Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co.
A court may sanction the filing of a complaint under Rule 11 or its inherent power, but 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies only to unnecessary filings after litigation begins.
After a district court imposed sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel for filing a securities fraud complaint, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the application of Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent powers. The court held that Rule 11 sanctions require a finding that a filing is both baseless and made without a reasonable inquiry, applying an objective-objective test to the factual basis of the claim. Furthermore, the court determined that § 1927 applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics once a lawsuit has begun and cannot be used to sanction an initial complaint. Finally, the court ruled that sanctions under a court's inherent power require a specific finding of subjective bad faith rather than mere recklessness.
At page 436Determining subjective bad faith for sanctions under section 192795 citing cases[b]ad faith is 12 present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a 13 meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent
- Nat'l Prods. Inc v. Innovative Intelligent Prods. LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00428 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2026).(Bad faith is 13 present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument[.])
- Kerner v. U.S. Vet. Affairs Med. Ctr., No. 2:23-cv-01872 (D. Nev. July 16, 2025).(For sanctions [under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ] to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is 21 not frivolous, it must be intended to harass.)
- Jones v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 3:15-cv-02726 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2025).(Bad 2 faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument.)
- Jones v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 3:15-cv-02726 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2024).(Bad faith is 4 present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument.)
- Westbrook v. Paulson, No. 2:20-cv-01606, 2021 WL 963486 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2021).([b]ad faith is 12 present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a 13 meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent)
- vPersonalize Inc v. Magnetize Consultants Ltd, No. 2:18-cv-01836 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2020).([b]ad faith is 9 present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a 10 11 meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent)
- Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, No. 2:17-cv-02133 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2019). (Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or 7 recklessly raises a frivolous argument . . . .)
- Sven Goldmanis v. John Insinger, 679 F. App'x 605 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished(We review the district court’s entry of sanctions under its inherent power for an abuse of discretion.)
- Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., 11 F. App'x 847 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished (For sanctions to apply, if filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous.)
- Wells v. Global Tech Indus., Inc, 658 F. Supp. 3d 912 (D. Nev. 2023).published(For 15 sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not 16 frivolous, it must be intended to harass.)
Show 84 more citing cases
- Raya v. Barka, No. 3:19-cv-02295 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2022).“section 1927 sanctions 'must be supported by a finding of subjective bad faith.' 15 'bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous 16 argument”
- In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010).published (For sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass.... [R]eckless non-frivolous filings, without more, may not be sanctioned.)
- Franco v. Dow Chem. Co., 611 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010).published (For sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass .... [Rjeckless non-frivolous filings, without more, may not be sanctioned.)
- Keenan Wilkins v. Jeff MacOmber, No. 23-15934 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026).unpublished(explaining that a counsel’s conduct may be sanctioned only upon a specific finding of bad faith)
- Segui, No. 2:25-cv-01849 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2026).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). 27 Although Plaintiffs did not respond to this request, (see generally Doc. 26), the 28 absence of a response does not relieve Stromfors of the burden of establishing the…
- Dam, No. 2:25-cv-00077 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
- Bjurling, No. 3:25-cv-05559 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th 16 Cir. 1996). 17 The court declines to impose sanctions on counsel for Intercity Transit.
- Early Warning Servs. LLC v. Johnson, No. 2:24-cv-01587 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2025). Lit., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1061 (9th Cir. 18 2010)).) Next, Mr. Johnson argues that the Court has issued inconsistent rulings, which 19 precludes the imposition of sanctions.
- Sonnenfeld v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:25-cv-05225 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th 15 Cir. 1996).
- R.Y.N.N. v. Jennings, No. 4:24-cv-00594 (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996).
- R.Y.N.N. v. Jennings, No. 4:24-cv-00594 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996). 17 Plaintiffs have been warned multiple times that their repetitive improper lawsuits 18 may subject them to sanctions.
- Mulato v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 76 F. Supp. 3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2014).published
- Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Banner Health, 402 F. App'x 289 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublished
- Eeoc v. Banner Health, No. 09-16019 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010).unpublished
- Best Odds Corp. v. Ibus Media Ltd., 657 F. App'x 641 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- Flowrider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01879 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020).
- Lundstrom v. Young, No. 3:18-cv-02856 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022).
- Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Ethel Cohn, 95 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- John Stiglich v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors Contra Costa Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. Sunne McPeak Tom Powers Phil Batchelor United Prof'l Fire Fighters of Contra Costa Cnty. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Robert Eason Robert Adams Michael Price, John Stiglich v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors Contra Costa Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. Sunne McPeak Tom Powers Phil Batchelor Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, & United Prof'l Fire Fighters of Contra Costa Co. Robert Eason Robert Adams Michael Price, 106 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- PRIMUS Auto. Fin. Servs., INC. v. Rudolph A. BATARSE, 115 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1997).published
- In re Richard P. Dellinger Dorathy M. Dellinger, Debtors, John Sutera v. Dorathy M. Dellinger, 116 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Susan Cowden v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Paul Dabon v. United Parcel Serv., 139 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1998).unpublished
- Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000).published
- United States v. Marion Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000).published
- B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Valenzuela v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2010).published
- Fink v. Gomez, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1999).published
- East Cascade Women's Grp., P.C. v. Tutthill, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (D. Or. 2002).published
- Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Ariz. 2003).published
- Na Mamo O 'Aha 'Ino v. Galiher, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Haw. 1999).published
- Anticancer, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 769 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014).published
- Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2008).published
- Xue Lu v. United States, 638 F. App'x 614 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2017).published
- MacPherson v. Comm'r, 702 F. App'x 621 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- Takaba v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 285 (T.C. 2002).published
- Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998).published
- Pratt v. California, 11 F. App'x 833 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Rosensweig v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., 14 F. App'x 765 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Tallman v. CPS Sec. (USA), Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1249 (D. Nev. 2014).published
- Kime v. Adventist Health Clearlake Hosp., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2017).published
- Jones v. Williams, 68 F. App'x 857 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- Ent. By J & J, Inc. v. Lee, 126 F. App'x 797 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublished
- Yagman v. Colello, 307 F. App'x 115 (9th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Bellagio, LLC v. Horaney, 319 F. App'x 652 (9th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Quantz v. Edwards, 264 F. App'x 625 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Morgan v. Cnty. of Yolo, 277 F. App'x 735 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Wavetronix, LLC v. Myers, 704 F. App'x 696 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- Wallis v. Centennial Ins., 927 F. Supp. 2d 909 (E.D. Cal. 2013).published
- Oliver v. IN-N-Out Burgers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2013).published
- Avendano v. Sec. Consultants Grp., 302 F.R.D. 588 (D. Nev. 2014).published
- Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, No. 2:17-cv-02133 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2019).
- IceMOS Tech. Corp. v. Omron Corp., No. 2:17-cv-02575 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2020).
- Stanley v. Mason, No. 2:21-cv-01454 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2022).
- David Wang v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-07385 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019).
- (PC) Caruso v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cv-00780 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2022).
- Srinvasan v. Kenna, No. 4:18-cv-03977 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020).
- Haley v. Clark Constr. Grp.-California, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-07542 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020).
- Love v. CHSP TRS San Francisco LLC, No. 4:20-cv-07259 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2022).
- Amin v. Subway Restaurants, Inc., No. 4:21-cv-00498 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023).
- Global Indus. Inv. Ltd. v. 1955 Capital Fund I GP LLC, No. 4:21-cv-08924 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2023).
- WI-LAN Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-01577 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2019).
- Lundstrom v. Young, 419 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (S.D. Cal. 2019).published
- Ewing v. Reliant Credit Repair, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01788 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020).
- Kailikole v. Palomar Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 3:18-cv-02877, 2020 WL 6203097 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2020).
- Stark v. GG Homes, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-01913 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2021).
- Horvath v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 3:21-cv-01665 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2022).
- Robert A. Slovak v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, No. 3:13-cv-00569 (D. Nev. Feb. 26, 2020).
- Leftenant v. Blackmon, No. 2:18-cv-01948 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2023).
- Xie v. Wu, No. 6:22-cv-01488 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2023).
- Joshua James Sharpe, No. 20-61168 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 31, 2021).
- Schnell v. Interstate Assembly Sys., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-01314 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2024).
- Deleon v. City of San Diego, No. 3:23-cv-00833 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024).
- Mondragon Martinez v. Vega Contreras, No. 3:24-cv-00694, 2024 WL 4528208 (D. Or. Oct. 17, 2024).
- Edifecs, Inc. v. Welltok, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01086 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2020).
- Corus Realty Holdings, Inc v. Zillow Grp., Inc, No. 2:18-cv-00847 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2020).
- Barton v. LeadPoint Inc, No. 3:21-cv-05372 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2022).
- White v. Univ. of Washington, No. 2:22-cv-01798, 2023 WL 3582395 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2023).
- Harris v. JFC Int'l Inc, No. 2:21-cv-01536 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2023).
- White v. Univ. of Washington, No. 2:22-cv-01798 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2024).
- Bio Energy (Washington) LLC v. King Cnty., No. 2:23-cv-00542 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2024).
- Silver Fern Chem. Inc v. Lyons, No. 2:23-cv-00775 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2024).
- United States ex rel. Raju A.T. Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe of Washington, No. 2:16-cv-00052 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2019).
At page 435Analyzing rule 11 and section 1927 sanctions authority53 citing casesThe filing of a complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court's inherent power, but it may not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.
- Xfinity Mobile v. Globalgurutech LLC, No. 2:22-cv-01950 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2025).(We have twice expressly held that § 1927 13 cannot be applied to an initial pleading.)
- Esposito, No. 2:25-cv-00588 (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2025).(For a sanction to be validly imposed, the 18 conduct must be sanctionable under the authority relied on)
- Internet Sports Int'l, LTD. v. Amelco USA, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00893 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2025).(For a 13 sanction to be validly imposed, the conduct must be sanctionable under the authority relied on)
- Miller v. 4Internet, LLC., No. 2:18-cv-02097 (D. Nev. Dec. 20, 2022). (The filing 22 of a complaint . . . may not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927)
- Amaro v. Bee Sweet Citrus, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00382 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2022).(The filing of a 9 complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court’s inherent power, but it may not be 10 sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.)
- Battle Born Munitions Inc v. Dick's Sporting Goods Inc, No. 3:19-cv-00561 (D. Nev. Jan. 5, 2021).(The filing of a complaint 25 . . . may not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.)
- Beverly v. Shermeta Law Grp., PLLC, No. 2:19-cv-11473, 2020 WL 2556674 (E.D. Mich. May 20, 2020).(The filing of a complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court's inherent power, but it may not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.)
- Gurman v. Metro Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 884 F. Supp. 2d 895 (D. Minn. 2012).published(The filing of a complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court’s inherent power, but it may not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.)
- Sunday's Child, LLC v. Irongate AZREP BW LLC, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1322 (D. Haw. 2018).published“rule 11 must be read not only to give effect to the rule's central deterrent goals, but also 'in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy.”
- Tomahawk Mfg., Inc. v. Spherical Indus., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01007 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 2026).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996) 19 (“For a sanction to be validly imposed, the conduct must be sanctionable under the authority relied 20 on”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Show 43 more citing cases
- Tomahawk Mfg., Inc. v. Spherical Indus., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01007 (D. Nev. May 15, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996). 8 To be sanctioned under § 1927, the attorney must have acted in bad faith.
- Boards of Trs. of the Cement Masons & Plasterers Health & Welfare Trust v. Leewens Corp., No. 2:23-cv-01626 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 2025).Co., Secs. 4 || Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996). “[Section 1927] cannot be applied to an initial 5 || pleading.” /d.
- Feick v. Brutsche Fam. Revocable Trust, No. 3:24-cv-05587 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).
- Roe v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. NA, No. 3:24-cv-05338 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2024).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996); De Dios v. Int’l Realty & Investments, 7 641 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 do not 8 apply to complaints or initial pleadings”).
- Willis v. City of Oakland, 231 F.R.D. 597 (N.D. Cal. 2005).published
- Colleen Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781 (11th Cir. 2006).unpublished
- Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Banner Health, 402 F. App'x 289 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublished
- MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).published
- De Dios v. Int'l Realty & Investments, 641 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011).published
- Mai Sys. Corp. v. Walbert Enter., Inc. Gene H. Walbert, Mai Sys. Corp., & Kip Schwartz Marilyn Jenkins Milner v. Sig Schreiber, Mai Sys. Corp. v. Gene H. Walbert, D/B/A Walbert Enter. Sigismund Schreiber, 116 F.3d 485 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- In re Start the Engines, Inc., 219 B.R. 264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998).published
- MacHeska v. Thomson Learning, 347 F. Supp. 2d 169 (M.D. Pa. 2004).published
- Moser v. Bret Harte Union High Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 2d 944 (E.D. Cal. 2005).published
- Delamater v. Anytime Fitness, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (E.D. Cal. 2010).published
- Terrebonne, Ltd. of California v. Murray, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Cal. 1998).published
- Eeoc v. Banner Health, No. 09-16019 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010).unpublished
- Glasser ex rel. Kirschner v. Blixseth, 649 F. App'x 506 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- Best Odds Corp. v. Ibus Media Ltd., 657 F. App'x 641 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- Best v. Comm'r, 111 T.C.M. 1142 (T.C. 2016).unpublished
- Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1999).published
- Athearn v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App'x 172 (9th Cir. 2004).unpublished
- Mirch v. Frank, 266 F. App'x 586 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Welk v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 850 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Minn. 2012).published
- Alutiiq Int'l Solutions, LLC v. OIC Marianas Ins., 305 F.R.D. 618 (D. Nev. 2015).published
- Nat.-Immunogenics Corp. v. Newport Trial Grp., No. 22-55990 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2024).unpublished
- Garrow v. Tucson Clips LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00243 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2023).
- Saetes v. expHand, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06235 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020).
- Pop Top Corp v. Rakuten Kobo Inc., No. 4:20-cv-04482, 2022 WL 267407 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2022).
- Whitaker v. Peet's Coffee, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-07698, 2022 WL 6698328 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2022).
- Flowrider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01879 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020).
- Lundstrom v. Young, No. 3:18-cv-02856 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022).
- Provitola v. Comer, No. 6:20-cv-00862 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2024).
- Foley v. Valdes, No. 2:17-cv-02783 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 2020).
- Egbert v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00483 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2020).
- Troyer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv-01056 (D. Nev. Oct. 25, 2021).
- Mayorga v. Ronaldo, 656 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (D. Nev. 2023).published
- Robert Miller v. 4internet, LLC, No. 22-16195 (9th Cir. June 28, 2024).unpublished
- BCB Contracting Servs., LLC, No. 2:19-bk-15555 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2021).
- Bustanoby v. Preserver Trans LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00200 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2022).
- Hart v. Wesen, No. 2:23-cv-00309 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2023).
- Gillespie v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.M. 91 (T.C. 2007).unpublished
- Davis v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.M. 81 (T.C. 2007).unpublished
- United States ex rel. Raju A.T. Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe of Washington, No. 2:16-cv-00052 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2019).
At page 434Determining reasonable inquiry standard for sanctions under rule 1136 citing casesA ‘frivolous’ argument or claim is one that is ‘both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.’
- Eon-Net v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609 (W.D. Wash. 2006).published(A ‘frivolous’ argument or claim is one that is ‘both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.’)
- Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01749 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). (See generally ECF No. 294-13; ECF No. 296-11.) 23 Perhaps most importantly—although plaintiffs argue at length about how the 24 emissions data supports their cause—they ultimately claim that they engaged in an 25 appropriate Rule 11 inves…
- Bartlett v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01374 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). (See generally ECF No. 294-13; ECF No. 296-11.) 23 Perhaps most importantly—although plaintiffs argue at length about how the 24 emissions data supports their cause—they ultimately claim that they engaged in an 25 appropriate Rule 11 inves…
- Barton v. Delfgauw, No. 3:21-cv-05610 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996)).
- Bartlett v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01374 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996) 22 (applying Townsend “to the factual basis for a claim”).
- Rinaldi v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01377 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996) 22 (applying Townsend “to the factual basis for a claim”).
- Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01749 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996) 22 (applying Townsend “to the factual basis for a claim”).
- Eon-Net Lp v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App'x 189 (Fed. Cir. 2007).unpublished
- Schuyler Van Scoy v. Charles G. Kinney v. Shell Oil Co., 98 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- Barkley v. Hermundslie, 110 F.3d 67 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
Show 24 more citing cases
- View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2000).published
- Levinson v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2005).published
- Nancy Radin v. Darlene Hunt, 499 F. App'x 684 (9th Cir. 2012).unpublished
- In the Matter of Rachel R. Alexander, 300 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2013).published
- Koon v. South Carolina, 110 F. App'x 301 (4th Cir. 2004).unpublished
- Rogler v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F. App'x 647 (4th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Friends of Nassau Cnty., Inc. v. Nassau Cnty., 752 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).published
- Chao v. Westside Drywall, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Or. 2010).published
- DeMarco v. Depotech Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (S.D. Cal. 2001).published
- United States v. Robert Nelson, 714 F. App'x 263 (4th Cir. 2018).unpublished
- In re Crystal Cathedral Ministries, No. CC-20-1103-FLT (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 28, 2021).unpublished
- Mulato v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 76 F. Supp. 3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2014).published
- Patterson v. Apple Comput., Inc., 256 F. App'x 165 (9th Cir. 2007).unpublished
- Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 888 F. Supp. 2d 963 (D. Ariz. 2012).published
- Willis v. City of Oakland, 231 F.R.D. 597 (N.D. Cal. 2005).published
- Gerke v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 289 F.R.D. 316 (D. Or. 2013).published
- Park Miller, LLC v. Durham Grp., Ltd., No. 3:19-cv-04185, 2020 WL 1955652 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020).
- J.H. v. Cnty. of San Mateo, No. 3:20-cv-00961 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2022).
- Aldini AG v. Silvaco, Inc., No. 4:21-cv-06423 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2023).
- Kohli v. Dayal, No. 2:20-cv-00538 (D. Nev. Aug. 22, 2022).
- Mehta v. Victoria Partners, No. 2:21-cv-01493 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2023).
- Halper v. Jerome Bennett Friedman, No. 1:19-ap-01021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2019).
- Koji IP, LLC v. Renesas Elec. Am., Inc., No. 3:24-cv-03089 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2024).
- Philips v. Berman, No. 1:23-cv-00017 (D. Guam Aug. 19, 2024).
At page 437Exercising sanctioning power with extreme caution16 citing casesRule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme 8 caution.
- Pulido v. Desert Platinum Props. LLC, No. 2:22-cv-01704 (D. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2024).([T]he power to sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 . . . is an extraordinary remedy 16 . . . to be exercised with extreme caution.)
- Aileen Brooks v. It Works Mktg., Inc., No. 1:21-cv-01341 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2022). (Rule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be 17 exercised with extreme caution.)
- Dakavia Mgmt. Corp. v. Bigelow, No. 1:20-cv-00448, 2022 WL 104245 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2022). (Rule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme 8 caution.)
- Xiong, No. 1:25-cv-00026 (D. Guam Apr. 20, 2026).(simplified)
- Nevada Fleet LLC v. Fedex Corp., No. 2:17-cv-01732 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025).Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 437 (9th Cir. 1996) 1 | (quoting Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336 , 1345 (9th Cir. 1988)). 2 | “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and . . . streamli…
- Lundstrom v. Young, 419 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (S.D. Cal. 2019).published
- Gemisys Corp. v. Phoenix Am., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. Cal. 1999).published
- Swisher Hygiene Franchise Corp. v. Clawson, No. 2:15-cv-01331 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2023).
- Anhar v. Citibank, N.A., No. 1:19-cv-00496 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021).
- Outlaw Lab'y, LP v. DG in PB, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00840 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2019).
Show 6 more citing cases
- Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, No. 3:17-cv-01436 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020).
- Ewing v. Freedom Forever, LLC, No. 3:23-cv-01240 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2024).
- Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00373 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2020).
- Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00373 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2021).
- Sanchez v. R.W. Selby & Co., No. 2:20-cv-02357 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2022).
- Quesada v. Marten Transp., Ltd, No. 2:23-cv-00311 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2024).
It is objectively 27 reasonable for counsel to rely upon experts when filing suit.
- Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01749 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). (It is objectively 27 reasonable for counsel to rely upon experts when filing suit.)
- Bartlett v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01374 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). (It is objectively 27 reasonable for counsel to rely upon experts when filing suit.)
“it is objectively 27 reasonable for counsel to rely upon experts when filing suit.”
- Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01749 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). “it is objectively 27 reasonable for counsel to rely upon experts when filing suit.”
- Bartlett v. BP West Coast Prods. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01374 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). “it is objectively 27 reasonable for counsel to rely upon experts when filing suit.”
Other citing cases
- Gonzalez v. San Mateo Cnty., No. 3:19-cv-00736 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021).
- (PS) Ferrantino v. San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:20-cv-00808 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020).
v.
KEEGAN MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendants-Appellees Michael MOORE, and Richard L. Jaeger Feldman, Waldman & Kline v. KEEGAN MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a Delaware corporation
Lead Opinion
Opinion by Judge POOLE; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge O’SCANNLAIN.
POOLE, Circuit Judge:We consider under what circumstances and pursuant to what authority attorneys may be sanctioned for the filing of a complaint. Because we find such circumstances[*433] not present here, we reverse the district court’s order imposing $100,000 in sanctions against attorneys Elizabeth Cabraser and Richard Jaeger, and their respective law firms, Lieff, Cabraser & Heimann and Feldman, Waldman & Kline.
I
The merits of this ease, a securities class-action, are not at issue. The sole question on appeal is whether plaintiffs’ counsel may be sanctioned for initiating this lawsuit.
Defendant Keegan Management was a franchisee of Nutri/System Weight Loss Centers (“Nutri/System”). It sold weight loss programs. In December 1989, Keegan made an initial public offering (“IPO”) of stock at $7 per share. Stock rose to $10 per share within a few months.
In early 1990, controversy over the Nutri/System program broke out. A series of personal injury lawsuits alleging gall bladder problems resulting from weight-loss programs were filed against Nutri/System. In March, Congressional hearings on the diet industry aired testimony discussing the health risks associated with such programs, including the risk of gallstones from rapid weight loss. The Wall Street Journal published an article discussing health problems associated with the Nutri/System program. Amidst these events and other reports, Keegan’s stock fell to 10% of its peak value.
Appellant law firms Lieff, Cabraser & Heimann and Feldman, Waldman & Kline were approached in late 1990 by potential clients interested in filing securities fraud suits against Keegan based on the possibility that Keegan had knowingly or recklessly failed to disclose health risks associated with its program in the 1989 IPO. Attorneys Elizabeth Cabraser of Lieff, Cabraser and Richard Jaeger of Feldman, Waldman & Kline ultimately filed separate class action suits on February 19 and March 4, 1991. The two suits, Moore v. Keegan and Crespo v. Keegan, were consolidated. These suits alleged that Keegan misrepresented the Nutri/System program as safe at a time when it knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the program might lead to gall bladder problems.
Keegan moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion in May 1992. The district court found plaintiffs’ evidence of scienter, and any known link between weight loss and gall bladder problems prior to December 1989, entirely lacking. That summer, Keegan moved for Rule 11 sanctions, but withdrew its motion as part of settlement negotiations. The parties reached a settlement in November 1992. However, prior to approval of that settlement, the district court sua sponte issued an order to show cause why Rule 11 sanctions should not be entered. The court conducted a hearing on April 27, 1993. On March 31, 1994, 154 F.R.D. 237, the district court entered sanctions against Cabraser and Jaeger in the amount of $25,000 each pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. It also sanctioned the attorneys’ firms $25,000 each pursuant to § 1927 and its inherent power. The district court concluded that the attorneys had been reckless in filing a complaint when they could at best only guess that Keegan recklessly failed to disclose health risks when issuing the IPO. The attorneys and firms have timely appealed.
II
At the time the complaint in this case was filed, Rule 11 provided in relevant part that by signing a filing, an attorney certified
that [1] to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that [2] it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. The district court sanctioned Cabraser and Jaeger pursuant to the first prong, the “frivolousness prong.” We review the district court’s entry of Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmans Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2460-61, 110 L.Ed.2d 359[*434] (1990); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir.1994).
Cabraser and Jaeger raise several challenges to these sanctions. We need address only one. Cabraser and Jaeger argue that the district court erred by failing to consider after-acquired factual evidence that would have adequately supported the complaint. We agree.
Under the district court’s understanding of the law, the key question was, ‘What did plaintiffs know when they filed their lawsuit?” District Court 3/31/94 Order at 241. Applying this understanding, the district court excluded from consideration any evidence supporting the suit which was unknown to counsel at the time of filing. This included a scientific study published in August 1989 — several months before the IPO— suggesting a weight loss/gallstone link, as well as a declaration from plaintiffs’ expert Dr. J.W. Marks reviewing the scientific literature and asserting that such a link was well-established prior to the IPO. These exclusions were dispositive; the district court acknowledged that “if, prior to filing the complaint, Plaintiffs had in their possession the same information that they offered in opposition to summary judgment, it would have been sufficient to justify filing this lawsuit.” District Court 3/31/94 Order at 241.
In effect, the district court applied a subjective-objective test. Objectively, would a reasonable attorney have believed plaintiffs’ complaint to be well-founded in fact based on what plaintiffs’ attorneys subjectively knew at the time? Appellants argue that an objective-objective test should apply: would a reasonable attorney have believed plaintiffs’ complaint to be well-founded in fact based on what a reasonable attorney would have known at the time? Alternatively, the issue may be framed as whether the “reasonable inquiry” and “well-founded” requirements are conjunctive or disjunctive. An attorney may not be sanctioned for a complaint that is not well-founded, so long as she conducted a reasonable inquiry. May she be sanctioned for a complaint which is well-founded, solely because she failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry?
We conclude that the answer is no. In Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1990) (en banc), an en banc panel of this court canvassed the circuit’s Rule 11 law. It explained the requirements for sanctioning an attorney under the frivolousness prong:
Our cases have established that sanctions must be imposed on the signer of a paper if ... the paper is ‘frivolous.’ The word ‘frivolous’ does not appear anywhere in the text of the Rule; rather, it is a shorthand that this court has used to denote a filing that is both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.
Id. at 1362 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Townsend thus approves of the conjunctive requirement and the objective-objective rule. Townsend goes on to expressly embrace an objective-objective analysis in dismissing an attorney’s lack of awareness of favorable precedent: “The fact that [counsel] did not cite that case ... does not render his argument sanetionable, since, objectively, his request was warranted by existing law.” Id. at 1367.
We have subsequently reconfirmed Townsend ’s objective-objective approach. “Because the frivolousness prong of Rule 11 is measured by objective reasonableness, see Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir.1986), whether [a party] actually relied on” the cases which show its claims aren’t frivolous is irrelevant. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 370 (9th Cir.1992). The same rule must apply to the factual basis for a claim.
Some language in our prior cases suggests the opposite result. We have held that “an attorney violates [R]ule 11 whenever he signs a pleading, motion, or other paper without having conducted a reasonable inquiry into whether his paper is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation.” Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 557 (9th Cir.1986) (italics in original, bold added), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822, 108 S.Ct. 83, 98 L.Ed.2d 45 (1987). Under Unioil, it appears not to matter whether a filing is frivolous, so long as the signing attorney has failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.[*435] This language accords with the district court’s subjective-objective approach, but is inconsistent with Townsend. To the extent Unioil endorses a subjective-objective test and authorizes sanctions solely for an unreasonable inquiry, we believe it has been implicitly overruled by the en banc decision in Townsend.1
Townsend compels our result. Its conclusion, we believe, is firmly rooted in the text and policies underlying Rule 11. Rule 11 must be read not only to give effect to the Rule’s central deterrent goals, but also “in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy[.]” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. at 2454. We do little to undermine the deterrent goals of the Rule by not sanctioning complaints which have merit on their face. The potential for such sanctions, however, may do much to increase the frequency of the collateral litigation that is Rule ll’s unfortunate side effect.
We conclude that the district court based its decision on an erroneous view of the law when it focused on the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ subjective knowledge at the time they filed the complaint. It therefore abused its discretion. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2460-61; Newton, 22 F.3d at 1463. The district court itself conceded that plaintiffs’ pretrial evidence was enough to render their complaint nonfrivolous. Under these circumstances, Rule 11 sanctions could not properly be imposed.
Ill
The district court also justified its sanctioning of all appellants based on 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review the entry of § 1927 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1096, 111 S.Ct. 986, 112 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1991). We conclude that § 1927 cannot justify these sanctions either, for two independent reasons.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides in pertinent part that:
Any attorney ... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Because the section authorizes sanctions only for the “multiplication of] proceedings,” it applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics once a lawsuit has begun. We have twice expressly held that § 1927 cannot be applied to an initial pleading. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831 (under § 1927, “the multiplication of proceedings is punished, thus placing initial pleadings beyond” the section’s reach) (emphasis in original); Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165,1187 (9th Cir.) (“Section 1927 does not apply to initial pleadings, since it addresses only the multiplication of proceedings. It is only possible to multiply or prolong proceedings after the complaint is filed.”), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.1986). In case these prior holdings were insufficiently clear, we restate the rule here. The filing of a complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court’s inherent power, but it may not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927. “For a sanction to be validly imposed, the conduct in question must be sanctionable under the authority relied on.” Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 490 (9th Cir.1988) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990). Here it was not. The district court’s imposition of sanctions under § 1927 was an abuse of discretion.
[*436] We reverse as well for a second, independent reason. Even if § 1927 did apply to initial complaints, the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining that sanctions were warranted.
The district court properly cited United States v. Blodgett for the proposition that § 1927 sanctions require a finding of recklessness or bad faith. 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1983). It also properly cited Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp. for the proposition that a filing need not be entirely frivolous to warrant sanctions under the same section. 740 F.2d 718, 727 (9th Cir.1984). From this the district court drew the erroneous conclusion that a reckless, not-entirely-frivolous filing could be sanctioned.
To the contrary, section 1927 sanctions “must be supported by a finding of subjective bad faith.” New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir.1989). “Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” Estate of Bias v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir.1986) (citations omitted); accord West Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1528 (9th Cir.1990); Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee, 849 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir.1988). For sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass. Thus, while it is true that reckless filings may be sanctioned, and nonfrivolous filings may also be sanctioned, reckless nonfrivolous filings, without more, may not be sanctioned.
The district court acknowledged that plaintiff’s complaint was nonfrivolous. It found that appellants acted recklessly, but did not make a finding that they had acted with subjective bad faith or with an intent to harass. Therefore, under the proper Estate of Bias test, the district court could not sanction appellants pursuant to § 1927. Because the district court based its decision on an erroneous view of the law, it abused its discretion in imposing sanctions for this reason as well. Cooler & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2460-61; Newton, 22 F.3d at 1463.
IV
The district court also justified its sanctioning of the two appellant law firms by reference to its inherent powers. We review the district court’s entry of sanctions under its inherent power for an abuse of discretion. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2138, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 931, 113 S.Ct. 2397, 124 L.Ed.2d 298 (1993). Here again, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion because it applied the wrong legal standard in imposing sanctions.
The district court concluded based on an out-of-circuit district court case that it could sanction based on conduct that was reckless or an abuse of the judicial process. See Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., Inc., 787 F.Supp. 1444, 1453 (S.D.Ga.1991). It therefore believed it could sanction appellants based solely on its finding that they had acted recklessly.
Our precedents plainly require more. While recklessness may be the standard under § 1927, Blodgett, 709 F.2d at 610, it is an insufficient basis for sanctions under a court’s inherent power. Instead, counsel’s conduct must “constitute[ ] or [be] tantamount to bad faith.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2465, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). In sanctioning counsel, “[c]ourts may not invoke [inherent] powers without a ‘specific finding of bad faith.’ ” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Stoneberger, 805 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir.1986)); accord Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir.1989) (“To insure that restraint is properly exercised, we have routinely insisted upon a finding of bad faith before sanctions may be imposed under the court’s inherent power.”)
The district court never made this required finding. Nor, for that matter, does the record as a whole support any finding of bad faith. Because the district court sanctioned based on recklessness alone, a legally[*437] insufficient basis, it abused its discretion. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2460-61; Newton, 22 F.3d at 1463. Consequently, the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the district court’s inherent power was improper.
V
“Rule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.” Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Company, 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir.1988). The same may be said of the power to sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and a court’s inherent powers. We do not in any way countenance attorney misconduct, but in responding to perceived misconduct, courts must use care to exercise the sanctioning power only when they are legally authorized to do so.
In this case, sanctions could not as a matter of law be imposed on these appellants under any sanctioning authority. We therefore reverse the district court’s order imposing sanctions in its entirety.
REVERSED.
We note in passing that while there is a split among the circuits on this question, our approach accords with that taken by the majority of the circuits to have considered the question. Compare Jones v. International Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir.1995) (requiring lack of reasonable inquiry and frivolousness); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir.1988) (same); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2d Cir.1988) (same), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989) with Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir.1994) (sanctioning based solely on failure to conduct reasonable inquiry); Matter of Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 1109, 1112 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that proper focus is reasonableness of inquiry, not frivolousness).
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Parts I, III, and IV of the opinion; I respectfully dissent from Part II.
The court concludes that the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions should be reversed, insisting that it is appropriate for a complaint to be filed on the basis of a hunch if it is ultimately well-grounded in fact and law.
In support of its ruling, the court cites our decision in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1990) (en banc), which noted that a filing is frivolous if it is “both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Id. at 1362. The court appears to hold that this language implicitly overrules Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.1986), which held that “an attorney violates Rule 11 whenever he signs a pleading, motion or other paper without having conducted a reasonable inquiry into whether his paper is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation.” Id. at 557. Since the Townsend language which the court cites is mere dicta, I must strongly disagree with the assertion that Unioil has been overruled.
The opinion also fails to evaluate what, in fact, happened in this case. The record is devoid of any showing of pre-filing investigation by the attorneys; rather the complaint appears to have been filed solely on the basis of several news reports and interviews with personal injury attorneys who had an interest in pending litigation involving the company. Although the ease eventually stumbled upon some merit, Rule 11, properly construed, as it provided prior to 1993 (which would be appropriate under the circumstances), requires independent judgment and does not allow post-complaint information to serve as adequate justification.
While I agree that we must avoid the spawning of satellite litigation and the chilling of vigorous advocacy, we must also recall that the Supreme Court case instructing such behavior, Cooter & Gell v. Haatmarx Corp. et al, 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), reminds us that Rule ll’s primary function is to deter frivolous litigation. Id. at 393, 110 S.Ct. at 2454. The Rule’s central goal is what compelled the Third Circuit, in Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir.1994), to find that “a shot in the dark is a sanctionable event, even if it somehow hits the mark.” Id. at 1279 (citing Vista Mfg., Inc. v. Trac-4 Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 138 (N.D.Ind.1990)). After ah, if a “lucky shot could save the signer from sanctions, the purpose of Rule 11 ‘to deter baseless filings’ would be frustrated.” Garr, 22 F.3d at 1279 (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. at 2454).
On this issue, I would remand to the district court with instructions to evaluate counsel’s conduct in preparing and filing the complaint under the pre-1993 amendment language of Rule 11, but to separate out those matters which are covered by section 1927 and which are beyond the scope of Rule 11. Based on the present state of the record, I would be inclined to affirm the Rule 11 sanctions but to reverse the section[*438] 1927 sanctions for the reasons expressed by the court in other parts of its opinion.