Joseph R.. Evanns v. At&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2000).

Joseph R.. Evanns v. At&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite

green Positive treatment Quoted verbatim 3× 30.2 score

“under th doctrine, once a carrier's tariff is approved by , the terms, of the federal tariff are considered to .be 'the law' and to therefore 'conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights, and liabilities' as between the carrier and the customer.”

122 citation events (121 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.

Strongest positive: Imperial Irrigation District v. California Independent System Operator Corp. (casd, 2015-11-24)

Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of

2000 2013 2026

Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗

examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Imperial Irrigation District v. California Independent System Operator Corp.

S.D. Cal. · 2015 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high

under th doctrine, once a carrier's tariff is approved by , the terms, of the federal tariff are considered to .be 'the law' and to therefore 'conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights, and liabilities' as between the carrier and the customer.

examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In Re Nos Communications, Mdl No. 1357 (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)

9th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high

that the defendant carriers had obligations . . . beyond those set out in the filed tariffs . . . is also barred by the filed-rate doctrine.

examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Fisher v. Nos Communications (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)

9th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high

that the defendant carriers had obligations ... beyond those set out in the filed tariffs ... is also barred by the filed-rate doctrine.

examined Cited as authority (rule) Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. V247 Telecom LLC (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."

N.D. Tex. · 2016 · confidence medium

Customers are charged with notice of the terms and rates on file with the FCC and “may not bring an action against a carrier that would invalidate, alter or add to the terms of the filed tariff.” Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840.

cited Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States

Fed. Cl. · 2009 · confidence medium

Id. (citing Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840-41).

cited Cited as authority (rule) Pfeil v. Sprint Nextel Corp.

N.D. Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium

Hill v. BellSouth Tele-comm., 364 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir.2004) *1277 citing Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.2000)).

discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davel Communications, Inc. v. Qwest Corp.

9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium

That is, the doctrine bars suits challenging rates which "if successful, would have the effect of changing the filed tariff." Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166 , 1170 (9th Cir.2002). 29 The regulatory scheme of the Federal Communications Act, the source since 1934 of the filed-rate doctrine in the telecommunications industry, see Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840, was fundamentally altered with the passage of the 1996 Act.

discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davel Communications v. Qwest Corporation

9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium

The regulatory scheme of the Federal Communications Act, the source since 1934 of the filed-rate doctrine in the telecom- munications industry, see Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840, was fun- damentally altered with the passage of the 1996 Act.

discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davel Communications, Inc. v. Qwest Corp.

9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium

The regulatory scheme of the Federal Communications Act, the source since 1934 of the filed-rate doctrine in the telecommunications industry, see Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840, was fundamentally altered with the passage of the 1996 Act.

discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davel Communications v. Qwest Corporation

9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium

9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium

Co., 114 F.3d 858 , 866(9th Cir.1997); Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840.

examined Cited as authority (rule) California ex rel Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."

9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium

Co., 114 F.3d 858 , 866(9th Cir.1997); Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840.

examined Cited as authority (rule) Priscilla Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications (8×) also: Cited "see, e.g."

11th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium

Id. at 60-63. 26 The Ninth Circuit in Evanns faced similar claims to those presented in Marcus and those presented by Hill in this appeal. 229 F.3d at 840-41.

examined Cited as authority (rule) William J. Brown, Iii v. Mci Worldcom Network Services, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see"

9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium

However, the filed-rate doctrine (also called the filed-tariff doctrine) "bars all claims--state and federal--that attempt to challenge the terms of a tariff that a federal agency has reviewed and filed." Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

examined Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Services, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see"

9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium

However, the filed-rate doctrine (also called the filed-tariff doctrine) “bars all claims — state and federal — that attempt to challenge the terms of a tariff that a federal agency has reviewed and filed.” Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

discussed Cited "see" Old Dominion Electric Cooperative v. PJM Interconnection, LLC

E.D. Va. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840 (9th Cir. 2000); Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 , 56 (2d Cir. 1998); Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rivero, 532 F.2d 450, 458 (Sth Cir. 1976) (“[t]he law is a fact and the Court is presumed to know the law or find it”).

discussed Cited "see" Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB

N.D. Ill. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns v. AT & T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.2000) (filed rate doctrine bars claim that telecommunications carriers were obligated to disclose that they passed-through certain FCC-imposed fees to consumers where the fees were included in the carriers’ filed rates); Marcus v. AT & T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir.1998) (filed rate doctrine bars claims alleging that company fraudulently concealed its billing practice of rounding-up the length of customer’s long-distance calls to the next full minute, where the company’s FCC-approved tariff provided that customers would be billed in whole-…

discussed Cited "see" Kagawa v. First Hawaiian Bank/Bancwest Corp.

D. Haw. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” That is, a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see Evanns v. AT & T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 839 (9th Cir.2000)).

cited Cited "see" Clemmons v. Hawaii Medical Services Ass'n

D. Haw. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see Evanns v. AT & T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 839 (9th Cir.2000)).

discussed Cited "see" TELESAURUS VPC, LLC v. Power

9th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face;” that is, plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Evanns v. AT & T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 839 (9th Cir.2000).

discussed Cited "see" Schilke v. WACHOVIA MORTG., PSB

N.D. Ill. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high

discussed Cited "see" Safehouse Progressive Alliance for Nonviolence, Inc. v. Qwest Corp. (2×)

Colo. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns v. AT & T Corp., supra, 229 F.3d at 840.

discussed Cited "see" Balthazar v. Verizon Hawaii, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."

Haw. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evcmns, 229 F.3d at 840.

discussed Cited "see" Verizon Delaware, Inc. Verizon New England, Inc. Verizon Maryland, Inc. Verizon New Jersey, Inc. Verizon New York, Inc. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. Verizon Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Covad Communications Company Dieca Communications, Inc., Verizon Delaware, Inc. Verizon New England, Inc. Verizon Maryland, Inc. Verizon New Jersey, Inc. Verizon New York, Inc. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. Verizon Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Covad Communications Company Dieca Communications, Inc.

9th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840-41 & n. 10 (9th Cir.2000); cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 420-24 , 106 S.Ct. 1922 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986) (refusing to overrule the doctrine in the shipping context though "assum[ing]" it "was unwise as a matter of policy").

discussed Cited "see" Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Communications Co.

9th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840-41 & n. 10 (9th Cir.2000); cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 420-24 , 106 S.Ct. 1922 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986) (refusing to overrule the doctrine in the shipping context though “assum[ing]” it “was unwise as a matter of policy”).

discussed Cited "see" In Re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation (2×)

D. Kan. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840 (9th Cir.2000) (under the filed-tariff doctrine customers are charged with notice of the terms of a tariff).

discussed Cited "see" Multi Solutions International, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

D. Kan. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns, 229 F.3d at 841 (holding plaintiff’s claim that carrier was required to disclose pass-through of Universal Service Fee (USF) to customers was barred by fíled-rate doctrine where the USF assessment was included in the tariff).

examined Cited "see" Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."

N.D. Ga. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high

See Evanns, 229 F.3d at 841 (holding that plaintiffs claim that carriers cannot collect a USF assessment unless they disclose that it is a pass-through charge was barred by the filed-tariff doctrine because it challenged collection of an assessment in compliance with filed tariffs and would add an additional obligation beyond those set out in the tariffs); Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488-90 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that state law claims for breach of contract and fraud were preempted when the effect of the suit would be to throw out an amended tariff as violating the original filed …

discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bullseye Telecom, Inc. v. Cal. P.U.C.

Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence low

The federal filed rate doctrine prohibits a utility from charging rates other than as set forth in its tariff filed with the federal authorities and “presumes the consumer’s knowledge of all lawful rates and bars consumer suits for damages arising out of claims involving those rates, on the premise that a consumer who pays the filed rate has suffered no injury and incurred no damage.” (Day v. AT & T Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 325, 329 ; see also Evanns v. AT&T Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 837 , 840; Gallivan v. AT&T Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1387 ; Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. C…

discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re: FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.

6th Cir. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low

See, e.g., Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under this doctrine, once a carrier’s tariff is approved by the FCC, the terms of the federal tariff are considered to be ‘the law’ and to therefore ‘conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities’ as between the carrier and the customer.” (quoting Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 , 56 (2d Cir. 1998))); Am.

discussed Cited "see, e.g." AT&T Corp. v. Aventure Communication Technology, LLC

S.D. Iowa · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low

Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222-23 , 118 S.Ct. 1956 , 141 L.Ed.2d 222 (1998)); see also Iowa Network Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 466 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir.2006) (“Under [the fled rate] doctrine, once a carrier’s tariff is approved by the FCC, the terms of the federal tariff are considered to be ‘the law* and to therefore ‘conclusively and xclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities’ as between the carrier and the customer.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840 (9th Cir.2000))); Freedom Ring Commc’ns, LLC v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.…

discussed Cited "see, e.g." Aventure Communications Technology, LLC v. Sprint Communications Co.

S.D. Iowa · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low

See also Iowa Network Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 466 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Under [the filed rate] doctrine, once a carrier’s tariff is approved by the FCC, the terms of the federal tariff are considered to be ‘the law’ and to therefore ‘conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities’ as between the carrier and the customer.” (alteration in original) (quoting Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840 (9th Cir. 2000)); Freedom Ring Commc’ns, LLC v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.Supp.2d 67, 70 (D.N.H. 2002) (“[LEC] BayRing also argues that the filed rate doct…

discussed Cited "see, e.g." Qwest Communications Co. v. Aventure Communications Technology, LLC

S.D. Iowa · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence medium

See also Iowa Network Servs., 466 F.3d at 1097 (“Under [the filed rate] doctrine, once a carrier’s tariff is approved by the FCC, the terms of the federal tariff are considered to be ‘the law’ and to therefore ‘conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities’ as between the carrier and the customer.” (quoting Evanns, 229 F.3d at 840)); Freedom Ring Commc’ns, LLC v. AT & T Corp., 229 F.Supp.2d 67, 70 (D.N.H.2002) (“[LEC] BayRing also argues that the filed rate doctrine has been ‘fundamentally changed’ by recent FCC rulings, which apparently allow certain …

discussed Cited "see, e.g." Medco Energi U.S., L.L.C. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co.

W.D. La. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low

See also Evanns v. AT & T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.2000) (where plaintiff challenged AT & T’s non-disclosure of its collection of certain pass-through charges which were not required by regulation, court held where AT & T had filed its tariff with the FCC, any claim that AT & T had an obligation to plaintiff “beyond those set out in the filed tariffs, i.e., that [AT & T] had a duty to disclose the fact that the USF assessment was a pass-through charge, is ... barred by the filed-rate doctrine.”); Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir.2004) (conclud…

discussed Cited "see, e.g." Crum v. Tomlinson (In Re Hettick)

Bankr. D. Mont. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low

Co., 2008 MT 424, ¶25 , 347 Mont. 395, ¶ 25 , 200 P.3d 46, ¶ 25 ; see also Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 839 (9th Cir.2001); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998); Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.1997).

Treatment classes

Mentioned in passing 53

Cited as authority (rule) 27

Cited "see" 21

Cited "see, e.g." 16

Cited as authority (verbatim quote) 3

Compared "cf." 2

Treatment by court

ca9	0R/0Y/31G	47
ca11	0R/0Y/8G	16
haw	0R/0Y/2G	5
iasd	0R/0Y/3G	5
dcb	0R/0Y/0G	4
ksd	0R/0Y/3G	4
sdd	0R/0Y/0G	4
calctapp	0R/0Y/1G	3
casd	0R/0Y/1G	3
coloctapp	0R/0Y/2G	3
gand	0R/0Y/3G	3
txnd	0R/0Y/3G	3

Federal circuit treatment

9th Cir.	Pos	0R/0Y/35G	35
11th Cir.	Pos	0R/0Y/12G	12
8th Cir.	Pos	0R/0Y/3G	3

Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…

Joseph R. Evanns, as an Individual and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated
v.
At&t Corporation, a Corporation MCI Corporation, a Corporation Pacific Bell, Inc., a Corporation MCI Telecommunications Corporation, Erroneously Sued as MCI Corporation MCI Communications Corporation, Erroneously Sued as MCI Corporation

12-56298.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Oct 25, 2000.

229 F.3d 837

2000 Daily Journal DAR 11381

2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8543

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26760

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Published

Pinpoint authority: bottom 53%

229 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2000)

JOSEPH R. EVANNS, as an individual and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AT&T CORPORATION, a corporation; MCI CORPORATION, a corporation; PACIFIC BELL, INC., a corporation; MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, erroneously sued as MCI Corporation; MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, erroneously sued as MCI corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-55165

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Submitted September 14, 2000^[1]
Filed October 25, 2000

Egon Mittelmann, Beverly Hills, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

James D. Gustafson, Claypool, Gustafson & Goostrey, Los Angeles, California; Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Jenner & Block, Washington, D.C.; and Gleam O. Davis, Pacific Telesis Group Legal Department, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Audrey B. Collins, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-06645-ABC

Before: Thomas G. Nelson, A. Wallace Tashima and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

[*~837]1

The principal issue to be addressed in this appeal is whether the filed-rate doctrine bars a suit by a consumer challenging a carrier's pass-through of a fee imposed by the Federal Communications Commission.

The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") requires communication carriers to remit funds to the FCC's Universal Service Fund ("USF") pursuant to the Commission's "Universal Service Order."^[2]Pursuant to authority granted them by the FCC, AT&T and MCI passed the USF fee on to their customers. Pacific Bell did not, but did collect the fee for AT&T and MCI for services they had rendered to Pacific Bell customers.

Joseph R. Evanns sued AT&T, MCI and Pacific Bell in California Superior Court, alleging that the USF fee, or "erate" as he described it, was "wrongful, illegal and unlawful under State and Federal Law." He sought damages in excess of one billion dollars and attorneys' fees of seventy million dollars. The carriers removed the case to federal district court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The district court found that it had jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint pursuant to the filedrate doctrine.

[*~838]4

On appeal, Evanns raises a number of issues, some of which were not raised in the district court. In this opinion, we address only the district court's dismissal pursuant to the filed-rate doctrine.^[3]

II.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^[4] Evanns' complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond a doubt that [he] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."^[5]

[*~839]6

Evanns' complaint alleges that the defendants have"collected from users of long distance telephones a special assessment surcharge"; that this "assessment was collected in order to fund a program set up by the Federal Communications Commission (`FCC') known as `e-rate' "; that, by collecting this assessment, the defendants "wrongfully and illegally and unlawfully . . . have passed on these costs to their customers in the form of the special assessment"; and that the special "assessment [is] wrongful, illegal and unlawful under State and Federal Law."^[6] Assuming, as we must, that the facts alleged in the complaint are true,^[7] the filed-rate doctrine prevents Evanns from stating a claim, under either federal or state law, upon which relief can be granted. The district court's dismissal was therefore proper.

[*~840]7

The filed-rate doctrine, also known as the "filed-tariff doctrine," derives from the tariff-filing requirements of the Federal Communications Act ("FCA").^[8] Under this doctrine, once a carrier's tariff is approved by the FCC, the terms of the federal tariff are considered to be "the law" and to therefore "conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities" as between the carrier and the customer.^[9] Not only is a carrier forbidden from charging rates other than as set out in its filed tariff,^[10] but customers are also charged with notice of the terms and rates set out in that filed tariff and may not bring an action against a carrier that would invalidate, alter or add to the terms of the filed tariff.^[11]

Moreover, "the filed rate doctrine bars all claims--state and federal--that attempt to challenge [the terms of a tariff] that a federal agency has reviewed and filed."^[12] For example, in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc.,^[13] the Supreme Court held that the filed-rate doctrine barred the plaintiff's state-law claims for breach of contract (including breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) and tortuous interference with contractual relations.^[14] In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that the saving clause of the FCA, 47 U.S.C. 414, preserved these state law claims: "[Section 414] preserves only those rights that are not inconsistent with the statutory filed-tariff requirements. A claim for services that . . . directly conflict[s] with the tariff the basis for both the tort and contract claims here--cannot be `saved' under 414."^[15].

In an attempt to circumvent the well-established filed-rate doctrine, Evanns argues that he is not challenging the defendant carriers' filed tariffs. As Evanns puts it, his claim is that the defendants' collection of the USF assessment is unlawful because "by law (47 CFR 69.604) they are not allowed to collect it unless they disclose to their customers that the customers are paying the defendants' own USF assessments and that this is not a charge required by the government to be paid by the consumers."^[16] In other words, Evanns claims that the defendant carriers had a duty to disclose that they were making an affirmative business decision to pass through the USF charge to the consumer rather than pay it themselves.

The USF assessments are, however, included in the defendant carriers' tariffs filed with the FCC. The defendants were therefore required to collect, and the consumers required to pay , this assessment.^[17] The filed-rate doctrine bars Evanns' claim, whether based on federal or state law, that the collection of the assessment in compliance with the tariffs was unlawful.^[18] Moreover, because, as stated previously, the terms of the filed tariffs "conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities of the contracting parties,"^[19] Evanns' claim that the defendant carriers had obligations to him beyond those set out in the filed tariffs, i.e., that the defendants had a duty to disclose the fact that the USF assessment was a pass-through charge, is also barred by the filedrate doctrine.^[20]

III.

The filed-rate doctrine bars any claim, whether couched in terms of federal or state law, attacking the defendants' collection of the USF assessment in compliance with the terms of the filed tariffs.^[21] The district court's dismissal of Evanns' complaint is therefore affirmed.^[22]

[*~841]12

AFFIRMED.

Notes:

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

See Report and Order, In re Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service , 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997) ("Universal Service Order").

The other issues raised by Evanns are addressed in an unpublished memorandum filed contemporaneously with this opinion.

See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998).

Id.

Complaint at 2-4.

See Steckman , 143 F.3d at 1295 (In determining whether dismissal of a complaint is proper under Rule 12(b)(6), "we must treat all of plaintiff's factual allegations as true.")

Under the FCA, every common carrier must file with the FCC "schedules" (also known as "tariffs") "showing all charges" and "showing the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges." 47 U.S.C. 603(a). Furthermore, a carrier may not lawfully "extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such schedule." 47 U.S.C. 203(c)(3).

Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1998); see Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp. , 133 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he filed tariff is the contract between the plaintiff . . . and Sprint."); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of New York , 83 F.3d 549, 552 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[F]ederal tariffs have the force of law and are not simply contractual."); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Garden State Inv. Corp., 981 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[F]ederal tariffs are the law, not mere contracts."); Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. , 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[A] tariff, required by law to be filed, is not a mere contract. It is the law.").

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981).

See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc. , 524 U.S. 214, 222, 227 (1998) (noting that the filed-rate doctrine applicable to the Interstate Commerce Act also applies to the FCA, that under the doctrine "[d]eviation from [the filed rate] is not permitted . . . [and customers] are charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable," and that " [t]he rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier"); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Carl , 227 U.S. 639, 653 (1913) (discussing the filed-rate doctrine in the context of tariffs filed in compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act).

County of Stanislaus v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 114 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 1997); see Marcus , 138 F.3d at 56-57, 64-65 (finding breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, false advertising and unjust enrichment claims to be barred by filed tariffs).

524 U.S. 214.

Id. at 227-28.

Id. at 227 (citation omitted).

Appellant's Op. Br. at 17-18 (emphasis added); see Appellant's Reply Br. at 7.

See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1915) (Even "[i]gnorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed. . . . The [applicable published] rate is that which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper must pay." (citations and quotations omitted)).

See Central Office, 524 U.S. at 226-27; Marcus , 138 F.3d at 60-62.

Marcus , 138 F.3d at 56.

See id. at 61-62 (finding non-disclosure claims to be barred by filedrate doctrine); see also Central Office, 524 U.S. at 227 ("The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.").

Evanns does not claim that the defendant carriers have failed to comply with the terms of their filed tariffs, nor does he claim that the terms of the filed tariffs themselves are unreasonable or unjust. Evanns claims only that the carriers had obligations beyond those set out in their filedtariffs--to disclose that the assessment set out in the tariffs was a pass through. For the reasons previously set forth, such a claim cannot survive the filed-rate doctrine.

Federal Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), and United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), two cases relied on extensively by Evanns, are inapplicable to the present case. The question before the Court in those cases was whether the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act gave a public utility company and a natural gas company the authority to unilaterally change a private rate agreement for distribution of electricity/gas simply by filing a new rate schedule with the Federal Power Commission. The Court held that the Acts did not confer such authority. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 352-53; Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343-44. The holdings in Sierra and Mobile are not applicable to the present case because in the present case we are addressing the FCA, not the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act and, as the Court recognized in Mobile , in contrast to the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act, the Commerce Act (and hence the FCA) "precludes private rate agreements by its requirement that the rates to all shippers be uniform." 350 U.S. at 338.