Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
12 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Walker v. State (fladistctapp, 2007-10-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] 884 So.2d 1014 , 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (finding that a defendant's battery on a law enforcement officer was a qualifying offense for sentencing as a PRR where the defendant intentionally touched or struck an officer against the officer's will and created a well-founded fear in the officer that violence was imminent by driving a car directly toward the officer), disapproved of by State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla.2007). [2] 789 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding "that battery on a law enforcement officer is a qualifying offense for [PRR] sentencing"), disapproved of by St…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hearns
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that BOLEO is a qualifying offense for sentence enhancement under subsection ( o ) of the PRR statute without analyzing the statute); Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (relying on Spann in holding that BOLEO is a qualifying offense under the PRR); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So.2d 582, 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (following Brown ); Branch v. State, 790 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("[B]attery on a law enforcement officer [is] a qualifying offense that falls within the ambit of statutory subsection [775.082(9)](a)(…
discussed Cited "see" Butler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (affirming prison releasee reoffender sentence when battery on a law enforcement officer was qualifying forcible felony).
cited Cited "see" Jenkins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)." Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
cited Cited "see" De La Portilla v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Stabile v. State, 790 So.2d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
discussed Cited "see" Mills v. State
Fla. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA) (applying prison releasee reoffender statute), review denied, 796 So.2d 535 (Fla.2001); Mills v. State, 773 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (applying habitual felony offender statute); Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38, 39-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (applying prison releasee reoffender statute); King v. State, 763 So.2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (applying habitual felony offender statute); cf. also Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655, 658 (Fla.2000) (approving imposition of a concurrent prisoner releasee reoffender sentence with longer habitual felony offender sent…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Horace BROWN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
2D00-494.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Mar 16, 2001.
789 So. 2d 366
Northcutt.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

[*367] James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Anthony C. Musto, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dale E. Tarpley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Horace Brown pleaded guilty to numerous charges, including drug crimes, battery on a law enforcement officer, obstructing an officer with violence and possession of a firearm by a felon. The State sought to have him sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender[1] and a habitual felony offender.[2] At the sentencing hearing and on appeal Brown raised several challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act.

His constitutional challenges have been rejected in Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000), and State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). The Fourth District recently has held that battery on a law enforcement officer is a qualifying offense for prison releasee reoffender sentencing. See Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We agree, and we reject Brown's argument on that issue. Brown also contends that the State is required to show he was released from prison because he had served his sentence. Here, the State presented a release affidavit from the Department of Corrections showing Brown's release date. We agree with the Fifth District that the State need only show that a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith v. State, 753 So.2d 703 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Once it makes that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove exceptional facts, such as an overturned conviction, that would negate his status as a prison releasee reoffender. Brown did not meet his burden.

[*368] Still, Brown correctly argues that he was improperly sentenced to equal, concurrent prison releasee reoffender and habitual offender sentences for his crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and opposing an officer with violence. Our supreme court has held these equal, concurrent sentences violate the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act. Grant, 770 So.2d at 659. We remand with directions to the circuit court to strike Brown's designations and sentences as a habitual offender for those crimes. In all other respects, we affirm.

FULMER, A.C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., concur.

1 § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).
2 § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).