(a)Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself. The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and ammunition is
not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is required by this section. The extent of liability in these cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
(b)It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313, and Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
(c)Except as provided in subdivision (d), no social
host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person may be held legally accountable for damages suffered by that person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of those beverages.
(d)(1)Nothing in subdivision (c) shall preclude a claim against a parent, guardian, or another adult who knowingly furnishes alcoholic beverages at his or her residence to a person whom he or she knows, or should have known, to be under 21 years of age, in which case, notwithstanding subdivision (b), the furnishing of the alcoholic beverage may be found to be the proximate cause of resulting injuries or death.
(2)A claim under this subdivision may be brought by, or on behalf of, the person under 21 years of age or by a person who was harmed by the person under 21 years of age.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
587
cases (
176 in the last 5 years), 1947–2026 · leading case:
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
· cites it 7× “4, I address, and reject, Navegar's more fundamental claim that it should bear no liability for its allegedly negligent marketing because at the time it made and sold the weapons at issue their manufacture and distribution outside the state was not illegal and it had no special…”
Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).
· cites it 10× “In short, Plaintiffs argue that California Civil Code sections 1714, 3479, and 3480 ("California tort laws"), provide both the cause of action and the requisite predicate statute under the PLCAA.”
John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153 (Cal. 2006).
· cites it 6× “2d 561 ] (citations omitted); Civ. Code, § 1714.)" ( Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.”
Ennabe v. Manosa, 319 P.3d 201 (Cal. 2014).
· cites it 4× “1, which created some narrow exceptions to this broad immunity, and we find one such exception relevant to this case.”
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
· cites it 4× “] [¶] A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the…”
Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 7× “) While the instant legislation obviously does not use the word "retroactive," I note that both Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714 contain express language which could be construed as giving the legislation retroactive effect.”
Artiglio v. Corning Inc., 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998).
· cites it 4× “Under the law of negligence of California, Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), declares the general principle that "[e]very one is responsible .”
Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
· cites it 4× “In delineating the extent of a tortfeasor's responsibility for damages under the general rule of tort liability (Civ. Code, § 1714), the courts must *447 locate the line between liability and nonliability at some point, a decision which is essentially political.”
Kahn v. East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003).
· cites it 2× “) A Although persons generally owe a duty of due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Civ.Code, § 1714, subd. (a)), some activities and, specifically, many sports are inherently dangerous.”
Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 636 P.2d 783 (Cal. 1981).
· cites it 4× “) No matter how great the harm threatened to his neighbor, or to one passing by, and no matter how small the effort needed to eliminate it, a possessor of land had no duty to remedy conditions that were natural in origin. (Rest.2d Torts, § 363, com.”
— Cal. Civil Code § 1714(a) — 40 cases
Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).
“In short, Plaintiffs argue that California Civil Code sections 1714, 3479, and 3480 ("California tort laws"), provide both the cause of action and the requisite predicate statute under the PLCAA.”
— Cal. Civil Code § 1714(b) — 2 cases
— Cal. Civil Code § 1714(c) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.