Donegan v. United States, 39 F.3d 1166 (1st Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Donegan v. United States, 39 F.3d 1166 (1st Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: UMB BANK v. GAUTHIER (med, 2024-11-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" UMB BANK v. GAUTHIER
D. Me. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barrows v. Resolution Trust Corp., 39 F.3d 1166 , at *3 (1st Cir. 1994) (table opinion) (Rule 59(e) “applies only to final judgments”); Farr Man & Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Rule 60 applies only to final judgments”); Widi v. McNeil, No. 2:12–cv–00188–JAW, 2014 WL 4987969 , *5 (D.
discussed Cited "see" BAILEY v. DEJOY
D. Me. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barrows v. Resolution Trust Corp., 39 F.3d 1166 , at *3 (1st Cir. 1994) (table opinion) (Rule 59(e) “applies only to final judgments”); Farr Man & Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Rule 60 applies only to final judgments”).
discussed Cited "see" Lyons v. Federal National Mortgage Asscociation
D. Mass. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barrows v. Resolution Trust Corp., 39 F.3d 1166 , at *3 (1st Cir. 1994) (table) (noting that Rule 59(e) “applies only to final judgments”); Farr Man & Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1990) (“It is, by this time, well settled that Rule 60 applies only to final judgments.”).
discussed Cited "see" Jodie Skellie on behalf of J.D.N. v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
D.N.H. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
To meet the requirements of a listing, you must have a medically determinable impairment(s) that satisfies all of the criteria of the listing.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 (d); see 8 Batista-Canales v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 39 F.3d 1166 , No. 94-1638, 1994 WL 631647, at *2 (1st Cir. Nov. 10, 1994) (table opinion) (“The diagnosis of bronchial asthma standing by itself is insufficient to establish claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits.”).
cited Cited "see" Sustache-Rivera v. United States
1st Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rivera, 39 F.3d 1166 (1st Cir.1994) (unpublished).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Donegan
v.
United States
94-1531.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Oct 26, 1994.
39 F.3d 1166
Unpublished

39 F.3d 1166

NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases.
Michael DONEGAN, Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent Appellee.
UNITED STATES, Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL HOWARD DONEGAN, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 94-1531, 94-1532.

United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.

Oct. 25, 1994.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge

Walter F. McKee on brief for appellant.

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Kevin O'Regan, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

D.Mass.

AFFIRMED.

Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Per Curiam.

1

Appellant, Michael Donegan, appeals his conviction and sentence and the district court's denial of his motion to reduce and/or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. In an order dated August 5, 1994, this court consolidated these two appeals for the purposes of argument and the filing of pleadings.

2

Appellant contends that the sentence enhancement provision contained in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326(b)(2) does not apply to him. We reject that argument as foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Rodriquez, 26 F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1994), and for the reasons contained in the district court's Memorandum and Order dated September 23, 1993. Appellant's second ground for appeal is that the district court erred in failing to reduce his offense-level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to Section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. For essentially the reasons stated in the district court's Memorandum and Order dated May 2, 1994, we conclude that denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility was not clear error.

3

Accordingly, we summarily affirm pursuant to Loc. R. 27.1 appellant's conviction and sentence and the denial of his Sec. 2255 motion.