Ex Parte First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 148 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. 1966). · Go Syfert
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Ex Parte First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 148 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. 1966). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Carolina Trucks & Equipment, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of North America, Inc. (ca4, 2007-07-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carolina Trucks & Equipment, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of North America, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
4th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
The South Carolina Supreme Court has written repeatedly that South Carolina statutes “have no extraterritorial effect,” Ex Parte First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 247 S.C. 506 , 148 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1966) (internal citation omitted); see also Robertson v. Bumper Man Franchising Co., Inc., 364 S.C. 155 , 612 S.E.2d 451, 452 (2005), because “the general rule is that no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or operate upon property or persons beyond its territorial jurisdiction,” First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 148 S.E.2d at 374 (internal citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carolina Trucks v. Volvo Trucks (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
4th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
The South Carolina Supreme Court has written repeatedly that South Carolina statutes "have no extraterritorial effect," Ex Parte First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 148 S.E.2d 373, 374 (S.C. 1966) (internal citation omitted); see also Robertson v. Bumper Man Franchising Co., Inc., 612 S.E.2d 451, 452 (S.C. 2005), because "the general rule is that no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or operate upon property or persons beyond its territorial jurisdiction," First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 148 S.E.2d at 374 (internal citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doctors Hospital of Augusta, L.L.C. v. CompTrust AGC Workers' Compensation Trust Fund
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Law/Analysis This certified question asks whether the statutorily created process for resolving fee disputes between a workers’ compensation insurer and a medical provider applies to an out of state medical 1 provider who performs medical services outside of South Carolina relating to a workplace injury occurring in South Carolina. 2 We answer “no.” In Ex parte First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 247 S.C. 506 , 507-08, 148 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1966), this Court addressed the question of whether a South Carolina resident involved in an automobile accident in North Carolina could enforce a South Ca…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doctors Hosp. v. COMPTRUST
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
LAW/ANALYSIS This certified question asks whether the statutorily created process for resolving fee disputes between a workers' compensation insurer and a medical provider applies to an out of state medical provider who performs medical services outside of South Carolina relating to a workplace injury occurring in South Carolina. [2] We answer "no." In Ex parte First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 247 S.C. 506 , 507-08, 148 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1966), this Court addressed the question of whether a South Carolina resident involved in an automobile accident in North Carolina could enforce a South Carolina…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Electric Capital Corp. v. Renew
4th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
In Ex Parte First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 247 S.C. 506 , 148 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1966), it recognized the general principle that “... no law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.” The reasons for such a rule are apparent.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ex Parte FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, In Re Eliza SAYLES, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
John RUSSELL and one 1965 Mercury Monterey, Bearing 1965 License No. K-78-131 (Penn.), Defendants.
18501.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
May 9, 1966.
148 S.E.2d 373
Brailsford.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

Messrs. Robinson, McFadden & Moore, of Columbia, for Appellant.

[*507] Messrs. Dallas D. Ball and Luther M. Lee, of Columbia, for Respondent.

May 9, 1966.

BRAILSFORD, Justice.

An automobile bearing a Pennsylvania license, owned and operated by John Russell, a resident of Pennsylvania, was in collision with an automobile belonging to Eliza Sayles, apparently a resident of South Carolina, on September 11, 1965. The collision occurred in the State of North Carolina. The Pennsylvania automobile was removed to Richland County, South Carolina. Claiming a collision lien on the automobile by virtue of Section 45-551, South Carolina Code of Laws 1962, Sayles commenced an action in Richland[*508] County Court against it and Russell and caused the automobile to be attached. The parties are agreed that the sole issue presented here is whether Sayles has a lien on the Pennsylvania automobile, assuming its negligent operation in North Carolina, by virtue of the South Carolina collision lien statute. The county court conceived the issue to be one of statutory construction, and, finding no territorial limitation expressed in the statute, held that the attachment was authorized. We disagree. With exceptions which are without significance here, the jurisdiction of a state is restricted to its own territorial limits. 81 C.J.S. States § 3.

"* * * The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565, 568.

"It is frequently declared that statutes can have no extraterritorial effect. By this statement, it is meant that legislative enactments can only operate, proprio vigore, upon persons and things within the territorial jurisdiction of the lawmaking power, and that no law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. Thus, the general rule is that no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or operate upon property or persons beyond its territorial jurisdiction. A statute which purports to have such operation is invalid. * * *" 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 485.

[*509] Under this rule, "rather universally recognized,"[*] it is quite clear that the South Carolina statute could not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties flowing from the North Carolina collision. No lien arose in North Carolina under the South Carolina statute, and none was created when the Pennsylvania automobile was transported into this state after the collision.

Reversed and remanded.

MOSS, Acting C.J., LEWIS and BUSSEY, JJ., and LEGGE, Acting Associate Justice, concur.

[*] State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W. (2d) 227, 67 A.L.R. (2d) 758.