Murthy v. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Murthy v. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“declin to infer any civil liability" in construction industry regulatory and penal statutes "as there is no evidence in the language or the legislative history . . . of a legislative intent" to create "a private right of action”
153 citation events (126 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Sarah Beck v. North Broward Hospital District (fladistctapp, 2026-01-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Sarah Beck v. North Broward Hospital District
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
declin to infer any civil liability" in construction industry regulatory and penal statutes "as there is no evidence in the language or the legislative history . . . of a legislative intent" to create "a private right of action
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) AMANDA HEINE and JHAYLA STREADY v. FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
there is no evidence in the language of the statute or the statutory structure that a private cause of action . . . was contemplated by the legislature in enacting this statute.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A.
D.D.C. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
egislative intent . . . should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. v. Blue Cross
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing civil liability.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A.
D.C. Cir. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
egislative intent ... should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexandria Investments, LLC v. Waterstone Capital, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
I, § 24-31(1) (2024) (“Whoever commits a violation of this chapter or any lawful rule or regulation promulgated under this chapter is liable to Miami-Dade County . . . .”) (emphasis added); Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1994) (observing that legislative intent, as discerned from “language of the statute or the statutory structure,” is a prerequisite to implying a private remedy). 2
cited Cited as authority (rule) Beth Wolf, APRN-BC LLC v. CIGNA Health and Life Insurance Company
S.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Disarro v. EzriCare, LLC
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
In Florida, “legislative intent ... should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one.” Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peoples Gas System, etc. v. Posen Construction, Inc., etc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
Our precedent says that “whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one” is primarily a matter of “legislative intent.” Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dyal v. Jeffcoat
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Legislative intent is “the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one.” Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted); accord Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court has gradually receded from its reliance on three of the[ ] four [Cort v. Ash][21] factors, focusing exclusively on legislative intent to create a private right of action as the touchstone of its analysis.” (emphasis in original)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club, Inc
M.D. Fla. · 2019 · confidence medium
Fla. 2010) (citing Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Property Construction Co. v. Empire Office, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2019 · confidence medium
The proposed counterclaim’s negligence count alleges that Dreke “owed a nondelegable duty to Empire” and that his duty was breached due to “insufficient and improper supervision.” (ECF No. 71-1 ¶¶ 42, 47.) The Florida Supreme Court held that although “a qualifying agent for a corporation has a duty to supervise a corporation’s construction projects” under §§ 489.119, 489.1195, Florida Statutes, the failure to meet that duty “does not give rise to a private cause of action against a corporation’s qualifying agent.” Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 19…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. a/s/o DOROTHY ANDERSON v. PATRICK LOFTUS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Subsequently, in Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme Court clarified that “legislative intent, rather than the duty to benefit a class of individuals, should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one.” There, although the court found that a qualifying agent for a corporation had a statutory duty to supervise the corporation’s construction projects, the court concluded that there was “no evidence in the language of the statute or the statutory st…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Carry, Inc., and Rebekah Hargrove v. John E. Thrasher, an individual
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“In general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing civil liability.” Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Moyant v. Beattie, 561 So. 2d 1319, 1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sorenson v. Professional Compounding Pharmacists of Western Pennsylvania, Inc. (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994). "[L]egislative intent, rather than the duty to benefit a class of individuals, should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one." Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hucke v. Kubra Data Transfer Ltd.
S.D. Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
Buell specifically rejected plaintiffs’ argument “that the availability of a statutory remedy should be irrelevant, as Florida common law makes rescission or restitution available to protect an innocent party from the consequences of a contract whose subject matter is illegal,” finding this argument ran afoul of the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Pincus v. Speedpay, Inc. (3×)
S.D. Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court which found “plaintiffs may not evade the Florida. legislature’s decision to withhold a statutory cause of action for violations of the pertinent provisions of FUITPA by asserting common law claims based on such violations.” Id. (citing Murthy v. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994) (courts must look to whether the statute intended to create a private remedy)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Braham v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Because it “ ‘merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public,’ it will not be construed as establishing civil liability.” Id. at 552 (quoting Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Physicians Group of Sarasota, L.L.C.
M.D. Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985-986 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Limones v. School District of Lee County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Murthy v. N. SinHa Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985-86 (Fla.1994) (“In general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing a civil liability.” (quoting Moyant v. Beattie, 561 So,2d 1319, 1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990))); see also Miulli v. Fla. High Sch.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lemy v. Direct General Finance Co. (2×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
L.P., 959 So.2d 176 (Fla.2007) at 182 (“whether a statutory cause of action should be [inferred] is a question of legislative intent”) and 186 (“it is outside this Court’s purview to [infer] a statutory cause of action ... where none was intended by the Legislature”); Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842, 852 (Fla. 2003) (“absent [an] expression of intent, a private right of action is not implied”); Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1994) (“we decline to infer any civil liability as there is no evidence ... of a legislative intent to crea…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Langbehn v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI-DADE
S.D. Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
The defendants' citation to cases such as Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994), is not very helpful.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Johnson v. Badger Acquisition
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
We agree. "[L]egislative intent . . . should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one." Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994). "[L]egislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law." Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981) (citing State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191 , 116 So. 255 (1928)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Abril
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
Similarly, it is contrary to the principle recognized in Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994), where this Court unanimously agreed that "legislative intent . . . should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one." (Emphasis added.) It is also contrary to the evolution in tort law that has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts since 1979, when the authors adopted section 874A (Tort Liability for Violation of Legislative Provision) to supplement the approach previo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buell v. Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
M.D. Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
Murthy, 644 So.2d at 986 (observing that a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing civil liability) (citations omitted). *1218 More telling as to the Florida legislature’s intent not to create a private right of action premised on a violation of section 626.9541(l)(z), is the fact that it expressly provided for a cause of action for violating other specific provisions of not only the UITPA but also of section 626.9541 itself.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lake Eola Builders, LLC v. Metropolitan at Lake Eola, LLC
M.D. Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PLANTATION GENERAL HOSP. v. Horowitz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994), there is a glimmer of an opening to this money door stating: "we agree that legislative intent, rather than the duty to benefit a class of individuals, should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one." [e.s.] Id. (holding that regulatory statutes governing construction industry did not create private cause of action in the absence of evidence in text or legislative history of intent to create private cause of action).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
S.D. Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.
Fla. · 2003 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1994) ("In general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing a civil liability.") (quoting Moyant v. Beattie, 561 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schupbach v. City of Sarasota
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
In Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1994), our supreme court held that "a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing a civil liability." Although here we deal with a municipal ordinance and Murthy considered a state statute, we conclude that Murthy's reasoning is applicable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shurgard Income Properties Fund 16—Ltd. Partnership v. Muns
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985-86 (Fla.1994), the supreme court concluded that whether or not a statute creates a private cause of action for its breach is a matter of legislative intent: [i]n the past, some courts dealing with this issue have looked to whether the statute at issue imposed a duty to benefit a class of individuals.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Sarasota v. Windom
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1994), the supreme court stated that "a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing a civil liability." We determine that analysis to be appropriate here.
cited Cited "see" Tammy King v. Sheriff Carmine Marceno, in his official capacity as Lee County Sheriff; Deputy Jay Brett, individual capacity; Deputy Jason Ward, individual capacity; Deputy Johnathon Armato, individual capacity; Deputy Melquias Olivo, individual capacity; Millenium Physician Group, LLC; Francisco Marasigan; Kristin Gustin
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994); see also Blinn v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (M.D.
cited Cited "see" King v. Lee County
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 985 .
discussed Cited "see" Adam Richardson v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration
Fla. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1994); Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 2003); Peoples Gas Sys. v. Posen Constr., Inc., 322 So. 3d 604 , 608-09 (Fla. 2021).
discussed Cited "see" Karpel v. Gebrueder Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG
S.D. Fla. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994) (citing Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“We hold that the negligent performance of the qualifying agent’s statutorily-imposed duty of supervision may support a cause of action for damages sustained by subsequent purchasers, such as the appellees, as a result of latent construction defects.”)); Parliament Towers Condo. v. Parliament House Realty, Inc., 377 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), disapproved of on other grounds by Casa Clara Condo.
cited Cited "see" Tabraue III v. Doctors Hospital
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1994).
cited Cited "see" Salcedo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1994); Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A., 982 So.2d at 633 .
discussed Cited "see" Wolicki-Gables v. Doctors Same Day Surgery Center, Ltd.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See 644 So.2d at 985-87 (declining to judicially create a civil cause of action based on a statute where the legislature had expressed no clear intent to create such a cause of action).
discussed Cited "see" United Automobile Insurance Co. v. a 1st Choice Healthcare Systems
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baumstein v. Sunrise Cmty., Inc., 738 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“There is no question that the primary, perhaps the only, issue pertinent to the question of whether a private cause of action may be based upon the breach of a statute is whether the legislature intended that to be the case.”) (emphasis added) (citing Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1994)).
cited Cited "see" Department of Children & Family Services v. Chapman
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla.1994); Miulli v. Fla. High Sch.
discussed Cited "see" Miulli v. FLORIDA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1994) (stating that, in general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing a civil liability).
cited Cited "see" ABERGEL v. Stuart
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Abergel v. Stuart
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla.1994).
examined Cited "see" Horowitz v. PLANTATION GENERAL HOSP. LTD. (4×)
Fla. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 984 .
discussed Cited "see" DADELAND DEPOT. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Fla. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla.1994). [6] The majority states that this "tool of statutory construction was called into question somewhat by our opinion in Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So.2d 1 (Fla.2004)." Majority op. at 1230.
cited Cited "see" Buckner v. FAMILY SERVICES OF CENT. FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited "see" Welker v. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Florida, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994) ("legislative intent ... should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one").
cited Cited "see" Blinn v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985-86 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited "see" Mora v. South Broward Hosp. Dist.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983 (Fla.1994) (holding that regulatory and penal statutes governing the construction industry did not create a private cause of action against an individual qualifying agent).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hallegere (Hall) MURTHY, et ux., Petitioners,
v.
N. SINHA CORP., etc., et al., Respondents.
81799.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 8, 1994.
644 So. 2d 983
McDonald.
Cited by 75 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 60%
Citer courts: D.C. Circuit (1)

[*984] D.S. (DAR) Airan of Airan and Associates, P.A., Miami, for petitioners.

Adam Trop, North Miami Beach, for respondents.

McDONALD, Senior Justice.

We have for review the following question certified to be of great public importance:

DOES CHAPTER 489, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), THE LICENSING AND REGULATORY CHAPTER GOVERNING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING, CREATE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL QUALIFIER FOR A CORPORATION ACTING AS A GENERAL CONTRACTOR?

Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So.2d 307 (Fla.3d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative.

The Murthys (owners) entered into a construction contract with N. Sinha Corporation (corporation) for construction of improvements and additions to their home. In May 1991, the corporation filed a claim of lien against the owners' home, alleging that the owners owed $28,010.57 on the contract. Thereafter, the owners filed a notice of contest of lien claiming the work on their home was defective and the payments requested were not yet due under the contract. The corporation then filed a complaint for breach of contract and foreclosure of its statutory mechanics' lien. The owners responded by filing an answer containing affirmative defenses, a counterclaim and a third-party complaint. After the court partially granted the corporation's motion to strike the answer, the owners filed an amended counterclaim against the corporation and an amended third-party complaint against Niranjan Sinha, the corporation's president, sole stock-holder, and qualifying agent. The third-party complaint alleged that Sinha, as the corporation's qualifying agent, was individually liable for the construction defects pursuant to chapter 489, Florida Statutes (1991).[1]

The trial court granted Sinha's motion to dismiss the amended third-party complaint and the owners appealed the dismissal of[*985] their claims for negligent performance of a contract, discharge of a fraudulent lien,[2] and violation of Florida's minimum building codes.[3] The district court held that the complaint stated a cause of action against Sinha for common-law negligence because the owners alleged both property damage and personal injury.[4] The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims because it determined that sections 489.119 and 489.129, Florida Statutes (1991), the regulatory and penal provisions of chapter 489, did not create a private cause of action against a qualifying agent. Murthy, 618 So.2d at 309. The court also recognized that Sinha could not be held personally liable in this case because he was not a party to the contract. Id.

The owners contend that chapter 489 creates a cause of action against a qualifying agent who fails to supervise his corporation's construction projects and that the trial court, therefore, erred in dismissing their claims against Sinha. In particular, they claim that sections 489.119 and 489.1195, Florida Statutes (1991), impose a duty to supervise on the qualifying agent and a violation of that duty constitutes negligence per se or at least evidence of negligence sufficient to send the cause to a jury. We agree that a qualifying agent for a corporation has a duty to supervise a corporation's construction projects,[5] but we find that the failure to meet that duty does not give rise to a private cause of action against a corporation's qualifying agent.

While chapter 489 provides administrative remedies against a qualifying agent,[6] it does not expressly provide for a civil cause of action. Accordingly, to address the Murthys' claim we must determine whether a cause of action should be judicially implied. In the past, some courts dealing with this issue have looked to whether the statute at issue imposed a duty to benefit a class of individuals. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874, 877 (1916); Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla.3d DCA 1964). These courts simply concluded that a cause of action arose when a class member was injured by a breach of that duty. Rosenberg, 168 So.2d at 680. Today, however, most courts generally look to the legislative intent of a statute to determine whether a private cause of action should be judicially inferred. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245-46, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) ("[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted."); Freehauf v. School Board of Seminole County, 623 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla. 5th DCA) ("Whether a statute creates a private cause of action for its breach, so that it is appropriate to instruct a jury that its breach is negligence per se, or evidence of negligence, turns on various considerations aimed at resolving what the Legislature intended when it passed the statute in the first place."), review dismissed, 629 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1993); Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So.2d 396, 397-98 (Fla.3d DCA 1991); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So.2d 785 (Fla.3d DCA 1989) (applying the criteria set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), to discern whether the legislature intended to create a cause of action when it enacted a particular statute). Although we are not bound by the decisions of these courts, we agree that legislative intent, rather than the duty to benefit a class of individuals, should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one. See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So.2d 1130, 1137 (Fla. 1990); Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981) ("[L]egislative intent[*986] is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.").

Chapter 489 establishes licensing procedures and regulatory duties for the construction industry and created the Construction Industry Licensing Board to enforce the performance of these procedures and duties. There is no evidence in the language of the statute or the statutory structure that a private cause of action against a qualifying agent was contemplated by the legislature in enacting this statute. Cf. Moyant v. Beattie, 561 So.2d 1319 (Fla.4th DCA 1990) (finding legislative intent to authorize private actions where regulatory statute limited recovery from statutorily created fund to persons who had received final judgment in any action where the cause was based on a violation of the statute). Rather, the language of chapter 489 indicates that it was created merely to secure the safety and welfare of the public by regulating the construction industry.[7] "In general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as establishing a civil liability." Id. at 1320 (quoting 49 Fla.Jur.2d, Statutes § 223 (1984)); see also Freehauf, 623 So.2d at 764 (citing 49 Fla.Jur.2d, Statutes § 223 (1984)).

The legislative history of chapter 489 does not reveal an intent to create a cause of action against a qualifying agent either. On the contrary, the sole provision in chapter 489 authorizing private suits, section 489.5331, Florida Statutes (1987), authorized them only against unlicensed or uncertified contractors. In 1988, legislators moved this provision to section 768.0425 and, thereby, removed from chapter 489 any reference to a private cause of action against a contractor.[8] Accordingly, we decline to infer any civil liability as there is no evidence in the language or the legislative history of chapter 489 of a legislative intent to create a private remedy against a qualifying agent.

Our interpretation of chapter 489 resolves the apparent conflict that exists among the districts with respect to this issue. While the Third District recognized that its decisions in this case and in Finkle conflict with the decisions in Gatwood, Hunt, and Alles, we conclude that the conflict is not as broad as that court or the owners suggest. Rather, we find that most of the decisions on which the owners rely do not clearly recognize that chapter 489 creates a private cause of action against a corporation's qualifying agent.

In Alles and Hunt the First and Fifth Districts simply upheld the Construction Industry Licensing Board's recommendations regarding the sanctions imposed on several qualifying agents who failed to supervise their corporation's construction project. While these decisions recognized that the Board may sanction qualifying agents for violation of their statutorily imposed duty, they do not imply that chapter 489 creates a private right of action against qualifying agents.

In Gatwood, the court also recognized the qualifying agent's duty to supervise its corporation's construction projects. The court, however, went on to conclude that "the negligent performance of the qualifying agent's statutorily-imposed duty of supervision may support a cause of action for damages sustained by subsequent purchasers ... as a result of latent construction defects." Gatwood, 475 So.2d at 723. We agree that an owner may recover from a negligent qualifying[*987] agent, but only under a common law theory of negligence or through the administrative remedies available pursuant to chapter 489. Due to our analysis of the legislative history in this case we cannot assume that the legislature intended anything more. Accordingly, we reject the First District's conclusion that a corporation's qualifying agent may be held individually liable for a breach of the duty created by sections 489.119 and 489.1195.[9]

Accordingly, we approve the decision below to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion and disapprove Gatwood to the extent it conflicts with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

1 Chapter 489 requires a corporation or other business entity seeking to become a contractor to procure an individual licensed contractor as its qualifying agent. § 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1991). The qualifying agent must apply for registration or certification with the Department of Professional Regulation on behalf of the corporation before the corporation can engage in any construction. See id. Additionally, the qualifying agent is responsible for supervising, directing, managing, and controlling both the corporation's contracting and construction activities. See §§ 489.105(4), .1195, Fla. Stat. (1991).
2 § 713.31, Fla. Stat. (1991).
3 § 553.84, Fla. Stat. (1991).
4 Specifically, the owners alleged that the corporation prematurely cut an overhang which caused flooding inside the owners' home. In addition, the owners alleged that the corporation's activities caused a ceiling to collapse which resulted in personal injury to Mrs. Murthy.
5 See § 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1991); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Hunt v. Department of Professional Regulation, 444 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Alles v. Department of Professional Regulation, 423 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
6 See §§ 489.119, .127, .129, Fla. Stat. (1991).
7 Section 489.101 describes the purpose of chapter 489 as follows:

The Legislature recognizes that the construction and home improvement industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when incompetent or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or services. Therefore, it is necessary in the interest of the public health, safety and welfare to regulate the construction industry.

8 When scrutinizing the legislative history of a statute to determine legislative intent, courts may also look to acts passed at subsequent sessions. Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 So.2d 388 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 839, 65 S.Ct. 1408, 89 L.Ed. 1965 (1945). In this case, we note that the legislature has recently amended chapter 489 to provide that "[u]nless specifically provided, the provisions of this part shall not be construed to create a civil cause of action." Ch. 94-119, § 265, Laws of Florida. Our conclusion, therefore, clearly comports with the legislature's intent.
9 We also reject the similar conclusion arrived at by Judge Hall in his special concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So.2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).