discussed Cited "see" United States v. Vincent P. Hurley Id. at 77 (footnote omitted). 1 So long as the standards for relevant conduct were satisfied — i.e., that “the acts of coconspira-tors were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant,” id. at 83— there was “no justification for limiting ‘underlying racketeering activity’ just to predicate acts specifically charged against one defendant,” id. at 77 (footnote omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 37 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948 , 122 S.Ct. 2639 , 153 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002).

discussed Cited "see" United States v. Keith Bernard Crenshaw, United States of America v. Kamil Hakeem Johnson, United States of America v. Timothy Kevin McGruder See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948 , 122 S.Ct. 2639 , 153 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 538 (6th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 930 , 122 S.Ct. 292 (2001); United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 117-19 (2d Cir.2000).

discussed Cited "see" United States v. Maldonado-Montalvo That is to say, the district court must attribute to the defendants the amounts of loss resulting from “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(B); see United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 37 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948 , 122 S.Ct. 2639 , 153 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002); United States v. Adeniji, 221 F.3d 1020, 1027 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Duliga, 204 F.3d 97, 100 (3d Cir.2000).

discussed Cited "see" Connelly v. Hyundai Motor Co. See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 32 (1st Cir.2002) (concluding that there cannot be plain error where the law is unsettled), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948 , 122 S.Ct. 2639 , 153 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002).