Flynn v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 283 U.S. 53 (1931). · Go Syfert
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Flynn v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 283 U.S. 53 (1931). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
210 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 39 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Garrels v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (ksd, 2024-11-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1931 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1931 1978 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garrels v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
D. Kan. · 2024 · confidence medium
FELA “gives a right of action to the employee, or in the case of his death, to his personal representative for the benefit of the widow and children….”27 The personal representative’s right “is derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the 24 45 U.S.C. § 56 . 25 283 U.S. 53, 56 (1931). 26 No. 17-3479, 2019 WL 1762950 (S.D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Poland v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
D. Neb. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co., 283 U.S. 53, 56 (1931).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kosin v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
E.D. Mo. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co., 283 U.S. 53, 55 (1931); see also Coman v. New York Cent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Foster Wheeler Co. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wash. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Ed 837, 72 A.L.R. 1311 (1931).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet (2×)
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
As Mr. Justice Holmes put it for a unanimous Court in Flynn, supra, the wrongful-death action is "derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time of his death." 283 U. S., at 56 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haws v. Luethje
Okla. · 1972 · confidence medium
Co., 283 U.S. 53, 57 , 51 S.Ct. 357, 358 , 75 L.Ed. 837, 839 (1931), recognized that a wrongful death action is derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured person at the time of his death, and that an effective release executed by the injured party makes it impossible for his personal representative to recover.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Glavich v. Industrial Accident Commission
Cal. Ct. App. · 1941 · confidence medium
Co., 283 U. S. 53 [51 Sup. Ct. 357, 75 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Miller v. Foster Wheeler Co. (2×)
Wash. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co., 169 F.Supp. 803 (E.D.Mich. 1959); see also Flynn, 283 U.S. at 56 , 51 S.Ct. 357 . [7] Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R.R.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Miller v. Estate of Sperling (3×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Kelliher v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 212 N.Y. 207 , 105 N.E. 824 , and the very recent case of Flynn v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 283 U.S. 53 [ 51 S.Ct. 357 , 75 L.Ed. 837 ]. [11 N.J.Misc. at 7, 163 A. 661].
examined Cited "see, e.g." Alfone v. Sarno (6×)
N.J. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Kelliher v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 212 N.Y. 207 , 105 N.E. 824 , and the very recent case of Flynn v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 283 U.S. 53 [ 51 S.Ct. 357 , 75 L.Ed. 837 ] [11 N.J.Misc. at 7, 163 A. 661.] Double recovery of damages presents a staggering problem in New Jersey, where it is well-settled that damages may be recovered for a tortious injury’s “prospective consequences,” including future medical care and treatment as well as anticipated pain and suffering.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Flynn, Executor,
v.
New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Company
235.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 23, 1931.
283 U.S. 53
Mr. William F. Ceenty, with whom Messrs. Thomas R. Fitzsimmons and William A. Bree were on the brief, for petitioner., Mr. Edward R. Brumley, with whom Mr. Fleming James, Jr., was on the brief, for respondent.
Holmes.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published
[*55] Mr. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of • the Court.

This is a suit under the Employers’ Liability Act for negligently causing the death of Edward L. Flynn, brought on May 15, 1929, by Flynn’s executor for the benefit of Flynn’s dependent widow and children. It is alleged that the injury was suffered on December 4, 1923, and that it caused Flynn’s death on September 1, 1928.[*56] The defendant, respondent here, demurred to the declaration on the ground that, more than two years having elapsed since the date when Flynn’s cause of action accrued, his right to sue was barred, and that therefore the suit could not be maintained. Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, §§1, 6, 35 Stat. 65, 66. Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 1, 36 Stat. 291. Code, Tit. 45, §§ 51, 56. The demurrer, and judgment for the defendant, were sustained by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Ill Conn. 196; 149 Atl. 682. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 282 U. S. 821.

The Act of 1908 gives a right of action to the employee or, in case of his death, to his personal representative for the benefit of the widow and children, and provides that no action shall be maintained “ unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.” § 6. Obviously Flynn’s right of action was barred, but it is argued that the right on behalf of the widow and children is distinct; that their cause of action could not arise until Flynn’s death, and that therefore the two years did not begin to run until September 1, 1928. But the argument comes too late. It is established that the present right, although not strictly representative, is derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time of his death. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70. On this ground an effective release by the employee makes it impossible for his administrator to recover. Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 344. The running of the two years from the time when his cause of action accrued extinguishes it as effectively as a release, Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 38, and the same consequence follows. Our conclusion that this action could not be brought is required by the former decisions of this Court.

Judgment affirmed.