State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1964). · Go Syfert
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State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
46 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Berube v. State (fladistctapp, 2009-02-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1964 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1964 1995 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Berube v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In this regard, "mere suspicion is insufficient.” State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla.1964).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Acevedo v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Id. at 543 (emphasis added); see also Smith v. State, 743 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding the trial court erred in admitting evidence of collateral crimes where there was not clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the collateral crimes); Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Audano v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964); Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bennett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Having cited State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964), for the proposition that the objective to be accomplished by allowing such evidence is not proof of a collateral crime, but rather to prove a fact at issue in a case before the court, the Fourth District offered the following analysis: If there is no fact `in issue' there is no relevancy and the collateral evidence should not be admitted.
cited Cited "see" Kelly Lamont Whisby v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964); Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
cited Cited "see" Anthony Lamar Simmons v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964).
discussed Cited "see" Durousseau v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla.1964) ("[M]ere suspicion is insufficient.
discussed Cited "see" McLean v. State
Fla. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964) (concluding that the district court's requirement that proof of the connection between the defendant and the collateral act be by clear and convincing evidence did not conflict with Williams ); Henrion v. State, 895 So.2d 1213, 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("The offering party is required to prove the defendant's connection with the similar act by clear and convincing evidence.").
cited Cited "see" Smith v. State
Fla. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 , 543 (Fla.1964); Acevedo v. State, 787 So.2d 127, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
cited Cited "see" Robertson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 , 543 (Fla.1964); Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Chapman v. State, 417 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see" Robertson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 , 543 (Fla.1964); Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Chapman v. State, 417 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see" Jackson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1964).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 (Fla.1964); Phillips v. State, 591 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); West v. State, 579 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); see also Charles W.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mutcherson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Phillips v. State, 591 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (presence and subsequent flight from scene of burglarized home, coupled with evidence of defendant's fingerprints and possession of items missing from residence, constituted clear and convincing evidence connecting defendant to prior burglary), with State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541 , 543 (Fla.1964) (evidence of prior arsenic poisonings inadmissible where state failed to connect defendant to prior murders), and Dibble v. State, 347 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (mistrial should have been granted where detective implied that defend…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Effie L. NORRIS, Respondent.
33316.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 30, 1964.
168 So. 2d 541
Thornal.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published

[*542] James W. Kynes, Atty. Gen., and James G. Mahorner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Walter G. Arnold, Jacksonville, for respondent.

THORNAL, Justice.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we are requested to review a decision of the Court of Appeal, First District, because of an alleged conflict with a prior decision of this Court. See Norris v. State, 158 So.2d 803.

We must decide whether certain similar fact evidence was admissible to prove the guilt of an accused in the absence of proof connecting the accused with the collateral situations.

The relevant facts are detailed in the opinion under review. Norris v. State, supra. Mrs. Effie L. Norris was convicted of first degree murder with a mercy recommendation. The crime alleged was the poisoning of one Merrill by administering arsenic oxide. The trial judge permitted testimony regarding the arsenic content found in the exhumed bodies of Earl Norris, late husband of the accused, and Vinton Pace, a business and social associate of Mrs. Norris. Mr. Norris died January 13, 1952. Mr. Pace died March 23, 1953. The current trial for the murder of Merrill was held October 15, 1962. Allegedly the homicide was committed on June 3, 1960. The defendant objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that there was no showing that she had anything whatever to do with feeding arsenic to Mr. Norris or to Mr. Pace. The point made was that the relevancy of similar fact evidence to prove a fact in issue depends upon proof which connects the defendant with the collateral occurrences. The District Court reversed the conviction, holding that it was error to admit the subject evidence. The State seeks review by certiorari claiming a direct conflict with our decision in Williams v. State, Fla., 110 So.2d 654.

Because of an apparent conflict between Williams and the instant decision, we granted the writ. Our study of the District[*543] Court decision following oral argument, suggests that the conflict was more apparent than real.

In Williams v. State, supra, we undertook to examine in depth the rules governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence as proof of a fact in issue in a criminal case. We there held that similar fact evidence is admissible if relevant, except to prove bad character or criminal propensities. Such evidence is not objectionable merely because it points to the commission of another crime. The objective to be accomplished by allowing such evidence is not proof of a collateral crime outside of the indictment. Its purpose is to prove a fact in issue in the case before the Court. Its relevancy will not be destroyed merely because it would also be relevant to the proof of a separate crime. It would be unduly burdensome to review our Williams opinion in detail. It is sufficient here to reaffirm the rule of admissibility of similar fact evidence which we there announced.

The State's concern is that by its strong reliance on Wrather v. State, 179 Tenn. 666, 169 S.W.2d 854, the District Court has deviated from the Williams rule of admissibility and has re-established a rule exclusion. We understand from the Wrather decision that Tennessee continues to follow the rule that similar fact evidence is inadmissible if it points to a collateral crime, unless it can be allowed under some recognized exception. It is correct that this statement of the rule was laid aside by us in Williams, when we held that such evidence is admissible if relevant. However, we do not construe the District Court opinion as adopting the questionable aspect of the Tennessee decision. Our analysis of the opinion under review leads us to conclude that the District Court used Wrather to demonstrate the related proposition that "Evidence of a collateral crime is inadmissible unless accompanied by evidence connecting the defendant therewith." Norris v. State, supra. In so holding, the District Court was on sound ground. This does not in any fashion detract or becloud the rule of admissibility announced in Williams v. State, supra. It simply means that in order for such evidence to be allowed against an accused, there must be accompanying evidence to identify or connect the accused with the collateral facts. Ralph Williams itself is illustrative. There the accused was specifically identified with the similar prior occurrences which we held to have relevant probative value in establishing various aspects of the case then at bar. Likewise, in Talley v. State, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So.2d 201, the conduct of the accused himself on occasions before and after the crime in issue, was held to be relevant at his trial. In each instance the so-called similar fact evidence was allowed. The connection between the accused and the collateral evidence was clearly established.

A contrary rule would most often lead to the improper construction of inferences upon inferences. The instant case is illustrative. In order for the questioned evidence to reach a degree of admissible relevancy, it would be necessary to infer that lethal potions of arsenic had been administered to Mr. Norris and to Mr. Pace. From that, we would have to infer that Mrs. Norris committed the acts. For the rules governing inferences, see Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, Fla., 73 So.2d 403, and Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, Fla., 90 So.2d 908. The evidence admitted here does not meet the test of the criminal rule announced by these decisions.

Instead of deviating from Williams v. State, supra, the District Court followed the rule there announced. It merely prescribed a related requirement that in order for the evidence to be admissible there must be proof of a connection between the defendant and the collateral occurrences. In this respect mere suspicion is insufficient. The proof should be clear and convincing.

In view of our analysis of the decision submitted for review we find no conflict with prior decisions of this Court. However,[*544] because of possible erroneous interpretations of the District Court opinion, we have deemed it advisable to state the reasons for our conclusion. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company v. Branham, Fla., 104 So.2d 356. The writ was improvidently issued and it is, therefore, discharged.

It is so ordered.

DREW, C.J., and O'CONNELL, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur