.2d 634 (1998).
As the Sixth Circuit further observed, the "safe harbor" provision applies only to sanctions imposed upon motion of a party. Id. at 297 n. 8. Rule 11 also provides:
On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(B). Nothing in the Rule or the history of the 1993 amendments prevents the district court from taking this action after judgment. The question might arise, then, whether the district court's retention of jurisdiction in this case after judgment, for purposes of sanctions motions, could be the equivalent of an election by the court to impose sanctions on its own motion. We conclude that it is not the equivalent.
In the first place, the court did not initiate the sanction; Imageware did. The Rule distinguishes between sanctions imposed upon motion of a party and those imposed by show-cause order on the initiative of the court. The distinction is not merely formal. The sanctions in this case were ordered to be paid to Imageware. Rule 11 provides that sanctions may include "an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, if the present sanctions payable to Imageware are considered to be sanctions imposed upon the court's initiative, they are unauthorized. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1993 Amend. ("The revision provides that a monetary sanction imposed after a court-initiated show cause order be limited to a penalty payable to the court").
Moreover, the fact that a district court has exercised its discretion to award sanctions on motion of a party does not necessarily mean that the court would exercise its discretion to impose sanctions on its own motion for the same conduct. See Hadges, 48 F.3d at 1329; Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1993 Amend. ("Since show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of court, the rule does not provide a 'safe harbor' to a litigant ... after a show cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative"). We therefore decline to equate the district court's award of sanctions on Imageware's belated motion to sanctions awarded on the court's own initiative. We accordingly reverse the Rule 11 award of sanctions payable to Imageware.[2]
Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
or the District Court's Inherent Authority
An award of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the district court's inherent authority requires a finding of recklessness or bad faith. See In re Keegan Management Co., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir.1996); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). The district court expressly declined to make such findings. The evidence in the record supports the district court's ruling; it certainly shows ignorance or negligence on the part of Carlsen, but does not compel a finding that he was reckless or acted in bad faith. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award sanctions under section 1927 or its inherent authority.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court awarding Rule 11 sanctions against Carlsen and in favor of Imageware is REVERSED. With respect to the cross-appeal, that part of the district court's judgment that denies sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent authority is AFFIRMED.
APPEAL REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL AFFIRMED.
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation
Carlsen subsequently filed an identical suit in state court, which was dismissed on demurrer
Our conclusion that Imageware is entitled to no Rule 11 sanctions defeats its contention on cross-appeal that the Rule 11 award was insufficient in amount