Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). · Go Syfert
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Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
361 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 64 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Scott (ill, 1992-04-16) · Strongest negative: State v. Breakiron (nj, 1987-10-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" State v. Breakiron (2×)
N.J. · 1987 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Rivera v. Delaware, 351 A.2d 561 (Del.Supr.Ct.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that insanity defense relates to the defendant’s state of mind, an essential element of an offense, and is directly relevant to the appropriate punishment).
discussed Cited "but see" State v. Baker (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.H. · 1980 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 879-80 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Scott
Ill. · 1992 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d at 160, 97 S. Ct. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); Hicks v. Miranda (1975), 422 U.S. 332 , 45 L.
examined Cited as authority (rule) People v. Kohl (3×)
NY · 1988 · confidence medium
The court’s grounding of its Davis holding squarely on "principles fundamental”, "humanity”, and "justice” seems, in all candor, wholly at odds with that court’s current interpretation of this earlier precedent as having stated a mere rule of practice devoid of constitutional implications (see, Rivera v Delaware, supra, at 879 [Brennan, J., dissenting]; Patterson v New York, 432 US 197, 203 ).
examined Cited "see" State v. Wilson (4×)
S.C. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware , 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed. (2d) 160 (1976) (defendant's request to overrule Leland dismissed for want of substantial federal question). [5] Some jurisdictions have completely abolished the insanity defense, and take the position that such action is constitutionally permitted.
discussed Cited "see" Daniels v. State (2×)
Del. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. State, Del.Supr., 351 A.2d 561, 561-63 , appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Dwayne Freeman (2×)
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) (request to overrule Leland dismissed for want of substantial federal question); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 368 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3051 n. 17, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (citing Leland with approval); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 , 122 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 1568 n. 23, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (citing Leland with approval); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2325 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (citing Leland with approval); Williams v. Wainwright, 712 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.1983) (indic…
examined Cited "see" State v. James (4×)
Iowa · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 ; see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207 , 97 S.Ct. at 2325 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 290 .
discussed Cited "see" Ortiz v. Rodriguez (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed. 2d 160 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Pete Mitchell (2×)
2d Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) (dismissing for want of substantial federal question appeal from Delaware decision placing burden of proving insanity on defendant); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952) (affirming conviction obtained under similar rule in Oregon). 5 *836 Apart from constitutional concerns, several considerations lead us to conclude that in federal criminal trials the Government’s burden in disproving at least one element of duress should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
discussed Cited "see" Alvord v. Wainwright (2×)
M.D. Fla. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) (cited in Patterson). 27 .
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Robinson
Mass. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1978) (dismissing for want of a substantial Federal question a Delaware decision placing the burden as to insanity on the defendant); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
cited Cited "see" State v. Howze
Ohio Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivera v. Delaware (1976), 429 U. S. 877 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mark Edward Thompson v. Gary T. Dixon, Warden, Central Prison (2×)
4th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 512 F.2d 443, 445 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), and Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976)) (“It is worth noting that placing the burden of proof of insanity on a criminal defendant does not violate the rule of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offense charged.”), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920 , 98 S.Ct. 2270 , 56 L.Ed.2d 762 (1978). * Thus, an inst…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Medina v. California (2×)
SCOTUS · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U. S. 877 (1976).
examined Cited "see, e.g." People v. Medina (4×)
Cal. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790, 798-799 [ 96 L.Ed. 1302 , 1308-1309, 72 S.Ct. 1002 ] (Leland); see Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228, 236 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 267, 275-276 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 ] [upholding, against due process attack, Ohio statute placing proof burden on defendant claiming self-defense]; see also Rivera v. Delaware (1976) 429 U.S. 877 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 160 , 97 S.Ct. 226 ] [dis. opn. on dismissal of appeal].) In Leland, the high court upheld an Oregon statute requiring the defendant in a criminal case to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wesley v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivera v. Delaware , 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Jeffrey Scott Amos (2×)
8th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) wherein an appeal was made from a Delaware conviction which, in reliance op Leland, had been affirmed over the claim that the Delaware statute was unconstitutional because it burdened the defendant with proving his affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderanee of the evidence.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Thompson (2×)
La. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976); State v. Roy, 395 So.2d 664 (La. 1981); State v. Lee, 395 So.2d 700 (La.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Edward Dennis Jacks, Jr. v. Jack R. Duckworth, Warden (2×)
7th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) (appeal claiming that the Winship and Mullaney decisions had overruled Leland dismissed as not presenting a substantial federal question). .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Burnham (2×)
Me. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976), and the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Carmen Nereida Rivera
v.
State of Delaware
75-6583.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 12, 1976.
429 U.S. 877
Brennan, Stevens, Marshall.
Cited by 155 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Appeal from Sup. Ct. Del. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree, in Delaware Superior Court. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to strike the murder conviction but to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter; the constitutionality of a Delaware statute that requires a criminal defendant raising an insanity defense to prove mental illness or defect by a preponderance of the evidence was sustained. The relevant sections of the Delaware Code provide:

“§ 401. Defendant’s mental illness or mental defect....
“(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or mental defect, the accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or lacked sufficient willpower to choose whether he would do the act or refrain from doing it.
[*878] “(b) If the defendant prevails in establishing the affirmative defense provided in subsection (a) of this section, the trier of facts shall return a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.’ ”
“§304. Defendant’s affirmative defenses; prove by preponderance of evidence.
“(a) When a defense declared by this Criminal Code or by another statute to be an affirmative defense is raised at trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence.” Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §401 (1975).

The Delaware Supreme Court held that Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), required its conclusion, because Leland “has not been overruled by Mullaney [v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975)], . . . either expressly or implicitly.” 351 A. 2d 561, 562 (1976). Because I believe this case presents the substantial federal question whether Leland can be reconciled with our recent holdings in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, I would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.

In Mullaney, we considered a Maine rule that placed upon a criminal defendant charged with murder the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden impulse in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. We concluded that this rule did not comport with the due process requirement, as defined in In re Winship, supra, at 361-364, that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. In reaching this conclusion, my Brother Powell’s opinion for the Court pointed out that, in 1895, this Court considered and conclusively rejected the practice, accepted in several jurisdictions, of requiring the defendant to negate the presumption that he acted with malice aforethought. 421 U. S. at 694-696. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469 (1895), the[*879] decision referred to, held in the context of a federal murder prosecution that the prosecution must shoulder the burden of proving the accused was sane at the time of the commission of the crime. This was so, the Court concluded, because “the crime of murder necessarily involves the possession by the accused of such mental capacity as will render him criminally responsible for his acts.” Id., at 485. It is thus clear, following Davis, at least in the context of federal criminal procedure, that the accused’s sanity is an ingredient of mens rea, an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Leland v. Oregon presented the same question in the context of a state rule requiring an accused to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Leland refused to extend the holding of Davis to the States based on reluctance “to interfere with Oregon’s determination of its policy with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of sanity since we cannot say that policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice.” 343 U. S., at 799. In effect, the Court concluded that Davis was not a constitutional holding, but rather prescribed a policy necessary to achieve uniformity in federal prosecutions. 343 U. S., at 797-798.

My Brother Ruhnquist’s concurring opinion in Mullaney, in which The Chief Justice joined, would distinguish Leland on the basis that the issue of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is considered by the jury only after it has found that all elements of the offense, including mens rea, are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Although that concurring opinion concedes that “evidence relevant to insanity as defined by state law may also be relevant to whether the required mens rea was present, [it states that] the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime.” 421 U. S., at 705-706.

I do not think that the logic of this view is self-evident.[*880] Like the state rule invalidated in Mullaney, which implied malice unless the accused negated it, the plea of insanity, whether or not the State chooses to characterize it as an affirmative defense, relates to the accused’s state of mind, an essential element of the crime, and bears upon the appropriate form of punishment. Nor is it sufficient after Mullaney to say, as the Court did in Leland, that a State may characterize the insanity defense as it chooses. We said in Mullaney that the requirement of Winship that the State prove all elements of the crime was one of substance, not limited to “a State’s definition of the elements of a crime . . . .” 421 U. S., at 699 n. 24.

The Court’s summary disposition of this case is especially inappropriate since Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975), accords that disposition precedential weight. See also Colorado Springs Amusements v. Rizzo, 428 U. S. 913 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Given the transparent erosion of Leland by Winship and Mullaney, the question whether Leland has continuing validity surely merits full briefing and oral argument.