Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). · Go Syfert
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Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1983 · …at the post-conviction hearing, marzullo's attorney made no claim that his decision not to challenge the jury was a trial tactic ⚠ not in text
160 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 48 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Garrett Brock Trapnell v. United States (ca2, 1983-12-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Garrett Brock Trapnell v. United States
2d Cir. · 1983 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
normal competency
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Joseph Thomas v. Walter D. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center (2×)
11th Cir. · 1983 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
at the post-conviction hearing, marzullo's attorney made no claim that his decision not to challenge the jury was a trial tactic
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Millan
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 , 62 n. 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978) (no error by trial court in failing to order Government disclosure of F.B.I. agent's reports regarding the ongoing investigation of a person only tangentially involved in defendant's illegal conduct).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Mellan
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 , 62 n. 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978) (no error by trial court in failing to order Government disclosure of F.B.I. agent’s reports regarding the ongoing investigation of a person only tangentially involved in defendant’s illegal conduct).
cited Cited "see" Arigbede v. United States
D. Maryland · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978); United States v. Nolan, 571 F.2d 528 (10th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Randy Lamont Patterson AKA Randy Brown, Marcus Wayne Edmundson, Tony Burton, Don Grogans, and Billy Ray Brown
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978) (examining is u.s.c. § 3575, a dangerous special offender statute worded nearly identically to 21 U.S.C. § 849 ).
discussed Cited "see" Menzel v. Morse (2×)
Iowa · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978); State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1982); Omaha Bank for Coop v. Siouxland Cattle Coop., 305 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Iowa 1981); State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470-71 (Iowa 1978). [5] We may judicially note this manual as a public document issued by a state agency.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Andres Carlos Ortiz Oliveras
1st Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Sherman Paul Arthur, Jr. v. Donald E. Bordenkircher, Superintendent, West Virginia Penitentiary
4th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) and Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 542-43 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978). 3 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Cirillo
S.D.N.Y. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978). 12 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Sheppard
E.D. Va. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" United States Ex Rel. Williams v. Franzen
N.D. Ill. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 , 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Eugene Difrancesco, United States of America v. Eugene Difrancesco (2×)
2d Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978) (sentencing court entitled to rely on variety of evidence in concluding that “ ‘protection of the public’ required [defendant’s] confinement for a period ‘longer than provided for [the] felony.’ ”); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1193-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 , 98 S.Ct. 197 , 54 L.Ed.2d 139 (1977) (purpose of dangerousness inquiry “is to determine whether and to what extent a sentence in excess of the maximum for the particular offe…
cited Cited "see" Knight v. State
Fla. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978) (White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see" James W. McCord Jr. v. F. Lee Bailey (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 , 544 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978); Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo.L.Rev. 483, 495-96 (1976).
cited Cited "see" Sovalik v. State
Alaska · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir.) cert. *1008 denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978); United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 762 (Supp.Op.) (8th Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Alan Hinton (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978): [E]ffective representation is not the same as errorless representation.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Willie Decoster, Jr., (Decoster Iii) (5×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See note 65 supra. The duties enumerated in Coles have recently been reaffirmed by the Fourth Circuit as “a definitive, objective description of the competency normally demanded of counsel in certain aspects of their service.” Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978). .
discussed Cited "see" Monroe v. United States
D.C. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 , 98 S.Ct. 103 , 54 L.Ed.2d 85 (1977); Annot., 26 A.L.R.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Feola
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978) (FBI agents’ reports on ongoing investigation of person to whom defendant had provided counterfeit money); United States v. Marshak, 364 F.Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y.1973) (investigative reports of city police department exempt from discovery or inspection).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ronald Thornley
1st Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ward v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) where the Court, relying on McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), held that the test for judging effective assistance of counsel is not whether representation was so poor as to make a farce of the trial, but whether the defense counsel’s representation was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Prokopis v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) where the Court, relying on McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), held that the test for judging effective assistance of counsel is not whether representation was so poor as to make a farce of the trial, but whether the defense counsel’s representation was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Lloyd
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) where the Court, relying on McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), held that the test forjudging effective assistance of counsel is not whether representation was so poor as to make a farce of the trial, but whether the defense counsel’s representation was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eutsey v. State
Fla. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
Nukapigak v. State, 576 P.2d 982 (Alaska 1978); State v. Wells, 265 N.W.2d 239 (N.D. 1978); see also U.S. v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.1978), cert. den., 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Adams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
Nukapigak v. State, 576 P.2d 982 (Alaska 1978); State v. Wells, 265 N.W.2d 239 (N.D. 1978); see also United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.1978, cert. den., 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 393 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Williams (2×)
Ariz. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011 , 98 S.Ct. 1885 , 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
State of Maryland
v.
Victor Dennis Marzullo
77-784.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 1, 1978.
435 U.S. 1011
White, Rehnquist.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 75%
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (2) · Second Circuit (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.

This petition presents a question of fundamental importance to the administration of criminal justice in both the state and federal courts: what minimum standard of competence must be displayed by an attorney for a criminal defendant in order to satisfy the requirement of the Sixth Amendment that the defendant receive the effective assistance of counsel?

Despite the clear significance of this question, the federal courts of appeals are in disarray. Three Circuits subscribe to the view that the representation of a defendant will be deemed adequate as a matter of constitutional law unless it was "such as to make a mockery, a sham or a farce of the trial." United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129 (C.A.1 1976); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 65 (C.A.2 1976); Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (C.A.10 1977). Four Circuits require, however, that defense counsel render "reasonably competent" assistance. United States v. De Coster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (1973); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1278 (C.A.5 1976) ("reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-666 (C.A.8 1976) ("customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances"). The Third and Seventh Circuits have developed their own, apparently different, standards for determining whether effective assistance of counsel has been rendered to a defendant. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (C.A.3 1970) ("the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 635, 641 (C.A.7 1975) ("assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation"). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is internally divided. Compare Saunders v. Eyman, 600 F.2d 728 (C.A.9 1977) ("farce or a mockery of justice") with Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (C.A.9 1977) ("reasonably effective assistance"), rehearing en banc granted.

This case presents an appropriate occasion for addressing this issue. The District Court, following an earlier decision of the Fourth Circuit which held that "one is deprived of effective assistance of counsel only in those extreme instances where the representation is so transparently inadequate as to make a farce of the trial," Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3 (C.A.4 1965), found that the representation which had been provided to defendant was adequate for constitutional purposes. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressly disavowed the test used in Root, adopted a new test requiring "representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," and applied this new standard to reverse the District Court. Thus, the choice of standard was determinative of the outcome of this case. Moreover, the Court of Appeals focused on a relatively discrete problem in the conduct of the trial, so that analysis of the adequacy of representation will not require inquiry into all aspects of the preparation and handling of the case.

The decisions of this Court recognize that the right to counsel is fundamental to a fair trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 3 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); and, in the last analysis, it is this Court's responsibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows that we should attempt to eliminate disparities in the minimum quality of representation required to be provided to indigent defendants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly frames an issue that has divided the courts of appeals, the Court shirks its central responsibility as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the administration of criminal justice under a Constitution such as ours.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

This petition presents a question of fundamental importance to the administration of criminal justice in both the state and federal courts: What minimum standard of competence must be displayed by an attorney for a criminal defendant in order to satisfy the requirement of the Sixth Amendment that the defendant receive the effective assistance of counsel?

Despite the clear significance of this question, the Federal Courts of Appeals are in disarray. Three Circuits subscribe to the view that the representation of a defendant will be deemed adequate as a matter of constitutional law unless it was “such as to make a mockery, a sham or a farce of the trial.” United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA1 1976); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F. 2d 62, 65 (CA2 1976); Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F. 2d 1182, 1187 (CA10 1977). Four Circuits require, however, that defense counsel render “reasonably competent” assistance. United States v. De Coster, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 331, 487 F. 2d 1197, 1202 (1973); Beasley v. United States, 491 F. 2d 687, 696 (CA6 1974) (“reasonably effective assistance”); United States v. Fessel, 531 F. 2d 1275, 1278 (CA5 1976) (“reasonably effective assistance”); United States v. Easter, 539 F. 2d 663, 665-666 (CA8 1976) (“customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances”). The Third and Seventh Circuits have developed their own, apparently different, standards for determining whether effective assistance of counsel has been rendered to a defendant. Moore v. United States, 432 F. 2d[*1012] 730, 736 (CA3 1970) (“the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place”); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F. 2d 634, 641 (CA7 1975) (“assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation”). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is internally divided. Compare Saunders v. Eyman, No. 75-3485 (Apr. 18, 1977) (“farce or a mockery of justice”) with Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F. 2d 1162, 1166 (1977) (“reasonably effective assistance”), rehearing en banc granted.

This case presents an appropriate occasion for addressing this issue. The District Court, following an earlier decision of the Fourth Circuit which held that “one is deprived of effective assistance of counsel only in those extreme instances where the representation is so transparently inadequate as to make a farce of the trial,” Root v. Cunningham, 344 F. 2d 1, 3 (1965), found that the representation which had been provided to defendant was adequate for constitutional purposes. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressly disavowed the test used in Root, adopted a new test requiring “representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” and applied this new standard to reverse the District Court. Thus, the choice of standard was determinative of the outcome of this case. Moreover, the Court of Appeals focused on a relatively discrete problem in the conduct of the trial, so that analysis of the adequacy of representation will not require inquiry into all aspects of the preparation and handling of the case.

The decisions of this Court recognize that the right to counsel is fundamental to a fair trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68-69 (1932); and, in the last analysis, it is this Court's responsibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows that we should attempt to eliminate disparities in the minimum quality of representa[*1013] tion required to be provided to indigent defendants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly frames an issue that has divided the Courts of Appeals, the Court shirks its central responsibility as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the administration of criminal justice under a Constitution such as ours.

I respectfully dissent.