green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
28.9 score
“the doctrine of law of the case, therefore, does not foreclose a court from reconsidering issues in a case previously decided by the same court.”
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Veritas Independent Partners, LLC v. The Ohio National Life Insurance Company
he pre-transfer rulings constitute the law of the case and should not be lightly disturbed.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Dayton
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the doctrine of law of the case, therefore, does not foreclose a court from reconsidering issues in a case previously decided by the same court.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lion Federal Credit Union v. Worldpay, LLC
This ruling on the applicability of the MSA’s forum-selection clause— and, by implication, the connected choice-of-law proviso, (Doc. 44, #192–93 (Lion’s arguing that the enforceability of both the forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions rises and falls with the unconscionability of the automatic renewal provision))—constitutes the law of the case and binds this Court, especially given no party requested supplemental briefing on whether the matter should be reconsidered.4 Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The pre-transfer rulings …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Incodel Michigan, LLC v. Blue Tech Global, LLC
Ohio 2008) (quoting Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 67 F.3d 586, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1995)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dayton Veterans Residences v. Dayton Metro. Housing Auth.
Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Tennessee v. Randall Kenneth Reed
(2×)
To avoid the horns of this dilemma, it is the practice to treat each successive decision as establishing the law of the case and depart from it only for convincing reasons.” Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting James W.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys.
Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995).6 5If a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust cases is ever appropriate, it is not here.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kelly Hagan v. Pamela Baird
It “is quite rigidly applied to force obedience of an inferior court, but more flexibly in its application to reconsideration by the courts that made the earlier decision.” Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting 1B James W.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
729, Inc. v. Kenton County Fiscal Court
Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir.1995) (citation omitted); Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985) ("The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision."). 2 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Scott v. Churchill
App. P. 40], those issues cannot Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 589-90 (6th be re-considered”).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Damon Dunbar
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 67 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir.1995).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dunbar
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Gillig v. understood that Dunbar was in fact making a motion to Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 67 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. dismiss, because the district judge stated, “if you are making 1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local No. 120
This Court has particularly recognized the import of this doctrine when a case is transferred from one judge to another “inasmuch as ‘[t]he utility of such a transfer would be seriously compromised if the fact of a transfer were to be treated as an invitation to seek a second opinion on every pre-transfer ruling. ...”’ Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1995)(quoting 1b James W.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (98-3986), George D. Edwards Kenneth Jackson Melvin L. Sealey Alvin Woodford Vera Hamilton Charles Young David Stewart Harland Jones Robin Hardwick Monty Rates Rudolph Gillen James Garner, and All Others Similarly Situated, Intervening (98-3935) v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local No. 120
This Court has particularly recognized the import of this doctrine when a case is transferred from one judge to another "inasmuch as '[t]he utility of such a transfer would be seriously compromised if the fact of a transfer were to be treated as an invitation to seek a second opinion on every pre-transfer ruling... .'" Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F. 3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995)(quoting 1b JAMES W.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vortekx, Inc. v. IAS Communications, Inc.
Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1995) (discussing the law of the case and transfer orders); Texas American Oil Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 24 F.3d 210, 212 (Fed.Cir.1994) ("When the Fifth Circuit transferred the appeal ... that jurisdictional ruling became the law of the case”); Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir.1991) (discussing law of the case in transfer orders); Triad Sys.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
CERVANTES
Moreover, even the strict doctrine of “law of the case” allows for the revisiting of issues where “controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to such issues.” Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); see also Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995); Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976). 6 The First Circuit found the Attorn…
examined
Cited "see"
Sudberry v. Warden, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See id. at 589-90 . 8 An “inter *781 vening change of controlling law” has been recognized as a sufficient justification for the court’s reconsideration of an earlier decision.
cited
Cited "see"
Pacific Employers Insurance v. Sav-A-Lot of Winchester
See Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1995) (citing Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[4.-2] (2d ed.1994)).
cited
Cited "see"
Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Sav-A-Lot Of Winchester
See Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1995) (citing Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[4.-2] (2d ed.1994)).
cited
Cited "see"
Frasure v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
See Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Barbakow v. USAir, Inc.
See Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1995) (judge had discretion to reconsider original trial judge’s denial of summary judgment motion on preclusive effect of a release).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Smith v. Warden of Toledo Correctional Institution
However, the doctrine merely “directs a court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power.” Id.; see also Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586 , 589–90 (6th Cir.1995).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
David J. Scott v. Patrick Churchill, Inspector, Carson City Regional Facility, Philip Bair
However, the doctrine merely “directs a court’s discretion, it does not limit the tribunal’s power.” Id.; see also Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 589-90 (6th Cir.1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Cordova Chemical Co. Of Michigan, Cpc International, Inc., Arnold C. Ott, Michigan Dept. Of Natural Resources
v.
Cordova Chemical Co. Of Michigan, Cpc International, Inc., Arnold C. Ott, Michigan Dept. Of Natural Resources
2326.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Oct 19, 1995.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CORDOVA CHEMICAL CO. OF MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants-Appellants,
CPC International, Inc., Defendant-Appellee,
Arnold C. Ott, et al., Defendants,
Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 92-2288/2326.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Oct. 19, 1995.
Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; KENNEDY, MARTIN, MILBURN, NELSON, RYAN, BOGGS, NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, BATCHELDER, DAUGHTREY, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
Prior report: 59 F.3d 584
ORDER
[*~586]1
A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service have voted for rehearing of this case en banc. Sixth Circuit Rule 14 provides as follows:
[*~587]2
The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on the docket sheet as a pending appeal.
[*~588]3
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the previous decision and judgment of this court is vacated, the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal.
[*~590]4
The Clerk will direct the parties to file supplemental briefs and will schedule this case for oral argument as soon as possible.