Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). · Go Syfert
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Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases · …the constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon states precludes irra- tional discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law. at p. 466 ✓
cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1998 · …the fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the states from drawing a sharp line between the sexes____ ✓
cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1970 · …the regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers. ✓
879 citation events (50 in the last 25 years) across 103 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board (ca7, 2024-11-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1948 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1948 1987 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board
7th Cir. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon states precludes irra- tional discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board
7th Cir. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon states precludes irra- tional discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board
7th Cir. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon states precludes irra- tional discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board
7th Cir. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon states precludes irra- tional discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Ganzy v. Allen Christian School (3×)
E.D.N.Y · 1998 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the states from drawing a sharp line between the sexes____
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Irvis v. Scott (3×)
M.D. Penn. · 1970 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Vitolo v. Guzman
E.D. Tenn. · 2021 · confidence medium
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were, see [Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)], to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) AAR, Ex parte
prsupreme · 2013 · confidence medium
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1895), y Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-310 (1936), con NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-467 (1948), con United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 , 543-544 y 556-558 (1996); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-551 (1896), con Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); así como Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-210 (1962), y Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-566 (1964), que revocó a Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-556 (1946).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nevada Department of Human Resources v. William Hibbs
SCOTUS · 2003 · confidence medium
For example, in Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873) (Illinois), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948) (Michigan), the Court upheld state laws prohibiting women from practicing law and tending bar, respectively.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2×)
SCOTUS · 2003 · confidence medium
For example, in Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873) (Illinois), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948) (Michigan), the Court upheld state laws prohibiting women from practicing law and tending bar, respectively.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Miami Springs v. JJT, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
We think the trial court's answer was erroneous. "[T]he regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers." Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 , 69 S.Ct. 198, 199 , 93 L.Ed. 163, 165 (1948).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (2×)
SCOTUS · 1982 · confidence medium
In a similar vein, the Court in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948), upheld a legislature’s right to preclude women from bartending, except under limited circumstances, on the ground that the legislature could devise preventive measures against “moral and social problems” that result when women, but apparently not men, tend bar.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hal Haviland v. Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture
D.C. Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 , 69 S.Ct. 198, 200 , 93 L.Ed. 163, 166 (1948), quoting Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 , 49 S.Ct. 336 , 73 L.Ed. 722, 728-729 (1929). 57 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Estate of Cavill (2×)
Pa. · 1974 · confidence medium
L.Ed.2d 16, 47 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 631 (1969) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163, 166 (1948).
examined Cited as authority (rule) San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1973 · confidence medium
See also Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357 (1963); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948). *89 But this Court has never suggested that because some "adequate" level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is therefore constitutionally excusable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Borman's, Inc. v. Liquor Control Commission
Mich. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Michigan provision in Goesaert v Cleary, 335 US 464, 465 ; 69 S Ct 198, 199 ; 93 L Ed 163, 165 (1948), referring to the regulation of liquor traffic as “one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers”.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby
Cal. · 1971 · confidence medium
Although Goesaert has not been overruled, its holding has been the subject of academic criticism (Kanowitz, Women and The Law, supra, pp. 33-34; Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws (1967) 44 Denver L.J. 344, 373-374); and its sweeping statement that the states are not constitutionally precluded from “drawing a sharp line between the sexes” (Goesaert v. Cleary, supra, 335 U.S. at p. 466 [ 93 L.Ed. at p. 165 ]) has come under increasing limitation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles William Caton v. United States
8th Cir. · 1969 · confidence medium
Experience, however, has indicated that jurors tend to be suspicious of those who do not testify (See, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272 (McNaughton rev. 1961)) ; thus, in Bruno v. United States, 398 U.S. 287 , 292, 69 S.Ct. 198, 299 (1939), the Court recognized the propriety of giving the instructions which admonished the jury that it should not presume guilt from silence: “The only way Congress could provide that abstention from testifying should not tell against an accused was by an implied direction to judges to exercise their traditional duty in guiding the jury by indicating the consideratio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vogulkin v. State Board of Education
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
(Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 [ 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 ] ; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 110 [ 69 S.Ct. 463 , 93 L.Ed. 533 ].) In considering an analogous situation involving legislation limiting the right to recover damages for negligence *431 the United States Supreme Court said, 1. . . there is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible, must reach every class to which it might be applied— that the legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. [Citations.] In this day of almost universal hi…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Werner v. Southern California Associated Newpapers (6×)
Cal. · 1950 · confidence medium
Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 [ 69 S.Ct. 550 , 93 L.Ed. 632 , 10 A.L.R.2d 945 ]; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-467 [ 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 ].) This court cannot invoke the due process clause to invalidate a legislative policy that it may deem unwise without exercising judicial censorship directed not at the constitutionality of legislation but at its wisdom, a censorship whose dangers Mr. Justice Holmes clearly envisaged: “I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe …
examined Cited "see" Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins (3×)
D. Colo. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725 n.10, 102 S.Ct. 3331 (discussing Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466 , 69 S.Ct. 198 ).
discussed Cited "see" Sutton v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), ce rt. denied, 479 U.S. 870 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 163 (1986); see also Steadman, 280 S.W.3d at 247 (reasoning that evidence is always factually sufficient when it preponderates in favor of the conviction).
discussed Cited "see" Motilla v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 163 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Miller v. Albright (2×)
SCOTUS · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hogan, 458 U. S., at 725, n. 10 (commenting on Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948)).
cited Cited "see" Turro v. State
Tex. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), ce rt. denied, 479 U.S. 870 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 163 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Taylor v. State
Tex. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 874 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870 , 107 S.Ct. 239 , 93 L.Ed.2d 163 (1986).
examined Cited "see" United States of America, and Richard Ganaway, Ii, a Minor, by His Father and Next Friend, Richard Ganaway Renee Gasden, a Minor, by Her Father and Next Friend, Raymond Gasden Tarsha Lucas, a Minor, by Her Mother and Next Friend, Catherine Williams Stacy Brown, a Minor Rotissa Renee Brown, a Minor Uganda Brown, a Minor by Their Mother and Next Friend, Louise Brown Mitchelle Buggs, a Minor Charlton Ancrum, a Minor, by Their Father and Next Friend, Henry Vernon Bernard Simmons a Minor, by His Mother and Next Friend, Idell Simmons David Bonneau Annette Bonneau, a Minor Sharon Bonneau, a Minor, by Their Mother and Next Friend Lorraine Bonneau Mona Lisa Lockhart, a Minor Dexter Smith, a Minor and Lichelle Lockhart, a Minor, by Their Mother and Next Friend, Marthenia D. Lockhart Black School Children Attending Charleston County Public School Represented by Their Parents v. Charleston County School District State of South Carolina Charlie G. Williams, Superintendent, State Board of Education Abraham Funchess Joseph D. Parker R.B. Gentry T.C. Kistler John R. Stevenson Lucy B. Hayes Creighton G. Edwards Joyce Wimmer Howard F. Burkey Jack F. McIntosh Robert E. Livingston Jessie B. Schoolfield W. Buford Estes Louis O. Dore Anne K. Collins Wilbur F. Smith, Jr. Dolphus Carter, as Members of the State Board of Education Richard W. Riley, Governor and Chairman Thomas G. Mangum Marion Gressette Earl Morris Grady Patterson, as Members of the State Budget and Control Board, United States of America, and Richard Ganaway, Ii, a Minor, by His Father and Next Friend, Richard Ganaway Renee Gasden, a Minor, by Her Father and Next Friend, Raymond Gasden Tarsha Lucas, a Minor, by Her Mother and Next Friend, Catherine Williams Stacy Brown, a Minor Rotissa Renee Brown, a Minor Uganda Brown, a Minor by Their Mother and Next Friend, Louise Brown Mitchelle Buggs, a Minor Charlton Ancrum, a Minor, by Their Father and Next Friend, Henry Vernon Bernard Simmons a Minor, by His Mother and Next Friend, Idell Simmons David Bonneau Annette Bonneau, a Minor Sharon Bonneau, a Minor, by Their Mother and Next Friend Lorraine Bonneau Mona Lisa Lockhart, a Minor Dexter Smith, a Minor and Lichelle Lockhart, a Minor, by Their Mother and Next Friend, Marthenia D. Lockhart Black School Children Attending Charleston County Public School Represented by Their Parents v. Charleston County School District State of South Carolina Charlie G. Williams, Superintendent, State Board of Education Abraham Funchess Joseph D. Parker R.B. Gentry T.C. Kistler John R. Stevenson Lucy B. Hayes Creighton G. Edwards Joyce Wimmer Howard F. Burkey Jack F. McIntosh Robert E. Livingston Jessie B. Schoolfield W. Buford Estes Louis O. Dore Anne K. Collins Wilbur F. Smith, Jr. Dolphus Carter, as Members of the State Board of Education Richard W. Riley, Governor and Chairman Thomas G. Mangum Marion Gressette Earl Morris Grady Patterson, as Members of the State Budget and Control Board (3×)
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 , 69 S.Ct. 198, 199 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Charleston County School District (3×)
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 , 69 S.Ct. 198, 199 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948).
discussed Cited "see" McDougall v. Rice
W.D.N.C. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1 , 301 S.E.2d 308 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 , 104 S.Ct. 197 , 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983), and State v. Van McDougall, — N.C.-, 344 S.E.2d 3 , petition denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 238 , 93 L.Ed.2d 163 (1986).
examined Cited "see" Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau (6×)
N.D. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 .
discussed Cited "see" Dorothy Ann WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John FLEMING, City Attorney for the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Defendant-Appellant (2×)
7th Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See the Twenty-First Amendment and Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 [ 64 S.Ct. 464 , 88 L.Ed. 605 ], The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards.” Id. 335 U.S. at 465-466 , 69 S.Ct. at 199 .
examined Cited "see" People v. Elliott (3×)
Colo. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 .
examined Cited "see" White v. Flemming (3×)
E.D. Wis. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 , (1971); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 , 92 S.Ct. 1724 , 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); see generally Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D.Ill., decided Feb. 5, 1974). *272 Defendants vigorously urge upon the court the cases of Goesaert v. Cleary, 4 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948), and Milwaukee v. Piscuine, 5 18 Wis.2d 599 , 119 N.W.2d 442 (1963).
examined Cited "see" Johnston v. Hodges (3×)
E.D. Ky. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Oleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 , 57 S.Ct. 578 , 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937) ; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 , 28 S.Ct. 324 , 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908) ; Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky University, supra. .
examined Cited "see" Norton v. Weinberger (3×)
D. Maryland · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See, for example, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1964); Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm’rs., 330 U.S. 552 , 67 S.Ct. 910 , 91 L.Ed. 1093 (1947). 5 .
examined Cited "see" Leventhal v. Melville Shoe Corp. (3×)
N.H. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corporation, 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968); Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell Co., 219 Tenn. 37 , 406 S.W.2d 166 ( 1966 ); see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S. Ct. 198 , 93 L.
examined Cited "see" Krauss v. Sacramento Inn (8×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Cal. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948).
examined Cited "see" Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne (3×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See, too, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 69 S. Ct. 198 , 93 L.
cited Cited "see" Bromfield v. Seybolt Motors, Inc.
N.H. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corporation, 399 F. 2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968); Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell Co., 406 S. W. 2d 166 (Tenn. 1966); see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 .
examined Cited "see" United States v. St. Clair (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 , 57 S.Ct. 578 , 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937).
examined Cited "see" New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1967 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 .
examined Cited "see" State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc. (6×)
N.D. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 .
examined Cited "see" Romiti v. Kerner (3×)
N.D. Ill. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 [ 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 ].
examined Cited "see" Buchanan v. Rhodes (3×)
N.D. Ohio · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 [ 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 ].
examined Cited "see" Grand Union Co. v. Sills (3×)
N.J. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948); Guill v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 582-583 (1956); Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 30 N.J.
discussed Cited "see" McGowan v. Maryland (2×)
SCOTUS · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sullivan-Knoff v. City of Chicago, The
N.D. Ill. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 ; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 210 n.23 (1976) (disapproving of the holding in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), in which the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law barring women from bartending because the sight of female bartenders caused “moral and social problems”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Sullivan-Knoff v. City of Chi. (3×)
E.D. Ill. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Virginia , 518 U.S. at 533 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 ; see also Craig v. Boren , 429 U.S. 190 , 210 n.23, 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (disapproving of the holding in Goesaert v. Cleary , 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948), in which the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law barring women from bartending because the sight of female bartenders caused "moral and social problems").
examined Cited "see, e.g." Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (3×)
D. Colo. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 210 n.23, 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (disapproving of the holding in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , 69 S.Ct. 198 , 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948), in which the Supreme Court earlier upheld a Michigan law that barred women from bartending that was justified on the grounds that the sight of female bartenders caused “moral and social problems”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." William Hibbs, United States of America, Intervenor v. Department of Human Resources Charlotte Crawford Nikki Firpo (2×)
9th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Goes-aert, 335 U.S. at 465-66 , 69 S.Ct. 198 (federal court relying on the separate spheres ideology to uphold a discriminatory state law); Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-23 , 28 S.Ct. 324 (same); see also, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 , 95 S.Ct. 1225 , 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975) (striking down federal social security law incorporating similar gender stereotypes). 26 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GOESAERT Et Al.
v.
CLEARY Et Al., MEMBERS OF THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION OF MICHIGAN
49.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 20, 1948.
335 U.S. 464
Anne R. Davidow argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants. Larry S. Davidow was also of counsel., Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Eugene F. Black, Attorney General, Daniel J. O’Hara and Charles M. A. Martin, Assistant Attorneys General.
Frankfurter, Rutledge, Douglas, Murphy.
Cited by 297 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #38,499 of 633,719
Citer courts: E.D. New York (3) · M.D. Pennsylvania (3)

Lead Opinion

[*465] Mr. Justice Frankfurter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

As part of the Michigan system for controlling the sale of liquor, bartenders are required to be licensed in all cities having a population of 50,000 or more, but no female may be so licensed unless she be “the wife or daughter of the male owner” of a licensed liquor establishment. Section 19a of Act 133 of the Public Acts of Michigan, 1945, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.990 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1947). The case is here on direct appeal from an order of the District Court of three judges, convened under § 266 of the old Judicial Code, now 28 U. S. C. § 2284, denying an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Michigan law. The claim, denied below, one judge dissenting, 74 F. Supp. 735, and renewed here, is that Michigan cannot forbid females generally from being barmaids and at the ’ same time make an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the owners of liquor establishments. Beguiling as the’subject is, it need not detain us long. To ask whether or not the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred Michigan from making the classification the State has made between wives and daughters of owners of liquor places and wives and' daughters of non-owners, is one of those rare instances where to state the question is in effect to answer it.

We are, to be sure, dealing with a historic calling. We meet the alewife, sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare, but centuries before him she played a role in the social life of England. See, e. g., Jusserand, English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages, 133, 134, 136-37 (1889). The Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots, and the regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers. Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes[*466] in the social and legal position of women. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and, now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic. See the Twenty-First Amendment and Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131. The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards.

While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme or reason. The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law. But the Constitution does not require situations “which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147. Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainable, as we think it is, Michigan has not violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legis[*467] lators nor question their motives. Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling.

It would be an idle parade of familiar learning to review the multitudinous cases in which the constitutional assurance of the equal protection of the laws has been applied. The generalities on this subject are not in dispute; their application turns peculiarly on the particular circumstances of a case. Thus, it would be a sterile inquiry to consider whether this case is nearer to the nepotic pilotage law of Louisiana, sustained in Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, than it is to the Oklahoma sterilization law, which fell in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535. Suffice it to say that “A statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, or because it may not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce.” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339.

Nor is it unconstitutional for Michigan to withdraw from women the occupation of bartending because it allows women to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed. The District Court has sufficiently indicated the reasons that may have influenced the legislature in allowing women to be waitresses in a liquor establishment over which a man’s ownership provides control. Nothing need be added to what was said below as to the other grounds on which the Michigan law was assailed.

Judgment affirmed.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Rutledge, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy join,

dissenting.

While the equal protection clause does not require a legislature to achieve “abstract symmetry”[1] or to classify[*468] with “mathematical nicety,” [2] that clause does require lawmakers to refrain from invidious distinctions of the sort drawn by the statute challenged in this case.[3]

The statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor establishments. A male owner, although he himself is always absent from his bar, may employ his wife and daughter as barmaids. A female owner may neither work as a barmaid herself nor employ her daughter in that position, even if a man is always present in the establishment to keep order. This inevitable result of the classification belies the assumption that the statute was motivated by a legislative solicitude for the moral and physical well-being of women who, but for the law, would be employed as barmaids. Since there could be no other conceivable justification for such discrimination against women owners of liquor establishments, the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal protection.

1

Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144.

2

Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-82; see also Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 501; Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73-77; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384.

3

Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. And see Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, dissenting opinion 564.