green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
8.4 score
G Cite
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 1995–2022 · 3 courts ·
…the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment applies only in criminal actions, following a conviction.
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989
2007
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Watt v. New Orleans City
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment applies only in criminal actions, following a conviction.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
White's Place, Inc. v. Glover
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment applies only in criminal actions, following a conviction.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Johnson v. City of Dallas, Tex.
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment applies only in criminal actions, following a conviction.
cited
Cited "see"
Thomas v. Galveston County
See Palermo v. Rorex, 806 F.2d 1266 , (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 77 , 98 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987).
discussed
Cited "see"
Riggs v. Schappell
(2×)
See Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 633 F.Supp. 1254, 1261 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 807 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).
discussed
Cited "see"
Arthur David Clifford v. Federico F. Pena, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation
See Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 , 854 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 *1418 S.Ct. 76, 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 587 , 594 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 904 , 110 S.Ct. 1922 , 109 L.Ed.2d 286 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Templeman v. Beasley
Sec. 1442 (a)(1) (pertaining to suits against "[a]ny officer of the United States ... for any act under color of such office"), inasmuch as defendant's relationship to plaintiffs "derived solely from [her] official duties." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969); accord, e.g., Palermo v. Rorex, 806 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (5th Cir.) (rejecting argument that defendants were not acting "under color of federal office" because their acts were alleged to have been maliciously motivated), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987); see also Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981) ("the right of rem…
discussed
Cited "see"
Templeman v. Beasley
Removal was plainly appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (pertaining to suits against "[a]ny officer of the United States ... for any act under color of such office"), inasmuch as defendant's relationship to plaintiffs "derived solely from [her] official duties." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969); accord, e.g., __________ ______ ______ ____ Palermo v. Rorex, 806 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (5th Cir.) _______ _____ (rejecting argument that defendants were not acting "under color of federal office" because their acts were alleged to have been maliciously motivated), cert. denied, 484 U.S. …
discussed
Cited "see"
Justus v. Financial News Network Inc. (In Re Financial News Network Inc.)
Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir.1982) (emphasis in original)); see Maritime Elec., 959 F.2d at 1205 (“within one case, actions against a debtor will be suspended even though closely related claims asserted by the debt- or may continue”); Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (8th Cir.1991). *573 Since section 362 mandates a stay only of litigation “against the debtor” designed to seize or exercise control over the property of the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a), it does not prevent entities against whom the debtor proceeds in an offensive posture—for example, by initia…
discussed
Cited "see"
Pompano-Windy City Partners, Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co.
See Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 807 F.2d 297 , 299 n. 2 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); See also Kakar v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 1039, 1041-43 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (finding no private right of action under Exchange Act Section 6).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
DGM Investments, Inc. v. New York Futures Exchange, Inc.
Although irrational or arbitrary behavior in some circumstances may support an inference of bad faith the behavior has to be ‘so arbitrary’ as to justify an inference of ‘constructive bad faith.’ Minpeco, 693 F.Supp. at 63 ); see also Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 807 F.2d 297 , 303 n. 9 (2d Cir.1986) (“We do not mean to foreclose the possibility that [exchange actions] might be so arbitrary as to constitute constructive bad faith.”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). 2.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Western Capital Design, LLC v. New York Mercantile Exchange
Although irrational or arbitrary behavior in some circumstances may support an inference of bad faith, the behavior has to be “so arbitrary” as to justify an inference of “constructive bad faith.” See Minpeco, 693 F.Supp. at 63 ; see also Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 807 F.2d 297, 303 n. 9 (2d Cir.1986) (“We do not mean to foreclose the possibility that [exchange actions] might be so arbitrary as to constitute constructive bad faith.”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); Jordon v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 571 *442 F.Supp. 1530, 1553 (S.D.N.Y…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill Company, Inc.
See Alabama Power Co. v. EPA 40 F.3d 450 , 456 (D.C.Cir.1994) (stating that to “vacate” means “to annul; to cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or to render void; to defeat; to deprive of force; to make of no authority or validity; to set aside”) (citations omitted); see also Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 855 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that vacating a regulation returns the conditions to the status quo ante), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Stanley Koolik, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant v. Stanley Markowitz, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee
See, e.g., In re Berry Estates, Inc., 812 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 77 , 98 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Maritime Electric Company, Inc., a New York Corporation v. United Jersey Bank, a New Jersey Banking Corporation Michael Gill and Maritime Electric Company, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation. Michael Gill, Third-Party v. Maritime Electric Company, Inc., a New York Corporation Thomas Gill, Individually and in His Capacity as President of Maritime Electric Company, Inc., (n.y.), Third-Party Maritime Electric Co., Inc., (Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant) and Thomas Gill (Third-Party Defendant)
See also In re Berry Estates, 812 F.2d 67 , 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 77 , 98 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577 . 51 Whether a specific judicial proceeding falls within the scope of the automatic stay must be determined by looking at the proceeding "at its inception." St.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Maritime Electric Co. v. United Jersey Bank
See also In re Berry Estates, 812 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 77 , 98 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Arthur A. Morales v. Department of the Army and the United States of America
See also, Palermo v. Rorex, 806 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 77 , 98 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (fact that “administrative remedies available will not allow complete recovery” does not change the result demanded by Bush).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Gray Panthers Advocacy Committee v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services
UMW, 870 F.2d at 666-67 ; see also Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 , 852-54 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Vigil Ex Rel. Vigil v. Rhoades
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(D) (“court shall ... set aside [procedurally invalid] agency action”) (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 2202 ; Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1977); Prows v. United States Department of Justice, 704 F.Supp. 272 (D.D.C.1988); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F.Supp. 652 (D.N.M.1976); see also Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 , 108 S.Ct. 76 , 98 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (where the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act are not met, a court can properly vacate the offending rule and restor…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Berry Estates, Inc.
v.
Regan, Comptroller of the State of New York
v.
Regan, Comptroller of the State of New York
No. 86-1839.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 5, 1987.
484 U.S. 819
Published
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.