Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Edmund Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472 (3rd Cir. 1980). · Go Syfert
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Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Edmund Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472 (3rd Cir. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“even when there has been a violation of a sequestration order, the witness is not necessarily disqualified”
126 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 33 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Hoa Van Nguyen (connappct, 1999-03-02) · Strongest negative: State v. Guild (nh, 2012-04-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 45 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" State v. Guild (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.H. · 2012 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir. 1980) (trial court has discretion to allow parent of young witness to remain in courtroom under exception for witnesses who are “essential” to presentation of party’s case); Com. v. Bonner, 601 N.E.2d 32, 34, 35 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (no error to allow mother of fourteen-year-old victim to remain in courtroom during victim’s testimony).
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Hoa Van Nguyen
Conn. App. Ct. · 1999 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
even when there has been a violation of a sequestration order, the witness is not necessarily disqualified
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hassan Ali
4th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
See Engelmann, 701 F.3d at 878 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing when there were no factual findings on which to determine prejudice); Solorio, 337 F.3d at 594 (requiring defendant to show prejudice); United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886 , 891–92 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 1980) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davaun Barnett v. Penn Hills School District
3rd Cir. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Gov’t of V.I. v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that “failure to sequester witnesses is not, in itself, grounds for reversal,” and that “the witness is not necessarily disqualified”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edwards
3rd Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
See United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 306 (3d Cir.1985), abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.1998); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980) (“[T]he failure to sequester witnesses is not, in itself, grounds for reversal unless defendant can show prejudice resulting from the failure to sequester.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jones (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 473 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Omeprazole Patent Litigation
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · confidence medium
The party seeking exemption for a witness under Rule 615(3) has the burden of showing that the witness’ presence is “essential.” See, e.g., Jackson, 60 F.3d at 135 ; Government of the V.I. v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donnelley & Sons Co. v. North Texas Steel Co., Inc.
Ind. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
The party seeking a witness's exemption under Indiana Rule of Evidence 615(8) bears the burden of proving that the witness's presence is essential Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stafford v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
See United States v. Sykes, 977 F.2d 1242, 1245 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 183 (10th Cir.1986); Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. State (2×)
Ind. · 1999 · confidence medium
See United States v. Sykes, 977 F.2d 1242, 1245 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 183 (10th Cir. 1986); Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ortiz (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Iowa · 1998 · confidence medium
This written order confirms the court’s oral ruling granting the defendant’s motion, because decisions of the courts of appeals suggest that “ ‘the trial court should explicate the factors considered if sequestration is denied.’ ” See United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 306 (3d Cir.1985) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bruneau v. South Kortright Central School
N.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
Cir.1995) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 615 advisory committee’s note; citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475-76 (3d Cir.1980); Frideres v. Schiltz, 150 F.R.D. 153, 158 (S.D.Iowa 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Opus 3 Limited v. Heritage Park, Incorporated, and Paul Stein, and James O'Brien David Kopp David J. Mislin John Does, Third Party
3rd Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
See United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 487 , 133 L.Ed.2d 414 (1995), and cert. denied, — U.S. -,-, 116 S.Ct. 951 , 1057, 133 L.Ed.2d 875 , 134 L.Ed.2d 201 (1996); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures International, Ltd.
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 306 (3rd Cir.1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3rd Cir.1980); Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 793 F.Supp. 589, 617 (E.D.Pa.1992). 36 Expert witnesses clearly fall within Rule 615(3)'s exception.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures Intern., Ltd.
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 306 (3rd Cir.1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3rd Cir.1980); Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 793 F.Supp. 589, 617 (E.D.Pa.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures International, Ltd.
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 306 (3rd Cir.1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3rd Cir.1980); Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey Nat’l Bank, 793 F.Supp. 589, 617 (E.D.Pa.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cox v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In Re One Moore Ford, Inc.)
Bankr. E.D. Ark. · 1992 · confidence medium
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey National Bank
E.D. Pa. · 1992 · confidence medium
Although it is error for a district court to sequester a witness who is essential to a party’s cause, the party who wishes to lift the sequestration order from a witness bears the burden of “supporting that allegation.” Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lapenna v. Upjohn Co. (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Pa. · 1987 · confidence medium
Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 473 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) El Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. Ortiz Tirado
prsupreme · 1986 · confidence medium
Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474-476 (1980). (8) En casos civiles en que la excepción de la regla se extiende al repre-sentante de la corporación, se ha dicho expresamente que sólo uno puede beneficiarse.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Agnes, Louis, AKA \Louis Martin\" (2×) also: Cited "see"
unknown court · 1985 · confidence medium
See United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 201 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 , 101 S.Ct. 1484 , 67 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475-76 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Scott Faul, United States of America v. Yorie Von Kahl, United States of America v. David Ronald Broer A/K/A David Ronald Brewer (2×)
8th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Appellant concedes he must show substantial prejudice, see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980), and an abuse of discretion by the district court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Henrietta Faye Ell
9th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Wood v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 637 F.2d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837 , 102 S.Ct. 142 , 70 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981); Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d at 1076 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Thomas Burgess (2×)
4th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Rowan v. United States, 440 U.S. 976 , 99 S.Ct. 1546 , 59 L.Ed.2d 795 (1979), reh. denied, 441 U.S. 957 , 99 S.Ct. 2188 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1979); Wood v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 637 F.2d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir. 1981); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 , 98 S.Ct. 1276 , 55 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978). .
discussed Cited "see" Diaz v. Ramsden
visuper · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moolenaar v. Atlas Motor Inns, Inc., 616 F.2d 87, 89 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. V.I. 1980) (appellate corn! applying § 46 of the Second Restatement of Torts); see also Alvarez v. Pueblo Int’l, 24 V.I. 141, 147 (V.I.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Masters
Cal. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
We previously have “characterized as ‘doubtful’ the ‘proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.’ ” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 468 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 , 93 P.3d 271 ] (Stewart).) We have noted that “the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the *1051 executive.” (Ibid., citing § 1324.) Moreover, “prosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; see People v. Samuels …
cited Cited "see" People v. Corraspe
visuper · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 219 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980) 4 .
discussed Cited "see" Hinkle v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation
Ohio Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Baker (Dec. 8, 1983), Cuyahoga App. No. 46743, 1983 WL 2877 , quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough (1980), 625 F.2d 472 . {¶ 12} In the instant case, the Clinic argued that both doctors’ actions were being called into question and their presence was needed to assist in the defense of their actions.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Spann
C.A.A.F. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited "see" Malek v. Federal Insurance
2d Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980) (“The mandatory language of the rule shows that it was intended to change the prior practice under which the trial court had discretion to determine whether a witness should be excluded.”).
discussed Cited "see" Malek v. Federal Insurance Company
2d Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980) ("The mandatory language of the rule shows that it was intended to change the prior practice under which the trial court had discretion to determine whether a witness should be excluded.").
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Virgil Powers Lynch, Jr., (85-5171/4217), Karl F. Fessler (85-5196)
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980). 14 Finally, both Lynch and Fessler argue that the evidence at trial showed at least three conspiracies, and the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the issue of, multiple conspiracies.
cited Cited "see" State v. Chavez
N.M. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of Virgin Islands, 625 F.2d at 473 .
cited Cited "see" Government of the Virgin Islands v. Luis Carino
3rd Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborongh, 625 F.2d 472, at 475 (3d Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Suppertime, LLC v. Frankfield Management, LLC
D.V.I. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
In Prosser, the court provides that Under section 46, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is committed when “one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. ...” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46; see also Moolenaar v. Atlas Motor Inns, Inc., 616 F.2d 87 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Williams v. Flat Cay Management, LLC
D.V.I. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
Page 18 of 27 (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46; see also Moolenaar v. Atlas Motor Inns, Inc., 616 F.2d 87 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Destin v. People
virginislands · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
App. Div. 2000); see also Gov’t of the V.I. v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 667 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Ntreh, 279 F.3d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[Residents of the Virgin Islands have no constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury.”); Rivera v. Gov’t of the V.I, 375 F.2d 988, 991 , 6 V.I. 155 (3d Cir. 1967) (“[T]he right of presentment by grand jury is merely a remedial right which is not among the fundamental rights which Congress in legislating for a territory not incorporated into the United States, such as the Virgin Islands, must secure to its inhabitants…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Simmonds v. People
virginislands · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence low
App. Div. 2000); see also Gov’t of the V.I. v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 667 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Ntreh, 279 F.3d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[Rjesidents of the Virgin Islands have no constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury.”); Rivera v. Gov’t of the V.I., 375 F.2d 988, 991 , 6 V.I. 155 (3d Cir. 1967) (“[T]he right of presentment by grand jury is merely a remedial right which is not among the fundamental rights which Congress in legislating for a territory not incorporated into the United States, such as the Virgin Islands, must secure to its inhabitan…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Christopher v. People
virginislands · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Gov’t of the V.I. v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229-30 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Carino sought to introduce Richardson’s conviction for manslaughter of her prior boyfriend to ‘demonstrate the fear’ and ‘the state of mind’ of [the] defendant at the time of the incident.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Codrington v. People
virginislands · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
App. Div. 2000); see also Gov’t of the V.I. v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 667 , 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Ntreh, 279 F.3d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[Residents of the Virgin Islands have no constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury.”); Rivera v. Gov’t of the V.I., 375 F.2d 988, 991 , 6 V.I. 155 (3d Cir. 1967) (“[T]he right of presentment by grand jury is merely a remedial right which is not among the fundamental rights which Congress in legislating for a territory not incorporated into the United States, such as the Virgin Islands, must secure to its inhabitant…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Edwards v. Government of the Virgin Islands
D.V.I. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Picket, 746 F.2d at 182 ; see also Edinborough, 625 F.2d at 474 (holding that failure of a court to sequester a witness is not reversible error absent a showing of prejudice).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Jackson
unknown court · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
R.Evid. 615, Advisory Committee Notes; see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475, 476 (3d Cir.1980); Frideres v. Schiltz, 150 F.R.D. 153, 158 (S.D.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Jackson
unknown court · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Rule 615 requires the trial court, at "the request of a party [to] order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses." The rule, however, 21 does not authorize the exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. 22 Rule 615 codified a well-established common law tradition of sequestering witnesses "as a means of discouraging and expo…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Lorenzo Gonzalez, A/K/A \Tito
unknown court · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence medium
United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 730 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 , 95 S.Ct. 56 , 42 L.Ed.2d 58 (1974) (citations omitted); see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir.1980) (holding that the standard of review of a denial of a sequestration motion is abuse of discretion).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Carl Emmitt Prichard (2×)
10th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Ortega-Chavez, 682 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (5th Cir.1982); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474 (3d Cir.1980) (no prejudice found); Johnston, 578 F.2d at 1355 (no abuse of discretion found).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GOVERNMENT OF the VIRGIN ISLANDS
v.
Edmund EDINBOROUGH, Appellant
79-2084.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Jun 9, 1980.
625 F.2d 472
George M. Alexis (argued), Federal Public Defender, St. Thomas, U. S. V. I., for appellant., Ishmael A. Meyers, U. S. Atty., Terry M. Halpern (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, U. S. V. I., for appellee.
Adams, Maris, Sloviter.
Cited by 50 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 55%
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for the sequestration of witnesses when requested by one of the parties. In this appeal we are asked to hold that the failure of the district court to sequester a witness is, without more, re[*473] versible error. Because we find that the action of the district court resulted in no prejudice to the defendant, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Defendant Edmund Edinborough was charged with raping the 13 year old daughter of his former wife on two occasions. [1] At his bench trial before the district court, the only witnesses testifying were the defendant himself, the 13 year old prosecutrix and the mother of the prosecutrix. The young girl was the first witness called, at which time the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: All right, let’s proceed, call whichever witness you want first.
[U. S. ATTORNEY]: Call [the prosecu-trix].
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May we have sequestration, please?
THE COURT: Is her mother in court? [U. S. ATTORNEY]: Yes.
THE COURT: No, I am not going to put the mother out while the child is testifying.

Defendant’s counsel made no attempt to explain the basis for the requested sequestration and he did not thereafter move to exclude the testimony of the mother which was elicited later in the proceeding.

Defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment ranging from five to eight years. [2] The only ground raised on appeal is the court’s failure to direct sequestration of the witness. Defendant argues that under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, sequestration of a witness is mandatory when a party makes a request, and the court’s failure to sequester the mother in this case was reversible error even absent a showing of prejudice.

II.

Sequestration of witnesses developed on the theory that falsehood could be detected by exposing inconsistencies in testimony. 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1837 at 455 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). [3] It prevents “the possibility of one witness shaping his testimony to match that given by other witnesses at the trial.” United States v. Leggett, 326 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 955, 84 S.Ct. 1633, 12 L.Ed.2d 499 (1964).

Rule 615 is a codification of this long-established practice of sequestering witnesses to discourage or expose fabrication, inaccuracy and collusion. Hearings Before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, on Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1974) (Testimony of Richard H. Keatings, Chairman, California Evidence Law Revision Commission). See Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. The rule provides:

Exclusion of Witnesses
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose pres[*474] ence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.

Fed.R.Evid. 615.

The mandatory language of the rule shows that it was intended to change the prior practice under which the trial court had discretion to determine whether a witness should be excluded. [4] See Advisory Committee’s Note on Rule 615. Nonetheless, we do not read Rule 615 to require reversal in every instance in which there has not been full compliance with the rule. In fact, even when there has been a violation of a sequestration order, the witness is not necessarily disqualified. [5]

Decisions in other circuits which have considered the issue are in accord. In United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), the court considered the refusal of a trial judge to exclude the Government’s witness from court during a suppression hearing and concluded that “the violation of . [R]ule [615 did] not . . . require the automatic exclusion of testimony, [unless] the defendants . . . demonstrate that the trial judge’s error created sufficient prejudice to require reversal.” See also Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 14 (4th Cir. 1979) (“While Rule 615 does make exclusion ordinarily a matter of right, the trial judge still retains a measure of discretion” in determining whether a witness must be sequestered); United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355, 366 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976, 99 S.Ct. 1546, 59 L.Ed.2d 795 (1979) (the failure of a witness to comply with a sequestration order would not render his/her testimony inadmissible absent a showing of prejudice); United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080, 98 S.Ct. 1276, 55 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978) (absent a showing of prejudice “[s]equestration of witnesses and sanctions for violations of a sequestration order are matters within the discretion of the court”).

Although we expect that the trial courts will comply with the requirements of Rule 615, we hold that in the absence of other circumstances showing reversal is appropriate, the failure to sequester witnesses is not, in itself, grounds for reversal unless defendant can show prejudice resulting from the failure to sequester. In this case defendant has failed to show any prejudice. Defendant asserts that the story of the rapes was fabricated. However, defendant’s counsel conceded on oral argument that the statements made by the prosecutrix and her mother at the time the offenses were reported did not differ materially from their testimony at trial. Furthermore, the mother and child continued to live together before, during and after the trial. There would have been ample opportunity for the mother and the child to have fabricated the story prior to the trial and, therefore, the failure to sequester the mother at trial was unlikely to have contributed to the alleged collusion.

III.

It is also possible to view the circumstances of this case as falling within an explicit exception to Rule 615. Subsection (3) of the Rule permits an exception for “a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.” This indicates that Rule 615 has not entirely eliminated all judicial discretion, Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12,[*475] 14 (4th Cir. 1979), [6] but rather has changed the burden of proof, 3 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence H 615[01] at 615-8. While the party desiring sequestration previously had to convince the court to grant it, under Rule 615 sequestration must be given unless the party opposing the exclusion has convinced the court to exercise its discretion to except a particular witness from the sequestration order on the basis of his or her necessity to the presentation of a party’s cause. The Advisory Committee provided two illustrations of the operation of subsection (3). The Notes to Rule 615 state “(3). The category contemplates such persons as an agent who handled the transaction being litigated or an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation. See 6 Wigmore § 1841, n.4.” We believe the situation presented by this case illustrates another such example.

At oral argument, defense counsel suggested that so long as the child is a competent witness, the presence of one acting in loco parentis cannot be viewed as essential for purposes of subsection (3). We disagree. Persons unfamiliar with judicial proceedings often find that the necessity of testifying produces anxiety. It follows that children, particularly those who must testify about sexual molestation, will find the judicial experience even more frightening if they are required to testify in the unfamiliar surroundings of a sterile courtroom without the sight of a familiar and protective individual. Defendant’s interpretation of Rule 615 would require the automatic exclusion of even the parents of a seven year old child. We conclude that subsection (3) authorizes the court to exercise its discretion to permit the presence of a parent, of a young witness.

In order to come within the exception of subsection (3), the party opposing sequestration has the burden of showing why the subsection should be applied. No such showing was made in this case, although it appears that the prosecutor had no opportunity to advance any reasons because of the court’s immediate rejection of the sequestration request. Furthermore, we view the rule to require that the trial court fully articulate the basis for the exercise of its discretion. In view of our disposition of this case on the grounds set forth in Part II above, we need not decide whether the judge’s statement that he was “not going to put the mother out,while the child [was] testifying,” (emphasis added), reflected the court’s conclusion that the mother was needed because of the witness’ age. It would have been preferable to make a more explicit balancing of the factors considered . by the court before it decided not to grant what would ordinarily be automatic sequestration upon request.

IV.

We also note that defense counsel failed to call Rule 615 to the court’s attention when he requested sequestration and never informed the court of the defense theory that sequestration of the mother was necessary because of the defense contention that the claim of rape was prefabricated by the mother for some other purpose. In United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1698, 52 L.Ed.2d 389 (1977), where we considered the failure of counsel to specify the parts of the trial during which they wished the sequestration order to apply, we indicated that when motions for sequestration “are made in a context where counsel’s desires may be ambiguous, a greater level of specificity is advisable.” Had the defendant called Rule 615 to the court’s attention and explained why the defense believed sequestration was needed, the court could have weighed the defense theory[*476] against the child’s need to have her mother present while testifying. As we have explained in rejecting appeals based on error by the trial court on matters which were not called to -the trial court’s attention, “a trial court should not be reversed on grounds that were never urged or argued in the court below.” Caisson Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 622 F.2d 672 at 680 (3d Cir. 1980). Cf. Walker v. Sinclair Refining Co., 320 F.2d 302, .305 (3d Cir. 1963) (en banc).

V.

To recapitulate, under Rule 615 the prior practice has been changed and sequestration should be granted upon request. A party who believes that the presence of the witness is “essential” must bear the burden of supporting that allegation and showing why the policy of the Rule in favor of automatic sequestration is inapplicable in that situation. The party desiring sequestration must then be given an opportunity to show why sequestration is needed. Finally, the trial court should explicate the factors considered if sequestration is denied.

Because the appellant has not shown prejudice from the failure to sequester in this case, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The amended information under which he was tried charged two counts of rape in the first degree, in violation of V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1701(1) and (2); two counts of rape in the second degree in violation of V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1702, and one count of assault in the third degree in violation of V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 297(2).

2

. Defendant received eight year sentences on each of the first degree rape counts, and five year sentences on each of the second degree rape counts and on the third degree assault count.

3

. The practice has existed since Bibical times. In The History of Susanna in the Apocrypha, Susanna was being tried before the assembly for adultery, solely on the testimony of two witnesses. Daniel separated the witnesses and questioned them. Their testimony differed on a material fact — the tree under which Susanna had lain when committing the adultery — leading to their convicting themselves “of false witness, by their own mouth.” 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1837 at 455-56 (quoting the Apocrypha).

4

. See Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92, 14 S.Ct. 10, 10, 37 L.Ed. 1010 (1893) (“the right to exclude under particular circumstances may be supported as within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); Young v. United States, 358 F.2d 429, 431 (9th Cir. 1966) (denial of a motion to exclude witnesses lies “within the discretion of the trial court.”); United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922, 77 S.Ct. 1380, 1 L.Ed.2d 1436 (1957) (“it is well established that exclusion of witnesses is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court.”); Powell v. United States, 208 F.2d 618, 619 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 961, 74 S.Ct. 710, 98 L.Ed. 1104 (1954) (“The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed except in case of clear abuse.”).

5

. See D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 371 at 601 (1979).

6

. In Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 14 (4th Cir. 1979), both Simpson and his attorney were called by the Government to testify about a phone call. Since there were pending charges against Simpson, it was held not to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have permitted the attorney to remain in the courtroom during Simpson’s testimony. The Court of Appeals noted that Simpson might have needed the protection of his counsel while testifying and held that the trial court still retains a measure of discretion in determining which witnesses should be excluded. Id.