green
Positive treatment
5.4 score
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "but see"
Martin v. School Bd. of Prince George County
But see Adams Central School District No. 090 v. Deist, 214 Neb. 307, 325 , 334 N.W.2d 775, 786 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
Holley v. CITY OF ROANOKE, ALABAMA
See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
Barron v. Public Health Trust of Dade County
See Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 913 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
In Re Cook
Accord, Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
Chatman v. Spillers
See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
Wilson v. City of Fayetteville
See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery County, Maryland, 706 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
Green v. City of Montgomery
Accord Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 912 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983). 10 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Ward Petroleum Corporation v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Nonetheless, on remand the district court may allow defendants to amend their pleadings if "justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see City of Columbia v. Paul N. Howard Co., 707 F.2d 338 , 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 238 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); 6 C.
discussed
Cited "see"
Ward Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Nonetheless, on remand the district court may allow defendants to amend their pleadings if “justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see City of Columbia v. Paul N. Howard Co., 707 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 238 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); 6 C.
discussed
Cited "see"
Wolf v. Regardie
See Cape Publica *1221 tions, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So.2d 426, 427-28 (Fla.Ct.App.1982) (protection does not extend to the hypersensitive), petition denied, 431 So.2d 988 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Bitsie v. Walston, 85 N.M. 655, 657-58 , 515 P.2d 659, 661-62 (collecting cases), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639 , 515 P.2d 643 (1973). 13 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Myles Osterneck, Cross-Appellees v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., E.T. Barwick, M.E. Kellar, Cross-Appellee, Buford Talley, Cross- Ernst & Whinney, Cross-Appellant. Myles Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., Ernest & Whinney, Myles Osterneck, Cross-Appellants v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., Melvin E. Kellar and Buford A. Talley, Cross-Appellees
See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1374-75 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983); Fed.R.App.P. 3(c) (requiring that a notice of appeal "designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from").
cited
Cited "see"
Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc.
See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1374-75 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983); Fed.
discussed
Cited "see"
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc.
See Nations v. Sun Oil Co., 695 F.2d 933, 938 (5th Cir.1983) (stating that a plaintiff was not precluded from using offensive estoppel because of an election to await development of its injuries, where no purposeful delay was shown), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1979) (allowing the use of offensive estoppel where joinder was “technically possible,” but plaintiffs were motivated by tactical concerns, not a “wait and see” attitude); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 comment e (1980) (st…
cited
Cited "see"
Ciarlante v. CSX Corp.
See, Lowry v. B & O, 707 F.2d 721 , modif. denied 711 F.2d 1207 , cert. denied 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 238 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 4 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Delon Hampton & Associates, Chartered Envirodyne Engineers, Incorporated v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
See also WMATA v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d 1312 , 1314 (4th Cir.) (“Section 4 of the Compact created WMATA as an instrumentality and agency of each of the signatory parties”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 238 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Pepco v. State Corp. Comm’n, 221 Va. 632, 634-35 , 272 S.E.2d 214, 215-16 (1980). 6 Hampton contends, however, and the district court agreed that WMATA did not enjoy sovereign immunity from application of the statute of limitations in the instant case because § 8.01-231 exempts only the Commonwealth from application of the statute of limitatio…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp. (In Re Chase & Sanborn Corp.)
The “claims under review are separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated” and “the nature of the claims already determined [is] such that no appellate court [will] have to decide the same issues more than once even if there [are] subsequent appeals.” Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. General Electric Company, 446 U.S. 1, 8 , 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1465 , 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980); see also Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir.), rehearing denied, 706 F.2d 318 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983) (lower court properly held that unadjudicat…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Heath v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
See e.g., Cape Publications v. Bridges, 423 So.2d 426, 427 (5th DCA 1982), review denied, 431 So.2d 988 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Parker v. Williams
See, e.g., Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 914 (11th Cir.) (may- or ultimate repository of city power because “all it took was the mayor to say, ‘Get your stuff and go, you are fired’ ”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Parker v. Williams
See, e.g., Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 914 (11th Cir.) (mayor ultimate repository of city power because "all it took was the mayor to say, 'Get your stuff and go, you are fired' "), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Parker v. Williams
See, e.g., Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 914 (11th Cir.) (“the evidence otherwise shows that all it took was the mayor to say, ‘Get your stuff and go, you are fired,’ that is what happened and the city closed him out”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983); see also Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (“If a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority on the question.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Parker v. Williams
See, e.g., Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 914 (11th Cir.) ("the evidence otherwise shows that all it took was the mayor to say, 'Get your stuff and go, you are fired,' that is what happened and the city closed him out"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983); see also Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) ("If a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority on the question.").
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Martin Rivera-Gomez v. Rafael Adolfo De Castro
Compare City of Columbia v. Paul N. Howard Co., 707 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir.) (where district court decided case as a contract matter but did not pass upon tort theory due to counter-claimant’s lack of clarity in presentation, amendment would be allowed after remand), ce rt. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 238 , 78 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815 , 819 n. 2 (1st Cir.1948) (if basis for federal jurisdiction cast into doubt on appeal following decision on merits, “it would [presumably] be within the discretion of the appellate court to remit the determination …
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Benoit Brookens v. Dawn White
See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1374-75 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 , 104 S.Ct. 239 , 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983); C.A.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Petramale v. Local Union 17, Laborers' International Union
(Emphasis added) With regard to allowing leave to amend an answer, the Seventh Circuit’s distinction between a remand for a whole new trial and a remand to determine damages follows from the Supreme Court decision in Retzer v. Wood, 109 U.S. 185, 188 , 3 S.Ct. 164, 166 , 27 L.Ed. 900 (1883), where it was held: “It is well settled that, in the absence of a contrary rule established by statute, a defendant who desires to avail himself of a statute of limitation as a defense must raise the question either in the pleading, or on the trial, or before judgment.” (Emphasis added) “A reversal …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
City of Columbia, Missouri
v.
Paul N. Howard Co.
v.
Paul N. Howard Co.
No. 83-202.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 11, 1983.
Published
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.