Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp. Et Al. v. Suthoff Et Al., 454 U.S. 1157 (1982). · Go Syfert
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Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp. Et Al. v. Suthoff Et Al., 454 U.S. 1157 (1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1990 · …i have nothing but sympathy for those who seek to divine meaning. ✓
264 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Awilda Arroyo-Torres v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.B.S. (ca1, 1990-11-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 39 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Awilda Arroyo-Torres v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.B.S. (3×)
1st Cir. · 1990 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
i have nothing but sympathy for those who seek to divine meaning.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Diane N. Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC
11th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1159 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber Of Commerce, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See id.; Yazoo County, 454 U.S. at 1160 , 102 S.Ct. at 1034 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 13 The commerce element of the Fergusons' complaint exemplifies the type of allegation courts should address through the three-tier structure of Bell. "[T]he interstate commerce requirement is tied to the merits as well as to the jurisdictional aspects of an antitrust case...." Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See id.; Yazoo County, 454 U.S. at 1160 , 102 S.Ct. at 1034 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marine Coatings of Alabama, Inc. v. United States
11th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Bell has been referred to as "a legal land mine” and "one of the most cryptic [cases] in the recent history of this Court’s jurisprudence.” Yazoo County Industrial Development Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1159 , 102 S.Ct. 1032, 1033 , 71 L.Ed.2d 316, 316 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stone Mountain Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt
N.D. Ga. · 1983 · confidence medium
The trial and, at earlier stages of the case, summary judgment proceedings, are for the purpose of deciding disputed issues of material fact. 454 U.S. at 1160-61 , 102 S.Ct. at 1034-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Hsia
D.D.C. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Olga Hernandez-Limon
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
Blue Br at 21; Red Br at 29-30; see United States v. Rascheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); 62 ALR Fed. 303
examined Cited "see" United States v. Sammy G. Daily and Frederik A. Figge (4×)
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 363 , 17 S.Ct. 72, 73 , 41 L.Ed. 467 (1896); see United States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Aleksandrs v. Laurins
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Gilbert Madrid Gerald Inouye Gordon Yabui Edwin Madamba (2×)
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 , 99 S.Ct. 568 , 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 , 93 S.Ct.…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Randy Lamont Patterson AKA Randy Brown, Marcus Wayne Edmundson, Tony Burton, Don Grogans, and Billy Ray Brown (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); cf. Moreno-Nunez, 595 F.2d at 1187 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Phillip Ray Jeter (2×)
6th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 851-52 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 , 1293 n. 3 (9th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Terry Goodpaster (2×)
6th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See, United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom., Phillips v. United States, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 , 101 S.Ct. 1984 , 68 L.Ed.2d 301 (1981); United States v. Schaffer, 599 F.2d 678 (11th Cir.1979); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 , 96 S.Ct. 1481 , 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 , 92 S.Ct. 943 , 30 L.Ed. 788 (1972); New Englan…
examined Cited "see" David Peek v. Ralph Kemp, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondent (4×)
11th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert MURRAY, James Moore, and Susan Watson, Defendants-Appellants
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); *1535 United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1177 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 , 101 S.Ct. 1359 , 67 L.Ed.2d 341 (1981).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gerald L. Rogers
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 854 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Thomas v. McComb
7th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982). 4 .
examined Cited "see" Stone Mountain Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, III (3×)
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1981); see Suthoff v. Yazoo County, 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 316 (1982), and --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1984); Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 , 101 S.Ct. 3009 , 69 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981). 14 In that Game Ranch's claims of unconstitutional deprivation are predicated on the defendants' breach of such a duty, its claims must fall.
examined Cited "see" Stone Mountain Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt (3×)
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1981); see Suthoff v. Yazoo County, 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 316 (1982), and — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1984); Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 , 101 S.Ct. 3009 , 69 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Quema Holloway
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 at 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 850 (9th Cir.1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982)).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Charles William Reagle, III (4×)
3rd Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. McGovern, 661 F.2d 27 , 29 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
cited Cited "see" United States v. John Gamble
10th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (mail fraud requires a showing of specific intent to defraud).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983 Marc Rich & Co. A.G., Intervenor-Appellant v. United States
2d Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.) (destruction or concealment of documents), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir.) (attempted delivery of pamphlet to juror advocating jury nullification), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 825 , 101 S.Ct. 87 , 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980); United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam) (defendant asked attorney to exploit his friendship with a federal judge to secure a favorable sentence for defendant’s associates); United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 21…
examined Cited "see" Siler v. Heckler (3×)
N.D. Ga. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Suthoff v. Yazoo County Industrial Development Corp., 637 F.2d 337 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 642 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 316 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Mitchell
N.D. Cal. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 853 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); see also United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Michael Edward Kennedy (2×)
9th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Daly v. State
Nev. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Darland v. United States, 626 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982) (where defendant did not take stand and crime charged not crimen falsi, trial court properly excluded evidence of defendant’s reputation for truth and veracity).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Paul Richard Portillo (2×)
9th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 1981) (nonconstitutional error harmless unless it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977) (same).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Edgar
1st Cir. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 854 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); Omni, 634 F.Supp. at 1422-23, 1431 . 13 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Edgar
1st Cir. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 , _________ _____________ _______ 854 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); _____________ Omni, 634 F. Supp. at 1422-23, 1431 . ____ -22- 22 The first line of defense to protect Edgar's privilege lay in the hands of his lawyer.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Everett W. Thompson, Jr.
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir.1978) (construing parallel provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976), which applied to any person who, inter alia, “corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeav- or[ed] to influence, intimidate, or impede” any grand or petit juror, witness, or court officer); see also United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981) (“corruptly” in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) required that act in question “be done with the purpose of obstructing justice”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031…
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. John F. Hayden
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 848 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom., Phillips v. United States, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Oliver L. North (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1990 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981) (Section 1503 proscribes "all manner of corrupt methods of obstructing justice" whether or not they involve threats or intimidation, and that the question before the court was "whether concealment of documents is a corrupt means of ... obstructing ... justice.") with id. (holding "that the word 'corruptly' as used in the statute means that the act must be done with the purpose of obstructing justice."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) 19 For example, North testified at trial that Poindexter …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ralph Allan Barry (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir.1980), appeal after remand, 659 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (testimony of character witness as to defendant’s reputation as a law-abiding citizen is admissible if relevant to the offense charged).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dale E. Kraus and Rosetta M. Kraus, Husband and Wife Cindy D. Kraus, Individually and Todd W. Montgomery, Individually v. County of Pierce (2×)
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Darland, 659 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir.1981), cert.. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (by identifying himself to officers, appellant provided link to getaway car necessary to give probable cause to arrest); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Everage (2×)
cma · 1985 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1032 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982), with United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 , 99 S.Ct. 2882 , 61 L.Ed.2d 310 (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Caudill
usafctmilrev · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 844 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 ; Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967) (citing numerous authorities); VIII Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton Rev.) § 2327 (1961) (citing cases since 1894); D.R. 4-101(C)(4), ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Stephen A. Gonsalves
9th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 , 102 S.Ct. 1031 , 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982). 10 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Yazoo County Industrial Development Corporation
v.
Jonez P. Suthoff
80-1975.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 11, 1982.
454 U.S. 1157
Rehnquist.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 73%
Citer courts: First Circuit (3)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Respondents in this case sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3). They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees or, in the alternative, the rescission of instruments by which they conveyed certain real property to petitioners. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2. Petitioners filed the customary Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motions requesting dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The District Judge, a practicing Mississippi lawyer for many years before he took the bench, granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction:

[*1158] “The complaint contains conclusory allegations, but when reduced to the essentials, plaintiffs allege that while they received $100,830.00 this was not enough; that the land was in fact worth several times this amount; that they were induced to sell by the fraud and deceit of their own attorneys and appraiser; and that the remaining defendants were in a conspiracy to acquire the land for a fraction of its true worth.
“The plaintiffs thus are asserting a classic common law action for the common law tort of fraud and deceit. If the plaintiffs indeed have such a claim it is properly re-dressable only in the state court. The allegations do not reach Federal Constitutional proportions.” Id., at A3.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of dismissal:

“The issue before us is narrow: Was the federal court without jurisdiction conferred by Congress to decide the case, on the face of the complaint, under the stringent test enunciated by Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681-682 . . . (1946); ‘[W]here the complaint... is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions, . . . must entertain the suit.’ (Italics ours.) (The two exceptions are where the federal question ‘clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ Id.) ... .
“So tested, the complaint sufficiently states federal claims, and (without intimating as to the merits of the claims) we reverse the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.” 637 F. 2d 337, 339 (1981).

Had the Court of Appeals been content to end its opinion at that point, this case would be one among hundreds where busy federal appellate courts decide whether “conclusory[*1159] allegations” made under the “notice pleading” premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do or do not properly invoke federal jurisdiction. This Court in turn would be entirely correct in concluding that the petition for certiorari does not warrant plenary consideration. But, for better or for worse, the Court of Appeals did not stop there. Instead, it proceeded to step on what is, in my opinion, a legal landmine when it elaborated on the meaning of Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). The Court of Appeals obviously recognized its obligation to follow the dictates of that case as best it could, and because to me the decision in Bell is one of the most cryptic in the recent history of this Court’s jurisprudence, I have nothing but sympathy for those who seek to divine its meaning.

It is apparent from the above-quoted language of the Court of Appeals that, on remand, the District Court would be perfectly free to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This conclusion was made crystal clear by the concluding language of the Court of Appeals:

“We do not necessarily hold that the plaintiffs will prevail if they establish the facts alleged in the petition; we hold only that, taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiffs have established their right to a day in federal court. The dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.” 637 F. 2d, at 340.

Whether or not the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction for consideration of the complaint under 42 U. S. C. §1983 is an issue which the Court of Appeals in this case approached somewhat differently than did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Beistline v. City of San Diego, 256 F. 2d 421 (1958), and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Warrington Sewer [*1160] Co. v. Tracy, 463 F. 2d 771 (1972). But whether these cases are properly distinguishable, as the Court of Appeals in this case thought, see 637 F. 2d, at 340, or whether they are not, is an issue on which I would not vote to grant certiorari if it stood by itself.

The far more fundamental issue, I think, is that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case reveals enough differences of approach among the Federal Courts of Appeals in deciding whether the federal question alleged in a complaint is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” within the meaning of Bell, to suggest a need for clarification of Bell itself. The Court of Appeals quite accurately recognized that Bell created, in cases seeking recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, three tiers of review. The first tier was where the complaint stated a claim found to be wholly insubstantial and frivolous, in which case it could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The second tier was where the complaint stated a claim not wholly insubstantial and frivolous, in which case the federal court could not dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but could dismiss it for failure to state a-claim upon which relief may be granted. In other words, at the second-tier level, the federal court might find simply on the basis of the allegations of the complaint that no triable constitutional issue was raised, and accordingly dismiss it on that ground. The third tier of review would be where the federal court finds the allegations of the complaint sufficient to state a constitutional claim, and accordingly requires further pleadings, discovery, and perhaps eventually a trial on the merits to determine whether the plaintiff can prove the allegations of his complaint.

But this three-tiered analysis required by Bell seems to me wholly at odds with Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which quite clearly contemplates only a two-tiered standard of review of a complaint on a motion to dismiss.[*1161] * As I understand Rule 12, it requires the federal court to make a legal determination of whether or not the allegations of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). This is a question of law, and if the court concludes that they do not state such a claim, an order of dismissal will be entered. But if the court concludes that the allegations do state a claim, the defendant will be required to answer and the case go to trial unless settled. The trial and, at earlier stages of the case, summary judgment proceedings, are for the purpose of deciding disputed issues of material fact.

With the vast expansion in the case dockets of all federal courts in recent years, the more settled the procedural system by which these cases are to run the judicial gauntlet, the better off will be litigants, lawyers, and judges. The Court of Appeals here, by its careful adherence to the dictates of Bell, has brought out the sharp contrast between those dictates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the merits of the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the constitutional question in this case may not justify a grant of certiorari, the question of how Bell can be reconciled with Rule 12, a question I believe to be fairly subsumed under[*1162] questions 2 and 3 of the petition, does justify such action. “To conceal [the] appropriate inquiry invites mechanical or thoughtless application of misfocused doctrine.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).

I would grant the petition for certiorari in this case, limited to questions 2 and 3 of the petition.

It might be argued that Rule 12(b)(1), which authorizes a court to dismiss a claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, is the equivalent of the first tier of Bell. Such an interpretation of Rule 12(b)(1) is possible, however, only because of the existence of the three-tier analysis of Bell and its cryptic statement that frivolous complaints invoke no federal-court jurisdiction. In the absence of Bell, Rule 12(b)(1) could be properly understood as referring to dismissals for lack of diversity or amount in controversy, or other more traditional jurisdictional defects. Thus, the existence of Rule 12(b)(1) does not obviate the need to clarify Bell.

As 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d) demonstrates, dismissals for frivolousness can be authorized without ambiguity. This Court has not done so in Rule 12(b)(1), and Congress has implicitly expressed satisfaction with the current formulation of Rule 12(b)(1) by not seeking to add a dismissal-for-frivolousness standard — like that found in § 1915(d) — in a manner similar to its revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.