California Codes

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a)The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 to be true:

(1)The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.

(2)The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree.

(3)The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.

(4)The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.

(5)The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.

(6)The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.

(7)The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

(8)The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

(9)The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.

(10)The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph, “juvenile proceeding” means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

(11)The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor’s office in this or any other state, or of a federal prosecutor’s office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim’s official duties.

(12)The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim’s official duties.

(13)The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the federal government, or of any local or state government of this or any other state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim’s official duties.

(14)The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the phrase “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity” means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.

(15)The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.

(16)The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.

(17)The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:

(A)Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

(B)Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.

(C)Rape in violation of Section 261.

(D)Sodomy in violation of Section 286.

(E)The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

(F)Oral copulation in violation of Section 287 or former Section 288a.

(G)Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.

(H)Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

(I)Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.

(J)Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(K)Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.

(L)Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.

(M)To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder.

(18)The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.

(19)The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison.

(20)The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim’s official duties.

(21)The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, “motor vehicle” means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.

(22)The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.

(b)Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.

(c)Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

(d)Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 723 cases (185 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case: People v. Strong, 514 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2022).
People v. Strong, 514 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2022). · cites it 4× “) This provision repurposes preexisting law governing felony-murder special-circumstance findings — the findings a jury makes in felony-murder cases to determine whether the defendant may be sentenced to death or life without possibility of parole (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (d))…”
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006). · cites it 8× “See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West Supp. 1995).”
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). · cites it 6× “Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West Supp. 1978).”
People v. Teron, 588 P.2d 773 (Cal. 1979). · cites it 12× “The court then found a special circumstance, that the defendant had personally committed the acts causing death and had "been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder of the first or second degree" (Pen. Code, § 190.2), permitting capital punishment.”
People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754 (Cal. 2002). · cites it 4× “(Pen.Code, § 190.2) "[T]he special circumstances serve to `"guide"' and `"channel"' jury discretion `by strictly confining the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty.”
People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984 (Cal. 1992). · cites it 8× “The jury found to be true the special circumstances that the murders were committed during a robbery (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)) and that defendant was guilty of multiple murders (Pen.”
People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007). · cites it 4× “(a)), as to which a felony-murder special circumstance was found to be true (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), two counts of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen.”
William Clark v. Jill Brown, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, 450 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2006). · cites it 7× “Clark was charged with the felony-murder (arson) special circumstance under former California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). This special circumstance provided for the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if “[t]he murder was committed while the…”
People v. Brooks, 396 P.3d 480 (Cal. 2017). · cites it 2× “(Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B).) In addressing a sufficiency challenge, we review the record " 'in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid…”
People v. Odom, 244 Cal. App. 4th 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 7× “702, is entitled Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990 — Other Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2 (c)). (Boldface omitted & italics added.”
People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 748 (Cal. 2003). · cites it 6× “02, subdivision (a)(1), of the Texas Penal Code, a special circumstance within the meaning of California Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2).”
People v. Garcia, 684 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1984). · cites it 6× “(Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) We granted a hearing in the present case to decide whether to give retroactive effect to our Carlos decision and to determine the test of prejudice applicable when a trial court fails to instruct a jury in accord with that decision.”
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(15) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(17) — 1 case
Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2002).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(2) — 1 case
St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2004).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(5) — 1 case
State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1998).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(A)(3) — 1 case
Brown v. Terhune, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a) — 12 cases
State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1983).
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010).
Ronald Taylor v. Matthew Cate, Sec'y Cdcr, 811 F.3d 326 (9th Cir. 2016).
Sessoms v. Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 2011).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(1) — 4 cases
Young v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2001).
Michael Anthony v. Steven Cambra, Jr., Warden, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000).
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
(DP) Catlin v. Davis (E.D. Cal. 2019).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(10) — 4 cases
State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. 1994).
United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(13) — 1 case
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(14) — 3 cases
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006). “See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West Supp. 1995).”
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(15) — 7 cases
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
Bradway v. Cate, 588 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2009).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(16) — 1 case
The People v. Sotelo CA2/3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17) — 25 cases
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008).
People v. Odom, 244 Cal. App. 4th 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). “702, is entitled Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990 — Other Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2 (c)). (Boldface omitted & italics added.”
Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2009).
People v. Williams, 299 P.3d 1185 (Cal. 2013).
William Clark v. Jill Brown, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, 450 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2006). “Clark was charged with the felony-murder (arson) special circumstance under former California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). This special circumstance provided for the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if “[t]he murder was committed while the…”
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A) — 7 cases
Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2012).
Joseph Anthony Padilla v. Cal A. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2002).
People v. Telles CA3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(B) — 4 cases
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2001).
David Rademaker v. Daniel Paramo, 835 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2016).
Brett Pensinger v. Kevin Chappell, 787 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2015).
(DP) Weaver v. Chappell (E.D. Cal. 2021).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(C) — 1 case
Samson Dubria v. G.A. Smith, Warden, 197 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1999).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(E) — 1 case
State v. Nelson, 273 P.3d 632 (Ariz. 2012).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(G) — 2 cases
Blufford Hayes, Jr. v. Jeanne Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002).
(HC) Hicks v. Robertson (E.D. Cal. 2022).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(H) — 2 cases
William Clark v. Jill Brown, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, 450 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2006). “Clark was charged with the felony-murder (arson) special circumstance under former California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). This special circumstance provided for the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if “[t]he murder was committed while the…”
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(I) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(i) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(iii) — 3 cases
Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001).
Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 1996).
Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509 (9th Cir. 1996).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(vii) — 1 case
Samayoa v. Ayers, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(viii) — 2 cases
William Clark v. Jill Brown, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, 450 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2006). “Clark was charged with the felony-murder (arson) special circumstance under former California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). This special circumstance provided for the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if “[t]he murder was committed while the…”
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18) — 3 cases
(HC) Quintero v. Lemon (S.D. Cal. 2024).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(19) — 2 cases
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
(DP) Catlin v. Davis (E.D. Cal. 2019).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(2) — 5 cases
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
State v. David, 468 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1984).
(DP) Catlin v. Davis (E.D. Cal. 2019).
Grant v. Brown, 312 F. App'x 71 (9th Cir. 2009).
Grant v. Brown, 312 F. App'x 71 (9th Cir. 2009).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(22) — 4 cases
People v. Benson CA3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
People v. Amante CA1/4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022).
People v. Higuera CA1/4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022).
People v. Cardenas CA1/4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3) — 22 cases
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2000).
Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2007).
Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2008).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(4) — 1 case
Odle v. Calderon, 919 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(5) — 1 case
People v. Valencia (Cal. Ct. App. 2026).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(7) — 1 case
State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose, 297 P.3d 906 (Ariz. 2013).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(8) — 1 case
Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536 (Wyo. 2003).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(b) — 3 cases
Dickey v. Davis, 231 F. Supp. 3d 634 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
Ronald Taylor v. Matthew Cate, Sec'y Cdcr, 772 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014).
(DP) Dickey v. Davis (E.D. Cal. 2019).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c) — 2 cases
Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).
People v. Garcia-Vega CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c)(3) — 5 cases
Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2012).
William Clark v. Jill Brown, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, 450 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2006). “Clark was charged with the felony-murder (arson) special circumstance under former California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). This special circumstance provided for the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if “[t]he murder was committed while the…”
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c)(3)(i) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c)(3)(iv) — 1 case
Reno v. Ron Davis, 46 F.4th 821 (9th Cir. 2022).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c)(4) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c)(5) — 2 cases
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). “Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West Supp. 1978).”
Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
— Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(d) — 7 cases
People v. Odom, 244 Cal. App. 4th 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). “702, is entitled Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990 — Other Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2 (c)). (Boldface omitted & italics added.”
Arreguin v. Prunty, 42 F. Supp. 2d 986 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
Abernathy v. Terhune, 60 F. App'x 143 (9th Cir. 2003).
People v. Strong CA3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
People v. Whitehead CA3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.