green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 9×
15.0 score
G Cite
cited 18× by 9 distinct cases, last quoted 2003 ·
…in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Davidson v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Woods v. Miamisburg City Schools
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Schaefer v. United States Postal Service
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Sain v. American Red Cross
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union 1099 v. City of Sidney
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Nilavar v. Mercy Health System-Western Ohio
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Wallace v. Henderson
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Parrish v. HBO & Co.
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. Iams Co.
(2×)
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint.
discussed
Cited "see"
Perez v. Wade
(2×)
See Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998). (court has discretion as to whether to consider matters outside the pleadings); Gauntner v. Boyle, 554 F.Supp.2d 779, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2008) (it is within the court’s discretion to consider matters outside the pleadings, although doing so converts the motion to one for summary judgment). 2 .
examined
Cited "see"
The Bronx Household of Faith, Robert Hall and Jack Roberts v. Board of Education of the City of New York and Community School District No. 10
(4×)
See 523 U.S. 1074 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).
examined
Cited "see"
Cleveland Brown v. Michael J. Crowley
(4×)
See Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254-55 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).
examined
Cited "see"
Straight v. Wyoming Department of Transportation (In Re Straight)
(8×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.1998) (in enacting § 106(a), Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity); accord Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of the Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1145 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wanda Sowards v. Loudon County, Tennessee and Timothy Guider, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Loudon County, Tennessee
(2×)
See Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 262 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998); Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Village Sch.
discussed
Cited "see"
Sowards v. Loudon Cnty TN
See Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d reasonable for Guider to understand that he was violating that 246, 262 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998); Ratliff v. right when he terminated her.
discussed
Cited "see"
University of Virginia v. Robertson
(2×)
See Schlossberg v. Maryland, {“Schlossberg”) 119 F.3d 1140 , 1145-46 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998) (dismissing an adversary proceeding that argued taxes paid to the state were a preference and, also, finding no evidence that the abrogation effort was pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, especially “when a specific, substantive Article I power clearly enabled the law.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
John Pendleton v. James Baker
(2×)
Accord Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998) (recognizing that “it is well-established that a public official’s retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of § 1983”); Fraternal Order of Police Hobart Lodge No. 121, Inc. v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir.1988) (stating that “retaliation by public officials against the exercise of First Amendment rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment”).
discussed
Cited "see"
John Pendleton Russell Signorino v. St. Louis County Economic Council of St. Louis County Robert P. McCulloch James Redmond, James E. Baker Judith K. Parker Michael Baker Ronald A. Battelle Harold Klein Howard Eaton George Damos Roger Melton, Dennis Coleman, Individually and in Their Official Capacities, John Pendleton Russell Signorino v. St. Louis County Economic Council of St. Louis County Robert P. McCulloch James Redmond, James E. Baker Judith K. Parker Michael Baker Ronald A. Battelle Harold Klein Howard Eaton George Damos Roger Melton Dennis Coleman, Individually and in Their Official Capacities
(2×)
Accord Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998) (recognizing that "it is well-established that a public official's retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of § 1983"); Fraternal Order of Police Hobart Lodge No. 121, Inc. v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir.1988) (stating that "retaliation by public officials against the exercise of First Amendment rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment"). 10 Defendants claim that they cannot be held …
discussed
Cited "see"
Paul Gilbrook Michael Garrison Don Herr Hal Raphael Dana Bowler Joe Wilson, Davis, Reno & Courtney, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee v. City of Westminster Charles v. Smith Craig Schweisinger Tony Lam Don S. Anderson John T. Demonaco Brian Mayhew, Paul Gilbrook Michael Garrison Don Herr Hal Raphael Dana Bowler Westminster Fire Fighters Association, Local 2425 Joe Wilson International Association of Fire Fighters, Afl-Cio, Davis, Reno & Courtney, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee v. City of Westminster Charles v. Smith Craig Schweisinger Tony Lam Don S. Anderson John T. Demonaco Brian Mayhew, Paul Gilbrook Michael Garrison Don Herr Hal Raphael Dana Bowler Westminster Fire Fighters Association, Local 2425 International Association of Fire Fighters, Afl-Cio Joe Wilson, Davis, Reno & Courtney, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee v. City of Westminster Charles v. Smith Craig Schweisinger Tony Lam Don S. Anderson John T. Demonaco Brian Mayhew
(2×)
See Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328 , 1331 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997) (citing those factors), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998). "[P]ublic employers need not allege that an employee's expression actually disrupted the workplace; 'reasonable predictions of disruption' are sufficient." Brewster, 149 F.3d at 979 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 , 114 S.Ct. 1878 , 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Gilbrook v. City of Westminster
(2×)
See Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328 , 1331 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997) (citing those factors), cert. denied, —- U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998). “[P]ublic employers need not allege that an employee’s expression actually disrupted the workplace; ‘reasonable predictions of disruption’ are sufficient.” Brewster, 149 F.3d at 979 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 , 114 S.Ct. 1878 , 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Sue Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock
(2×)
Although we have previously recognized that in some cases “injury based on embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional *500 distress” is sufficient to be actionable under § 1983, see Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 679-80 (6th Cir.1998); see also Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1997), ce rt. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 , 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998), we find that such circumstances did not exist in the present case.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Brenda Mattox and Dona Holly v. City of Forest Park Stephen Vollmar, Police Chief Ray Hodges and Kenneth Hughes
(2×)
Bloch, 156 F.3d at 679-80 ; see also Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Brown v. North Carolina Division Of Motor Vehicles
(2×)
Id. at 59-73 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 ; see also In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1145 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that "Congress' powers under Article I cannot be construed to empower it to expand federal jurisdiction by abrogating the states' sovereign immunities"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles
(2×)
Id. at 59-73 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 ; see also In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1145 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that “Congress’ powers under Article I cannot be construed to empower it to expand federal jurisdiction by abrogating the states’ sovereign immunities”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1517 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton
(2×)
See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1518 , 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998) (upholding a sweeping prior restraint on the right of the press to interview discharged jurors because a juror’s fear of interviews could affect its deliberations); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir.1994) (upholding a prior restraint on juror interviews); United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 666 (2d Cir.1978) (modifying the district court’s prior restraint on juror interviews).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Georgia Department of Revenue v. Burke
(2×)
We decline to rely on § 106(b) because, in deciding the instant case, we have assumed arguendo that the State of Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been validly abrogated by § 106(a) and because we acknowledge that "the power to define waiver can become the functional equivalent of the power to abrogate.” AER-Aerotron v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 681 (4th Cir.1997); see also Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of the Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1997) (concluding that the language of § 106(b) "amounts…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Georgia v. Burke
We decline to rely on § 106(b) because, in deciding the instant case, we have assumed arguendo that the State of Georgia’s Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been validly abrogated by § 106(a) and because we acknowledge that “the power to define waiver can become the functional equivalent of the power to abrogate.” Aer- Aerotron v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 681 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of the Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the language of § 106(b) �…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re: Gary Burke, Pamela Burke, Debtors. State of Georgia Department of Revenue v. Gary Burke Pamela Burke, in Re Raymond D. Headrick, Cynthia J. Headrick, Debtors. The State of Georgia, Department of Revenue v. Raymond D. Headrick Cynthia J. Headrick
(2×)
We decline to rely on § 106(b) because, in deciding the instant case, we have assumed arguendo that the State of Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been validly abrogated by § 106(a) and because we acknowledge that "the power to define waiver can become the functional equivalent of the power to abrogate." AER-Aerotron v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 681 (4th Cir.1997); see also Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of the Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1997) (concluding that the language of § 106(b) "amounts to …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Roger SCHLOSSBERG, Trustee
v.
MARYLAND COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
v.
MARYLAND COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
No. 97-1363.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 20, 1998.
Cited by 9 opinions | Published
Citer courts: S.D. Ohio (18)
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.