BAA v. State, 356 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1978). · Go Syfert
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BAA v. State, 356 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dunn v. City of Boynton Beach (flsd, 2016-06-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. City of Boynton Beach
S.D. Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
A. A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304, 305 (Fla.1978). b.
cited Cited as authority (rule) M.J. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“It is not to be used as a ‘catch-all’ provision when there is an insufficient basis for another charge.” Id. (citing B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla.1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simms v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
As we stated in Woody , for example, “the loitering and prowling statute [was used] as a catchall provision to detain a citizen and prosecute him where there was insufficient basis to convict on some other charge.” 581 So.2d at 967 (citing cf B.A.A., 356 So.2d at 304 (stating that if officer believed appellant was soliciting prostitution by repeatedly approaching drivers stopped at intersection, officer should have arrested her for that instead of loitering or prowling)); see also Ecker, 311 So.2d at 111 (“The use of Section 856.021 as a ‘catchall’ criminal offense may result in a fi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Albuquerque (2×)
N.M. · 1999 · confidence medium
Davis, Rights of Juveniles: The Juvenile Justice System § 3.2, at 3-9 (2d ed.1999) (noting that the potential for abuse in this area is at least as great as it traditionally was in the handling of adults under vagrancy laws); cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 , 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding that Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in failing to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct or to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement officers); B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla.1978) (“The [loitering and prowl…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Towne v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1978); State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d at 110 ; Patmore v. State, 383 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Springfield v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
The courts have repeatedly disapproved use of the loitering and prowling statute as a "`catchall' provision [w]hereby citizens may be detained by police ... when there is an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction on some other charge." B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1978) (footnote omitted); Ecker, 311 So.2d at 111 .
cited Cited "see" McClamma v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978).
cited Cited "see" DG v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978); Carter v. State, 516 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
cited Cited "see" D.G. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978); Carter v. State, 516 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
discussed Cited "see" L.C. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A., 356 So.2d at 306; Springfield v. State, 481 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
discussed Cited "see" LC v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A., 356 So.2d at 306 ; Springfield v. State, 481 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
cited Cited "see" Watts v. State
Fla. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978).
cited Cited "see" Cross v. State
Fla. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Geoffrey Madge v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 , 306 (Fla.1978) (“[T]here are no specific and articulable facts which would reasonably warrant a finding that the public peace and order were threatened or that safety of persons or property was jeopardized by the actions of the juvenile.”); Jones v. State, 117 So.3d 818, 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (stating that the court could not rely on observations of lay witnesses of events that occurred before law enforcement arrived to determine whether defendant was guilty of loitering and prowling); A.D. v. State, 817 So.2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (hol…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chamson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
In this case, the police officer failed to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a finding that a breach of the peace is imminent or the public safety is threatened." Ecker, 311 So.2d at 109 ; see Springfield v. State, 481 So.2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (no probable cause to arrest for loitering where officer observed defendant carrying tape recorder on public sidewalk at 10:40 P.M. and where defendant could not explain his presence); White v. State, 458 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (sleeping defendant cann…
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Rash
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978), on remand, 357 So.2d 269 ; Patmore v. State, 383 So.2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
B.A.A., a Juvenile, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
49992.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Mar 9, 1978.
356 So. 2d 304
Boyd.
Published

[*305] Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William M. Grodnick, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.

BOYD, Justice.

This cause presents an issue of the application of Florida's loitering and prowling statute, Section 856.021, Florida Statutes. We have conflict certiorari jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Conflict in this cause is with State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1975).

The juvenile in the instant case was arrested for loitering and prowling after a police officer observed her, a number of times, approaching cars stopped at a traffic light and engaging the drivers in conversation. The arresting officer observed the juvenile acting in this manner on approximately forty previous occasions, and on the night of her arrest had earlier warned her to leave the streets.

Following a delinquency hearing in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Dade County, the juvenile was found to have violated the "loitering" statute. Adjudication of delinquency was withheld and she was placed under the supervision of the Division of Youth Services. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, upheld the decision of the trial court. B.A.A., a juvenile v. State, 333 So.2d 552 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976).

In State v. Ecker, supra, we construed Section 856.021, Florida Statutes, as requiring that "`the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' a finding that a breach of the peace is imminent or the public safety is threatened." 311 So.2d 104, 109. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). In Ecker, the elements of the offense which must be satisfied for conviction of loitering and prowling were set forth as:

"(1) the defendant loitered or prowled in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals; (2) such loitering and prowling were under circumstances that warranted a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. This alarm is presumed[*306] under the statute if, when the law officer appears, the defendant flees, conceals himself, or refuses to identify himself. Prior to any arrest, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern by identifying himself and explaining his presence and conduct. If it appears at trial that the explanation is true and would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern, then the defendant may not be convicted under this statute." 311 So.2d 104, 106.

In the instant case, there are no specific and articulable facts which would reasonably warrant a finding that the public peace and order were threatened or that safety of persons or property was jeopardized by the actions of the juvenile. If the finding of loitering is upheld under the facts of this case it could be upheld against anyone at street intersections lawfully seeking donations, for charitable purposes, from drivers of automobiles.

The statute is not to be used as a "catch-all" provision hereby citizens may be detained by police and charged by prosecutors when there is an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction on some other charge.[*] Rather, it is a specific prohibition against specific conduct. All elements of this crime must be satisfied. We reaffirm these elements as set forth in Ecker, supra. In utilizing these elements and examining the juvenile's conduct, we must conclude that the statute may not be applied here. The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is quashed and the cause remanded.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and KARL, JJ., concur.

[*] The District Court found a threatened breach of peace because the arresting officer believed the juvenile was offering to commit prostitution, a misdemeanor. If there was evidence of such solicitation, it should have been charged against her. But the record here does not establish that there was a reasonable alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity, the second element necessary to sustain a charge of loitering.